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One of the primary purposes of this paper is to
try to bring together enough of the various writings in
the field of cross-cultural interaction to make possible
an overview of the field. To accomplish this, we have
combed through a substantial number of original source
materials, including research reports and speculative
writings in those disciplines upon which the student of
the cross-cultural is largely dependent. In an effort
to reflect the substance of such materials, we have
made use of extensive quotations, in some instances, or
paraphrasing, in others.
We have found it difficult at times to para-
phrase materials, especially when dealing with rather
complex theory, without paralleling an author's style,
or even using his own words and phrases in some cases.
This means that we have found ourselves in a dilemma
t
to quote verbatim in every case would be to extend the
paper to impossible length j to synthesize, yet faithfully
reflect the author's intent, requires a certain amount
of paraphrasing, with the author's own words frequently
interwoven, yet not cited as quotations. We have chosen
the latter course, hoping that we have accorded faith-
fully with the rules of "fair usage" throughout.
Certainly, if we have failed in this regard, the failure
has been inadvertent. In no instance have we desired
or intended to "plagiarize" in thought or in word, nor
have we wanted to deny credit wherever or to whomever
due. We have been particularly conscious of the prob-
lem in our extensive use of the materials of Martin
Sternin, Richard McGonigal, Dean Havron, Robert Mole,
Warren Newman, a number of unidentified Navy Chaplains,
and the theoreticians who offered papers at the
Washington Conference on Cross-Cultural Interaction to
which we refer frequently and at length. Since much of
the material cited from these and other sources was
sponsored by or submitted to a United States Government
agency, we have felt somewhat free to use it for this
paper, prepared under similar sponsorship. But again,
we assert without reservation that in no instance has
it been our intention to pretend authorship of another's






Besides the many scientists to whom we are
indebted, some specifically cited, some unnamed, we must
particularly acknowledge the invaluable assistance,
support and opportunity provided in special ways by a
number of persons. Certain Georgetown University offi-
cials and faculty members, while not directly involved
in the development of this paper, helped make it possible
through their general understanding, course
-guidance,
and overall interest. Dean of the Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences, Rocco Porrecco, Chairman of the
Department of Government, Karl Cerny, Government Depart-
ment faculty members James Horigan, S. J,, Jeanne and
Evron Kirkpatrick, and Nicholas Onuf, University Fellows
Robert L. Schweitzer and Michael Bolzano are among those
whose assistance is most deeply appreciated.
The United States Navy, sponsor of the studies
that resulted in this paper, and its "agent" in this
instance, Chief of Chaplains James W, Kelly, need hardly
be cited. As a chaplain on active duty, the author
appreciates particularly the Navy»s efforts to maintain
the highest level of professionalism amont its chaplains.
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materials, and countless hours of discussion time.
Lieutenant Calvin Brown gave extensive logistic support
and many hours in the discussion of his personal experi-
ences in South Vietnam. Captain Robert Agro, anthropo-
logist in the Marine Corps, was a gold mine of informa-
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a one thousand page first draft which might well have
passed for the final form, then cheerfully retyped the
entire paper after it had been edited. Her professional
competence and loyal dedication, exercised with unfail-
ing cheerfulness, are beyond acknowledgement.
Finally, the heroes of any completed disserta-
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longt the readers. For the meetings and discussions
related to the overall project, and most particularly
for the patience in reading approximately one thousand
pages of type, and offering their recommendations, the
author is immensely grateful to the Georgetown Univer-
sity Department of Government's James D. Atkinson,
Paul S. Ello and Howard R. Penniman. How they found
time to address this paper, while carrying full teaching
loads and engaged in multiple other duties as faculty
members, is truly amazing. The fact that each was able
to approach it from a different perspective proved
particularly helpful. Dr. Ello's knowledge of theory
in international relations, together with the back-
ground of his own doctoral dissertation in matters
related to South Vietnam and his personal interest in
empirical research, Dr. Penniman* s comprehensive famili-
arity with polling methods and other forms of surveys,
and his experience in South Vietnam as an observer of
the presidential elections, appointed by President
Lyndon B. Johnson, and Dr. Atkinson's extraordinarily
extensive background and writings in military issues
involved in international relations made these readers
especially helpful. Dr. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, one of
the earlier readers, contributed much from her back-
ground in comparative politics and knowledge of develop-
ing cultures, before she was obliged to withdraw from
the project because of commitments in France.
The senior reader, Dr. Ulrich S. Allers, was
dissertation mentor, as well, and to acknowledge ade-
quately the assistance, encouragement, and guidance ne
provided would be totally impossible. Despite the fact
that during much of the time that the author was writing
this paper Dr. Allers was on sabbatical leave from
Georgetown University f s Government Department, and
engaged in his own research and writing, he not only
accepted the task of mentoring, but spent many hours of
every week for several months in extended discussions

"1
with the author, carefully reviewed every word of the
manuscript, and repeatedly offered invaluable recommen-
dations. This mentoring, coupled with the countless
insights provided during Dr. Allers 1 many course lec-
tures in Political Theory attended by the author, was
essential to the completion of this paper. Most helpful,
too, was the genial hospitality proferred by Mrs. Allers,
as well as the comments she offered from her rich store
of cross-cultural knowledge, in general, and of linguis-
tics, in particular. It detracts not at all from
Dr. Allers 1 merit to say that his efforts fittingly
continued and enhanced the tutoring and guidance enjoyed
by the author when he completed doctoral studies in
philosophy years ago under Dr. Rudolph Allers, one-time
Chairman of Georgetown's Department of Philosophy, and
father, now deceased, of the mentor of the present
paper
•
To have credited so many people for their assis-
tance in behalf of this paper might well suggest that
the author considers the paper a contribution of major
worth. Such is far from the truth, but failure to
achieve a goal is by no means the fault of the many
who helped the aspirant. Rather, failure is the more
poignant when the help needed for success is so gener-
ously given. If, however, even a partially useful over-
view of the field of cross-cultural interaction is here-
in provided, with a start made toward profitable con-
ceptualizing in the field, this much must be attributed
to those named above and many others who helped along
the way. If a more significant achievement has not
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Policy Science. Political Science, and Approaches to
Cross-Cultural Interaction! Need for Evaluation
This paper is an effort to evaluate various cur-
rent conceptual approaches, research projects, and train-
ing programs focussing on interaction between and among
persons of differing cultures and sub-cultures. Such
an evaluation is important for both those concerned with
cross-cultural interaction from a United States policy-
making point of view, and those interested from the
viewpoint of political science itself, or the develop-
ment of political theory.
The reason for concern by policy makers is fairly
obvious, in light of the widespread dispersion of
Americans 1 throughout the world. Between 1950 and i960,
the number of Americans living abroad grew from 482,000
Unless otherwise noted, the term "American (s )"
will be used throughout the paper to designate United
States personnel.

to l,37:>t000. 2 »3 By 1966, 2.5 million Americans were liv-
ing abroad in 130 countries and 36 "non-countries" with
4,200 United States corporations controlling 14,000
foreign enterprises worth about $50 billion. Trends have
continued upward, with the conflict in Vietnam alone
accounting for an additional deployment of more than
500,000 military and civilian personnel and expenditures
of many more billions of dollars in the latter 1960 , s.
The numbers of Americans overseas, however, is
less important than the nature of their involvement.
Many nations now require that managerial representation
of business firms be at least equally divided between
foreign personnel and their own citizens. New organi-
zations, such as the Peace Corps, work with indigenous
peoples at "grass roots" level. The United States
Department of State now instructs Foreign Service per-
sonnel to relate with foreign nationals as "participants".
American military forces engage in large-scale activities
2World Almanac
. 1965t P« 313«
^For collating these and the following figures
and indicating original source materials, we are indebted
to J. Daniel Loubert, The Trans-Cultural Research and
Training Institute (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences
Research, Inc., April 196?) , pp. 3-9.
^Newsweek, 28 November 1966, p. 43
.

ranging from military assistance and advisory efforts to
civic action programs, all involving close personal
association with indigenous peoples, while substantial
numbers of American military personnel are assigned to
positions abroad directly concerned with politico-military
affairs.
The point need hardly be labored. The inter-
national climate has become such that if there were ever
a day that Americans living and working abroad could pru-
dently remain aloof from the local populace, and safely
pretend superiority, or conduct themselves as military
conquerors, or as lords and masters of industrial
colonies, that day appears to be gone. Indeed, Americans
who have lived abroad for extended periods have seen the
problems generated for the United States by real or
alleged misdemeanors and unacceptable attitudes on the
part of Americans. On the other hand, anyone familiar
with the type conflict being waged in Vietnam is aware
of the tremendous value in being accepted by "the people".
Americans who have engaged in insurgency/counter-
insurgency activities have found that winning the trust
and confidence of indigenous peoples is frequently the
key to saving lives, avoiding ambush, learning the move-

ments of the enemy, gleaning intelligence in general, in
short, "winning the war", both militarily and politically,
and laying the groundwork for continued peaceful alliance.
It is hardly surprising, then, that a large num-
ber of government agencies and private organizations
should be concerned with issues of cross-cultural inter-
action. This concern has resulted in a proliferation of
research projects designed to yield information on the
basis of which training and orientation programs can be
developed for purposes of preparing Americans for living
and working abroad, either as official representatives
of the United States or in carrying out financial,
academic, religious, or other legitimate objectives.
Today, emphasis is placed on screening and selecting
candidates and training them in areas assumed to be per-
tinent to their mission, whether they are members of the
Foreign Service, executives of major industries, or
religious missionaries. The training runs the gamut
from the linguistic, through the technological, to the
broadly cultural. The multiplicity of such programs, the
diversity of training methods, the extent of research
and variety of conceptual approaches to cross-cultural
issues, and the fact that students of cross-cultural

interaction contradict one another not infrequently, all
indicate the critical need for continuing evaluations of
the entire field.
No less a need should be apparent to the politi-
cal scientist than to the policy maker, particularly to
the scientist engaged in "theory building". One need but
examine the table of contents of such a work as Contend-
ing Approaches to International Politics * edited by
Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau , or International
Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis , edited by
Herbert C. Kelman , to discern the efforts to develop
conceptual approaches or theoretical frameworks for the
study of cross-cultural interaction. Illustrative in
such texts are Ithiel de Sola Pool's "Effects of Cross-
National Contact on National and International Images",
%laus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, Contending
Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1969). (While the provoca-
tion for this work was the April 1966 World Politics
article by Hedley Bull, giving the case for a "classical
approach" to international theory, and the replies to
this article which make up the text address this argument,
the authors go far beyond the central issue and discuss
rather extensively the issues of interpersonal relations
and personal behavior vis-a-vis international relations.)
Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior t A
Social-Psychological Analysis (New Yorki Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, 1966).

Chadwick F. Alger's "Personal Contact in Intergovern-
mental Organizations", Richard A. Brody's "The Study of
International Politics Qua Science" , and Michael Haas 1
"A Plea for Bridge Building in International Relations".
Such writings are not mere expositions of successful or
unsuccessful techniques or methods of programming for
improved international relations, nor are they merely
reports on experiments in training individuals for cross-
cultural activities. As Kelman puts it, they are efforts
to examine approaches toward "a general conceptual
framework", or "a more or less systematic structure out
of which a series of questions emerge, and in terms of
which answers or potential answers can be organized".'
Multiple examples of concern on the part of
political theorists, whether "traditionalists" or
"behavioralists" , "classicists" or "scientists", could
be readily provided. An entire body of theoretical
literature on cross-cultural issues in political develop-
ment and political culture, for example, can be repre-
sented by Everett E. Hagen's On the Theory of Social
7Ibid., p. 17.

oChange . particularly as it treats of colonialism and
economic growth. Mere mention of the work, Comparing
Nations; The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National
Research , edited by Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan^,
is sufficient to reflect the theoretical interests in
cross-cultural interaction on the part of such political
scientists as Karl W. Deutsch, Carl J. Friedrich,
Harold D. Lasswell, and Daniel Lerner, to name only a few
of those represented.
What one finds in the writings cited above and
in associated literature, in essence, is a continuing
effort to explore the implications and dynamics of inter-
personal relations at every level, in a cross-cultural
setting, from the viewpoint of their potential signifi-
cance to political theory, or to the development of
political science. As Knorr and Rosenau point out,
despite the polarity of approach or contentions between
traditional and scientific approaches, each of the pro-
tagonists in both camps
^Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change
(Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1962). See especially
Parts IV and V.
Q7Richard L. Merritt and Stem Rokkan. Comparing
Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National
Research (New Haven. Conn. t Yale University Press, 1966)
.

• • • clearly conceives the subject (of
international phenomena) to consist of the
individuals and groups who initiate and sustain
the actions and interactions of nation-states.
All of them plainly aspire to a greater under-
standing of this behavior and it is equally
evident that they are not lacking in shared
beliefs about how a more profound comprehension
can be achieved,*
And Kelman, observing that since in recent years scholars
have become increasingly oriented "toward the formulation
of general propositions about international behavior,
grounded on empirical observations" , notes
i
. • • social-psychological processes —
such as those relating to motivation, perception,
trust, and suspicion, definition of the situation,
stress, communication, leadership, influence,
loyalty — enter importantly into various general
conceptualizations of the interaction between
nations and foreign policy-making. Typically,
these conceptualizations focus on the behavior ..
of individual actors and their interactions • • .
In other words, whether one is considering rela-
tions between persons or groups of diverse national
cultures, or between sub-groups (or sub-cultures) within
the one society, the emphasis is on the dynamics of inter-
personal relations and the necessity for trying to dis-
cover stable principles underlying such dynamics, to
1 n
Knorr and Rosenau, op.cit. , p. 4.




hypothesize, to conceptualize, to develop analytical and
theoretical frameworks for studying such dynamics.
One can argue need and interest, then, in an
evaluation of the "state of the art" of cross-cultural
interaction studies from the viewpoint of both the policy
maker and the political scientist. It would be a
mistake, however, to dichotomize too sharply the
approaches made from each of these viewpoints. In some
fields, perhaps, such a distinction might be made
readily, just as in some fields the distinction between
basic and applied research might be relatively easy to
make. But in the field of cross-cultural interaction,
the situation is complicated.
It is generally agreed, perhaps, that pure, or
basic, research contributes to overall knowledge in a
particular discipline, while applied research is expected
to lead to some aspect of engineering, such as improve-
ment of techniques or production. Justifiably or not,
pure research is often associated with the halls of
academe, clad in the ivy of altruism, unspoiled by con-
cern for pedestrian problems. Applied research is often
associated with "engineering types", who merely try to






marketing potential of an end product. More specifically,
pure researchers are idealized as scientists who scientize
for the sake of science, while practical researchers are
thought of as interested in production alone.
In the area of cross-cultural research, the over-
whelming majority of research projects have been under-
taken by "engineering types", usually employed by commer-
cial contractors engaged by the United States Government.
Paradoxically, however, in light of the above distinction,
many of these pragmatic researchers "wear two hats". They
are at the same time university professors with impeccable
academic credentials. Indeed, despite the interest and
concern manifested by political scientists and others in
the field of cross-cultural interaction, as discussed
above, little actual research has been initiated as "pure"
research, or for purely academic reasons, or for the sole
purpose of broadening theoretical understanding on the
part of political science or other disciplines. As
12
F. K. Berrien and others have pointed out, most of the
research has been prompted by the phenomenon we have
cited above, the proliferation of Americans in overseas
2 F. K. Berrien, Some Methodological Problems in
Cross-Gultural Research (East-West Center for Cultural





assignments • There has been a substantial demand for
pragmatically-oriented research, research that would
yield findings on which could be developed training and
orientation programs designed to prepare Americans to
interact effectively with foreign nationals, ^
1 ?JF, Kecskemeti, Utilization of Social Research
in Shaping Policy Decisions (Santa Monica. Calif . t Rand
Corporation, 24 April 1961), pp. 6-7. P. Kecskemeti has
an interesting observation on what might be called the
melting pot for basic and applied researchers in this
still new and undefined field of cross-cultural inter-
action. The melting pot is the research "project", and
since we shall be examining several research projects,
his comments are worth noting, even if we do not agree
completely with his argument. "The major avenue toward
the policy application of research in the newer social
sciences is undoubtedly the project. It has to be used
since, in most cases, there is no other alternative.
But it is a profoundly problematic one. The idea of
applied science presupposes the existence of a general
theory from which particular conclusions, applicable to
a practical problem, can be deduced. The project approach
does not correspond to this schema. It is being used to
solve problems v/hich lie outside the scope of existing
general theories. A policy-relevant project typically
consists in getting together all the facts about a field
which the policy-maker ought to know in order to make the
best possible decision. This may be eminently worthwhile;
many mistakes can be avoided, and many successes can be
scored, if the decision-maker knows the facts about the
situation with which he has to deal. But this has nothing
to do with the application of scientific theory. At most,
it may involve the application of scientific procedures,
such as scientific sampling methods. This does not mean
to say that all scientific projects undertaken with a pol-
icy application in mind necessarily remain on the level





When we wish to examine diverse conceptual
approaches to cross-cultural interaction on behalf of
"pure" political science, then, we find that we must lean
heavily on data offered by those engaged for the most
part in applied research, if theoretical postulates are
to be weighed against empirical evidence at all. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that there is no
single discipline which concerns itself primarily or
exclusively with the study of cross-cultural interaction,
a problem we shall examine below. What we find is that
those concerned with cross-cultural questions turn to one
or more of the social and behavioral sciences for
answers, and discover that in these disciplines, once
again, either basic research in pertinent fields is
lacking, or so little of such research has been
"translated", and so few findings synthesized into analy-
tical or conceptual frameworks, that, without the data
supplied by applied research, the cross-cultural investi-
gator discovers little immediately useful for his purpose.
We shall return to this problem.
At this point, it may suffice simply to repeat
that both policy makers and political scientists have need





approaches. The policy maker can hardly feel secure in
operational programming in the field of cross-cultural
interaction without a reasonably acceptable theoretical
synthesis. The political scientist interested in the con-
tinuing process of deducing and testing new hypotheses
and enunciating new propositions on behalf of political
science in general is equally in need of such a synthesis.
To our knowledge, no such theoretical synthesis or com-
prehensive conceptualization of cross-cultural issues
currently exists. It seems likely that both the policy
maker and the political scientist would welcome efforts
toward such a synthesis, whether such efforts are rooted
in the theorizing of pure theorists, the deductions of
basic researchers, or the data gleaned from applied
research. Indeed, the likelihood that such efforts would
be welcomed by all interested parties provides the basic
assumption of the present study.
For this reason, while much of this study con-
cerns itself immediately with cross-cultural activities
of American military personnel in South Vietnam and
addresses theoretical formulations, research projects,
and training programs particularly related to these acti-





of a particular set of concepts and procedures for the
benefit of policy makers. The study is an effort to con-
tribute to the general body of knowledge of concern to
political science as such. However, there appears to be
no intrinsic reason why findings or formulations of inter-
est to political scientists, or vice versa.
Moreover, from a standpoint of sound scientific
procedure, certain parameters must be established for
every study. The fact is that we are currently engaged
in a massive political and military effort in Vietnam,
involving literally millions of sets of cross-cultural
relationships, and that a substantial number of research
projects have been initiated, many reports have been
submitted, conceptual frameworks have been developed and
hypotheses deduced, largely because of this effort in
Vietnam and the future efforts it may foreshadow. It
appears reasonable, therefore, to use this situation as
the framework for much of our theoretical investigation
and the context for seeking empirical data pertinent to
such investigation.
The opportunity to generalize is, of course, the
ultimate fruition of theory construction, but a scienti-




specifics? it must be careful not to extend findings
unduly beyond the specific situation in which they are
revealed. Indeed, we shall see below that the tendency to
overextend findings, to generalize too readily, is one of
the weaknesses in much of the cross-cultural literature.
A number of specifics are available to us,
however, by way of the situation in Vietnam, so that it
becomes in several respects a highly useful laboratory
for investigating the dynamics of cross-cultural inter-
action in general, with an unusual opportunity provided
to relate empirical data to theoretical formulations.
Obviously, we must take pains to confine our evaluations
to the data available, the findings revealed by the
studies in situ , avoiding the danger of unwarranted exten-
sion of such findings. At the same time, where generali-
zation appears v/arranted, as where findings in the Vietnam
situation accord with findings elsewhere, or where dis-
parate sets of relationships in Vietnam seem to have some-
thing in common, we shall generalize. In such generali-
zations, hopefully, we shall contribute to a theory of
cross-cultural interaction valid beyond the situation in
Vietnam.
Thus far, we have been discussing the importance




approaches, research projects, and training programs
focussing on cross-cultural interaction. Prior to such
evaluation, however, it is necessary to identify and
discuss certain problems confronting the student of cross-
14
cultural interaction. We shall now consider certain of
these problems in general terms, leaving detailed treat-
ment to a later point in our study.
Problems in the Study of Cross-Cultural Interaction
Defining Terms
As is so often the case in social science issues,
the first problem confronting the student of cross-
cultural interaction is one of definition. Terms have a
way of slipping into the literature and being taken for
granted simply by way of repeated usage. What does
"cultural" mean in such terms as cross-cultural interaction
One of the most incisive studies of these prob-
lems is F. K. Berrien's, Some Methodological Problems in
Cross-Cultural Research , op.cit. Berrien notes that many
of the methodological and conceptual problems in the field
of cross-cultural research are "either more salient and
stubborn or are nearly unique to situations involving more
than one ethnic group" • He warns of the danger of accumu-
lating data "having little generality and less validity",
unless these problems are defined and examined, and notes
that a "number of extensive studies gathered at great





or cross-cultural relations? A. L. Kroeber and Clyde
Kluckhohn * quote Bronislaw Malinowski as referring to
culture as "the most central problem of all social
science" t and Stuart Chase as stating that the "culture
concept of the anthropologists and sociologists is coming
to be regarded as the foundation stone of the social
sciences". They then proceed to give no less than six
categories of definitions of culture — descriptive,
historical, normative, psychological, structural, and
genetic — and a seventh category of incomplete
definitions! Within several of these categories, in
turn, are sub-categories, classified by way of their
emphasis, some stressing habit, others learning, still
others adjustment, and so on.
We need not consult other authors to discover
that the meaning of the term culture is hardly self-
evident or univocal. Nor does it become such in adjec-
tival form merely by compounding it with "cross" or
"inter" or "trans". We are not being specious here.
Later discussion will demonstrate some of the difficulties
generated by vagueness and ambiguity in the use of the
^A, L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A
Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York:




word culture, or cultural, in efforts to develop concept-
ual formulations about cross-cultural interaction, as well
as in trying to devise appropriate training programs.
Need for Integration in Social/Behavioral Sciences
A second problem is that of the lack of integra-
tion in the social sciences. Johan Galtung's essay on
polarization and integration in the social sciences
reflects the concern of much of the literature on the
subject, that
• • • the division of labor between them
(the social sciences), however necessary at the
time when it emerged, and the differences in
style, however understandable, today serves like
a Machiavellian devide to impede certain types
of scientific progress.*"
While this problem is serious for all social
science disciplines, it is critical for the study of
cross-cultural interaction, not only because no single
discipline concerns itself with this latter study, but
because serious interdisciplinary communications barriers
have impeded that appropriate exchange of findings which
the investigator in the field of cross-cultural inter-
action might call upon to devise an approach to this





field, F, K, Berrien illustrates the problem by com-
paring the diverse interests and nomenclatures of psycho-
logists, on the one hand, and ethnographers and anthro-
pologists, on the other,
• . • psychologists are relative new-comers
to cross-cultural studies. The ethnographers and
cultural anthropologists have been the pioneers
and were understandably interested in describing
those phenomena more readily observable j customs,
rituals • • • tribal organization, kinship
patterns • • • The psychologist's interests are
somewhat more subtle , , , To put the matter in
extreme form, the psychologist is interested in
the dynamic behavior rather than the artifacts
of a culture and from the character of this
behavioral interplay, he wishes to infer something
about the fundamental " subjective** basis for it
, • • (A) central conceptual problem has been one
of devising a proper taxonomy which will facili-
tate the comparability of the observations taken
in various parts of the world,17»l8
'F. K, Berrien, op.cit,
. pp. 2-3.
°Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research
(New York: Pantheon, Random House, 1969) , pp. 59t^2.
Gunnar Myrdal adds color to criticisms of this type by a
frontal attack. "While a great tradition in social sci-
ence was to express reasoning as clearly and succinctly
as possible, the tendency in recent decades has been for
social scientists to close themselves off by means of
unnecessarily elaborate and strange terminology, often to
the point of impairing their ability to understand one
another — and perhaps even occasionally themselves
. , • The employment of algebraic formulas (however useful
they may be for mastering complicated relationships), of
Greek letters, and of other symbols facilitates the escape
from stating clearly implied assumptions and, in particu-
lar, from being aware of the valuation load of main con-
cepts. In the other social sciences as well (Editor's





What can be said of psychologists, ethnographers,
and anthropologists can be said of sociologists,
economists, political scientists, moralists, and others,
and the disparity of perspectives and lack of a "coin of
exchange" provide special difficulties for the student of
cross-cultural interaction. In their essay, "The Impact
of Social Change in Developing Countries", James M.
McKendry and his associates comment on these difficulties
as related to the study of political development. The
comments are equally pertinent to the study of cross-
cultural interaction.
One of the basic causes of methodological
problems stems from the lack of a unified
approach to development problems or some general
theory of development. Getting a reasonably
accurate picture of technical approaches, tools,
and techniques adequate to attack problems in
any field whose subject matter overlaps numerous
academic disciplines is difficult • • . (T)here
is not even a semblance of a neat progression
from a generalized theory-methods-analysis-
synthesis to an expanded, improved theory,
complete with applications. There are, of course,
a small number of miniature theories varying con-
siderably in rational elegance which are oriented
to the discipline of the investigator involved.
Many of these appear to be completely independent
of each other. The end result is that numerous
of the very considerable attention devoted in recent
decades to exuberant terminology is of the same character.
It is to a great degree an elaborate attempt to 'objec-





gaps in knowledge exist, most of which are a
consequence of (1) the methods of investigation
used, and (2) the breadth of the problem being
investigated. In addition, some points of con-
flict are starting to become apparent. *9
Reliability in the Social/Behavioral Sciences
While pertinent comments on this problem could be
drawn from many sources, and the need for integration in
the social sciences is expressed repeatedly by researchers
in the field of cross-cultural interaction, the appeal
for what Galtung calls a "super social science*1 leaves
unanswered an even more important question, that of the
reliability of the individual disciplines themselves.
This study is certainly not the vehicle for a critical
evaluation of each of the social and behavioral sciences
in toto . if, indeed, we were presumptuous enough to
attempt such a critique. But insofar as they relate to
or are called upon in behalf of the study of cross-
cultural interaction, it is reasonable to question the
validity and reliability of certain of the data yielded
by psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science,
and related disciplines. How carefully have the
^James m. McKendry, et, al. , The Impact of Social
Change in Developing Countries (State College, Penna. t




techniques employed been evaluated, the research designs
examined, the statistical methods questioned, the
investigatory instruments themselves investigated? These
are the questions which will be explored below, as we
examine various research reports of projects carried out
in disciplines to which the cross-cultural investigator
turns for help, as well as of projects carried out speci-
fically in the field of cross-cultural interaction.
Since we shall examine such work critically
later, it is perhaps important that we state our bias
frankly at this point, namely, that there is a mystique
about method which often gives it the appearance of
substance. If the method looks awesome and complicated
enough, it has a fair chance of relatively unchallenged
acceptance, not only by those not skilled in the parti-
cular discipline in which the method is used, but even,
at times, by professionals in the discipline itself. In
other words, there is something of the same "sacred cow"
syndrome about the reporting and interpreting of research
in the social and behavioral sciences that has in times
past marked the work and publications in the physical
sciences. Unless we are prepared to accept at least the





in the "science" of cross-cultural interaction is remote.
It is imperative that those interested in this latter
field, who are so dependent on workers in other sciences,
since there is as yet no science of cross-cultural
interaction, approach the findings of others with some-
thing less than naiveness.
P. Kecskemeti, after describing the Government's
traditional utilization of research and analysis by
economists and the equally traditional limitations
placed upon the economists 1 policy-shaping role,
observes*
It is when we turn to the other social
sciences — sociology, social psychology,
anthropology, political science — that wefind open problems, uncertainties, and unknownpossibilities. These sciences themselves are
still m an inchoate fluid state? they neitherhave a well-established theoretical base nor
many regular avenues of application. 20
Social Psychiatrist Bryant Wedge, one of the
leaders in cross-cultural interaction training, is much
more blunt on the subject of gathering data from other
disciplines.
. • • let me be brutally clear on one
point: the combined social sciences have









processes and elements of culture and human
communication. We know only enough to make
a start • • .21
Since researchers in cross-cultural interaction
look perhaps more frequently to psychology than to any
other science for data, as well as for conceptual
assistance, it is worth noting the comments of Psycho-
logist Ray Hyman.
Unfortunately, the separation of method
from content often seems to result in trivial
or misleading research. Psychologists fre-
quently seize on a new method without adequately
understanding its limitations and the assumptions
on which it is based. In employing methods they
do not fully understand, investigators often
wind up in the ludicrous position of using a
technique which assumes a type of relationship
that the investigators* theoretical models deny.
Some investigators, for example, apply the
method of factor analysis, which assumes that
individual traits combine additive ly, to a psycho-
analytic theory which clearly implies that traits
combine in a non-additive manner. 22
The problem Hyman explicates is compounded by
political scientists who either use the findings gleaned
by psychologists using methods they don't understand, or
^Bryant Wedge, "Training for Leadership in Cross-
Cultural Dialogue: The DA-TA Model", in Conference on
Research in Cross-Cultural Interaction (Washington, D.C
.
t
Office of Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, April-
May, 1968).
2.7Ray Hyman, The Nature of Psychological Inquiry




themselves attempt research relying on these methods.
One study we shall examine below, for example, in the
field of cross-cultural interaction, leans in part on an
"Asian version" of the Thematic Apperception Test, a test
devised initially for clinical diagnostic work with dis-
turbed individuals in a one-to-one setting in a "Western"
culture, 3 The TAT is not considered a definitive diag-
nostic tool even by psychologists who use it for the
purpose and in the circumstances for which it was origin-
ally developed. The study examined below not only
departs substantially from the original intent and usage
of the test, but provides extremely modest evidence of
standardization for the new "Asian" form.
Since we have cited a study pertinent to South-
east Asia, we might well include here a comment by
Gunnar Myrdal which reveals further complexity in the
problem we are discussing.
Biases have freer reign in the studies of
South Asia as well as in those of other under-
developed regions because statistics and other
factual information are so scarce and weak.
Much of the pretended data, for instance, about
"unemployment" and "underemployment", is meaning-
less or means something entirely different from
23philip Worchel, et al. , A Socio-Psychological
Study of Regional/Popular Forces in~yietnam (New York:






that which it is assumed to mean, as it has been
collected and analyzed by utilizing concepts of
the "modern approach" that are inadequate to the
realities in these countries so different from
the developed countries. Thus the assembling
of statistics and other empirical material can-
not provide a check on the approach, as con-
frontation with facts normally should. 2^
Myrdal's mentioning of the potential disparity
between "findings" and reality highlights, in turn,
another aspect of the problem, namely, the tendency to
assume that the same dynamics at work in a "laboratory"
of college sophomores are at work among men in a jungle,
or on patrol, or in actual combat. As D. Wolfle has
pointed out in questioning the readiness of the social
sciences for massive financial support by Congress similar
to that given to molecular biology and biomedical
research, for example
i
Some of the fundamental work needed to gain
greater understanding of human and social pro-
cesses can be conducted under controlled or
laboratory conditions. But much must be studied
where things are happening, under conditions of
frustratingly complicated reality. 25
James M. McKendry and associates go somewhat fur-
ther than Wolfle in expressing concern about these matters.
2 Gunnar Myrdal, op.cit. , p. 4-6.
2
^D. Wolfle, "The Support of Science in the United






Difficulties associated with testing hypo-
theses in field studies have caused most social
scientists to express preference (or longing)
for the security of the laboratory. Here, the
scientist has means at his disposal to control
things, to estimate effects of numerous biasing
factors i and to demonstrate his case in as
unambiguous a manner as possible. Also, he can
make strong meaningful predictions and manipulate
things to show his points dramatically rather
than relying upon arguments bolstered by uncon-
trolled observations. Unfortunately, it appears
that in some cases, the security of the labora-
tory has been sufficiently great to cause people
to overlook what appear to be important parts
of their chartered field of interest, rather
than leave the security of the laboratory.
Instead, rigorously controlled, small scale
experiments are run on college sophomores and ,
sweeping conclusions are drawn from the results.
Apropos of this same point, most conceptualizing
and actual research in group dynamics has related to
small groups. Perhaps the only significant attempt at
Macroscopic sampling until very recently was that
reported by Stouffer and his associates in The American
27
Soldier . Prior to the World War II D-Day invasion, the
U. S. Army^ Research Branch did a study of 12,295 men in
an effort to evaluate combat attitudes. As Stouffer and
associates state:
26James M. McKendry, et al. , op.cit. , p. 38*
2?S. A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier
t
Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton,





One of the most important lessons learned in
the Research Branch experience was that of the
risks of generalizing from a pattern of differ-
ences revealed in a single small sample. How
often one sees in psychological or sociological
journals a study based on one sample and that
small! Even if differences are in excess of
chance, there are other biases which can play
havoc with the interpretation, 28
This Army lesson and the large-scale sampling it
introduced emphasizes the issue of extending findings
beyond the situation in which they have been gleaned.
Even macroscopic sampling, however, does not necessarily
measure the differences between small group dynamics and
those which develop among large masses of men, an impor-
tant point in the field of cross-cultural interaction.
The increase in the dynamics of interpersonal relations
as groups get larger is much more geometrical than
arithmetrical in nature.
Failure to Use Available Materials
A tendency opposite to the inclination to accept
too much at face value is the inclination to ignore an
immense amount of ongoing or completed work, in favor of
developing new research designs and embarking on new
projects.





Ray Hyman comments critically about this
tendency.
, • • encouraging "originality" or "being
different" for its own sake seems often to
result in an unwillingness to tackle currently
accepted or standard problems. The young and
ambitious psychologist does not want to cover
old ground. He wants to innovate, tackle new
problems, use new methods, invent new concepts,
and attach his name to novel phenomena. Unfor-
tunately, the consequences of such ambition all
too frequently are a spate of isolated reports
leading nowhere and making contact with neither
the past nor the present. Such efforts fly in
the face of the fact that the scientific enter-
prise is a cumulative affair; each new addition
to the edifice grows out of. and builds upon,
what has already been done. 29
Robert R. Mackie and his associates have reported
a study undertaken with several objectives, among which
was the effort to discern the communicating processes
intervening between psychology researchers and research
users. 3 Learning research was selected for specific
study, but the findings in this field are certainly
generalizable to the field of cross-cultural interaction.
As might be suspected, the investigators discovered
critical weaknesses in the research-to-application
29Ray Hyman, op.cit. . p. 28.
3°Robert R. Mackie, et al., Translation and Appli-
cation of Psychological Research (Goleta, Calif.: Human







process, the synthesis of findings, interpretation and
translation, and similar areas.
We by no means intend to single out psychology,
of course, as a bete noir in these matters. Donald Hornig,
one-time Director of the Office of Science and Technology
and Chairman of the Presidents Science Advisory Committee
(1965 )t was addressing the situation in all the social
sciences when he noted*
. • • despite the fact that the behavioral
sciences affect every aspect of our lives and
interact with every function of the government,
I believe we would all agree that they have not
been applied to government problems in the same
systematic way as the natural sciences nor has
a clear picture emerged as to how their develop-
ment should be fostered
. . • anyone who has
ever worked in the sciences is aware that in fact
recorded information is singularly useless, that
much depends on how it is presented, whether
written or oral, with what attitude the potential
user approaches the information, the degree to
which he is stimulated to use that information.
3
1
Pure and Applied Research and the Demands of Expediency
Hornig' s comments lead us to the next problem
requiring further discussion in this introduction, that
of distinguishing between pure and applied research, and
3 D. F. Hornig, Challenges Before the Behavioral
Sciences (Washington, D.cTi APA-Public Information
Office, October 16, 1965). Paper read at the dedication





what this distinction implies in terms of research in
the field of cross-cultural interaction.
The demand we discussed above, for immediate solu-
tions to cross-cultural problems, generates at least two
major difficulties. First, there is the temptation to
devise techniques and instruments so rapidly that it is
almost impossible for them to meet generally accepted
standards. McKendry and his associates describe the same
problem related to work in the field of development.
The major impetus to research came from hav-ing people abroad, working in the field, whose
mission it was to provide technological supportfor development. It didn't take long for techni-
cal assistance personnel to realize that thetask was demanding and sometimes impossible. Thelogical consequence was a cry for help which was
answered by researchers and scholars in numerous
a^eas. The significance of this development jgthat social scientific technology did not antici-pate practica l problems. Rather, the burden was.
and^is bemfl~piaced upon existing techniques to
meet a new dema nd.. Therefore, serious question^
arise concerni n
F[ the applicability of existing "tools to this new problem area"! This fundamentalpoint tends to be obscured for a number of
reasons, one being the fast pace of effort. 32(Original underlining,
)
The experience of the Peace Corps illustrates the
difficulties encountered when exigencies demand develop-
ment of "instant technique". Initial preparation of
32




Peace Corps volunteers was rooted in extant thinking
about the dynamics of cross-cultural interaction. After
several years of effort, the Peace Corps found itself
concluding that "the development of interpersonal and
cross-cultural sensitivity, which should be the integrat-
ing principle of Peace Corps training, is usually
peripheral" ." Having met with considerable disappoint-
ment by way of volunteers who had become "bitter,
disillusioned, cynical, and hostile because of their
failure to make inroads into the (overseas) community",
and because too few "demonstrate understanding, accept-
ance of, and respect for the local culture", and so on,
the Corps began in the spring of 1968 an "agonizing
reappraisal" of cross-cultural training methods and the
conceptual framework thereof. The questions they began
asking themselves at that point address some of the basic
assumptions on which initial Peace Corps efforts had been
founded, and which are still fundamental to many other
efforts in the area of cross-cultural interaction.
•^Cross-Cultural and Community Involvement
Training; A Draft Handbook (Estes Park, Colo.i
Prepared for the Peace Corps by The Center for Research
and Education, May 1969). See pp. 5, et sqq . . for





The second difficulty generated by the demand for
immediately applicable findings in cross-cultural research
lies in the temptation for researchers to find what pro-
ject sponsors are looking for, a complication we simply
may not ignore. Alfred P. Parsell speaks of the "lamppost"
approach to action research, with statistics used the way
a drunk uses a lamppost, "for purposes of support after
the fact, not for illumination".^
Research organizations, whether associated with
universities or privately operated, depend on contract
funds. While substantial expenditures are made by var-
ious funding agencies, including the United States
Government, on behalf of basic research, it is fair to
agree with McKendry's observation that society at large
expects some ultimate "payoff", such as a man on the
moon. Moreover, every experienced researcher knows that
funding of a project and "top level support" are only the
beginning. Cooperation is indispensable on the part of
those directly involved in the research or experiment,
those who must provide immediate logistic support, those
^Alfred P. Parsell, The Role of Research in
Action Programs: The "Lamppost" Approach to Action"
"
Research (Santa Monica, Calif.: System Development





who are to act as subjects, those who must adjust
schedules to make personnel available.
Within a military context, field commanders in
combat abhor continued interruptions, incessant demands
to devote precious time, scarce resources, and fighting
or support personnel to the needs of interviewers,
testers, surveyers, and similar investigators, whatever
their competence, and whoever has authorized their
research. Frequently, a "hard sell" is needed, a highly
optimistic assurance given that information gleaned
through a particular research project will help shorten
the war, improve weapons reliability, boost morale,
provide better intelligence, or in some other way contri-
bute to fighting effectiveness in the foreseeable future.
The field commander has a job to do now .
In turn, when a research report is submitted to
the responsible "project officer" who must justify to
some degree having requested the project, the researcher
would be less than human were he not hopeful that his
findings would be considered helpful. And, since many
research contracts are funded in increments with a second





research has produced "promising** results, the temptation
is rather obviously increased,
None of the above characteristics need necessar-
ily mark applied research projects, nor need all such
characteristics be necessarily bad or invalidate findings.
It is essential, however, that we recognize frankly the
many human elements in research. Gunnar Myrdal warns of
the consequences, in terms of self-deception and misuse
of research findings, if we refuse to recognize certain
human elements. Discussing the search for M objective"
truth, he points out that the social scientist faces
the question: How can he be objective, yet practical?
What is the relation between wanting to
understand and wanting to change society? How
can the search for true knowledge be combined
with moral and political valuations ... In
our profession there is a lack of awareness
even today that, in searching for truth, the
student, like all human beings whatever they
try to accomplish, is influenced by tradition,
by his environment, and by his personality.
Further, there is an irrational taboo against
discussing this lack of awareness. It is
astonishing that this taboo is commonly
respected, leaving the social scientist in
naivete about what he is doing. 35





The Knottiest Problemi Crossing Cultural Boundaries
We come, now, to the final problem needing intro-
ductory discussion here, the problem which pervades all
others, namely, that we are concerned precisely with
cross-cultural issues. It is essential that we remain
aware throughout this study that we are investigating
interaction between persons and groups of differing
cultures. In the essay cited previously, F. K. Berrien
singles out four central methodological problems unique
to cross-cultural research precisely because it does
attempt to cross cultures. 3° We have touched in part on
two of these, but it is worth reviewing all four*
Berrien discusses: (a) the comparability of samples,
(b) ethnic impact on the definition of researchable
problems* (c) the comparability of research instruments,
and (d) the cultural bounds on data interpretations.
In discussing comparability of samples, Berrien
cites failures that have accrued in various studies of
Japanese culture because of, for example, the attempt to
compare groups which may not be truly comparable at all,
such as Japanese blue collar workers and American blue




collair workers, then extrapolating the data to make
unwarranted generalizations. As Berrien puts itt
The samples drawn from two contrasting
populations exhibit in their behavior the
effects of the cultural milieu, and that
milieu, like rain from above, affects all
segments of the population. 37
Berrien gives a number of examples to illustrate
the problem of ethnic impact on the definition of
researchable issues, demonstrating that the researcher
ordinarily addresses questions which he considers to be
significant in the cultural milieu being investigated,
simply because they are significant in his own cultural
milieu, when these issues may not be significant at all
in the host culture, and, indeed, may not even be
researchable because of societal taboos, differing
levels of abstraction, and similar difficulties. He goes
on to observe*
With the emphasis upon the developing
countries, investigators are fanning out from
those countries where research techniques have
reached a higher level of sophistication into
those where the supply of indigenous skilled
researchers is severely restricted. These
emissaries necessarily carry with them their
ethnic biases which shape the significance and
definition of problems.






There may also be a tendency, he points out, "to
overwhelm the host researchers into accepting totally
inappropriate research issues and methodologies*.
Referring to the question of comparability of
research instruments as "one of the most subtle,
challenging, and interesting methodological problems in
cross-cultural research" , Berrien offers some of the
warnings that we have already mentioned in relation to
the "Asian" form of the Thematic Apperception Test, and
adds comments about other difficulties that arise in
every effort to devise "culture-free" tests, or to use
tests in a culture for which they have not been designed
or standardized. Citing the work of Guthrie in this
field, he notes a subtle trap, namely, that "if one
devises an instrument that is culture-free, then the
instrument itself may obscure the differences that are
extant". 59
Finally, in describing the difficulties of data
interpretation because of cultural boundaries, Berrien
asks if it is even possible — in fact, appropriate —
"to interpret the data from an Olympian, culturally
38Ibid., p. 11.






detached vantage point". Reminding us that the behav-
ioral sciences have always modeled themselves after the
natural sciences, he admonishes the researcher about the
difficulties of attaining the same universalities that
have become commonplace to physical scientists. While
a Pakistani may perform a physically-oriented experiment
in India with German instruments and get results pre-
cisely meaningful to natural scientists everywhere, the
behavioral scientist has at his disposal few variables
which mean the same thing everywhere, and few readers
who have a universally acceptable set of "anchor points".
Add language problems, different value patterns, the
lack of a universally accepted definition of personality,
or even of human nature, and similar complexities, and
the effort to achieve culture-free interpretations of
data is fraught with very considerable peril.
These, then, are some of the problems which must
be kept in mind throughout the course of our study,
problems which we shall examine more concretely and
specifically as we meet them in the research projects,
the proposed training procedures and the conceptual
approaches in the field of cross-cultural interaction






In the chapters to follow, we shall attempt first
an analysis of representative research projects and
reports directly addressing the area of cross-cultural
interaction, examining them for soundness of methodology
and consistency of findings. Next, we shall attempt to
analyze representative conceptual and theoretical
approaches to the subject. Some of these are based
immediately on research reports we shall have already
treated? others draw from research findings in the field
of cross-cultural interaction only indirectly, depending
more directly for their premises and postulates on find-
ings in such areas as communications, group dynamics
studies, psychology of personality, and other associated
fields.
In examining these theoretical formulations, we
shall look for: (a) internal consistency within each
conceptual framework, (b) whatever common elements may
be tracked through all such frameworks, (c) elements
which appear to be most reasonably supported by empirical
findings yielded by way of the research projects dis-
cussed, insofar as these have been judged reasonably






gleaned from studies in related fields and that provided
by the accrued experience of military personnel and
others actually engaged in cross-cultural interaction.
Finally, we shall attempt to contribute to a
foundation for a theoretical framework or a conceptual
approach out of those internally consistent postulates
and empirically supported elements which remain after
inconsistencies and unverified elements are "factored
out" • It is neither our intent nor our hope to originate
a theory of cross-cultural interaction, or to construct
such as an objective of the present study. We shall be
quite happy if we can justifiably propose, at the con-
clusion of our analytical efforts, a series of postulates





REPRESENTATIVE STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL INTERACTION
It has become popular in recent years to distin-
guish between studies of cultural values and studies of
cultural attitudes. Frequently, the distinction seems
to be more nominal than real, as becomes evident when
one examines carefully the terminology used by investi-
gators in both fields. For example, in a study of
interaction between Americans and Koreans, Robert L.
Humphrey considers the problems of Americans among the
indigenous peoples in various foreign countries as being
"mainly a matter of attitudes ". He then goes on to dis-
cuss the necessity of motivating personnel (a value
concept) to try to understand the life-values of the
people among whom they live and work. (Underlining
ours.) In a paper entitled Attitudinal Differences
Between Vietnamese and Americans , Abraham M. Hirsch tells
us that two sets of attitudes are important for an under-
standing of any culture.
^°Robert L. Humphrey, Fight the Cold War (Korean
Supplement) (Washington, D.C.i American Institute for





People act on the basis of their Mreal
attitudes". But they often judge others,
including — quite illogically, really —
persons of another culture group, on the basis
of the "self-image attitude ". Moreover, the
two sets of values create a certain amount of
tension within the society.^! (Underlining
ours.
)
A study reported by John R. Raser is entitled
Values. Attitudes, and Multi-National Decision-Making
.
and uses indiscriminately, ad passim , such phrases as
"values and opinions" , "attitudes and values which change
drastically according to the immediate social setting"
as distinguished from "attitudes reflecting more basic
values", and such statements asi
The subjects* scores on active-passive
personality dimensions are expected to influ-
ence their emphasis on economic, diplomatic,
military, or cultural aspects of the simulation.
Other values and attitude characteristics are
expected to correlate with perceptions and
communication behavior. **2 (Underlining ours.)
M. Dean Havron and his associates attempt to
clarify the distinction between values and attitudes*
^Abraham M. Hirschj Attitudinal Differences
Between Vietnamese and Americans (Saigon, Vietnam*
Mimeographed reproduction of lecture, 19o7), p. **••
2John R. Raser, Values. Attitudes, and Multi-
National Decision-Making* Introduction (La Jolla, Calif.*
Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, 1968), ad passim ,




r Values and attitudes can both be thought of ^
as determinants of behavior. And while no clear
line of demarcation can be drawn between values
and attitudes, values can be thought of as more
general, and as having referents to classes of
phenomena rather tha specific referents as to
attitudes. A person is more likely to be aware
of his attitudes than he is of his value orienta-
tions which he tends to take for granted as given.
He may be aware of his own positive attitude
toward planning in an orderly way to achieve some
future goal, for example, but he is less likely
to be conscious of the fact that this attitude is
rooted in certain value orientations concerning
causality and man's capabilities for controlling
nature. *0
Peter G. Nordlie suggests a distinction based on
the nature of the respective objects of values and
attitudes
i
Both an attitude and a value are expressions
of a relationship between a person, A, and an
object, X. The difference between an attitude
and a value, viewed from the outside, lies in
the nature of the X. The object of a value is
an end-state of being , or a mode of conduct .
^3m. Dean Havron, Martin Sternin, Robert H.
Teare, The Uses of Cultural Data in Psychological Opera-
tions in Vietnam (McLean. Va. i Human Sciences Research,
Inc., 1968), p. 18. This is a companion volume to a
volume we shall be reviewing in detail, by Martin Sternin,
Robert J. Teare, and Peter G. Nordlie, A Study of Values.
Communication Patterns and Demography of Rural South
Vietnamese (Same publisher and date). It is to be noted
that Sternin and Teare worked on both volumes. We shall
turn from one volume to the other frequently, simply
referencing each as the Havron Volume or the Sternin
Volume, respectively, when suggested for simplicity,
since both report on the same study. Both volumes are
called "Review Draft" as of February 1968. However, the
senior authors of each have assured us in personal con-





"Salvation 1* might be an end-state that one values
highly, and " going to church regularly" might be
a desired mode of conduct, the object of an
attitude, on the other hand, may be any object,
event, or situation which can be perceived.
One's attitudes, therefore, are likely to number
in the thousands, while one's yalues are more
likely to number in the ten's.^
The distinctions between studies of value and
those of attitude, then, are frequently tenuous.
Nonetheless, they are useful in several ways, one of
which, for our purposes, being that they provide frames
of reference within which individual studies are pursued.
The researcher who makes the distinction usually has at
least a mental set toward one group of factors or the
other, values or attitudes, and usually entitles his
study accordingly. In seeking a format, therefore, for
an examination of research projects in the field of
cross-cultural interaction, we may conveniently divide
studies into these two categories, those which nominally
concern themselves primarily with values, those which
nominally concern themselves primarily with attitudes,
recognizing both the overlapping usages of terms and the
vagueness and ambiguity of concepts involved.
Peter G. Nordlie, "The Role of Values in Psycho-
logical Operations" , in HSR Conference on Psychological
Operations and Communications with Foreign Nationals
(McLean, Va.i Human Sciences Research, Inc., 20 June




In this chapter, we shall examine in detail one
representative study of values, and in the following
chapter, one representative study of attitudes, in the
field of cross-cultural interaction. Two obvious
questions arise immediate lyi (a) On what basis may
we consider these studies representative? (b) How can
we content ourselves with having adequately examined
a field if we examine only two studies?
In answer to question (a), we note that both
studies qualify as representative in that their assump-
tions are considered to oe grounded in well-known and
widely used theoretical formulations i the methodologies
employed in devising investigative instruments and the
design of the field research activities are typical of
many such studies j they address the area of our immediate
concern, South Vietnam; they were undertaken to provide
data on which cross-cultural activities between Americans
and South Vietnamese could be based i they are both
intended to yield findings applicable to cross-cultural
theory and activity beyond the confines of South Vietnam
or any other single country or culture. Moreover, the
second of the two studies even goes beyond being "merelyM




sampling population employed in the research project is
much larger than usual for such projects.
The answer to question (b) lies in the fact that
we shall explicitly call upon the assumptions and find-
ings of many other studies in examining the two selected.
Thus, at the conclusion of the examination, we should
have not only familiarized ourselves with the topical
literature in general, but implicitly or explicitly
evaluated the assumptions and findings of several other
significant and representative studies in the field.
While this approach seems to have high positive
value in itself, it has also the "negative" value of
avoiding both the impossible task of a detailed examina-
tion of every research project and report available,
and the unprofitable alternative of simply providing one
of the superficial reviews of the literature similar to
those already available in the prefatory sections of
many studies and project reports, in which we are told
casually that so-and-so has definitively demonstrated
such-and-such, with no reference to the original
investigator's own careful qualifications and reserva-




What we shall be attempting, then, is to use the
two studies as frameworks within which we may examine
extant ideas about values and attitudes in the area of
cross-cultural interaction. At the same time, by examin-
ing each of the two studies in somewhat unusual and per-
haps tedious detail, we shall be providing opportunity
to evaluate typical methodologies and procedures, so
important in evaluating findings, as we have emphasized
in our introductory chapter.
One thing more. While the structured research
projects and other technical studies are necessary, they
can rarely tell the whole story. Sometimes findings con-
tradict one another. Sometimes conclusions do not truly
follow from the premises postulated. Frequently, as we
have seen, technical problems escape solution. It can
be helpful, therefore, to evaluate a study from the view-
point of common sense experience and commonplace obser-
vation, even on the part of the untrained observer. We
shall employ, therefore, the unstructured reports of a
number of Americans whose personal experiences and
observations in South Vietnam provide insights often








The main research project report we shall discuss
is presented in two volumes. Our primary concern will
be with the volume entitled, A Study of Values. Communi-
cation Patterns and Demography of Rural South
Vietnamese
.
prepared by Martin Sternin, Robert J.
Teare, and Peter G. Nordlie, but we shall frequently
refer to the companion volume, as well. The Sternin
volume provides data for the investigation of the role
of values in cross-cultural interaction. The immediate
concern is with interaction between South Vietnamese and
Americans, but the authors present their data and find-
ings in a manner designed "to reveal their more general
^We refer, for example, to the "debriefing"
reports of some 80 U. S. Government officials and simi-
lar observers, to more than 250 responses of U. S. Navy-
Marine Chaplains to questionnaires concerning experiences
with South Vietnamese peoples, to our own questioning of
American Marines in Vietnam, and to like resources.
Havron Volume and Sternin Volume . See foot-
note ^3.




implications for intercultural communications".^ A
precis of their study is in order.
Precis of Research Project
Researchers spent eight months in the Mekong
Delta of South Vietnam in collecting data relating pri-
marily to values held by ethnic Vietnamese. Selected
populations in each of three hamlets were interviewed by
Vietnamese interviewers. Hamlets were selected because
of proximity to research headquarters, reasonable dis-
tance from one another (to avoid or minimize inter-
hamlet communications), religious homogeneity within
each hamlet, desired contrasts between hamlets in regard
to religion and origin of residents, typical size and
economic level, cooperativeness of local officials and
hamlet residents, and security.
Residents of the first hamlet, Binh Hanh, were
natives of South Vietnam; more than eighty percent prac-
ticed Buddhism and/or ancestor worship. Residents of
the second, Binh Dinh, had come from North Vietnam in
195^» and were almost all Catholics. Residents of the
third, Thanh Due, were refugees from more insecure areas




of the Delta, and practiced the Cao Dai religion.^
(See Figure II-li Area of Study.)
The study concerned itself with three major cate-
gories of data* (1) "values data", giving information
on "beliefs and values in certain areas of life and the
various orientations these values may take" t (2) demo-
graphic data, or descriptions of people holding the
values studied i (3) communications data, relating to
"the sources from which these people obtain information
and the various channels through which it passes. "->°
Values and Value Orientations
As the authors point out, in the 1930 1 s the work
of such sociologists as Durkheim, Mannheim, Weber,
^The authors call the Cao Dai "a variant of
Buddhism" (p. 9 of Sternin Volume ). This is not quite
the case. Cao Dai is a highly militant politico-
religious sect, which attempted, beginning in 1926, to
synthesize Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism,
and spirit worship. It's saints range from Christ to
Victor Hugo. See, for example, Joann L. Schrock and
associates, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam
(Washington, D.C.i Cultural Information Analysis
Center, The American University, 1966), Ch. 20.








Original source: Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers
12-65, 1965.




Parsons, C. Kluckhohn^ 1
, and others brought the question
of cultural values to public attention. By 1952,
A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn felt free to state
categorically i n • . . values provide the only basis for
the fully intelligible comprehension of culture, because
the actual organization of all cultures is primarily in
terms of their values."^
Efforts to explore the newly-publicized concept
empirically by Spranger, Allport, Cantril, Morris,
Osgood, and others have met with considerable methodologi-
53
cal difficulty. However, the authors of the present
study believe that their modification of an approach
devised by F. Kluckhohn and F. Strodtbeck makes certain
^ Clyde Kluckhohn will be referenced frequently,
as will Florence Kluckhohn. References will be distin-
guished by first initial, except in the case of the fre-
quently cited work by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, of which
F. Lluckhohn is the senior author.
^ 2A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, op.cit. .
p. 3^0.
^-^We have discussed F. Berrien's reference to
' such methodological difficulties in our introductory
chapter. See also William J. Wilson and F. Ivan Nye,
Some Methodological Problems in the Empirical Study of






methodological problems manageable.-^ We shall discuss
below the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck from which
our authors have borrowed, but we must first understand
what Sternin and associates mean by values.
Our authors define values asi
• • • a set of implicit criteria for deter-
mining relevance, criteria that allow the people
who share them to identify which of the many
events and actions comprising their experience
are important, that permit them to see the world
in meaningful and related units. 55
If members of a culture or subculture are to maintain
"efficient social intercourse and communication", they
must share values. Peoples' reactions to others and the
world are coherent and integrated because they unknow-
ingly agree to "use the same form of logic, the same
kinds of premises and criteria". Values are the least
changeable elements in a culture, tend to persist through
a lifetime, and to be passed on from one generation to
the next, hence providing "one of the principal elements
of cultural and social continuity" .5° The shared values
J Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck,
Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, 111. t Row,
' Peterson and Company, 1961).
55Sternin Volume
, p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 7.
5^

characterizing a culture affect peoples' perceptions,
behavior, logic, and judgments unconsciously,
Sternin and associates discuss the intercultural
system proposed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, based on the
proposition that "there are certain universal life
problems; problems for which all people, of all times,
have had to find some manner of solution". Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck have identified five classes of such
problems, and have pointed out that our ways of respond-
ing to, or handling these problems, depend upon and
reflect our particular Value Orientations .
In the Havron volume we have cited, M. Dean
Havron and his associates (including Martin Sternin)
describe the notion of Value Orientations.
Starting from childhood, the surrounding
culture teaches us ways of organizing our
experiences. The similarity of organizations
of experience make communications between the
members of the same culture more efficient
because the tacit understandings on which
communications are based are habitual and often
subconscious.
Value orientations are ways of organizing
experience which begin to be learned from
childhood — from the culture, family, and
continuous associations with friends and fellow
workers. Value orientations determine in large
part how people perceive the world around them,
the criteria of relevance by which they inter-
pret incoming stimuli, and how they choose among





and continuously applied, value orientations
become, in large measure, subconscious habits of
perception and thought. While men of all cul-
tures regard themselves as rational, this does
not mean that given the same "facts" they will
derive the same conclusions. Many of our daily
acts, including important ones, are more or
less predicated or set, on our ingrained criteria
for relevance. 5
7
We noted above that Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck have
identified five classes of universal life-problems.
These problems concern the character of human nature
itself, the question of our relationship with " nature ",
in the sense of environment, the ways we have of dealing
with time , the motives we have for our various
activities , and the relationship we feel or assume in
regard to authoritative decision-making. Discussion of
each of these areas toward which we are said to respond
in accordance with our particular value orientations is
important.
The Human-Nature Orientation
People everywhere must make judgments about other
people, with whom they live, whom they meet from time to
time, engage in business or any other activity with,
those who are complete strangers. We judge people,





according to the Value Orientation theory, not merely as
individuals or members of groups, or on the basis of
their here-and-now behavior, but within the framework of
our own beliefs about human nature as such. Some men
believe that human nature is intrinsically good, some
that it is intrinsically evil, and some that it is a mix-
ture of both good and evil. While there are other poss-
ible variations and shades of beliefs, these are the
three dominant ways of looking at human nature , or the
three main "variations" , as they are called by Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck. Their approach to the other four value
orientations is similar? three dominant variations are
singled out for each.
The Man-Nature Orientation
Men everywhere live in a physical environment
and have to relate to it in some way, and to the various
"forces of nature" with which they are confronted. Some
accept events as inevitable, and submit to them fatalis-
tically as uncontrollable. Others attempt to control
and master the environment. Still others put conflict
reduction above all else, and simply try to live in har-
mony with their environment. Submission , dominance .






particular value orientation, the three main characteris-
tic "ways of life H •
These variations exert their influences, accord-
ing to the authors, on all of life's events, from "the




Variations within this orientation are toward the
past, the present, the future. Some men place such value
on the past, on history, precedent, tradition, that
change, new ideas and methods are virtually precluded.
Some, always looking toward a brighter future, work, plan,
save accordingly, and habitually seek new and presumably
better ways of doing things. Others, considered
"philosophical" about life, or, perhaps, "opportunistic",
are oriented toward the present, and deal with reality
as it happens, as the authors put it, "taking what they
can when the opportunity arises and relinquishing what is
necessary when the times demand it".-*'








Various activities are important sources of satis-
faction to various people for various reasons.
Some value
taking action primarily because it gives them a
feeling
of accomplishment or achievement. Others
derive their
satisfaction from the action itself, simply as a means
of
self-expression, whatever its outcome. Still others
engage in activity for the sake of inner-development,
or
evolution and development as an individual.
These three
different approaches are called by Kluckhohn
and
Strodtbeck the doing , the being, and the be ins-in-
becoming variations, respectively.
The Relational Orientation
Men everywhere fit into some sort of a
system.
Their relations with others in the system
demands that
they have some set of principles
determining who fulfills
what roles, who makes the authoritative
decisions affect-
ing the "body politic". Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck see
three variant approaches toward these
issues, the lineal,
the collateral, the individualistic.
When the lineal
principle dominates, emphasis is on
continuity of group
goals through time, ordered positional
succession within








within a hierarchy of ordered positions. In a dominantly
collateral orientation, everything is subordinated to
group goals and welfare, and decisions are made by the
group or its representatives. In the individualistic
variation, each individual's goals take priority over
specific lineal or collateral groups, and the individual's
society at large, as well as his position in society, is
defined in terras of autonomous roles and goals, that is,
independently of specific groups.
These five value orientations and their varia-
tions are not intended to be all-encompassing categories
of human experience. They are intended to classify the
universal problems of life broadly enough to allow for
cross-cultural comparisons. Moreover, our authors note,
while the orientations may be highly abstract in formula-
tion, they do relate concretely to the daily events of
life, and "are connected, as constructs, with operations
having an intrinsic face validity."
The implications of the discussion above will be
examined later and examples will be cited. We now have
enough background, however, in the authors* use of the





research procedures described in their report. One fur-
ther note will be helpful for this purpose. Sternin and
his associates use the terms traditional , situational ,
and goal-oriented to describe the variations in the Time





Their Activity orientation varia-
tions are rendered as expressive , inner-development, and
achievement, in place of being
. being-in-becomJnf; . and
doing. The variations within the Relational orientation
are renamed formalistic and peer-oriented , in place of
linea
-
1 and collateral i the name for the individualistic
orientation remains the same.
Research Procedures: Test Development
How does one measure value orientations, or modal
patterns of response to problems, or ways of life and
their variation? Sternin and associates modified and
expanded a test schedule designed by Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck for measuring value orientations. They chose
this schedule because they believe it to be theoretically
well-grounded, capable of being applied to both American
and Vietnamese cultures and of being modified and





operationally fie Id-tested, and, always important in
research projects, simple enough to avoid undue length
and administration cost. Our authors call their modified
version of the instrument the Value Orientation Schedule ,
or VOS
.
As the authors point out, however, even their
adjustments did not relieve the original schedule of
certain inherent difficulties. Among other difficulties
was the requirement for oral administration because of
the functional illiteracy of most of the population of
the rural South Vietnamese to be surveyed, with the
resultant danger that items would
(a) tax the memory of the respondents when
given orally t (b) result in lengthy administra-
tion time because of the need to repeat questions;
(c) be difficult for uneducated respondents to
follow. 61
Moreover, the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck instrument
and the VOS measure only broad value perspectives, within
the five general categories discussed above. Neither
instrument is able to determine whether a given group of
people surveyed have different value orientations for
different areas of human activity. In other words, they
are unable to measure the variations of value orientations






by content area. For example, we would like to know if
the rural South Vietnamese surveyed view human nature as
good, bad, or a mixture of both. But we would also like
to know if, when they look at concrete human beings, they
view them the same way regardless of the activities in
which they are engaged. Do they always see human nature
as good (or bad, or mixed), or do they see those human
beings engaged in business activities, for example, as
bad, and those engaged in government work as good? Our
authors could attempt to answer questions such as the
latter only if they had an instrument which would measure
variations of value orientations by content area. They
decided to concern themselves with three groupings of
such content areas* economics and business t personal
and social affairs; government and community activities.
Their aim now became to detect differences, if such
existed, between the way in which South Vietnamese might
look at people engaged in activities in proportion to
these groupings, and in how variations in all five value
orientations might fluctuate in proportion to the content
under consideration at any given time.
To achieve this latter objective, and because of






searched for a companion instrument. George P. Murdock 1 s
Outline of Cultural Materials62 provided the basis for
the development of a companion instrument they call
Taxonomy of Concerns. The Murdock Outline is basically
a filing system of cross-cultural data gathered by
anthropologists, organizing and classifying cultural data
in such a manner as to permit cross-cultural comparisons.
From items available in the Outline
. our authors selected
118 "based on their relevance to the overall objectives
of pacification, economic development, and nation-
building", giving preference to "topics bearing on
matters of social equilibrium, such as social mobility,
political behavior, law, etc., and matters of sustenance
and welfare, such as prices, wages, and individual
enterprise". They then wrote a set of five items for
each of these 118 topics, one item for each of the five
value orientations described above, giving them 590 items
in all. Their objective was to generate items "whose
manifest content was linked to specific areas of activity".
A typical item is offered here*
62„George P. Murdock, et al., Outline of Cultural






"iA natural disaster such as an epidemic or
flood should "be met byt
(a) quiet resignation to the powers of
nature
•
(b) attempts to compensate for its
occurrence through prayer and good
acts.
(c) quick steps to minimize damages and
correct the situation. °3
The authors then sorted the 590 items into three major
content areas, as we have seem personal/social?
economics/businessj government/community. Under
personal/social would be included items concerning ways
in which human beings relate to one another as people,
involving activities and expectations in respect to
friendship, kinship, neighbors, and co-workers.
Government/community would include items involving
individuals as members of organized groups other than
business or family groups, e.g., formal and informal
institutions such as law and politics, crime, taxation,
voting, and so on. Economic/business items concern
people or processes involved in production, distribution,
or consumption of goods and services, as such. The
authors include among these items business practices,
JSternin Volume , p. 21, for this and the above





labor relations, medium of exchange, relations between
merchant and customer, employer and employee, and so on.
Figure II-2 shows how the Value Orientation Schedule and
the Taxonomy of Concerns are integrated.
Finally, the authors developed a Socio-
Demographic Questionnaire, or SDQ, and a Communications
Questionnaire, or CQ. The purpose of the latter is to
detect which media serve as formal and informal sources
of information for hamlet residents, and who are con-
sidered key communicators. With this outline of instru-
ment development, we may proceed to a review of field
research activities.
Research Procedures i Field Activities
Because of the conflict in Vietnam, our authors
were particularly interested in psychological operations,
hence decided to sample those whom they consider to be
likely targets of psychological operations and pacifica-
tion efforts. They therefore chose ethnic Vietnamese
rather than other ethnic groups such as Chinese or
Montagnards, and residents of rural areas, rather than
those in cities. Moreover, they chose three religious
























































*Adapted from Peter G. Nordlie, "The Role of Values in Psycho-
logical Operations", in HSR Conference on Psychological Operations
and Communications with Foreign Nationals (McLean, Va. : Human





between religious differences and value differences.
The Mekong Delta was chosen for five reasons listed by
the authors
i
(1) It contained the largest homogeneous
rural population (almost half of the rural
ethnic Vietnamese population) i (2) it included
representatives of the several major religious
groups i (3) the area was the subject of more
published ethnographic research than any other
region; (4) it offered relatively good security
and ease of road travel; (5) it had felt the
least impact from American military presence
and operations. 64
(See Table II-l, Basic Demographic Description of
Sample.
)
Hamlets selected for study were chosen, in turn,
to meet the criteria we have listed previously.
Interviewers were selected to administer the testing
instruments, in accordance with three criteria. In the
words of the authors , they had to be t
(1 ) Acceptable to respondents — they had
to be ethnic Vietnamese who spoke the language
and were sensitive to cultural and social
differences; (2) familiar with local customs
and not condescending toward the rural
population; (3) readily trainable either












BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE*
Total
Demographic Sample Binh Hanh Binh Dinh Thanh Due
Variable (N-360)1 (N-120) (N-120) (N-120)




Wale 137 (38) 2 45 (38) 45 (38) 47 (39)
Pemale 223 (62) 75 (62) 75 (62) 73 (61)
Agei
Youth 77 (21) 25 (21) 27 (23) 25 (21)
(14-19 yrs.)
Young Adult 69 (19) 23 (19) 24 (20) 22 (18)
(20-29 yrs.)
Adult 73 (20) 24 (20) 22 (18) 27 (23)
(30-39 yrs.)
Mature Adult 138 (38) 48 (40) 44 (37) 46 (38)
(40-60+)
Educationi
None 98 (27) 33 (28) 38 (32) 27 (22)
1-2 yrs. 77 (21) 22 (18) 21 (18) 34 (28)
3-5 yrs. 146 (40) 46 (38) 44 (37) 56 (47)
6-12 + 39 (U) 19 (16) 17 (14) 3 ( 2)
Religion!
None 15 ( 4) 13 (11) 1 ( 1) 1 ( 1)
Buddhist 80 (22) 67 (56) 1 ( 1) 12 (10)
Cao Dai 103 (29) 5 ( 4) ( 0) 98 (82)
Catholic 124 (34) 5 ( 4) 117 (97) 2 ( 2)
Pure Ancestor
Worship 31 ( 9) 26 (22) ( 0) 5 ( 4)
Others 7 ( 2) 4 ( 3) 1 ( 1) 2 ( 2)
Ancestor
Worshipi
Non-Worshipers 144 ( 4) 11 ( 9) 114 (95) 19 (15)
Worshipers 216 (60) 109 (91) 6 ( 5) 101 (84)
^Frequencies for Hamlet or Sample totals (for any demographic
variable) may not always add up 120 or 360. These slight differences
are the result of unanswered questions.
2These percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
Because of unanswered questions, they may not always total 100 percent
for a civen demographic variable.





























































































































































































(32) 6 ( 5)
(ID 2 ( 2)
3These amounts are expressed in piasters. At the
time of the study,





Sixteen young Vietnamese were chosen. Most were part-
time graduate students in sociology at the University of
Saigon, teaching in local schools, who had done community
work as undergraduates. Others were undergraduates in
sociology. All had some field experience and almost
all had interviewing experience. Mechanics and under-
lying theories of the study were explained in several
sessions to these interviewers, and additional training
was provided by the pretesting work required to
-standardize- various facets of the tests. Following
the pretesting, results were reviewed, and appropriate
modifications made, to try to assure that questions and
responses would be clear, meaningful, relevant, and
comprehensive, in terms of Delta peasants. Extreme
length of questionnaires prompted further modifications
and shortening of several phases.
After final formats of testing instruments had
been constructed, and careful translating accomplished,
further training was given the interviewers, in part by
means of role-playing techniques. Appropriate procedures
were employed to assure that sampling would be on a
random basis. All questionnaires were then administered





Concerns was administered only in the hamlet of Binh
Hanhi the other tests were administered in all three
hamlets, with the SDQ and the VOS given to 120 people in
each hamlet, and the CQ given to 50 of these 120 in each
hamlet. Accuracy checks were made as appropriate and
errors resolved.
Findings
At the moment, it is not necessary for our pur-
poses to discuss the analysis of data. Some of the
problems relating thereto will be considered below.
The authors determined for various reasons to analyze
and present four kinds of datai demographic characteris-
tics of respondents, value orientations, relationship
between demography and values, communication data. On
the basis of these they present their findings, under
six categories: Demography, Values, Values and
Demography, Communications (Formal), Communications
(Informal), Communications and Demography. Our primary
interest is in the area of values and value orientations.
In the Havron volume, the findings in these areas are
outlined clearly enough to suggest our simply reproducing





table provided to demonstrate variations in values and
value orientations by demographic characteristics. 66
In *?e Human Nature orientation, the mostnoteworthy finding is the very small proportionof the sample who felt that the behavior of their
that was
a







iing find ing about their concep-
is thefr^Ltf N?K Ur °r man and his environment
rSip?f/?^lng ?hat man should exert a dominantole in dealing with matters of his environment?
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^t6- orientation, very few Vietnamese
Xrm« n/m?°rtanCe °£ resP°nding to situations in^ s of planning and goal orientation Mostindicated that actions and behavior should bechosen on the basis of characteristics of theimmediate situation .
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d t0 be a fairly high achievementti atio and a very low value placeT^n"
expressiveness . *
Finally, it was determined that in theRelational orientation, group or peer decision-
making was generally lacking while there was astrong commitment to making decisions on thebasis of formalized and well-established criteria.
When the three different content areas were
compared for variations in value orientation, thefollowing major breakdowns appeared.
In the Human Nature orientation, forty per
cent of the respondents considered the economic
and business activities of men to stem from a
H
n«^+ <





human nature which was a mixture of good and
evil . This perception was even stronger with
respect to the conduct of personal and social
affairs. The most noteworthy departure from
this was found in the area of government and
community affairs where more people viewed
human nature as expressed in political activi-
ties as inherently good . By the same token,
more villagers looked upon it as inherently
evil .
In the ways in which Man in relation to
Nature or his environment were viewed, the
Vietnamese were highly dominance oriented in
the fields of economics and business and in
personal and social affairs. They also tended
to have an extremely low harmony orientation
in those same activities. In government and
community activities, the harmony orientation
was generally high.
The Vietnamese were equally divided in their
Time orientation with regard to economic and
business with traditional and situational
orientations appearing thirty-three per cent of
the time for each. The same general split
appeared in personal and social activities. In
the realm of government and community affairs,
the Vietnamese were extremely high in the
situational orientation and very low in the
traditional orientation .
In the Activity orientation, the achieve-
ment motive pertained almost entirely to the
affairs of economics and business. Inner-
development was of value primarily in personal
and social affairs, and to a lesser degree in
government and community concerns. Political
activity was more diversely viewed than any
other area and was considered the area most
proper for expressive activity.
An examination of the Relational orientation





high proportion of formalized commitments in
economic and business affairs and also in
government and community activities
•
The Sternin volume makes four specific points
inherent in the above, but deserving of special
statement. One is that content area made a significant
difference in value orientations in each of the five
value orientation categories. The second is that a
general observation can be made without reference to
content areas, namely, that "in all instances, neither
goal-oriented behavior nor peer-oriented decisions-
making were common value commitments" of the
respondents. Thirdly, occupation "appears related to
values only in the Man-Nature orientation. Students,
soldiers, teachers, and civil servants commonly chose
the dominance option. Teachers and civil servants
rarely chose harmony" . This third observation is
reflected, of course, in Table II-2. The fourth point
is that religion as a demographic characteristic seems
to make no significant difference, although,
surprisingly, the Buddhist and Cao Dai hamlets showed
greater dominance in the Man- Nature category than did
67
the Catholic hamlet, which also showed dominance.
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Before we can evaluate the findings cited, it is
necessary to backtrack at this point to examine (a) the
assumptions basic to the entire research project, and
(b) the assumptions inherent in the methodological
procedures. Critical fault in either could, of course,
invalidate the findings, or at least make them
68questionable. The following eight sets of assumptions
appear to us to represent the basic premises of the
study.
(1) Culture denotes H the body of values, symbolic
meaning, and particular ways of perceiving the events in
the world around them which characterize the people of a
society"
•
(2) "To communicate effectively with people of
cultures different from our own, U. S. forces must know
how they think, what they value and consider important,
and what their assumptions are about the world around
them."
68We say "sets" of assumptions, since within each
explicitly stated assumption there are several other
assumptions implied. We have collated this list by





(3) "Beliefs and values are assumed to form the
essential component of the cultural tradition which, in
any society, is passed from one generation to the next in
the process of socialization."
(4) Beliefs and values "differ to a greater or
lesser extent from one society to another".
(5) Beliefs and values "may vary within a given
society as they reflect differences in the activities and
experiences of particular classes or groups of people
who make up the society".
(6) "An individual's social background, and what
he believes and values, would have a direct bearing on
his communications habits."
(7) "Individuals of similar social position and
holding similar values would tend to be exposed to and
utilize similar channels of communication for similar
reasons." ("Conversely, socio-demographic classes and
groups showing significant differences in their values
may be expected to rely on different channels.")
(8) "There are certain universal life problems:
problems for which all people, of all times, have had to




Several of these assumptions have been supported
by a number of studies, as we shall see, particularly in
the areas of perception and communications. Others might
be considered as having a certain prima facie validity,
or to be reasonably self-evident. Still others might be
considered mere assertions, supported by something less
than substantial evidence. It is important to remind
ourselves, however, that none of these assumptions,
whether self-evident or empirically verified, represents
either a simple or a simply understood state of affairs.
Assumption (1) above, for example, and several
of the succeeding assumptions are based on what we
believe we know about the mysterious cognitive process
called perception . It seems a virtual truism to say that
we all view the "objective" world from the perspective
of our own, individual "apperceptive mass", the sum
total of all the experiences of a lifetime. This con-
cept fits very neatly, of course, into the notion of
culture basic to the present study. It would certainly
appear to be true. But it is not simple . In a paper on
the social implications of perception, for instance,
Rudolf Allers describes some of the complexities involved





If it is, as one cannot doubt that it is,
always the whole person who is confronting a
whole situation — then it becomes inevitable
that man be engaged with the totality of his
being in every performance or experience; but
also that in every moment of his life he stands
under the influence of his whole situation.
The interrelations are enormously complex . It
is almost impossible to arrive at a perfect
clarity in regard to these questions. Inevitably,
in consequence of the limitations of our
intellect, we have to proceed by way of analysis
and separation, have to consider the several
performances of man H as if" they were factually
separable and relatively independent of each
other. This is the only procedure any kind of
inquiry may adopt. Nevertheless, it is of pri-
mary importance that one remain constantly aware
of the artificiality of all descriptions and
explanations based on this procedure. Nothing
is more of an obstacle to our understanding of
reality, particularly of human reality, than
that kind of simplification which is proper to
the sciences of inanimate nature. In human
affairs all simplification amounts to
falsification . Qy (Underlining ours.)
When assumption (1), then, describes culture in
terms of values, symbols, and perceptions — concepts
common to many definitions of culture — some highly
complex notions are involved.
Let us return, for example, to the notion of
values discussed in passing at the outset of this chapter.
^Rudolf Allers, "The Social Implications of
Research", in Perception in Present-Day Psychology: A
Symposium (New York: American Catholic Psychological





We have seen Nordlie 's assertion that whereas "one's
attitudes are likely to number in the thousands", one's
values "are more likely to number in the ten's" . Yet
when Harold Lasswell lists his famous "eight" values,
he makes it clear that these are but symbols of many
thousands of values.
It is commonplace that living forms pur-
sue outcomes that gratify what are variously
referred to as "wants", "drives", "wishes",
"predispositions", or "demands" of the indivi-
dual concerned. We refer to any outcome of the
kind as a value (preferred event). All the
outcomes sought are not consciously pursued or
recognized, although they may come acutely to
the focus of attention in situations of
conflict. If we were to make an inventory of
all the specific outcomes sought by typical
individuals in a given social setting the list
would run into thousands • . . Lists of this
kind are unwieldy unless classified by a few
key terms; and this is the function of the
eight terms which my colleagues and I have
found convenient to standardize for our use.'
Nordlie continues to compare values with atti-
tudes, as we have seen, noting that they are similar,
but that values are more basic, more enduring, more
firmly rooted. He then goes on to propose a concept of
values quite similar to Max Weber's notion of value
-
orientations in scientific investigation. Nordlie says
7°Harold Lasswell, Politics t Who Gets What. When.






that values "provide criteria by which a person inter-
prets his perception and judges which of the infinite
variety of events and actions in his experience are
71important" . As Julien Freund excellently summarizes
Weber's position* "Value-orientation determines the
questions we put to reality".' 2
Yet, when Nordlie continues his description of
values, he differs diametrically from Weber's position
and is less than completely consonant with Lasswell's
position, but for a different reason. Nordlie observes:
You know when you have violated one of
your values — you are apt to feel guilty and
ashamed. When you have acted in accord with
one of your important values, you feel enhanced
and gratified. 73
For Weber, value-orientation involves "ethical
neutrality" , and has nothing to do with goodness or
badness, guilt or shame. Lasswell, as we have seen
above, avers that value outcomes sought are not all
consciously pursued or recognized. Nordlie, then, has
^Peter G. Nordlie, op.cit.
. p. 28. We make much
of Nordlie' s remarks because they appear in a lecture
intended to summarize the assumptions and findings in the
Sternin and Havron volumes.
721 Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber
(New York i Pantheon, 1968), p. 52.






introduced here a moral or ethical element out of phase
with Weber, and a cognitive element not at all necessary
to Lasswell* s approach to values. Actually, a brief look
at Figure II-2 shows us that Nordlie himself includes a
moral or ethical judgement in the Categories of Value
Orientations only in regard to the Human Nature
relationship.
On the other hand, Nordlie is quite in accord
with Lasswell* s emphasis when he notes
t
• • . values do not inhere in the indivi-
dual alone; the institutions of a society are
formed around and are a direct reflection of
the values which its people share. Values are
found not only in the internalized conscience
of the individual? they are also reflected in
the laws of the land and institutions which form
the social system. 7^
Lasswell, of course, sees the political system as viable
only in proportion to the degree to which its institu-
tions meet the expectations and demands of its members
for desired value outcomes. Social institutions for
Lasswell, are, precisely, patterns of practices designed
to shape and bring about sharing, or appropriate distri-
bution of value outcomes. Governments, political parties,







for example, are all institutions specialized for these
purposes — to reflect a society's values, to assure
distribution of preferred outcomes. ^
What we are pointing out here, really, is that
there is not only an abundance of definitions of culture,
as we have seen in Chapter I, but that each component
of each definition can be interpreted in many ways.
This is especially true of values. If we are to consi-
der the value approach significant in the study of
cross-cultural interaction, as we do, we must be quite
aware that the concept "value" is subject to many
interpretations. Turning to a previously-cited study
by Wilson and Nye, concerning the empirical study of
values, we read that "there is no agreed upon procedure
of how 'value' concepts should be used and interpreted
in social research and social theory". They quote
Adler's statement that "the discussion of values is made
difficult by pronounced differences in what the term
•value' means to different people", and illustrate the
difficulty by pointing to the differing usages of the
^Lasswell even offers an extended list of








term employed by philosophers, on the one hand, social
76
and behavioral scientists on the other.
The second component rather casually inserted
by our authors in their description of culture is the
notion of symbols . Once again, we are confronted with
a highly complex concept, but its vital importance in
the area of cross-cultural understanding requires that
we explore it.
Not too many researchers have appeared to recog-
nize the significance of symbols in cross-cultural
understanding. Harold Lasswell is one exception. The
notion is basic to his understanding of the "self" in
society (as it is with George Herbert Mead), and is
essential to his contextual, or configurational approach
to politics and to cross-cultural interaction. His
approach is germane, we feel, to assumption (1), above,
and to succeeding assumptions.
For Lasswell, as for Mead, the self can be con-
sidered either as the primary, irreducible ego, or,
more typically, the primary ego together with its
possessions, parents, wife, children, countrymen, etc.






The "boundaries of the self" include symbols of both the
primary ego and these constituent parts of the self.
Lasswell calls these the "symbols of identification".
A lengthy quotation from Politics is worth including in
full.
The principal implication of the configura-
tive principle for the political thinker is that
the act of perceiving and naming a social pattern
can affect both the relationship named and other
relations in the context. Turning points in
political thinking, for example, have been the
act of articulating key symbols of identity
which have facilitated the mutual discovery and
active cooperation of men and women of various
"nations", "religions", "parties", "industries",
or "corporations" • • • When such symbols (of
identity and of demand and expectation) are
brought into the focus of attention of partici-
pants in the process of any body politic they are
likely to release the energies of motivation and
provide guidance for discharge against targets
of tension • . • One way to formulate the "trend-
discovering" function that may be performed by
political thinkers is to conceive of it as a
quest for identity. All men who loosen the bonds
of the culture into which they are born by
becoming aware of it face the eventual challenge
of equipping themselves with identity cards. Am
I to conceive of myself as a Republican or a
Democrat? A Communist or a Socialist? An
American or a Cosmopolitan? And so on through a
vast array of potential "selves". Are these
components of the "self" with which I am deeply
involved, or are they worn lightly, to be removed
at convenience? Who invented all these rival
self-symbols? Who am I? Or rather, as whom shall
I identify myself? And what are the implications
for the remaining years of life? • • • The political
thinker who draws attention to the collective







secedes from the past into the future is seen
performing for adults the function that every
child was once mainly engaged in looking after
himself. The function is the quest of human
identity, 77 % 78
Once again, what we are getting at by way of
references to Lasswell and others is that relatively
simple-appearing concepts — that of "symbols", for
example — can be extraordinarily complex. Using them
''Harold D. Lasswell, op.cit.
. pp. 193-195
(1958 Postscript).
' In his work with Nathan Leites and associates,
Lasswell throws further light on the concept of symbols
of identification as boundaries of the personality, as
these relate both to the political system and to the
notion of culture with which we are concerned. The
authors point out that key symbols are basic terms of
the "political myth" (the whole body of beliefs traceable
to certain fundamental assumptions believed by the "mass
of the world" ; not necessarily imputed as false or
fictional by the designation "myth"). These symbols pro-
vide a common experience for everyone in the state —
"one of the few experiences that bind human beings
together, irrespective of race, region, occupation, party,
or religion" — all are exposed to the same set of keys.
In the long run, therefore, the study of style (of the
language of politics) is extremely significant for inter-
preting political trends. Moreover, the characteristics
of style "may prove to be diagnostic criteria for the
disclosure of destructive or creative political
personalities". That the authors 1 comments are as appli-
cable to a culture itself as to the culture's political
system is attested to by their quoting the pithy maxim of
India's Prime Minister Nehru 1 "Languages change organi-
cally when the people who speak them change." H. D.
Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and associates, Language of
Politics t Studies in Quantitative Analysis (Cambridge,





as though they were, indeed, simple and universally
understood contributes little to clarity. When we talk
"culture", we talk "complexity 1*, and this is true of
each of its components.
Moving to the second of the authors' basic
assumptions, we find again that we must be careful. The
injunction that American forces must know how others
think, what they value and consider important, what
their assumptions are concerning the world around them,
is repeated in one form or another, in the doctrine of
most training programs designed to prepare Americans for
cross-cultural interaction. Is the injunction realistic
or simplistic? We could probably consider it both.
Certainly there is nothing new in this concept.
Rene Dubos notes
i
One of the most ancient and continuing pre-
occupations of mankind has been the patient and
subtle effort to understand man's relation to
other men and to the rest of the world. There
have been as many answers to the riddle as there
are religions and philosophies. 79
When one considers the many schools of psychology,
psychiatry, group dynamics programs, the currently popu-
lar "sensitivity seminars", the proliferation of popular
797Rene Dubos, So Human an Animal (New York:




works in "transactional analysis*1 , self-understanding,
"Games People Play", and so on, all devoted to helping
Americans understand themselves and other Americans, the
On
assumption we are discussing seems naive, indeed.
On.ou0n a cross-cultural basis, Urie Bronfenbrenner
addresses the problem of "Allowing for Soviet Perceptions
and Motives", He quotes the preamble to the UNESCO
Charter to which both the United States and the Soviet
Union are signatories i " . • . since wars begin in the
minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences
of peace must be constructed," He goes on to describe
his own field experiment in testing what is essentially
the very assumption we are discussing, though differently
phrased. As he phrases itt "effective communication
is most likely to occur if carried out in a context in
which there has been prior recognition and, where
possible, acceptance of some values cherished by the
other party." Stating that, although originally developed
as a means of studying the Soviets, his approach is pre-
sumed to have general validity, he discusses what he calls
"the problem of seeing through Soviet eyes".
"Soviet behavior is determined by Soviet per-
ceptions, Soviet fears, and Soviet modes of thought.
Any attempt to predict how the Russians would react
which is based solely on considerations of strategy,
deductive reasoning, and the assumption (usually
unrecognized) that Soviet thought processes are
similar to our own is doomed to miss the mark.
Given our own necessarily limited perspective, we
cannot arrive at an appreciation of the springs of
Soviet action solely through the power of logical
analysis, no matter how rigorous, or of creative
imagination, no matter how ingenious."
Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Allowing for Soviet Perception and
Motives", in Psychology and International Relations , ed.
by Gerald Sperrazzo (Washington, D.C.i Georgetown Univer-





Returning to our earlier discussion of values,
symbols, and perceptions, we might point out as Max
Weber does, that even our effort to understand the
values and value orientations of others is conditioned
by our own values and value orientations. Moreover, our
own needs play a major role. In an unusually insightful
8lpaper, "Human Communications" , Franklin Fearing
describes from Mark Twain* s story of the Connecticut
Yankee transported to King Arthur's Court, the scene in
which the Yankee and a sixth century British girl search
for a castle. Finally, the young girl "sees" it; the
Yankee sees a pigsty. The girl sees a captive princess;
he, a hog. She sees three giant ogres; he, some
swineherds. The scene concludes with her exclamation:
The ogres? Are they changed also? It is
most wonderful. Now am I fearful; for how canst
thou strike with sure aim when five of their
nine cubits of stature are to thee invisible?
Ah, go warily, fair sir, this is a mightier
emprise than I wend.
The sixth century girl's exclamation seems
extraordinarily modern in the context of the conflict in
Vietnam and in other arenas where cross-cultural
^Franklin Fearing, "Human Communications" , in
People. Society . and Mass Communications , ed. by Lewis A.





understanding is vital. Fearing agrees — at least
with the young lady's observation that "this is a mighty
emprise".
"It is indeed!", he observes, then goes on to
explicate the need-value complex. His remarks are quite
commonplace, but we wonder if assumption (2), above, and
all the training programs based on it, do not suffer
from ignoring the commonplace?
2Fearing is worth quoting at length:
"A question that is almost certain to inject
itself at this point is: To what extent does the
•world 1 that is the result of structuring process
differ from the •real' world? Or, in the case of
Mark Twain* s characters, which of the two percep-
tions of the •castle 1 , the •ogres 1 , and their high-
born prisoners was the •true 1 one? They are
clearly not the same. The answer need not be a
metaphysical discourse on the nature of ultimate
reality. In terms of the problems with which we
are here concerned, the simplest answer is that
there are not two worlds, one of illusion and one
that is 'real*. There is one world — the individ-
ual lives in, bends to his needs, has relations
with other persons in, loves in, and dies in • • .
The striking thing, and that which furnishes the
psychologist with most of his problems, is that
• . • man not only reacts to this world but, in
the various ways we have described, on it. He
manipulates it and constantly recreates it.
Psychologically, there is not just one world, but
many worlds. The critical question is: How are
they related?
"It is at this point that the problem of
•reality* becomes acute. The world or environment




The stress problems peculiar to combat, which
is the context within which much of our cross-cultural
activity takes place, particularly in Southeast Asia,
make the need-value equation even more complex, ^
"I
things; it is a world of meanings and signi-
fications. The dog that is my pet is a much
loved creature with a thousand engaging ways and
a personality all his own. To me, my neighbor's
dog is an unpleasant creature with annoying
habits and a mean disposition. To a third person,
the two animals are just dogs which he has diffi-
culty in telling apart. Which of these are the
real dogs? The answer is that the two dogs as
stimulus objects are structured in different
ways by different individuals, each with his
special need-value-belief system. The resultant
structurizations are real because they have real
or objective effects on behavior."
Franklin Fearing, loc. cit. t p. 5°»
^A homely response by a U. S. Marine Sergeant
in South Vietnam to a question posed by one of his
seniors, relative to the Sergeant's previous remark
about not caring for the Vietnamese people, speaks
volumes along these lines:
"We always thought of the Vietnamese as
'gooks'. It didn't matter whether they were
Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Array, or villagers.
Not only did we think of them as 'gooks* but
for the majority of the time we treated them as
such. When we swept through a rice paddy, corn
field, or garden, an awful lot of the crop
would be destroyed. You would be hot and
miserable, you had humped two clicks (kilometers)
to get to the place and by the time you got
there you didn't give a damn about anything. If
three or four plants got in your way, no big
thing. It's a lot easier to step on them than





Within the context of combat the author has
encountered innumerable situations in which because of
mutual suspicion and distrust, at times justifiable,
farmer two months to grow those plants. I never
looked at it from his point of view. It never
really crossed my mind of the work that family
had put into that garden that we just destroyed.
If we went by a cucumber or a watermelon patch,
we would help ourselves, and my personal thoughts
were always: 'Did each of my men get one or was
there enough for my whole squad?' I never thought
of the guy that planted these things. Did we leave
him enough for his family, for the market, or even
enough for seeds for next year? When I did think
about those things it was too late to do anything
about it. Next time I had a chance to do some-
thing about it, I was too hot, or it was too miser-
able, or I was just too plain teed off to care
about the 'gooks'. Another example, when we would
search their houses we would throw clothes, rice,
wood, tools, everything would wind up in the dirt.
When it came time to go we would go? nobody would
even make an attempt to pick the gear up. This
would naturally tee the villagers off. It would
tee any human being off,
"The villagers weren't really treated as comba-
tants but on the other hand they weren't treated as
non-combatants. They were either good guys or bad
guys, and when you first saw them they had two
strikes against them just because they were Viet-
namese. If you asked them where the VC were at
and they didn't give the straight scoop, or, let's
say, what you wanted to hear, why they were classi-
fied as VC, or VC sympathizers, just for that."
This statement, a portion of an interview, was
placed in the author's hands when he personally discussed
with the Sergeant involved the questions of relations with
the peoples of South Vietnam, near Danang, South Vietnam,
November, 1969. The Sergeant's name is withheld since





Americans and South Vietnamese found it psychologically
impossible to understand one another. The "distortion
by fear" emphasized by Bronfenbrenner, above, creates
critical problems of perception, and both parties become
convinced of Kipling's East is East and West is West,
One illustration will typify many problem-creating
incidents.
In November, 1969i on behalf of this present
study, we were visiting certain Marine units in South
Vietnam engaged in Combined Action Platoons, to be dis-
cussed later. These platoons are composed, ideally,
of 15 Americans and 35 South Vietnamese (Popular Forces).
They bivouac and patrol together. Often American Marines
become wary when a new group of Vietnamese are attached
to the unit, because of the fear that the latter may
break and run when they encounter their first "fire
fight". On the day of our visit to a particular unit,
such fears were expressed to us openly by the Marines.
A few hours later the fears were justified. On their
first patrol, upon meeting sniper fire, all but two
Vietnamese broke and ran. The two who remained were
killed by enemy fire, as were two Marines j two more






was no reasonable chance of reuniting the Marines with
the Vietnamese who had run away. All semblance of trust
was destroyed. The unit involved had to be completely
restructured.
It is this type incident which results in the
conviction i "I'll just never understand these people in
a million years."
What are we getting at? Quite simply, that cross-
cultural interaction is not carried out in a vacuum. The
realities of life, especially in a tension or conflict-
filled milieu, the value-needs and personality character-
istics of the individuals who must interact with others
are all crucial factors in cross-cultural understanding.
The desirability of our knowing how others think, what
they value and consider important, what their assumptions
are about the world around them is unquestionable. The
probability of effecting this with any ease — or,
perhaps, the possibility of doing it at all, in any
profound sense — must , of necessity, be questioned by
the conscientious researcher. We have, as we shall see,
some evidence of some success in true cross-cultural





are so overwhelmed with such evidence that we can consi-
der the question closed.
In light of the homely examples and commonplace
observations we have offered above, and in view of the
fact that the hundreds of thousands of American military
personnel who interact with indigenous peoples in South
Vietnam are, for the most part, individuals of "average",
rather than exceptional, education and intelligence, how
could we expect them to interpret the remarks of the
Vietnamese social scientist cited below? Indeed, how
should the remarks be interpreted by even the sophisti-
cated social scientist? They highlight rather dramati-
cally a factor true of most large societies — that when
we speak so knowingly of a society's culture (see asump-
tions (1) and (2) and succeeding assumptions above), we
may be speaking very superficially, since the society
84
may be composed of a vast number of "cultures".
Dr. Ton That Thien, one-time Vice-Dean of the
Faculty of Social Sciences at Van Hanh University,
84We question the use of the term "subculture" to
convey our meaning here. In the context of the Thien
paper cited, how would one infallibly define the culture
of Vietnam — numerically? Hardly. To investigate fur-





Saigon, is, as of this writing, Minister of Information
for South Vietnam. He is presumably familiar with the
temper of the peoples of South Vietnam. If his analysis
is correct, our efforts to assist South Vietnam in
"nation building" have been little short of disastrous,
in large part because we have paid all too much attention
to economics, "and not enough to the deeper aspects of
the problem, in particular, social structures and cultural
and psychological attitudes".
While so many of our American training publica-
tions emphasize the "Asian" aspect of Vietnamese culture,
and so much of our effort is dedicated to helping
Americans understand and appreciate the cultural values
of the Vietnamese as Southeast Asians, heirs of a thou-
sand year old cultural tradition, Thien tells us:
With regard to culture, French rule meant,
among other things, the establishment of French
schools in Viet Nam, and in time, the displace-
ment of the Vietnamese educational system by the
French system, at first at the university, then
progressively, at the secondary level, as well
as the traveling of Vietnamese students — that
is mostly the sons of high officials and of rich
men — to France. French rule meant also the
adoption of the French way of life and thought
through the "demonstration effect" resulting
from the presence of Frenchmen among Vietnamese
and the desire of a number of Vietnamese to look
"Western" out of snobbery or desire to win French
favors. French rule meant also the transformation





image of France — in particular the building
of new cities, or "western districts" in the
Vietnamese cities. • • . They (the Vietnamese)
were forced both to examine western values
carefully and decide what to adopt, or to pre-
serve, and what to reject or eliminate. As
mentioned above, the westernization of Vietnam
produced a new intelligentsia culturally alien-
ated from its own society. The westernized
Vietnamese spoke in French, thought in French,
and lived like Frenchmen, that is at a higher
material and intellectual — though not necess-
arily higher moral — level than their
compatriots. ... On the other hand, the masses
looked upon western culture with hostility* they
considered it the cause of their enslavement,
poverty, intellectual inferiority, and low social
status. In between stood the nationalistic mem-
bers of the intelligentsia and the enlightened
among the masses. These shared the hostility of
the broad masses towards western culture, but
at the same time, they realized that it was in
western science — especially military science —
and technology that they would find the means
for emancipation and progress. Thus, the
reactions of the three groups to western impact
would be different, although in respect to the
desire to get rid of western rule, these reactions
converged • • •
Since 195^ a new element has come into playt
the intrusion of America, whose culture is still
farther removed from the Vietnamese, and still
more devastating in its disintegrating effects on
Vietnamese society, because the speed of change
under its tremendous and pitiless impact has
outrun the Vietnamese capacity for adaptation.
The American values — rejection of authority,
the equation of success with wealth, the insist-
ence on ruthless efficiency — to the detriment
of sentiment — combined with American political
dominance, have produced an explosive effect on
Vietnamese society and culture. The Vietnamese
felt the American threat to their own culture much
more than the French threat. The latter was never




Americans. The French, however obsessed by the
mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission),
always had a certain admiration and respect for
Vietnamese culture which was absent from the
Americans ... Of course, there was a minority
who favored Americanization, some because they
had a genuine admiration for American values —
especially American democracy and efficiency —
some because it gave them the new instrument to
acquire riches — know how. This minority —
still small as of 1968 — was still more alienated
culturally from Vietnamese society than the
Frenchified elite. 85
This is the milieu, then, in which Americans in
South Vietnam must interact with "Vietnamese". If one
is to argue that they must know how the Vietnamese think,
what they value, etc., the question is quite legitimate:
"Which Vietnamese?".
Admittedly, however, we have been treating assump-
tion (2) negatively, and deliberately emphasizing the
complexities of the problem in order to counteract the
simplistic approach. Realistically, as we shall be dis-
cussing when we consider various training methods, there
is another side of the coin which deserves mention.
Richard A. McGonigal, in an article whose title reflects
^Ton That Thien, Viet Nam's Reaction to Western
Impact: The Search for a New Identity (Honolulu: Univer-
sity of Hawaii, East-West Center, June 13, 1968), pp. 8-
10. (Address delivered by Dr. Thien at Conference for





its philosophy, "Breaking the Myth of the Asian Mind",
comments*
To "understand" people hardly means knowing
them completely . It's foolhardy to think we can
predict how the Vietnamese will invariably react.
It's not always easy to understand our wife or
children. Some of us do not truly understand
ourselves . Let's not aspire to understand too
much about the Vietnamese even when we take them
one at a time • • • let's sort out our thinking
about the significance of culture. To understand
any person, it certainly helps to study his
society • • . Experts speak of a "cultural
envelope", and claim that predicting what people
will do or what they desire involves comprehend-
ing their cultural envelope, their society.
Well and good . Most letters come in envelopes.
The envelopes can tell us the origin and launching
date of the letter. But the real message is inside
the envelope. Many of us go astray by exaggerating
the importance of the cultural envelope and ignor-
ing the individual inside • • •
We learn about any group of people one person
at a time. We never learn to know all there is
about anyone. Understanding culture helps to fit
the pieces together. But the clue to the whole
puzzle is still the magic of a buma.n being treat-
ing the other as a human being. °°
To support the McGonigal observations, and,
perhaps, to gainsay to a considerable degree what we have
already said, there is, as we have noted, some evidence
to suggest that "knowing" the Vietnamese, their values
Richard A. McGonigal, "Breaking the Myth of the
Asian Mind" , in Marine Corps Gazette (Quantico, Va.
:




and their assumptions is not really a complex or sophis-
ticated problem at all.
In November 19^9i as noted above, we visited Com-
bined Action Platoons in South Vietnam. We personally
discussed with U. S. Marines living in rural areas of I
Corps, in hamlets, with their Vietnamese Popular Force
counterparts, the question of understanding, appreciat-
ing, generally relating to the local civilians and the
Popular Forces. The median age of the American Marines
questioned was 20. Fifty-one percent were high school
graduates, who had had approximately a 10-hour course
in the Vietnamese language. We talked individually, or
in groups no larger than four men, with 100 American
Marines in 20 different units, in 20 different locations.
In addition, we listened to the tape-recorded
interviews of 80 American Marines serving in similar
Combined Action units between 1966 and 1968. This was
a random sampling of 155 tape recordings.
Typical responses for both sets of subjects
follow 1
In our outfit we had a lot of good, dedicated,
seven-day-a-week, hard-working Marines. They
really believe the village belonged to them, that
is, it was their responsibility and the village
people were their people. You could see it.





greetings from everyone. In almost all cases,
they had picked up enough Vietnamese to talk
back. In a couple of cases the Platoon Leader
was made honorary member of the village council,
and they insisted he sit in on all the council
meetings. When you get to this point you really
have the people truly with you and you've accom-
plished most of your mission right there.
Most Marines were first enlistees. I was
surprised how these 19-20 year olds could be so
effective in a totally foreign environment.
The Combined Action Platoons are an essen-
tial part of the war. If you get the people on
your side, like we got them, they helped us
build a school. They couldn't get the materials,
like tin and nails and stuff, and we could pull
nails out of old ammo boxes and straighten them.
They didn't care for the way the VC treated
them. I say when people are on your side and
don't want Communists in the area, you've got the
war half won right there.
Our Corpsman didn't especially care for the
Vietnamese people but he looked at it as a doc-
tor would. So he set up his own MedCap program.
We Marines and the Popular Forces built the
facility. He held sick call every morning and
afternoon and emergencies anytime. These people
live with the land and sanitation is something
they don't know too much about. Big thing for
village kids used to be when the Marines had
swim call in the river. They'd scrub our backs
and we'd scrub theirs. Some Marines personally
paid to send kids to school.
After we built a schoolhouse we couldn't get
schoolteachers. I guess the VC put out the word.
So we started using the schoolhouse as a commun-
ity center and teaching older people English at
night. Most of our fellows could speak some
Vietnamese. But you have to round this out.
You can't just teach them English and expect them
to learn without picking up a little of their




a man more who learns their language and customs
than if we try to push ours on them.
We worked with the village chief and every-
thing worked out real well. You gotta give and
take with these people. They got their customs
and ways. You got to get in and understand them
to get along with them. Like usually when they
come in the biggest deal you can do for them
when you go talk with them is have dinner with
them. Sometimes this takes a strong stomach, but
our chow would seem strange to them.
Whenever you have two people of different
backgrounds together, you're bound to have
problems. We have our share. It's not an easy
job for a Marine out here. There's a world of
difference between him and the Popular Force man.
There's a language barrier, and that leads to
misunderstanding. The main problem here is
merely a lack of understanding between the Marines
and the Popular Forces. Most PF's are young,
under draft age. They join to avoid the draft.
They have little education. Fifty percent of
them are illiterate. Most Vietnamese are very
childish. They're fun loving and quick to laugh,
and vice versa. It doesn't take much to hurt
their feelings. If you get on their back they
go sulk or get obstinate or won't do anything.
But these are small problems. Our greatest prob-
lem is to avoid hurting feelings. Often we don't
know why they're hurt until a couple of days later,
then we find some PF was talking with a Marine
and grabbed the Marine's hand and the Marine
slapped him, because he didn't know that for men
to hold hands in Vietnam is o.k.
I suggest that you got to listen to these
people. You got to come to a ville with an open
mind. They're interesting and enjoyable to work
with. They can be frustrating, because they have
different personalities. We want to rush. They
think they can take their time on everything. You
have to be patient; you have to meet them halfway.
They have quite a different way of life. Don't





When they are sympathizing over somebody's
death they smile. One of our men was about to
hit a Popular Force smiling when one of our
men was killed. The fight got broken up just
in time.
Occasionally we do something natural to us,
but it's an insult to the Vietnamese. We have a
language barrier and misunderstandings take place.
But most people are pretty friendly and under-
standing, and they recognize we don't understand
their customs, and so on.
We get invited to religious ceremonies, and
when we go on day patrols, we're constantly being
invited to stop for tea. They laugh at us, we
laugh at them. It's all good-natured. They^re
very easygoing. My advice is to learn to smile a
lot. If you do they know you're friendly but
they watch the kind of smile, because they're
very polite. Try to learn the language. They are
impressed by your desire to help them in this way.
Be careful about the customs, especially
about taking pictures. The Vietnamese have a
real good sense of humor. They're easy to get
to know.
At first life seems much different from ours.
The longer I'm here, the less hectic, the quieter
their life appears. They have a strong family
life. It's unbelievable how they respect their
elders.
We're real tight with them. I speak some
language. I don't have any communication problems.
Some individual Vietnamese are forward and like to
learn. Others sit back and watch. We have a good
relationship.
A certain number of pejorative comments concern-
ing Vietnamese peoples could be included here. However,




attitudes, but with indications that so many unsophisti-
cated and relatively untrained Americans at least think
they know the Vietnamese with whom they associated. Does
this suggest that the whole process of understanding
other peoples is very much simpler than our discussion
above makes it out to be? Perhaps, but hardly so. As
we have averred, the communications problem is a compli-
cated one, and the fact that "ordinary" young Americans
can get along quite adequately in remote Vietnamese
hamlets probably makes it even more, rather than less,
complicated — a paradox we shall discuss later.
So much for the first two assumptions. Space
precludes further observations at this point.
Each of the next six sets of assumptions could
be fruitfully questioned to some extent. In the interest
of space, however, and because most have been discussed
implicitly in the foregoing, we shall comment only
briefly on assumptions (3) through (7).
Assumption (3) defines its own terms, with which
there is little point in quarreling. One might question,
however, the ease with which the authors assure us that
a cultural tradition, with its beliefs and values, "is





socialization" . (Underlining ours.) The complexity of
the "socialization" process is attested to by the abun-
dance of literature on the subject. Whoever feels he has
discovered a simple formula for understanding socializa-
tion need only review the ponderous effort of Talcott
87
Parsons to explain it!
Concerning assumption (4), we must again sound a
note of caution. That beliefs and values "differ to a
greater or lesser extent from one society to another"
seems reasonable enough and is basic to much of our dis-
cussion above. Confused with the value relativism
inherent in the earlier theorizing of Lucien Levy-Bruhl
and popularized by Sigmund Freud, however, this seemingly
reasonable postulate has led many an anthropologist and
sociologist into a morass. Rudolf Allers provides
important insight.
The idea that man's nature is not stable but
has changed notably in the course of the thousands
of years of his way from the pre-paleolithic age
to our times, that between our way of thinking
and acting on one hand and that of the primitives
there is a profound gap, and therewith the further
notion that a man cannot truly understand another
if the other is a member of a totally different
civilization and, especially, speaks a language
of a totally different structure, all these notions
'See, for example, his well-known, The Social





had found a powerful support in the theory pro-
posed by the eminent French philosopher and
sociologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl in 1910 . . ,
Levy-Bruhl*s ideas were sharply criticized by
some outstanding students of cultural anthro-
pology, among whom the late B. Malinowski
deserves mention. They were criticized also by
a number of psychologists • . . These criticisms
were, however, not able to stem the enthusiastic
reception the theory of Levy-Bruhl was given by
a great many psychologists and anthropologists.
The reason for this widespread approval was,
probably, the close alliance jhese ideas formed
with Freudian psychoanalysis. °°
Unfortunately, as Allers points out, despite the
fact that at an advanced age, Levy-Bruhl thoroughly
recanted and disavowed his earlier theory, its popu-
larity has grown, rather than diminished in many quarters.
Space precludes a discussion which would take us far too
deeply into the fields of ethics, anthropology, and
psychology. Enough to note that the assumption could be
distorted.
It is probably the validity of assumption (5)
that accounts for varieties of cultures, or sub-cultures
within cultures, and everything we have discussed above,
concerning perception, symbols, needs, and values, would
support assumptions (6) and (7).
00
Rudolf Allers, "Ethics and Anthropology", in
The Philosophical Works of Rudolf Allers 1 A Selection ,
ed. by Jesse Mann (Washington, D.C.i Georgetown Univer-





The authors' final major assumption under con-
sideration here, that which postulates certain universal
life problems for which all people, of all times, have
had to find some manner of solution, together with the
value orientation theory associated with this assumption
has been explored by a number of investigators. The work
of Harry C. Triandis and his associates is representative
of both the empirical investigations and the conceptual
developments in this area. Their findings appear to
support the work of Kroeber and Kluckhohn, and of
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, from whom our authors have
borrowed, and to justify the assumption we are consi-
dering.
"
In a paper on nation-building, Triandis himself
summarizes many of the concepts we have been discussing,
particularly those inherent in this final assumption.
Every human group has a set of goals that it
wishes to reach. These can be quite different
as we look from one group to another. Some empha-
size economic development, some equality, some
freedom, some pleasure, some wisdom, some love.
Behind such goals there are value orientations,
that is, conceptions of what is man's nature and
9Harry C. Triandis, Keith M. Kilty, A. V.
Shanmugam, Ysaumasa Tanaka, Vasso Vassilou, Cultural
Influences Upon the Perception of Implicative Relation-
ship Among Concepts and the Analysis of Values (Urbana,




role in the universe, how is man to relate him-
self to other men, to nature, to the past, to
the present and to the future. When there is a
conflict between man and nature should man change
himself or should he change nature? Exactly what
is the proper balance of emphasis on each of these
values? Such questions are often so fundamental
and become so intertwined with every human's way
of thinking, that most of us are not even aware
that we strive to reach such goals and use cul-
turally defined answers to such questions to guide
our behavior . It is only when our ideas are chal-
lenged that we stop and think about these values. 90
Triandis discusses the notion of "subjective
culture", and defines it as»
• • • the characteristic way that members of
a group use to perceive and conceive their social
environment. It consists of the particular ideas
that they associate with different stimuli in
their environment, the particular ways they feel
about these stimuli, and the way they intend to
behave towards different kinds of people or in
different kinds of situations. It includes the
goals and values used by a social group. 91
Triandis goes on, then, in this same paper on
nation-building, to report on studies of "subjective
culture" in more than 20 different societies, studies in
which he and his associates have used rather demanding
research techniques. We mentioned one of these studies
9°Harry G. Triandis, Nation Building. A Psycholo-
gist's Viewpoint . Paper presented to the Center for
Research in Social Systems, American University, Washing-
ton, D.C., April 3, 1968. (Washington, D.C.j American
University, 1968), p. 1.








above as supporting our authors* assumption. It deserves
92
further consideration here.
Triandis and associates agree that all human
beings "use categories when responding to their environ-
ment" 95 — the Kluckhohn postulate our authors accept —
responding to different stimuli "in identical or very
similar ways"
.
92We refer here to the previously-cited Cultural^
Influences Upon the Perception of Implicative Relationship
Among Concepts and the Analysis of Values. It is perti-
nent to note the variety of cultural backgrounds of those
who report this study. Triandis and Kilty are at the
University of Illinois; Triandis was born in Greece, but
has spent half of his life in the United States. Shan-
mugam is at the Indian Institute of Mass Communication,
in New Delhi. Tanaka is from Gakushiun University in
Tokyo, and is currently in Canada; and Vassilou is at the
Athenian Institute of Anthropos, in Athens. Several of
these investigators and a number of others with equally
diverse cultural backgrounds have contributed to an on-
going series of studies of which the present one is but
a single unit. The series concerns "Communication,
Cooperation, and Negotiation in Culturally Homogeneous
Groups", and is under the guidance of Triandis and Fred E.
Fiedler as principal investigators.
^Triandis, Kilty, et al. , op.cit., p. 1.
9^0f course, one of the most comprehensive treat-
ments of value and value orientations available is Clyde
Kluckhohn's (and associates'), "Values "dValue-Qrigita-
tions in the Theory of Action", in Toward a General Theory
of Social Action , ed. by Talcott Parsons and Edward A.
Shils.—This treatment likewise includes a highly informa-






In addition, they point out that there "is much
evidence that the content of these categories is strongly
influenced by culture, and that language is strongly
implicated in categorization and generally in cognition".
They cite, in behalf of the latter claim, the work of
Stefflre, Vales, and Morley, reported in 1966. -^ Further,
they observe that cultural influences "are not only
important in determining the content of categories, but
they are also important in determining the subjective
probabilities that one category is related to another.
96Such probabilities are worthy of analysis". After
referencing a number of efforts to perform such an analy-
sis (Peak, 1955; Rosenberg, 1956; Fishbein, 1961; Vroom,
1964; McLeod, 19^7; Deese, 1966; et al. ), the authors
turn to the well-known Semantic Differential developed
by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, in 1957» a widely-used
instrument for the measurement of connotative meaning.
They then make an observation relevant to the study we
have been examining, and particularly to the reasons for
9^V. Stefflre, C. C. Vales, and Linda Morley,
"Language and Cognition in Yucatan 1 A Cross-Cultural
Replication", in Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology
.
l± (1966), pp. 112-115*





Sternin*s having developed the Taxonomy of Concerns to
complement their Value Orientation Schedule.^'
Results obtained with this instrument (Seman-
tic Differential) suggest that certain aspects of
meaning escape measurement. For example, GOD and
COCA-COLA have rather similar semantic differential
profiles, for certain kinds of people; i.e., both
concepts are "good", "powerful", and "active".
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the two words mean
something very different.
It is clear on purely intuitive grounds that
the concepts HERO and SUCCESS, which have similar
semantic differential profiles, do not mean the
same thing. It is, therefore, important for
studies of the behavior of culturally heterogen-
eous groups to develop additional procedures for Qn
the measurement of similarity of concept meaning.-^
The authors note, then, that both Osgood and
Triandis started from this latter observation, and pro-
ceeded in two different directions, with Osgood initiating
his Semantic Features Analysis, in 1966, an instrument of
which the authors sayi "... when fully developed (it)
is likely to be the most powerful technique for the
99
measurement of denotative meaning."
Triandis, proceeding differently, developed the
technique used in the study under discussion, which the
9?It will be recalled that the VOS does not mea-
sure "content" within value orientations; hence the need
for the TC.
qO
Triandis, Kilty, e_t al. , op.cit. , p. 4.
[_ "ibid ., p. 5. J
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authors call only a modification of well-established free
word association procedures, but one "which appears
directly relevant for studies of interpersonal conflict
in culturally heterogeneous groups". The technique is
called the "antecedent-consequent method", designed to
study the "implicative relationships" which appear
particularly relevant in interpersonal conflict, but a
useful instrument, as well, for the cross-cultural study
of values.
The Triandis instrument was used to analyze data
gleaned from the study of approximately 1,500 male stu-
dents, from Illinois, Athens (Greece), Southern India,
and Tokyo.
The major trends of the results suggest that
the Americans valued mostly achievement, self-
development, and peace of mind; the Greeks,
affiliation; the Indians, status; and the Japanese,
achievement, self-development, and aesthetic
satisfaction. 1 01
The authors consider the Triandis method reliable. We,









Our purpose in citing this study, however, as we
have suggested above, is not to evaluate it in itself,
but to offer it as significantly representative of the
literature supporting the assumption of Sternin and his
associates concerning the universality of certain life
problems and the responses thereto. A particularly note-
worthy statement made at the conclusion of the study by
Triandis and associates, however, is equally germane to
the work we have been examining, and serves to introduce
the next phase of this examination.
A word of caution is needed. We have sug-
gested that the antecedent-consequent method is
effective in the exploration of implicit norms
and values. However, it must be remembered that
much depends upon the "meaningful" interpretation
of the obtained results. The data are not meaning-
ful in themselves, without outside information
concerning the economic, political, religious and
other cultural characteristics of the samples
that provided the responses. For example, to
understand the American under-emphasis of hunger
as a cause of DEATH, one needs to know about the
availability of food in North America j to under-
stand the Japanese emphasis on length of life as
an antecedent of DEATH one must know some Japanese
philosophy and history. 102
Certainly what Triandis and his associates say
about interpretation of acquired results is a necessary







research, but to all research. The "findings" reported
in a study are validly useful only if validly interpreted.
Mindful of the various reservations we have
introduced, we may accept the "background assumptions" of
Sternin and his associates, for operational purposes, as
long as we are not misled by the simplicity of their
appearance, and recognize that they represent highly
complex, and not always sharply defined, concepts. As
we proceed from the general to the more specific assump-
tions, however, we must be even more careful. This
becomes clear as we examine each of the five classes of
universal life concerns identified by Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck, and employed by our authors under title of
Value Orientations. The Triandis injunction about care
in interpreting is particularly applicable here.
Value Orientations t Assumptions and Interpretations
It will be recalled that Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
and our own authors recognize varying modes of response,
or options, which they call variations, within each of
the Value Orientations, or life styles of responding to
or handling the basic concerns of life. In the Human







be seen as good, evil, or a combination of both.
Sternin and his associates, recognizing that members
of a culture might be generally inclined to view human
nature in one way, let us say as evil, but that in
certain specifics might view human activity in
another way, namely, as good, emphasize the need for
distinguishing "content" when trying to categorize
variant responses within the Value Orientations.
We must ask, however, whether even this
latter qualification — that of content distinction
(which they attempt to discern by their Taxonomy of
Concerns) — adequately avoids the knotty problem
of "stereotyping" the members of a given culture. It
is, precisely, stereotyping against which virtually
all cross-cultural interaction investigators inveigh,
and which is indicted in so much of the literature
on international conflict (especially the psychologi-
cal literature) as a Public Enemy of highest rank,




is too well-known to require lengthy explanation
heret
10 3 .l<A.105
In exploring "the anatomy of a persistent
unfavorable perception of the United States", Bryant
Wedge points up the reason for our concern that the Value
Orientation approach could encourage stereotyping with
unfortunate results for programs of cross-cultural
interaction. He says that his exploration suggests
103
A major section of Herbert C. Kelman's pub-
lication, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological
Analysis , under title of National and International
Images, addresses problems of stereotyping. See Herbert
C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior; A Social-
Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1966), pp. 4-3-277. (Includes essays by Ithiel




Introduced by Walter Lippman in 1922, the
validity of the stereotyping concept has been demonstrated
virtually beyond question countless times, by a wide var-
iety of techniques. See Walter Lippman, Public Opinion
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922).
There seems to be little doubt that, as is
stated in a paper by M. Abate and F. K. Berrien, "...
people do have consistent impressions as to what they
believe is the 'true nature' of a stimulus, particularly
when that stimulus is the name of a national or racial
group." See Explorations in the Process of Stereotyping
National Groups (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, East-




• • . that stereotyped images of other
nations, which certainly impair the conduct
of international relationships, are continually
maintained and reinforced by the distinctive
interpretations of social reality which charac-
terized national "political culture". Such
images, it appears, persist not only because
they have become established as myths or
truisms of the national culture but also
because they are sustained and fed by percep-
tion of new information in ways confirmatory
of the image. Stereotyped national images, in
this view, are the outcome of dynamic processes
of perception and their modification depends on
developing approaches to their source in the
dynamics of social perception. 106
Wedge goes on to support his hypothesis with data gleaned
from observations concerning foreign leaders in the
United States on exchange visits.
The reason for our concern becomes clearer when
we examine the various illustrations offered by Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck of variations in Value Orientations —
examples included with apparent approval by our authors,
who add illustrations of their own which cause us equal
concern.
V/e begin with Kluckhohn' s description of our own
culture, offered as illustrative of variations in the
Human Nature Orientation.
"1
Bryant Wedge, "Nationality and Social Percep-
tion", in The Journal of Communication , Vol. XVI, No. k




• • • Few will disagree that the orientation
inherited from Puritan ancestors and still strong
among many Americans is that of a basically Evil
but perfectible human nature . According to this
view constant control and discipline of the self
are required if any real goodness is to be
achieved, and the danger of regression is always
present. But some in the United States today,
perhaps a growing number, incline to the view that
human nature is a mixture of Good-and-Evil. These
would say that although control and effort are cer-
tainly needed, lapses can be understood and need
not always be severely condemned. *-®<
This kind of generalization comes far too close
to stereotyping to be scientifically comfortable. As a
recent work on Puritan political ideas points out, much
of the Puritan reputation was born in the imagination of
H. L. Mencken and James Truslow Adams, who "depicted the
Puritan fathers as joyless, dark-minded, petty entre-
preneurs who believed in human depravity and a predestined
elect, erected a theocratic state, and tyrannized their
subjects within an inch of their lives". In reality,
the work maintains, there is much evidence that "Puritan-
ism was a very complex system of beliefs and institutions
with as much diversity, creativity, and vitality as the
Enlightenment", to which it was a bridge from medievalism,
107
' Sternin Volume
, p. 11. (Original citation is







and across which "travelled many of our most cherished
concepts of democratic constitutionalism". y » 10 9
Further support for our concern about stereo-
typing, in respect to the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
reference, is Edward McNall Burns' discussion of anthro-
pologist Ruth Benedict. He takes up her famous and highly
controversial classification of cultures as either
Dionysian or Apollonian, considering Dionysian peoples
as stern individualists who assume that men's motives
are invariably evil, and that lawlessness is common
among them. Burns' comment is worth rather lengthy
quotation, not only because germane to the present point,
but because provocative in terms of our entire study.
It seems possible that Ruth Benedict exag-
gerated somewhat the contrast between patterns of
1 nft
Edmund S. Morgan, ed., Puritan Political Ideas
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963TJ P« vii»
1097If an amusing digression were permissible in a
study of the gravely serious field of cross-cultural
interaction, we might quote at length from Edward McNall
Burns' Ideas in Conflict , in which, while discussing the
political theories of the contemporary world, Burns gives
us a wide variety of references to Puritans and Puritan-
ism, ranging from Mencken's including them among those
American barbarians who would license chiropractors, to
an analysis of Bernard Shaw as a devotee of Marx,
Nietzsche, Proudhon, Bellany and Bergson, but "essentially
a Puritan". Edward McNall Burns, Ideas in Conflict; The
Political Theories of the Contemporary World (New York;







culture in order to heighten the effect of some
of the criticisms she wished to make of our own
civilization. Indeed, a leading anthropologist
has described her work as better poetry than
science. She was obviously perturbed by what
she regarded as paranoid features of modern
society. 3y these she meant an inordinate sus-
picion of human motives, a tendency to regard
unintentional injury as a personal affront,
megalomania and persecutory delusions, an eager-
ness for vengeance and a chip-on-the-shoulder
belligerence. She saw these traits as especially
characteristic of modern nations in their dealings
with one another. The chauvinism and saber-
rattling of the Great Powers of the twentieth
century she thought of as remarkably similar to
the sense of humiliation and the head-hunting to
wipe out the same indulged in by Kwiakutl Indians
when some neighboring tribe or clan trespassed
upon their "rights". She also indicted the ego-
mania, the guilt complexes, the passion to enforce
conformity, the waste and the greed, and the com-
petitive ruthlessness which she regarded as the
principal elements in the psychoneurotic heritage
from Puritanism.il
The main point we are making, of course, is not
merely that it is too easy to stereotype our culture as
Puritan (which title even ignores the fact that early
America knew varieties of Puritanism), but that stereo-
typing it at all is a highly questionable exercise. In
his Religion in America , Willard L. Sperry deplores that
others (Englishmen) would ask:
110Ibid
. , pp. 436-^37. (The leading anthropolog-
ist Burns references is Donald Cook, "Ruth Benedict,





. . • for the sake of easy generalities
about America, that the ways of New Orleans
should be accommodated to those of Duluth, or
the mind of a Wyoming cattle ranger merged with
that of a Marine fisherman, to yield to some
single synthetic American mentality. Given a
national crisis all Americans are now aware of
their community of interest. But, as with "the
Solid South", so with other parts of the country,
sectionalism is a stubborn fact both politically
and culturally. This fact conditions, and in a
measure defeats, all attempts to generalize about
American religion. The country was in colonial
times diverse in its origins, and immigration
during the subsequent years of our national
independence, so far from clarifying the
situation, has only complicated it.* 11
What is questioned about the Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck reference to Puritanism is questioned equally
about what they consider to be today's trend in the
United States, that pointing toward the view that human
nature is a mixture of good and evil. Without belaboring
the point at much greater length, we ask whether anyone
really knows what "Americans" think, believe, feel about
human nature and behavior. It has been popularly
publicized, for example, that there is widespread, highly
unethical "freeloading" indulged in by millions of
Americans who refuse to work because they are recipients
of some $^ billion dollars of national welfare grants.
~1
11:J
-Willard R. Sperry, Religion in America




r £ nIn December of 19°9» a Senate Subcommittee investigated
this widely-held belief. The investigation concluded
with Senator Walter Mondale's comment i "I assume this
mythical, able but unwilling adult male free-loading on
112
welfare is just that, a myth." Or, as Joseph Califano,
one-time assistant to former President Johnson, has put
it:
• • • the disturbing truth is that the basis
of recommendations by an American Cabinet officer
on whether to begin, eliminate or expand vast
social programs more nearly resembles the intui-
tive judgment of a benevolent tribal chief in
remote Africa . • .112
Even a superficial glance at extant literature
on racial problems, generation gaps and similar social
issues reveals that the constantly reiterated complaint
on all sides is, precisely, that "the other side" simply
doesn't understand, won't understand, can't understand!
It is popular today, for example, to equate long hair
and unusual clothes styles with hippies, and both with
violence. Yet Bishop James A. Pike professed to see in
the 300,000 hippies of America a close resemblance to
the early Essene communities of Israel, currently
112
Both quotations cited by columnists Richard
Harwood and Laurence Stern, The Washington Post




"functioning like the Salvation Army of the Depression
years — with a mission and a soup kitchen • . .
preaching Love • • • joy, nonviolence, altruism and
mysticism • • , ,,11 3 And in a discussion of poverty,
ghetto and racial problems, black psychologist president
of the Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Inc.,
Kenneth B. Clark, maintains!
Jeffersonian democracy was a major develop-
ment. A political system with an essentially
moral, ethical basis, one that stated that the
rights of human beings were its concern. Unfor-
tunately, that policy was being contradicted
even as it was being articulated. Even a sophis-
ticated, civilized man like Jefferson was caught
up in the American web of moral schizophrenia.
Slavery was clearly a violation of all the
wonderful words of the Declaration of Independence
and the first ten amendments of the Constitution.
But those words did exist, they were v/ritten • . .
And they do exist. And they form the basis for
the torture of America. America does not have the
freedom of Nazi Germany, which had no moral and
ethical "monkey" on its back. -^
In sum, while one might readily accord with such
statements as that "there are some in the United States
today" who "incline to the view that human nature is a
"1
11 7
^James A. Pike, "Religion and Rebellion", in
Psychology Today , Vol. 1, No. k (August, 1967), p. ^5-
11
^Mary Harrington Hall, "A Conversation with
Kenneth B. Clark", in Psychology Today , Vol. 2, No. 1
(June, 1968), p. 21. (Clark is the author of Dark Ghetto;
Dilemmas of Social Power, Prejudice and Your Child , co-





, what do such statements really
tell us, since a myriad of diverse statements could be
equally true? It would probably be quite as accurate
and quite as uninformative to say that a substantial
number of Americans in the days of the "Puritans" inclined
to this same view, and that, on the other hand, an empha-
sis on the sinful in human nature was at least as strong
among many German, French, and Irish Catholic settlers of
America, whose doctrine had reached them through Jansen-
ist priests, as it was among any of the Puritans.
Moving on to the Man and Nature Orientation , we
meet with further stereotyping. Our authors contrast
Spanish-American Indians with pioneers of European
extraction, and both with Tibetans or Chinese. The
former allegedly feel there is nothing they can do to
avert calamity, when faced with poverty and generations
of bare existence. The European-type pioneers, on the
contrary, "conquered" the wilderness, engaged in per-
petual industry, and "seized every opportunity to make
the world a better place to live in". The Tibetans and
Chinese, on the other hand, seeking to find the "way",
which the authors call the course of least resistance,








How much, again, are we dealing with romantic
fiction, how much with fact? How well can we really
read the motives behind the activity of a people? If
the Spanish-American Indian thought he could do nothing
to avert calamity, why did he pray and offer sacrifice?
Are magic rites mere submission to nature, or an attempt
to dominate, or, at least, manipulate and win nature over
by appeasement or by trickery, or by invoking a power
greater than nature's to handle nature in some way? Is
the Spanish-American Indian of the Southwest poor and
threadbare today because of belief in submitting to
nature, or because of the highly complex socio-economic,
educational and environmental problems he has experienced,
which, coupled with exploitation by others, have made it
virtually impossible for him to improve his lot?
A work we have previously cited, by Rene Dubos,
traces the advent of Indians into the Americas many thou-
sands of years before Christ, and their development of
strong theocratic governments, calendars, mathematics,
architecture, temples, sculptures — "a true urban
complex". He asks, indeed i "What could demonstrate more
clearly the biological and psychological unity of man





Indian princesses shortly after their arrival in Mexico
115and Peru?" We have mentioned above Ruth Benedict's
controversial position on Apollonian and Dyonisian
cultures. She applies these categories to Indians,
classifying the Pueblo, Hopi, and Zuni as Apollonian
in their values and behavior, in contrast to the
Dionysian values and behavior of Indians surrounding
them. She, in turn, as we have seen, is taken to
task by other anthropologists.
As to the Chinese, we could speculate along
quite different lines from those apparently guiding our
authors. Our personal experience accords with that of
many other observers, that many of the Chinese found
throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia are the
leading businessmen, not infrequently scorned as "the
Jews of the Orient" — hardly a stereotype in consonance
with that of following the line of least resistance.
It seems probable that we are confronted here with two
common tendencies: (a) the tendency to study a people
by way of their sacred books and other honored and
115
-"Rene Dubos, op.cit.
. pp. k? , et sqq .
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traditional documents} (b) the tendency to accept as
definitive Max Weber's evaluation of the Chinese in
respect to capitalism.
Brief but pertinent comments on both these ten-
dencies are offered by participants in the 1963 confer-
ence on Cultural Motivations to Progress in South and
Southeast Asia. In discussing interrelations between
social structures, economic conditions, traditional and
modern practices, and religious values, the participants
returned frequently to the necessity of defining
between religion as idea and belief system and religion
as part of the continuing social structure, between
folk religion and "the great tradition". Several of
them pointed out, for example, that "while scriptural
positions within Hinduism and Buddhism might stand in
the way of development, the actual folk religion has
managed to adapt itself to the world sufficiently so
117
that it can gracefully accommodate modernization".
In the same vein of discussion concerning
religion, progress and cultural mores , one discussant
observes 1
"^Robert N. Bellah, ed., Religion and Progress






There are the great Weber studies in this
area, but beyond that we have gone almost nowhere
in thinking about the relationship between relig-
ious experience proper — the actual ritual
experience, the actual worship experience that
people have — and the kinds of mentality they
have in the cold light of day when they are not
being properly religious in the narrow sense of
the term. That is, what effect does their relig-
ious experience have on the secular life?11 ^
We seem, perhaps, to be forcing our authors'
reference to the Tibetans or Chinese, who seek to find
the "way", into the context of misinterpretations of
religious concepts, in order to find appropriate litera-
ture to indict them for stereotyping. Not so. The "way"
to which they refer is precisely the Tao , the ethico-
religious life pattern to which so many anthropologists
and sociologists refer in trying to explain the ways of
the East. It is probably in large part because of stereo-
typed interpretations of Tao , the "way", traceable to
Max Weber, that Tibetans and Chinese have been stereo-
typed as they are in the case we are discussing.
In his Introduction to the Hans H. Gerth trans-
lation of Max Weber's The Religion of China , C. K. Yang
reminds us of Weber's basic assumption, namelyi
Ascetic Protestantism was a major impetus for





in the West, and the absence of similar dominant
religious values caused the failure of capitalism
to appear in China. 119
Yang claims several weaknesses in Weber's thesis
that deserve consideration. Yang maintains, for example,
that Weber failed to differentiate consistently between
Taoism as a philosophy and Taoism as a religion. Another
of Yang's claims is that on the important question of
"propriety" in Confucianism, Weber's interpretations can
be rather readily contradicted, with neither his position
nor the contradiction as yet supported by a systematic
i on
.
conceptual study. ^ Still another weakness, of immedi-
ate concern to our point, is that Joseph Needham's
"enormous project on the study of Chinese science and
civilization", reveals an "impressive list of Taoist
contributions to science and technology", and his inter-
pretation of the Taoist meaning differs drastically from
Weber's, in that he sees that by imitating the Tao, the
121
sage will be able to govern and control .
* %ax Weber , The Religion of China: Confucian-
ism and Taoism , ed. by Hans H. Gerth. Introduction by





. , p. xxxiv.





We have reason for added concern about the
issue we have been discussing because of the widespread
tendency of commentators on Vietnam, including those who
have lived there for a time, to stereotype Vietnamese
as largely "Buddhist". Because of this, it is not
unusual to find resource materials made available to
Americans about to be assigned to Vietnam, or elsewhere
in Southeast Asia, which provide them with detailed
descriptions of the "Great Way", the "Little Way", the
"Four Noble Truths", and so on, and to attribute life
122
styles and cultural divergences to "Buddhism". We
might well question whether this does not encourage a
"mental set" antagonistic to effective cross-cultural
interaction. Does it simply fortify for Americans the
Kipling warning that never the twain shall meet? Or,
even more importantly, does it open a veritable Pandora's
box of those cognitive dissonants about which Festinger
123has told us so much , when Americans learn that in a
land allegedly so largely "Buddhist" they in fact meet
so many paddy farmers and merchants and soldiers who
122See, for example, The Religions of South
Vietnam in Faith and Fact (Washington, D.C.: Department
of the Navy, NavPers 15991 f 1967).
12 3we shall be discussing Leon Festinger* s Theory




know much less about the "Great Way" than they, the
Americans, do, and who walk so slowly and look so sub-
dued because of poverty and long-time vitamin deficiency,
rather than because of religious beliefs?
We shall consider the remaining three Value
Orientations in less detail. To illustrate the Time
Orientation , our authors again look to Puritanism, this
time as illustrative of the futuristic outlook of the
American culture, allegedly "rooted in puritanism", with
its concept of preparation for an after-life. Purport-
edly, orientation toward an after-life orients one
toward "planning, saving, and investing", the "highly
futuristic" characteristic of the American culture.
Once again we see the strong influence of Max Weber,
this time by way of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism . One of the virtues of citing Weber, of
course, is equally a vice. Weber is completely open-
ended, in that his work was never finished, so that what
he "might have said" leaves a great deal to the
imagination.
Be that as it may, many critics, such as





is to accept this Weberian thesis at face value . ^
The social and economic dynamics at work in the develop-
ment of capitalism, the concepts of thriftiness and
"rugged individualism" are much more complex than the
equation that those who are oriented toward an after-
life are those who plan, save, and invest. Indeed, it
is said to have been characteristic of medieval
Catholicism that — was it Chesterton who so phrased
it? — men paid little heed to what they had here below
because they lived with one foot in heaven. As Yinger
points out, had it not been for the shrewd thriftiness
of the Geneva merchants who saw in Calvinism a medium
for making their hard-bargaining and highly lucrative
approach to their neighbors a virtue, it is highly
questionable that the "Protestant ethic" would have
flourished.
As a further illustration of Time variants,
"American" futurism is contrasted with the Chinese
veneration for ancestors and respect for precedent and
tradition, which is said to reflect an orientation
toward the past. Must these characteristics indicate
J. Milton Yinger, "A Critique of Weber 1 s







orientation toward the past as conflicting with orienta-
tion toward the future? Consider those Eastern burial
rites which dress the deceased in finery, and leave food
within the tomb, for future use. What of the great Asian
beliefs in metempsychosis? Is the transmigration of
souls, the belief in repeated lives of purification, an
orientation toward the past, or toward the future? If
American notions of planning, saving, and investing are
alleged to reflect predispositions toward an after-life,
should not the peoples of Asia practice these same
activities? The "contrast", on these grounds, at least,
seems highly strained.
We are next told that members of "peasant cul-
tures" are illustrative of people "taking what they can
when the opportunity arises and relinquishing what is
necessary when the times demand it". Once again, the
picture looks blurry. First, is it alleged that
Americans are not opportunistic? The daily flux in the
stock market hardly agrees. Secondly, peasants can be
found in both futuristic and traditional cultures. Their
religious beliefs within these cultures may orient them
toward an after-life quite as resolutely as do the




then, should they, too, not be predisposed toward
planning, saving, investing? Or why would Chinese
peasants not be oriented toward the past, venerating
their ancestors, respecting precedent and tradition
quite as much as the mandarins? (This author has seen
many a South Vietnamese peasant carrying out very care-
fully the various prescriptions of ancestor veneration,
as he has seen Ryukyuan peasants in Okinawa doing the
same.) One wonders if even anthropologists are not
beguiled by the English drawing-room interpretation of
the "cunning" peasant of the Russian novel!
Typical of materials which serve to stereotype
the peasant as "opportunistic", in the sense in which
our authors so classify them, is a United States Informa-
tion Agency research report, which tells us:
The peasant is not a moralist. He rarely will
take an unyielding stand on principle. Flexibil-
ity, suppleness, "bending with the wind", he
admires more than firmness. He does not lose face
by changing sides since consistency is not
expected. Desertion is not treachery when personal
or family interests are at stake. Honesty may be
the best policy but strict honesty is a virtue for
saints, not ordinary mortals. The peasant prefers
honest officials but is grateful if their graft
is not too great. He admires clever dishonesty
and views strict honesty as a little stupid. Yet,






the peasant usually will be honest in personal
relations with persons he knows well. 1*5
Since the same publication tells us that four
out of five Vietnamese are peasants, and that it "is
mainly from these peasant masses that both the Viet Cong
and the Government of Viet-Nam draw their fighting men",
the implication is obvious — that Americans had better
know their peasantry if they are going to be effective
in cross-cultural interaction in Vietnam*.
It seems to us that two questions may be raised
about the citation above i (a) Does it really reflect
the "mind of the peasant"?; (b) Does it reflect the
"mind of the peasant" any more than it reflects the
mind of the "'average' American"? We ask question (b)
in part because daily reading of American newspapers
leaves one with an impression that they seem to reflect
"most peoples ,u attitudes toward graft, officialdom and
politicians in tones not unlike those used above to
describe Vietnamese peasant attitudes (give or take a
turn of a phrase or two), and in part because of our own
12 ^ The Vietnamese Peasant: His Value System
(Washington, D.C.: Research and Reference Service, United







personal experience, perhaps worthy of modest mention
here. In 195^» engaged in research to develop discussion
materials for use in the United States Navy and Marine
Corps Character Education Program, we placed to approxi-
mately fifty separate groups of naval personnel, averaging
at least twenty men in each group, the question: "Is
honesty the best policy?" Affirmative responses were
almost universal. We then modified the question slightly,
giving it an "opportunistic" flavor: "Is honesty always
the best policy?" Responses became significantly less
than unanimous in every group!
In regard to question (a), we turn to a research
report of October, i960, presenting preliminary findings
on one phase of the refugee problem in Phu-Yen and Dinh
Tuong Provinces, in South Vietnam. It will be recalled
that our authors' entire investigation was carried out
in the latter, Dinh Tuong Province, so that we are talk-
ing about the same general area. We cite now, ad passim ,
from the 1966 report.
The conventional view of the Vietnamese pea-
sant sees him in the context of a multifaceted
traditional society. The peasant himself is con-
ceived to be relatively unresponsive to and
unaware of the issues and factors, predominantly
economic in nature, which are often associated
with more highly developed societies. The pre-
liminary findings of this report, however, do




Among development economists there was in
the 1950' s a tendency to classify as "non-
rational" the motivations of the peasant in
traditional societies. Theories relating to
dualisms, both sociological and economic, were
promulgated to deal with different basic econo-
mic motivations of the member of the traditional
society and the member of the advanced or developed
society. Recently, however, such theories have
been questioned in the light of a better environ-
mental understanding of traditional economies.
Basically the current thought tends to see the
peasant as maximizing or satisfying within the
constraints of his traditional environmental
surroundings, just as a member of an advanced
society would maximize or satisfy in his
respective surroundings • • •
The Hendry-Hickey studies of the Village of
Khanh Hau (Editor's note 1 Also in the Mekong
Delta, the site of the Sternin Volume studies)
in 1957-1959 provide some evidence to support
the more current economic thought. Hickey
relates that both he and Hendry were somewhat
taken aback by the seemingly rational responses
they received to their questionnaires. The
rural peasant seemed to exhibit a desire for
additional income in order to purchase means of
production, to trade, to purchase food and to
educate his children. Hickey has found Vietnamese
attitudes to be guided by an "innate conservation
outweighed by economic advantage" ,127
Brief comments concerning the Activity and
Relational Orientations, respectively, will suffice.
1 ?7
'Robert L. Sansom, Economic Considerations of
the Refugee Situation, Republic of Viet-Nam (McLean, Va.
:
20 October 1966). pp. 11-12. ad passim ^ The Hendry-
Hickey studies cited are 1 G. C. Hickey, "Notes on the
South Vietnamese Peasant of the Mekong Delta" (Memorandum!
RM4116 ISA, May 1964)} and James B. Hendry, The Small






They are similar to comments above, and could likewise
be extended. In the discussion of the Activity
Orientation , we see once more in the analysis of human
motives the oversimplification which can hardly lead to
clarity. For example, the Achievement Orientation is
illustrated by the architect, who purportedly devotes
his energies to bigger and finer achievements in order
to leave "tangible evidence for posterity". One is
reminded of the complex reasonings of Harold Lasswell's
efforts to discern the unconscious motivations behind
Genghis Khan's mother's rearing her child to believe that
"a man's highest job in life is to break his enemies,
etc.", or those behind the activities of the parents of
Ludwig of Bavaria, President Garfield, and Lyndon B.
Johnson, respectively, which ultimately drove their
progenies to seek the pinnacles of political power.
If it is a highly complicated and often tremendously
difficult business for a trained analyst to learn what
makes an individual, real patient "tick", often taking
many months of analysis, how can we arrive so easily at
the motives of architects, in the abstract?
128See Harold D. Lasswell's World Politics and
Personal Insecurity , Psychopatho logy and Politics , Power






In the Relational Orientation , the reference to
our American culture as highly individualistic is suffi-
cient to demonstrate the vagueness inevitable in such
stereotyping. Would William H. Whyte accept De Tocque-
ville's description of American life of one hundred years
ago to describe us today? Would he, or David Riesman,
describe us in terms of Teddy Roosevelt's "rugged
individualism"? On the contrary, in The Organization Man
,
Whyte avers that in today's American social ethic:
Man exists as a unit of society, Of himself,
he is isolated, meaningless; only as he collabor-
ates v/ith others does he become worthwhile, for by
sublimating himself to the group, he helps produce
a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. ^9
David Riesman' s concept of the "other-directed"
man is too well-known to require explanation here. But
his impression about the prevalence of "other-directed"
men in American society hardly supports the claim that
we are individualistic.
It is my impression that the middle-class
American of today is decisively different from
those American's of Tocqueville's writings who
nevertheless strike us as so contemporary . • .
It is also my impression that the conditions I
believe to be responsible for other-direction
are affecting increasing numbers of people in
12%illiam H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man





the metropolitan centers of the advanced indus-
trial countries. My analysis of the other-
directed character is thus at once an analysis
of the American and of contemporary man. Much
of the time I find it hard or impossible to say
where one ends and the other begins. ^3°
Of course, if one insists that we are, in fact, a
highly individualistic people today, despite the Whytes
and the Riesmans, he is then confronted with the rather
obvious questions "Why so much furor over the highly-
heralded rebellion of youth against the •Establishment'?"
A thoughtful reply would almost certainly have to remind
us that stereotyping is not a one-way street. ^31
A paper by Abraham Hirsch offers pertinent
comment, and serves rather fittingly to conclude this
section of our examination of assumptions.
noJ David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney,
The Lonely Crowd (Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955)$
p. 35* (Anchor Books Edition)
3 1What we are saying here about stereotyping
American culture as individualistic could be said of other
illustrations that our authors use which space precludes
discussing. For example, the Israel kibbutz is given as
an illustration of the collateral, or peer-oriented,
orientation. In fact, the kibbutzim have never included
more than ten percent of the Israelis and currently
include only about three and one-half percent. It appears
to us questionable to use this mode of life as illustra-
tive of a culture. At best, it is a sub-culture, and the
lack of truly reliable information about its internal
functioning leaves us with some doubt about its useful-
ness, even in representing the latter. See Bruno' Bettel-





Actually, the American and the Vietnamese
value-systems have some things in common. The
American value-system is fairly rigid, and so
is the Vietnamese. Both systems stress con-
formity. Both offer acceptance into the group
only to those willing to abide closely to the
group's standards. Both systems impose on the
individual very specific patterns of behavior,
and both view with abhorrence any significant
deviations from these patterns. 132
The writer goes on to discuss the American self-
image of "rugged individualism" which he avers lacks
real substance.
It is his (the American's) selected status
group which provides him his standards: the
socio-economic or professional group with
which he identifies himself on the basis of
his occupation, his income, his education,
his location, or some other factor. This
identification leads him to a rather strict
conformism; it may influence the choice of
marriage partner, membership in social and
religious organizations, political behavior,
and such sumptuary patterns as his clothing,
the kind of house and neighborhood he resides
in, the kind of car he drives, the kind of
vacations he takes, etc 1 33
3 2Abraham m, Hirsch, Attitudinal Differences
Between Vietnamese and Americans (Saigon t Mimeographed








We shall now consider some of the assumptions
employed by our authors in developing and applying their
13^-
methodology, J We have seen the reasons for their
selecting, then modifying, the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
instrument for measuring value orientations. One under-
standable reason for the selection and modification
which plagues most research projects of this type is,
namely, that the instrument had to be simple enough
that costly training would not be required for its
administration. This helps make a project possible,
of course, but implies that were more time and funds
available, a more sophisticated instrument would have
been sought or developed — hardly a vote of confidence
*3^0ne problem in evaluating methodology in a
cross-cultural study is that there is hardly a single
"right'* method, to the exclusion of all others.
Anthropologist Harold E. Driver, who has given a number
of courses in Methods of Cross-Cultural Analysis, remarks,
M 0f the thousands of (ethnographic) field reports written
in this century, no two of them package their data in
the same manner • • . " The remark is applicable to
research project reports, as well. (See Harold E. Driver,
"Introduction to Statistics for Comparative Research",
in Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology , ed. by
Frank W. Moore (New Haven x Human Relations Area Files




in the instrument used. ->-> Similar weaknesses must be
noted if we are to understand the problems which typify
research projects in this field, and if we are to exer-
cise appropriate judgment in evaluating the findings
offered in the Sternin Volume itself.
In developing the Socio-Demographic Questionnaire,
the authors say they studied, among other characteristics,
those including exposure to battle, Viet-Cong contact,
contact with and exposure to foreign nationals. In
selecting the geographical area in which to conduct their
study, however, they tell us they chose an area with
relatively good security and ease of road travel, and
which had felt the least impact from American military
presence and operations.
Several things must be questioned about this
rationale. First, we must question what we mean by
"American military presence and operations", and the
impact therefrom. The data for this study was collected
13*5
-^This weakness is not unique to this study,
and in citing it we have no wish to cavil, but the point
is important in efforts to evaluate methodology. We
raised this question to M. Dean Havron, President of
the research firm, and senior author of the companion
volume, on 22 December 1969, who advised us that they
had turned to this instrument because there is so little
available in the field. In later conversation (22 Janu-
ary 1970), Havron also advised us that the Taxonomy of




in Dinh Tuong Province during eight months of 1967
(February to September), with research headquarters in
My Tho, as we have seen. The first United States military
base in the Mekong Delta was established in Dinh Tuong
Province in mid-January, 1967, only six miles outside
My Tho, a city of 80,000 people. 1 ^
It would appear, then, that the American military
"presence" was simply developing during the period of
the study, and that prior to mid-January the Vietnamese
in the general My Tho area had felt minimal impact. Let
us turn to an unofficial description, however, from an
eye and ear witness whose job in the My Tho area required
him to know what was going on and who provides a
"flavor" which does not appear in the official report,
above, or in the Sternin Volume.
In May, 1966, military representatives came
and said that American troops were going to
come — but top secret — nobody could know the
American troops were coming in. Even the
3 The base was called — wistfully — Dong Tarn,
that is, United Hearts and Minds! It consisted of a 600
acre "island" created among inundated rice paddies with
earth dredged from the bottom of the Mekong River. As
the official report puts it: "Occupying the base at
Dong Tam was the first step toward creating the Mobile
Riverine Force to operate on the waterways of the Delta."
U. S. G. Sharp and W. C. Westmoreland, Report on the War






Province Chief can't know it -- of course, the
Province Chief has to donate 90 acres of land
to build the base, but he can't know why. Here's
an American surveying team out there surveying
the land, but nobody can know why, I don't know
if they thought we were putting up Disneyland
East or what, but it was ridiculous. You could
go downtown and ask any local merchant when the
9th Division was arriving and he'd tell you —
but it was a big secret. The problem we were
facing anyway was that the land they were going
to build on was located approximately six miles
outside of town. The capitol (My Tho) is a city
of 80,000 people, which is no small city in
Vietnam. How do you stop several things from
happening — extravagant inflation — the worsen-
ing of relationships between Americans and
Vietnamese, Incidents arise when there is a
large amount of Americans — they go into town
and have a few drinks, get plastered, etc.
Sometimes we even had rapes and it just didn't
help relationships. There were no bars in our
city — none of the girlie bars and that sort of
thing. It was a real clean town, relatively
speaking. How do you go about — when it's a
big secret — making sure that this doesn't
happen in your province? How do you go about
arranging it so that people don't all leave the
farm to go to work for, Americans at three or four
times the price?1 37
The writer goes on to discuss alternatives that
confronted him — let "nature take its course" with a
number of "sin city" type shanty towns growing up around
the base i build a town, to satisfy American needs and
^This report is included in a file held by the
author. The reporter must remain anonymous. The file
itself, identified as File USX , is available for examina-
tion by interested researchers. The subject report is





"desires" in a controlled situation; surround the base
with barbed wire, etc. The latter effort was made, but
the reporter maintains that the minute American troops
arrived buses came from Saigon and unloaded girls at the
gate, who thenceforth "visited" men right in their
bunkers, despite all efforts to keep them out. Continued
raids finally disposed of most of them. In the meanwhile,
in order to prevent My Tho from being "adversely
affected", the entire city was put off limits, a large
social center was built for the Americans on their own
base, and American troops were forbidden to purchase
anything on the local economy. Nonetheless, inflation
ensued. -" (See footnote on previous page.)
The point we are making in citing the above
informal description of circumstances in the My Tho area
is that the terms "American military presence" and
"impact on the people" are highly ambiguous. Inflation
constitutes a major impact. The excitement of six months
of advance preparation for the arrival of the Americans,
the plans laid by respectable merchants on the one hand,
gamblers and prostitutes on the other, constitute major
impacts. The presence of the bar girls and prostitutes







of putting a major city completely off limits to
Americans is most assuredly a major impact in terms of
cross-cultural attitudes.
The author has personally witnessed the kind of
thing under discussion here, while in South Vietnam in
1965, 1967» and 1969. One illustration from a recent
visit (November, 1969) will suffice. When informally
questioned, a number of American Marines, in a unit some
50 miles south of Danang, advised us that, in view of
the fact that they are never permitted to leave the
confines of their base, they have no association with
South Vietnamese. They were quite sincere in this
belief. Yet upon further investigation, we learned
that 55 South Vietnamese civilians work on the base and
live in local hamlets. Not only do the Marines "assoc-
iate" with these civilian workers every day — the assoc-
iations generate all sorts of new status relationships
and problems. For example, the Vietnamese girls who
work as waitresses in both the enlisted and officer clubs
have been given "uniforms" to wear. In place of the
traditional ao dai, they wear blouses and mini-skirts.
The women who work as maids and laundresses provide their




Vietnamese workmen are paid according to a scale agreed
upon between American and Vietnamese officials. Somewhat
high by Vietnamese standards, perhaps, their wages are
far from exorbitant. Waitresses in the enlisted club,
however, on one evening following an American pay day,
may receive between thirty-five and one hundred dollars,
in tips, in the equivalent of American money. The
author learned that there is considerable resentment in
the hamlets where these waitresses live, because they
can afford luxuries far beyond the reach of other
workers on the base, and, of course, those who do not
work on the base at all. How does one measure "American
impact"?
Another question that must be raised about the
selection of the study area is that of extrapolating data
from a "secure" situation and applying it to an insecure
situation, or one in which the Viet Cong prevail. This
is a problem with virtually every study carried out in
South Vietnam,
Next, the authors tell us that since the study
was designed to help collect cultural data useful for
psychological operations, it was desirable that the




Vietnamese who are likely targets of psychological
operations and pacification efforts . But the most
likely target of such operations and efforts are those
in areas controlled "by the Viet Cong! ^
Again, the Delta area was chosen because it "was
the subject of more published ethnographic research than
any other region" • But ethnographic research normally
means surveys, and the more the surveys, the less naive
the subjects surveyed. Since it is a common and almost
certainly well-founded assumption that Vietnamese (and
*3
"Another question about the choice of the sam-
ple population concerns the intent to select "ethnic
Vietnamese", This is a commonly used term. What does
it really mean? The authors distinguish between "ethnic
Vietnamese" and "other ethnic groups" such as the Chinese
or the Montagnards. During one thousand years of Chinese
rule, the Viets intermarried with their racially differ-
ent conquerors. In turn, various tribal groups migrated
into the mountains of Vietnam; many have retained their
identity, many have been incorporated into Vietnamese
culture, as have the neighboring Chams and numerous
Khmer-speaking peoples. As Chester Bain points out,
"Modern Vietnamese are racially and linguistically the
product of this fusion. Physical types vary, depending
on the degree to which Chinese, Cham, Thai, Khmer, or
other physical characteristics prevail. The original
Viet language was probably a Thai-related dialect, but
centuries of fusion have altered it." (See Chester A.
Bain, Vietnamt The Roots of Conflict (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.i Prentice-Hall, 1967)
, p. 38* ) In a land of a
great number of "tribal groups" (one can identify at
least 18 tribal groups among the Montagnards alone), one






many other people throughout the world) have a tendency
to answer as they think they are expected to, is it poss-
ible that those surveyed in the present study would be so
test-wise that their responses would be suspect on these
grounds alone? In fact, My Tho appears to lend itself so
well to data acquisition that when a Military Information
Specialist was sent to Dinh Tuong Province in 1967, his
job was
... to set up a collation center in My Tho
city • • • for the purpose of gathering as much
information as possible concerning what the VC
were doing to undermine the South Vietnamese
military and civilian structures and American
efforts in the province.
3"This same specialist gives us further insight
into the area — insight hardly serving to allay our
suspicions.
"My job was to try to collate all of the
information that was being produced in the pro-
vince by the various agencies working there to
find out how we could better use what we had
available to us in order to neutralize the effect
of the VC in the province. My job was predominantly
important to the military tasked with keeping
Highway b open. Dinh Tuong was the most important
province in IV Corps because this road was the only
link between the Mekong Delta and Saigon . Every-
thing produced in the Delta was sent to Saigon
on Highway 4 so the road had to be kept open."
(Underlining ours.)
The Information Specialist goes on to tell us of the var-
ious individuals and agencies he worked with, including
Vietnamese and American military, pacification workers,
and, not least to be mentioned, "another fellow there who




The position and nature of My Tho lead to other,
related questions. The authors tell us that their
research company was known to and "had previously estab-
lished rapport with local GVN and U. S. officials".
Anyone who has functioned in South Vietnam must ask to
what degree a study is influenced by rapport with such
officials. For example, how responsive will South
Vietnamese "peasants" be to questions placed by inves-
tigators who have "established rapport" with provincial
capitol officials? How much will the provincial offi-
cials influence the direction of the study, the areas
to be surveyed, the individuals who assist, guide,
interpret for the investigators?
We are told that My Tho had the advantage of
being readily accessible to Saigon, and of being a
relatively large town, yet, at the same time, that the
desire was to study residents of rural, rather than urban
areas. We have already noted from other sources that
"Dinh Tuong was the most important province in IV Corps
because this road (Highway ^) was the only link between
the Mekong Delta and Saigon".
Tuong Province for four years. Included as Number 2 in




Another insight is provided by another official's
description of the area.
Dinh Tuong Province is one of the most
important in the country. It has a population
of 600,000, and it's very close to Saigon • • .
It's an old educational center, so the level of
sophistication of the people is relatively high.
It's also very important strategically and
economically — it's the largest pork producing
province in the country. 1 ^
The scene, in other words, is somewhat less than
typically bucolic. Can rural residents of such an area
be accurately compared with rural residents in much more
remote areas, which are never visited by outsiders, are
relatively inaccessible to the national capitol or any
other capitol, more likely to be controlled by the Viet
Cong than by the Government, much poorer, and so on?
In brief, the question becomes » "How representative is
•representative'?"
The authors were careful in their selection of
Vietnamese interviewers. Was their carefulness effective?
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Elihu Katz, and others have addressed
the problem of "the two-step flow of communication" in
interviewing
,
and, following their line of reasoning,
1 Included as Number 3 in our File USX , previ-
ously cited.
lZflElihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal




David Riesman and his associates have observed that "a
lower-class response to a middle-class interviewer could
not be analyzed in the same terms as an upper-class
142
response to the same interviewer"
•
It would appear to be this dynamic at work,
coupled with attitudes toward officialdom mentioned
above, that resulted in the situation our authors them-
selves describe.
Problems encountered in the administration
of the SDQ instrument (Socio-Demographic
Questionnaire) were related primarily to the
fear that rural people have about answering
questions concerning their life histories,
which they likened to a police investigation.
Some thought the questionnaire would be used
to determine what kind of relations the
respondent had with the Viet Cong. They were
also afraid of increased taxation and the
military draft. One person indicated that he
thought the Americans were doing the interview-
ing in preparation for moving the families out
of the area so that a new base could be con-
structed there, (These seemed related to a
Viet-Cong propaganda offensive at the time of
the construction of the American base near
1 h,p
David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Social
Structure, Character Structure and Opinion", in Inter-
national Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research . 2,
(19^8), pp. 512-527. See also Stein Rokkan, "Compara-
tive Cross-National Research: The Context of Current
Efforts", in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds.,






Thanh Due. The Viet-Cong claimed that peopled
land was being taken without payment.
J
1^3
Most of the Vietnamese interviewers were teachers
doing graduate work at the University of Saigon. They
were selected because of being ethnic Vietnamese, who
spoke the language, were sensitive to cultural and social
differences, familiar with local customs, and not condes-
cending toward the rural population, among other reasons.
In light of the above description of difficulties they
experienced, one can only hope that these virtues were
all operative. It is very difficult to judge, but it
does not really seem likely, or, if it does, it might
simply verify that the hamlets involved were not rural
in a fully representative sense. It has been our exper-
ience that some residents of Saigon and other major
cities in South Vietnam suffer a more acute "culture
shock" when they first see truly rural areas than do our
own American military personnel? Presuming their
•^Sternin Volume , pp. 38-39, Again we can glean
an insight into the question of "American impact" dis-
cussed above.
Ik|i ... ... . -
An investigation of the feasibility of social
science research in villages in Thailand cites as one
problem, for example, the arousing of villagers' hostility,
because in some cases "Thai university graduates enter-
tain patronizing attitudes ..." Pilot Study and Feasi-





familiarity with the area t however, then we must raise
another question.
Our authors note that it would have been desir-
able to pretest the instruments used in the province
where the surveying would be done, Dinh Tuong. Because
headquarters had not yet been established in My Tho,
however, pretesting was carried out in a hamlet in Gia
Dinh Province, "which was readily accessible and familiar
to the Vietnamese interviewers who had worked there dur-
ing their undergraduate and graduate work studies at the
university". Again we must ask: How naive were the
subjects used in the pretesting? Did the hamlet's
proximity to a university make it more test-wise and
sophisticated than would be a truly rural hamlet? Would
students be inclined to return to their familiar haunts
and old acquaintances, whom they had questioned before
while engaged in other studies? These same inquiries
must be pursued if the interviewers were indeed familiar
with the Dinh Tuong hamlets tested.
Thai Villages . Prepared by ABT Associates, Cambridge,
Mass., for Advanced Research Projects Agency, Washington,
D.C., 31 August 1966, p. 18.






We are told, too, about the interviewers that,
whereas they received several explanatory sessions and
additional training for the research project, many of
them had to leave before the project was completed. A
number of new interviewers were hired, some of whom were
suspected of writing answers to questionnaires without
interviewing intended respondents.
The Taxonomy of Concerns was given two pretests.
Since the second set of items, we are told, contained
most of the more difficult items, and time was limited,
it "did not receive the same amount of attention in
preparation as did the first set". Further, the T/C
,
which was developed to help compensate for inadequacies
of the Value Orientation Schedule, was administered in
only one hamlet. Binh Hanh . This could be a serious
flaw.
The authors have made much of the Taxonomy of
Concerns intended to compensate for deficiencies in the
Value Orientation Schedule. However, the Taxonomy of
Concerns was administered only in Binh Hanh. And
whereas the authors assert that "because the variations






universal demographic characteristics — age, sex, and
level of education — there is some evidence that these
value differences may well be manifested in other hamlets
throughout the Mekong Delta" , we find no evidence in
147
their report to support such a statement.
We should add, too, about the Taxonomy of
Concerns, that the first set of forty-five items (out
of a total of ninety) was given two pretests, whereas
the second set of forty-five items, containing most of
the more difficult questions, "did not receive the same
amount of attention in preparation as did the first
set", again because of time limitations.
In regard to the Communications Questionnaire,
we are told that it was pretested in the hamlet of Long
Than "adjacent to the Buddhist study hamlet of Binh
Hanh" • Did the word get to Binh Hanh before the inter-
viewers did? We are minded of the comments above of
the official unable to get the United States military
to release "top secret" information which he was able
^Martin Sternin advised us in telephone con-
versation on 1? December 1969 that a significant amount
of data had been acquired in the study, but had not been
processed or reported. However, no specific evidence
was offered to support the statement about broader mani-





to get from any merchant in My Tho. Further, it had
been anticipated that ten to fifteen people would be
identified as key communicators. However, the respond-
ents in all hamlets singled out consistently only two or
three people as key communicators, usually the most
important people in the hamlet — village chiefs, hamlet
chiefs, and religious leaders. These people, however,
were too busy to be persuaded to take the entire battery
of tests, so that the plan to administer all four
instruments to them had to be abandoned. Moreover,
"only limited time remained for field work, and there
was pressure to complete as many questionnaires with as
many people as possible".
The problem of time limitations is noted again
and again. For example
i
In the case of the T/C as in the VOS, no
system of interviewer checking was devised.
Since time was rapidly running out, each repeat
interview conducted would have resulted in one
less new interview. However, incidents did \lq
occur which made check interviews a necessity. "
Again i "The whole translation process proved extremely
time-consuming and resulted in the loss of valuable time
148
Sternin Volume , pp. 37-38.





which otherwise could have been used for more extensive
pretesting."
^ Much of what we have said above is summarized
with refreshing candor by the authors themselves, in a
frank review of the field research activities. Their
statement deserves quoting in full.
"The second important set of factors (deter-
mining methods and forms of data analysis)
stemmed directly from the very practical problems
encountered in attempting to carry out systematic
data collection in a foreign language, in a for-
eign culture, in a none-too-secure field situation.
In such a situation, where normally routine, simple
tasks easily can present formidable and extremely
time-consuming difficulties, one is continually
confronted with the differences between how one
would like to do a particular task and what one
must settle for under the exigencies of the
situation. There is no way to minimize the extent
to which practical difficulties inherent in the
field research situation affected the design of
the research study, characteristics of the data
collecting instruments, and ways in which data
could be meaningfully analyzed.
"Under different circumstances, far more exten-
sive pretesting would have been done during the
instrument development phase. A number of pre-
tests would have been desirable to provide data
for item analyses and to give greater opportunity
for improving the translation, relevance, and
semantic equivalence of items. Repeated item
analyses could have permitted further improvements
in the equivalence of items within a given orien-
tation and in the cultural relevance, clarity, and
conceptual purity of alternatives.
"As it was, under the field conditions of this
study, only limited pretesting was feasible and
this was more for the purpose of training inter-
viewers and eliminating the most obvious inadequa-





With this summary by the authors, we complete
our examination of methodological assumptions and the
assumptions basic to the entire research project, an
examination we began on page 77 of this paper, at which
point we noted that critical fault in either set of
assumptions could invalidate, or at least make ques-
tionable, the findings of the study.
Our examination has been critical to the point
of the near-piccayune. We have justified it on the
grounds of reasons set forth in our Introductory
Chapter, on the basis of our personal discussions with
a number of commercial contractors engaged in cross-
cultural interaction research, and on examinations of
the literature which have repeatedly yielded the finding
that not only commercial contractors but many academi-
cians in cross-cultural fields have presented reports
of studies in which populations sampled have been
extremely small, and methodological weaknesses have been
systematic item analyses. When the data analysis
began, therefore, there was no systematic know-
ledge of i (1) item equivalence within orienta-
tions, (2) correlations between orientations, and
(3) scale properties of items. The lack of this
kind of information heavily influenced the kind
of analysis performed."




obvious. Moreover, there is a strong tendency for
researchers in the field to quote one another as author-
ities, or to cite repeatedly two or three studies which
become authoritative because so frequently cited! ^
^ Philip E. Converse, of Michigan University's
Survey Research Center, details the questions concerning
the degree of control which must be exercised in cross-
cultural survey studies. These include questions about
surveillance and cross-checking of individual efforts in
each phase of the operation. Items must be pretested
for comprehension, pains must be taken with interviewers
and coders, and so on, "through a long list of other con-
trol processes, all of which have been shown to be
necessary • • •" Converse further observes
i
"Sad to say, any one of these control efforts
absorbs time and personnel, and thereby repre-
sents cost. Furthermore, controls can be lopped
off here and there at considerable savings without
the difference being detectable to the client or
the outside observer either in the general study
description or in the tabulations which represent
the study project. These things being so,
commercial agencies, whose prime attention must be
focused on matters of cost and profit, are under
strong pressures to cut corners on control proce-
dures ... It is rare that there is any real
external check on the accuracy of these types of
materials. In the eventuality that a competitor
might study the same questions with the same tools
six months later, most gross differences in
results could be attributed to 'real' change.
"From a number of glimpses into the inner
workings of some relatively prestigeful commer-
cial houses on both sides of the Atlantic, I have
come to doubt severely that there is more than a
tiny handful of agencies that consistently run
a well controlled survey operation. I suspect
further that a significant proportion of the





Now, however, we must make a value judgment,
1 52We previously listed the Findings of this study •* as
succinctly presented in the Havron Volume which comple-
ments the Sternin Volume. The important task ahead of
us is to evaluate these Findings and to question the
authors* interpretations of the Findings, as well as
their recommendations about using the Findings in cross-
cultural interaction efforts. But, has our examination
of the various assumptions of the study revealed so
many weaknesses and/or questionable procedures that the
Findings must be almost certainly unreliable? To reply
is to make a value judgment.
Our several discussions with M. Dean Havron,
President of the research firm, senior author of one
volume in the study, co-author of the other, as well as
past data to social science research not only
run virtually uncontrolled operations, but
would not know how to do a well controlled
operation if they were asked."
These are strong words, indeed, and would seem to justify
a much more thorough examination of the study we have
been considering than that to which we have subjected it.
See Philip E. Converse, "The Availability and Quality of
Sample Survey Data in Archives within the United States",
in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, op.cit. t pp.
152





careful examination of many other research projects
carried out by this same firm under his direction, con-
vince us that every reasonable effort was made to effect
a highly controlled project, within the cost, time, and
other limitations discussed above. As we noted at the
outset of this chapter, the study is representative of
work in the field of cross-cultural interaction. We
might well say that it appears to us to be representative
of the best work in the field.
This judgment obviously does not resolve the
questions How reliable are the Findings? This is
exceedingly difficult to judge. Of all the weaknesses
or questionable procedures we have discussed, that which
continues to disturb us most is that the all-important
Taxonomy of Concerns, developed exclusively for this
study because the authors deemed it essential, was applied
to so small a sample of the population — only 120 resi-
dents of one village, out of the 360 total sampling
population in all three villages tested by the other
instruments. In light of the various problems we dis-
cussed above, how broadly applicable are such findings?
We simply to not know. The findings within the small




value orientations according to content areas on a
significantly better than chance basis. But what would
happen statistically if the sample were expanded, or to
what degree the data can be extrapolated from the small
sample and applied to all rural South Vietnamese —
these are entirely different questions.
Peter Nordlie, whom we have mentioned as one of
the Sternin Volume authors, has reported elsewhere on
efforts to compare values data obtained on three differ-
ent American samples with that of the Vietnamese sample.
He observes:
The general picture is this. Twenty values
comparisons can be made between the Vietnamese
and an American sample. Three American groups
give us a total of 60 comparisons. Of these 60
comparisons, 5$ of the differences are statis-
tically significant and most of them highly so.
The differences among the American groups tend
to be trivial. !53
(See Figures II-3 and II-4, pages 165 and 166.)
This is an interesting and helpful finding in
terms of the potential of the authors 1 techniques for
comparing certain Americans with 120 South Vietnamese
of Binh Dinh hamlet. Not too much else is readily
apparent.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































How resolve our dilemma? Perhaps it is insol-
uble, but we do have a reasonable approach available.
At the outset of this chapter, we stated that we would
address two representative studies, one in values, one
in attitudes, We also observed that these concepts are
often ill-defined and frequently overlap. The latter
is equally true of research projects nominally addressed
to either of the two concepts. Much of what we find in
each category of study, therefore, is applicable to
the other.
Since this is particularly true of the second
study we shall consider, it appears advisable to complete
a similar examination of it, present its findings, then
compare the two sets of findings, interpretations, and
recommendations. We have especially good reason for this
approach. Our second study was carried out with a far
greater sampling population — greater, indeed, than is
the case with any prior cross-cultural survey ever under-
taken in South Vietnam, to our knowledge. The study was
initiated in 1965 and has been continued both in succes-
sive formal phases and by way of on-going, informal
reports from knowledgeable observers since that date.




American military personnel in South Vietnam, includes
surveys of South Vietnamese military and para-military
personnel and civilians. Further, we shall include in
our examination of this second study a number of refer-
ences to other studies which will be frequently appli-
cable to the Sternin study as well. Finally, in various
phases, various types of testing instruments have been
used. The possibilities for at least limited "cross-
validation" of the values study by Sternin and associates






REPRESENTATIVE STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL INTERACTION
The Attitude Approach
The main study we shall examine in this chapter
is comprised of several successive research efforts
carried out in relation to the United States Navy and
Marine Corps Personal Response Project . Each research
effort carries an individual title, but we shall refer
to the overall study as the Personal Response Pro.ject
Attitude Surveys *
The Personal Response Project has the general
objective of assisting American military personnel to
"understand the people of an unfamiliar culture by
discovering the ways in which their cultural patterns,
and especially their religious and ethical value systems,
affect daily thoughts and actions", in order that con-
structive mutual relations may ensue. v Project
Sponsors engage in two major activities: (a) carrying
out research programs to yield a data base on which
* Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook
(Washington, D.C.i Department of the Navy, Headquarters,





training and orientation programs and resource materials
for personnel deploying to overseas areas may be developed
and refined; (b) developing and carrying out this train-
ing and orientation effort. We shall examine the latter
activity when we address the subject of training in a
later chapter. At present, our concern is with the field
research conducted to support the training effort.
Interestingly, the first research effort was
designed to collect data on values of the South Vietnam-
ese
,
particularly religious and ethical values, while
successive efforts have been designed primarily to sur-
vey attitudes of both American military personnel and
South Vietnamese. *° The attitude surveys, in turn, have
been conducted in an effort to define cross-cultural
interaction problems attributable to differences in
value systems between Americans and South Vietnamese, as
reflected by expressed attitudes and behavior of both.
In fact, the official Marine Corps Instruction
describing the project explicitly interrelates attitudes
and values
»
1 55see The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith
and Fact , op.cit. i and Understanding the Vietnamese (FPO,
San Francisco i Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 1966).
Titles and bibliographical data for each atti-




Personal Response • • • is a systematic
effort in intercultural attitude improvement
involving an understanding of indigenous cul-
tural value systems, customs and religious
mores • • • (Certain) studies 1^ , , ,
identify and measure favorable and unfavorable
attitude and behavior patterns which directly
and indirectly affect American-Vietnamese
relations. These studies point to a need for
orientation among American personnel in
Vietnamese cultural value systems, customs
and religious mores in order to circumvent the
development of indigenous civilian hostility
toward Americans as a result of thoughtless or
irresponsible behavior. 15°
The first research effort on behalf of the
Project was begun in July of 1°65» The most recent
data collecting effort was completed in April of 1 Q69»
and, as of the current date (January 1970) is still
being processed and analyzed. Between these two dates
there have been several successive research efforts,
so that we are dealing with a continuing program, but
one being conducted in at least partially discrete
phases. We shall consider each of the research efforts
a "phase", and so designate it in our examination. A
brief precis of each phase, with some general historical
1
^^The "(Certain) studies" referenced are the
attitude surveys we shall be examining^
*^ I Corps Coordinator Instruction lj60.1. para,
l.a. (Ill Marine Amphibious Force, Fleet Marine Force,





background to provide perspective, is provided as
Appendix A of the present manuscript.
Conceptual Parameters: Innovation Diffusion
and Cognitive Dissonance
Much of the conceptual framework for the Personal
Response Project Attitude Surveys has been borrowed from
the work of Everett M. Rogers Jy and that of Leon
Pestinger •
Personal Response researchers believe that the
systematic surveys of American and Vietnamese attitudes
have "led to a communications strategy based on awareness
of the social patterns of innovation diffusion, of the
principles of learning involved in the modification of
attitudes, and of the vital role of cognitive dissonance
161
in the motivation of learned behavior" • The communi-
cations strategy "was envisioned as having three major
steps i the segmentation of the target, the discernment
^Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations
(New York i Free Press of Glencoe, 1964),
1 Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Disson-
ance (Stanford, Calif
.
t Stanford University Press, 1957).
l6l







of opinion leaders, and the linkage of target personnel,
16?
attitudinal problems and types of communication".
The attitude surveys cited above were believed
to have given a number of clues to understanding how
negative attitudes toward the South Vietnamese are
learned and reinforced in Vietnam. As we shall see
when examining each survey individually, distinctive
patterns of attitudinal trends and reversals of trends
are considered to have been revealed. Allowing for
broad interpre tability of the terms like and dislike
(and we shall see below the more specific meanings of
the terms), there appeared to be three general categor-
ies among personnel* those who liked the Vietnamese,
those who were neutral , those who disliked them. In
each category were some who had had previous conscious
experience with the Vietnamese and some who had not. 3
*"^W« Warren Newman, "The Personal Response
Project — A Communications Perspective", in Conference
on Research in Cross-Cultural Interaction , sponsored by
Group Psychology Branch, Office of Naval Research, and
Chief of Chaplains, Bureau of Naval Personnel (Washington,
D.C.i Chaplain Corps Planning Group, 1968)1 pp. ^-5.
(Much of the description of the communications strategy
given here is adapted from the Newman paper.)
1
^3it will be recalled that earlier in this chap-
ter we described Americans who in fact "associated" with
Vietnamese every day — Vietnamese maids, laundresses,
and others — but who, when questioned, say sincerely




The surveys also seemed to indicate, within the frame-
work of the Rogers theory, those most likely to respond
most quickly to efforts to modify their attitudes. (See
Figure III-l.)
~l
Pig, III-l.—Segmenting the target for
attitude development*
Those having had exper-
ience with Vietnamese
Those not yet having had.
experience with Vietnamese
PRO-ORIENTED Successful Experience •Anxious to try
Supportive communica-




















Attitude change likely only
after long campaign, a




Reproduced from W. Warren Newman, op.cit. . p. 5«
Everett M. Rogers has postulated that individuals
in any group are normally distributed on a curve as
innovators , trial testers , early followers , late followers
and laggards , with respect to potential for attitude
change and the dissemination of new ideas, methods,
materials, etc. — in other words, the "diffusion of




















































































various individual and social characteristics with each
of these categories, and Personal Response investigators
argue that their attitude surveys have likewise yielded
such characteristics, hence enabling them to project an
identification of opinion leaders and prospective opinion
leaders among Americans in South Vietnam, We shall
examine this claim below. Figure III-3 offers an example
of such a projective identification.
Such projections are said to make feasible the
concentration of educational efforts on prospective opin-
ion leaders who would then favorably influence the opin-
ions and attitudes of the greatest number of people.
The innovators in this system are considered a special
kind of trial tester, identifiable as prospective opinion
leaders because relatively free of the social liabilities
with which the stereotyped dreamer or visionary is
burdened. Their prestige, known experience, and practi-
cal achievements preclude their being so stereotyped.
Festinger's "cognitive dissonance" has been
equally important conceptually to the construction of
attitude survey designs in the Personal Response Project,
Festinger holds that many individuals seek spontaneously
179




to reduce tensions induced by conflict between group
opinions or attitudes and their own personal opinions
or attitudes. Within the framework of American Marine-
Vietnamese relationships, McGonigal and others have been
particularly interested in testing for signs of "strain
between private belief and actual practice" , and for
tendencies for Americans in this milieu "to try to
reduce cognitive dissonance by either changing their
actions or their beliefs". Indeed, McGonigal states the
Personal Response mission as helping personnel "reduce
cognitive dissonance by drawing both actions and beliefs
into closer accord with our fundamental beliefs about
human life and our reason for existence in the military".
In his September 1966 survey, he presents a chart reveal-
ing the cognitive dissonance dynamic at work, and says
that it "contains the most significant observation in
this study". * The chart reflects findings that the
individual sees his peer group as more negative in atti-
tude toward the South Vietnamese than he is, and attempts
to make his expressed opinions and behavior consonant
with theirs.
l6
^Richard A. McGonigal, Second Project Phase
cited







The third step of the communications strategy
is as complex as it is ambitious. The objective is to
link target personnel, attitudinal problems, and types
of communication. Its primary relation to the attitude
surveys lies in its dependence on such surveys to identify
stimuli and symbols which appear to provoke unfavorable
responses in a communications system. For example, the
verbal use of the word "gook" is a rather obvious
stimulus. Less obvious a stimulus would be an American's
approaching a lesser personage than the village chief
when he wants to discuss something related to the village.
Even less obvious would be the stimuli evoked in a common
experience of American truck drivers in rural areas.
Blowing a horn often means to a Vietnamese i "I see you.
Don't be concerned, I won't hit you," To the Marine
Private truck driver recently from Brooklyn, a horn means
no such thing, "The 'gook' is just too stupid or too
166
stubborn to move!" This leads us to a discussion of
^Of course, the theory of Edward T. Hall that
we communicate in an almost infinite variety of non-verbal
ways is so basic to Personal Response Project research,
and is so well known, that it needs little discussion
here as one of the theoretical "givens" in the Personal
Response efforts. We shall describe the Silent Language
concepts briefly, at a later point. See Edward T. Hall,








The concept of culture shock is extremely impor-
tant to the theoretical background of the Personal
Response Project, including its first phase, the collec-
tion of data on South Vietnamese religious, ethical and
other cultural values. The literature on this phenomenon
is voluminous, but it seems particularly fitting to cite
the description given by the Martin I, Sternin of our
"value study"
•
Sternin describes culture shock as one form of
various reactions which may mark the entrance of many
people into a foreign culture.
(Culture shock) is the most popularly recog-
nized form of shock reaction. Its onset is fre-
quently abrupt, making it all the more dramatic,
and its effects are disturbing to watch. A man
in culture shock is frightened — he withdraws
as far as possible, usually to the seclusion of
his room j he is depressed, alone and irritable.
He rarely ventures out except to attend to the
most basic necessities and these excursions are
extremely difficult, causing him considerable
anxiety. He is pitifully incapacitated and, if
this state is prolonged, he may even become a
danger to himself. The usual and most human





Culture shock • • • serves very important
protective functions • The importance of these
functions is reflected in the obvious severity
which some of these shock reactions display
If I were asked to speculate upon just what
this real or experienced danger consisted of, I
would be inclined to propose that in the case
of Americans, it is concerned most often with a
sense of helplessness and a fear of losing
control • • •
Shock reactions appear to fall into two very
general classes — though they all serve the same
function of avoiding direct emotional confronta-
tion with a state of helplessness. It is ironic
that that state is often the very outcome of these
protective devices, but the helplessness in those
cases is self-produced and emotionally avoided.
The two classes of reactions I have in mind can
be loosely called "active** and "passive". In the
former the avoidance is achieved by actions which
steer the individual away from honestly dealing
with an alternative, foreign world view. In the
latter, the avoidance is achieved by means of *,„
withdrawal. Culture shock is a passive reaction. '
Otto Schneider describes less dramatic appearing
reactions indicating culture shock, illustrates these
within the context of the situation in South Vietnam,
and explains the practical importance of the phenomenon
in terms of the Personal Response Project.
^Martin I. Sternin, "Toward the Specification
of a General Adaptation Process in Americans Overseas"
,







One of the important goals of Personal Res-
ponse orientation is a reduction of the effects
of culture shock • • • The sounds, smells,
inability to communicate verbally, uncertainty
and discomfort around people of a different
culture or race and difficulty in understanding
their manner of approaching familiar situations
creates feelings of confusion, anxiety, frustra-
tion, contempt, and in its worst instance,
hostility • • • You'll sometimes hear • • • i
"I'm over here for 13 months, I'll do my job
but don't ask me to have anything to do with
those gooks. I don't want to know anything
about them, etc., etc." This is usually
expressed with bravado and profanity to give
the appearance of toughness. Actually, under-
neath the surface, you will probably find a very
anxious individual experiencing culture shock
and attempting to relieve the feelings of dis-
comfort through an expression of haughtiness,
superiority or outright contempt. lo°
Schneider then graphically describes certain of
the practices observed among some South Vietnamese by
Americans in regard to such mundane fundamentals as the
failure to use toilet paper, failure to use a handker-
chief, etc. The image of the "primitive, dirty gook" is
readily aroused. If this happens early in an American's
tour of duty, without previous instruction in "cultural
mores" of the South Vietnamese, negative attitudes are
developed or reinforced.
Otto Schneider, Personal Response: Concepts
and Objectives (Camp Pendleton, Calif . 1 Headquarters,






Richard A. McGonigal addresses the concept of
culture shock as a critical impediment to combat
effectiveness in Vietnam, and, in fact, at one point
defines the Personal Response Project largely in terms
of efforts to reduce culture shock. "^ McGonigal con-
trasts a jnythical Marine Captain newly arrived in South
Vietnam, able to speak some Vietnamese, familiar with
the history of Vietnam, and able to discuss in some
detail the various Vietnamese religions and other cul-
tural practices, with a mythical Marine Corporal. The
Corporal is a high school dropout, the Captain a univer-
sity graduate. The Captain, on arriving, sees nothing
but "dirty, lazy, corrupt gooks", who are, in fact,
Vietnamese Popular Forces. The Corporal is already eat-
ing with the PFs, sharing a rough "hootch" with them,
and has already had his life saved by them in fire fights.
If the Corporal ever experienced culture shock, he has
recovered, and is now communicating an attitude of trust
and respect toward the South Vietnamese. The Captain
has already begun communicating contempt. The assumption
^Richard A. McGonigal, For Want of an Attitude
(Quantico, Va. i Marine Corps Development and Education






is clearly in favor of the Corporal's being much more
successful in training and motivating PFs than the
Captain will be.
Whereas one might argue "consistency theory" » as
does Harry Triandis, to the effect that "the greater the
cognitive similarity between two people the more they
will be effective in communicating with each other and
170
the more they will like each other" , as McGonigal
justifiably points out, our mission requires sending men
of all backgrounds to fight an insurgency. Most of
these come from white, middle-class suburbia. It is
with all of them that efforts must be made to reduce
culture shock and produce attitudes which will speed
pacification and nation building. The total effort to
reduce culture shock among the 77,000 Americans of
I Corps, in South Vietnam, and their successors, and to
equip them with communication skills and motivate them
to motivate host national forces "has been labeled the
Personal Response Project".
7 Harry C. Triandis, "Categories of Thought of
Managers, Clerks and Workers About Jobs and People in an






Since the "culture shock" phenomenon is referred
to so frequently in cross-cultural interaction literature,
and since Personal Response Project investigators and
training officers have made so much of it, one further
reference may be useful. Anthropologist Cora Du Bois,
for example, tells us that culture shock "is a malady
that seems to affect most transplanted people". She
considers the genesis of the malady very simple, namely,
that it is precipitated "by the anxiety that results from
171
losing all your familiar cues"
•
* 71Cora Du Bois goes on to sayi
"People the world over react to frustrations
in fairly comparable ways. First they reject,
with repressed or expressed aggression, the
environment that causes them discomfort. Second
they regress with irrational fervor to the familiar
and comforting. If you observe a group of
Americans — or any other group of nationals —
in the throes of culture shock the symptoms are
startlingly similar. The slightest inefficiency
or delay — particularly variations from our own
obsessional time sense — provoke disproportionate
anger. All things American acquire new and a
sometimes irrational importance. You have all
experienced how easy it is to shift from being a
"live-and-let-live" patriot to being a chauvinist
when you are abroad. You have all observed the
tendency of American tourists to cluster together
even though they may be spending only a few weeks
of their hard-earned vacation to see the English
in England or the French in France.
"There are other manifestations — the sitting





Specific ways in which these postulates —
innovation diffusion, cognitive dissonance, and culture
shock — have provided conceptual guidelines for various
phases of the Personal Response Project will be discussed
below. We now have sufficient background, however, to
review the research procedures reported for each phase
of research. If our review must follow a tortuous path,
it should be recalled that we are considering at least
seven distinct field research efforts, some of which
concern American attitudes ; others, Vietnamese attitudes;
still others, reciprocal attitudes. Moreover, a variety
of testing instruments were employed and must be examined.
Finally, the very first study directly addressed the
question of values, that of attitudes only indirectly,
while successive studies have taken almost the opposite
grousing about the host country. When you begin
hearing broad, and usually derogatory, comments
like — the Burmese are lazy; the Indians are
ignorant; the French are grasping; the Americans
are materialistic, or naive or shallow — then
you can be fairly sure the speaker is suffering
culture shock. The trouble with this disease is
that its symptoms can become chronic. As a
result you never do acquire an adequate adjust-
ment to the new environment."
Cora Du Bois, "Culture Shock", in Special Publication
Series. Number 1 (New Yorki Institute of International







approach. Indeed, the emphasis on attitude research has
been considered vital by the investigator who has pursued
most of the research, Richard A, McGonigal. Addressing
the American Psychological Division, McGonigal observed
i
At every step of the way attitude research
has been pivotal to progress. What we learned
in Southeast Asia has taught us more about our
problems at home. The name of the game in
Vietnam is relationship. When a Marine sees the
ancient Vietnamese grandmother who smiles at him
with her beetlenut stained, ebony teeth as a
full-fledged human being , he is ready to operate
more effectively than we had ever hoped. He
becomes more careful in his use of firepower,
more sensitive in dealing with refugees and a
better trainer of host counterparts. 1 72
In an effort to avoid confusion to the degree
possible in managing so many reports and so much data,
we shall organize our examination of each research phase
in the following fashion. First, we shall simply des-
cribe the methodology for each research phase, without
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evaluation. IJ Secondly, we shall present the principal
^^Richard A. McGonigal, Uses of Gross-Cultural
Attitude Research in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.t
American Psychological Association, Sponsoring Division
19, September 3, 1969). (Mimeographed form of lecture
prepared as a field paper and provided us by McGonigal.
)
?^We shall make one exception. The first
research effort, that concerned with values, differs sub-
stantially in methodological approach from all successive
efforts, and we can offer so little by way of evaluation
that it seems feasible to append it immediately to the




findings for each research phase. Thirdly, we shall exam-
ine and evaluate the assumptions of the field research
and the general methodology employed in each. Fourthly,
we shall attempt to evaluate the findings of each.
Research Procedures
Phase Onet Religious and Ethical Values of the South
174Vietnamese '
The fundamental premise of this study, explicitly
offered by the author as the first of his "guidelines for
understanding", is that man's basic physical, mental,
* ^"Reported in studies previously cited: The
Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and Fact , and Under-
standing the Vietnamese^ As noted previously, the first
of these was written by Robert L. Mole, the second in
collaboration with Richard A. McGonigal, based on Mole's
findings. A brief precis of Mole's background is perti-
nent to understanding his research procedures. He spent
6 years as a missionary of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church in the "Bible Lands" of the Middle East (Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, and related areas), where
he likewise established the first coeducational college
among Arabs, in Lebanon, The Middle East College, in
which he likewise taught history. He served in a liaison
capacity with various Middle East Government representa-
tives, and organized the work of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church in Cyprus. He spent from July 1965 to July 1966
in South Vietnam, continued studying his research find-
ings in 1966 and 1967 at American University's Center for
South and Southeast Asian Studies, and returned to South
Vietnam in September 1967 for a second year of similar









social and spiritual needs are universally the same, but
expressed and satisfied in different — sometimes radi-
cally different — ways. '* There are two reasons for
this disparity i (a) "varying geographical, historical,
economic and religious factors determine the value systems
of a people or locality" i (b) these value systems
"dramatically influence the manners, customs and daily
behavior patterns of communities and individuals".
Behavior, then, is never haphazard t it is habitually
consistent with the value structures built by a particu-
176lar complex of influences, '
Within the complex of influences determining a
value system, religion plays a major role, with ma^s
religious beliefs shaping and controlling his cultural
patterns and his educational, political and economic
177institutions in both theory and practice, '' His life
is so ordered by religion — which the author calls "a
complex of notions about life which are so deeply held
that all he does is governed by them" — that one can
17
^Robert L. Mole, The Religions of South Vietnam
in Faith and Fact , op.cit, , p. 91*
1?6 Ibid., p. 91.





not understand, appreciate, or influence a society of
peoples without awareness of how its various religious
beliefs and practices are manifested in daily life. 1 ''8
This is particularly the case in respect to South Vietnam,
where "religion plays an unusually determinative role in
the establishment and operation of the value systems of
indigenous peoples" •
™
Mole is convinced of one more premise which guided
his research efforts, namely, that every religion can be
approached from two points of view, one propounded by the
professionals or authoritative exponents of the faith,
the other held by the masses of people who profess adher-
ence to that faith. There is often a vast difference
between the two, and always something lost in trans-
mission from chief spokesman to large membership. The
Buddhist, for example, may have little or no doctrinal
knowledge about Buddhism, but may be a good Buddhist in
the popular sense of the term, "more a Buddhist by habit
and outward practice than by conviction". The non-
adherent who would understand a culture, then, must know







complex of attitudes and beliefs which lie behind the
rites and rituals if they are to be evaluated realisti-
cally-. 180
It was to learn and report the "actual" attitudes
and beliefs, rather than the "theoretical", that Mole
spent his two years in field research in South Vietnam
and additional year in related efforts at the South and
Southeast Asian Center at American University, If his
approach must be classified, it would probably fit best
in the "participant observer" category of anthropological
methods, in that, while he administered no carefully pre-
tested, structured questionnaires to carefully selected
samplings of South Vietnamese populations, and made no
attempt to quantify his findings statistically, he
gathered an awesome amount of raw data, personally
observed, engaged in or conducted a very substantial num-
ber of religious services, and interviewed a broad spec-
1 fti
trum of South Vietnamese in their "natural habitat".
18oIbid .. p. 2.
1 Ibid,, p. 2. In addition to discussions with
and observations of residents in approximately one hun-
dred hamlets, Mole conferred personally with some five
hundred South Vietnamese in relatively knowledgeable
positions, including bishops, priests, bonzes, members of
South Vietnam^ Senate, 250 South Vietnamese military




While we shall discuss Mole's assumptions and
findings at a later point, there is relatively little that
in all four military zones of South Vietnam, He partici-
pated in approximately 50 religious observances and ser-
vices of diverse religious groups of South Vietnamese, and
preached at approximately 12 of these. He conferred with
and preached to, as well, a number of Viet Cong prisoners*
Further, he conferred with Frank Lynch, of the Ateneo of
Manila's Pastoral Institute, co-author, with George M.
Guthrie, of Impact of Modernization in the Philippines i
with Gerald C. Hickey, of RAND, much of whose work in
Vietnam is published by and recorded in Yale's Human Rela-
tions Area Files; with William Smalley, Associate Secre-
tary for Translation, American Bible Society, and consul-
tant to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Saigon; with
Louis J. Luzbetak, Executive Director, Center for Applied
Research in the Apostolate, and author of Customs and
Cultures t Anthropology for Christian Missions ; with auth-
orities of the Association of Asian Studies, University of
Michigan; of the East-West Center, the University of
Hawaii; of the Center for South and Southeast Asian Stu-
dies, American University; with approximately 200 of the
250 American missionaries in South Vietnam; and various
other consultants, including the author of this paper.
The draft of his report was reviewed by approximately 150
such consultants, whose comments were in general accord
with the report . (It is safe to estimate that few workers
in the field have exposed their reports to more comprehen-
sive review.) Finally, as a random-sampling check of his
extensive bibliography demonstrates, he has synthesized
many of the findings of other authors in the field. (We
base this summary of Mole's procedure on personal dis-
cussions we held with him in August 1965 in Okinawa, early
in his effort; on two lengthy telephone discussions with
him in Washington, in January 1970; on a review we made of
his periodic progress reports (submitted on approximately
a monthly basis) on file in the Office of the Project
Sponsors, in Washington, D.C.; on discussions with the
Project Sponsors themselves, in Washington; and with
Mole' 8 former supervisor during his second year in South
Vietnam, James J. Killeen, currently at the U.S. Naval
Academy in Maryland, where we discussed Mole's work with
him personally. We have also read several of the reviews
of his work submitted by those assumed to be authoritative





can be said about his research procedure, or methodology.
Obviously, it can not be called scientific, if one
restricts the terra to a research design in which a speci-
fic hypothesis is formally tested in a controlled environ-
ment with some type of "objective" instrument, the valid-
ity and reliability of which have already been demon-
strated, and in such fashion that the entire procedure
can be replicated with reasonable probability that simi-
lar findings will accrue. On the other hand, a trained
observer, schooled in history, anthropology and theology,
an experienced missionary in another "foreign culture",
living and talking with indigenous peoples over a period
of two years, habitually conferring with others pro-
fessionally trained in the field and familiar with the
area and the peoples, comparing his observations with the
writings of others, and so on, may very possibly achieve
insights unavailable to the researcher restricted to the
purely "scientific" approach. In a sense, the effort to
compare these approaches, and to "cross-validate" one by
the other, has constituted the history of anthropology.
The successive phases of the Personal Response
Project which we shall now discuss may be examined





phase is immensely important, in that the attitude studies
of the successive phases (and much of the training effort
we shall see below) look to Mole's "value" findings as
their starting point, and, in part, their raison d'etre ,
yet its methodology almost defies evaluation. However,
at the very least it deserves to be included among the
most impressive of the "common sense experience" and
"commonplace observations" to which we have previously
referred. At best, it could, indeed, be the most thor-
ough research yet done in its field in South Vietnam.
Phase Two i Survey of Marine and Navy Attitudes Toward
ARVN. PFs. and South Vietnamese Civilians in September
1966182
The rationale of this and of each successive
attitude survey is rooted in three assumptions: (a) that
it is essential for all American military personnel in
South Vietnam to understand and respect the religious
and social customs of the South Vietnamese people
j
(b) that it is essential to identify both the problems
experienced in the area of such understanding and respect
182Cited above. (ARVN - Army of the Republic of






and the military personnel experiencing and/or provoking
problems in this areai (c) that it is possible to iden-
tify such problems and personnel by means of attitude
183
surveys, J
Arrangements were therefore made to survey a
representative sample of American Marine and Navy per-
sonnel in I Corps, to determine
t
(a) What are the existing attitudes toward the
Vietnamese?
(b) Where do the greatest problems exist?
(c) How does the learning of these attitudes take
place?184
-^Richard A, McGonigal relieved Robert L, Mole
as senior researcher in the Personal Response Project in
1966. In conference with Mole, McGonigal agreed on the
necessity of every man's understanding and appreciating
South Vietnamese values, particularly in order that South
Vietnamese behavior could be understood within the con-
text of these values, and that Americans, understanding,
would develop favorable attitudes which would be reflected
in cross-cultural interaction with the South Vietnamese.
McGonigal believed, however, that one may assume neither
understanding nor misunderstanding, hence neither favor-
able nor unfavorable attitudes, without scientific surveys
of attitudes.
Survey of Marine and Navy Attitudes Toward ARVN ,









McGonigal surveyed approximately one percent of
all Marines and Navy personnel serving with Marines in
I Corps, in September 1966, On a controlled random
sampling basis, 650 subjects were originally tested, of
which 150 were ultimately eliminated because of failures
or sampling errors in the selection system. Hence, the
185
results of 500 tests were tabulated.
The attitude survey questionnaire was adapted
without significant change from written and oral ques-
186tionnaires developed by Robert L. Humphrey.
^Subjects were selected from nine infantry
battalions, five regimental command posts, one tank
battalion, one medical battalion, one engineer battalion,
one artillery battery, one logistics command, one air
wing headquarters group, two helicopter groups, one con-
struction battalion. Testing contexts varied from rela-
tively secluded headquarters areas to three actual com-
bat operations. Geographically, the area extended from
Ben Sonh to Route 9» west of Cam Lo, and from deep in the
Song Tra Bong River valley to the beaches of Chu Lai.
186
An open-end questionnaire, it asks the individ-
ual how he personally feels about various Vietnamese and
various American-Vietnamese interaction incidents, and
how Marines in general feel about the same? how the ARVN,
PFs and Vietnamese civilians feel about Americans 1 what
could be done to improve relations; what has been done
to harm relations; and similar questions. The attempt,
of course, is to develop a "cognitive dissonance" factor,
that is, to determine the difference between individual
opinions and behavior and the individual's image of peer
group and other group opinions and behavior, as described
above in relation to Festinger's theory of cognitive
dissonance. When asked how he feels, or how a given group






Phase Three i Report on Vietnamese and American
Attitudes in Combined Action Units
Within the overall rationale for the attitude
surveys, the particular reason for studying Combined
Action Units (CAPs) becomes clear only if the nature
"likes" or "dislikes" or has some other feeling, and why
he or the group feels this way. The assumption is that
respondents will describe behavior and/or expressed atti-
tudes which will reflect underlying values . Presumably,
then, if the respondents come to understand that the
behavior and attitudes which they encounter are explain-
able within and congruent with the cultural value system,
and that this cultural value system is as "valid" for
the Vietnamese people as our "American" value system is
for Americans, a step will have been taken toward promot-
ing favorable attitudes. (See Robert L. Humphrey, Fight
the Cold War: A Handbook for Overseas Orientation , op.
cit. , Appendixes D-L.
)
As one of the Personal Response Project Officers
has phrased its
"This Project grew out of the realization that
the behavioral patterns and attitudes of people
are a natural consequence of their religious, cul-
tural and ethical convictions and value systems
and that greater understanding of a people could
result from increased awareness of these convic-
tions and systems. Such increased understanding
is regarded as one of the keys to the modification,
and eventual elimination, of unfavorable attitudes
and offensive behavior patterns toward indigenous
citizens."
(See W. Warren Newman, op. cit. . p. 3«)
A copy of the questionnaire is attached to this






of these units is understood. Hence, a brief explanation
is in order, '
The basic unit is a Combined Action Platoon, and
ideally consists of 14- American Marines, one American Navy
Medical Corpsman, and 35 Popular Forces, Currently,
there are more than 100 such units deployed throughout
the four tactical zones of I Corps, and most of these are
"mobile" units, that is, they hold no fixed compound
areas; rather, they patrol during part of each day and
night, and rest in a different hamlet during part of each
day, selecting different resting places on each occasion.
At the time of the survey being reported, there were
approximately 60 units, and most of these remained in
fixed compounds, from which they patrolled and to which
they returned upon concluding patrols.
The Marines in most units are commanded by young
Corporals or Sergeants (median age, approximately 22
years), who have no direct authority over the PFs. The
l87Perhaps the best available unclassified review
of the Combined Action Units, including historical develop-
ment, is found in Colonel D, H. Blanchard's Pacificationt
Marine Corps Style (Newport, R.I.i Naval War College,
Masters Thesis', 15 May 1968),
l88In many instances, the number of Americans






latter are commanded by one of their own number, with
whom the Marine commander must develop a working relation-
ship.
In the fixed compound situation, where the platoon
surrounds itself with barbed wire and other defenses,
association with civilian villagers or hamlet residents
is often minimal, and within many such units, Marines
live, eat, and generally exist apart from the Popular
Forces, who frequently (as only paramilitary forces) go
to their own hamlets to till their fields by day, joining
the Marines at nights for patrols. In mobile units, PFs
are much more likely to travel with Marines on a rela-
tively full-time basis, although the matters of eating
and living together vary with varying units.
Marines are expected to train the PFs in military
tactics and related skills. Since usually the PFs
assigned to a platoon live in one of the hamlets of the
village, however, and, as noted, may wish to take care
of family affairs on a daily basis, Marines who would
carry out their training mission must exercise consider-
able tact and ingenuity. Recourse to higher authority
to settle disputes or to increase PF participation





Combined Action Company Officer (responsible for several
platoons), to local Vietnamese officials, and so on.
With a few words about the CAP mission, we shall
have adequate background. CAPs are expected to accomplish
three objectives i (a) provide area security, denying
Viet Cong access to villages i (b) pacify given areas,
protecting pro-government elements from Viet Cong
terrorism, and trying to eliminate the Viet Cong political
infrastructure; (c) assist in "institution building",
trying to help the South Vietnamese villagers develop
their own capabilities for defense and self-government
pursuant to American withdrawal.
While carrying out these missions, many Marines
involve themselves in helping to build schools, teach
English, provide medical services, and engage in similar
good will and civic action activities.
In a sense, then, the Combined Action Platoon is
a microcosm of and for cross-cultural interaction. The
Marine units are very much on their own, often deployed
at considerable distances from major American forces,
living, working, patrolling and fighting the enemy in
rural areas, often totally dependent on South Vietnamese





movements, in many cases eating and sleeping with their
counterparts among the Popular Forces, working with them
during the day, patrolling with them at night, saving
their lives, and being saved by them, tending their
wounded, burying their dead, often eating in their family
homes, playing with their children, and so on. It makes
sense, therefore, that, having surveyed a sampling of
American Marines and Navy personnel deployed in South
Vietnam, but in much less intimate association with South
Vietnamese, our investigators would want to survey mem-
bers of Combined Action Platoons, to see if attitudes
toward South Vietnamese differ in the latter. At the
same time, they were provided with the opportunity to
try to survey attitudes on the part of South Vietnamese
toward Americans. In this fashion, it was hoped thatt
(a) something would be learned of the "flow" of attitudes
of both Americans and Vietnamese in a "microcosraic"
situation; (b) the survey would help identify problems
which might yield to educational efforts.
Two secondary objectives were intended* (1) the
discernment of notable characteristics of Marines and
PPs whose expressed attitudes seem to suggest that they





-ipurpose of developing norms for selecting Marines and
PFs for this type assignment); (2) the identification of
-images'* or -mediators" 189 which might guide future
educational efforts.
Instrument Development and Survey
The questionnaire used for the Marines in the
CAPs was the same as that used in the September 1966
survey described above, with the single addition of a
9The "image" or "mediator- hypothesis involves
what the principal investigator of this survey. calls a
"simple communication continuum" (See his previously cited
address to the American Psychological Association, Sept-
ember 1969» "Uses of Cross Cultural Attitude Research in
Southeast Asia", p. 2.). In our opinion, this is a far-
from-simple continuum. For our purposes here, it is
enough to give a very rough illustration of what is meant,
without agreeing that this process is actually what occurs.
A Marine sees a leaking, dilapidated roof on a Vietnamese
hut (stimulus), a Vietnamese farmer sleeping in mid-day
(stimulus), a PF fishing (stimulus). All these stimuli
can be "integrated" in several ways. For example, they
can all equal "Vietnamese are lazy", or "Vietnamese are
poor, weak, emaciated", etc. Internalized, the integrated
stimuli become "images" or "mediators", through which, or
in accord with which, the Marine may respond to Vietnam-
ese attitudinally and/or behaviorally. The next time he
sees a hungry villager, he may say, "It serves him right.
He's too lazy to work", or, "The poor man needs my help".
Those educators in the field of cross-cultural interaction
who hold this communications concept try to reinforce
positive responses, in part by attaching further desir-







question asking how much time had been spent in a CAP
unit. The design of an instrument to survey the PFs
proved extremely difficult. Assistance was obtained from
the RAND Corporation, the Research and Development Field
Unit in Saigon, and the Eighth Army Research Unit in
Seoul, Korea.
Translations of the testing instrument into
Vietnamese by officer interpreters resulted in choices of
words and "tones" of meaning which were either too aca-
demic for, or appeared condescending to, the PFs.
Solutions were provided largely by a South Vietnamese
Sergeant, who was formerly a journalist in Saigon, and
190
who has published a number of children's stories.
Initial pre-testing of the instrument revealed
that considerable anxiety was aroused in the Vietnamese
tested. Either they would refuse to answer some
questions, or all would answer every question with iden-
tical replies. The investigators assumed that both the
instrument and their method of presenting it were at
fault, hence revised both. The instrument went through
191
seven revisions. For presentation, two Vietnamese
1 90no further data is given on this Sergeant.
1 ^1A copy of the final form is attached to this





interpreters were trained for a period of three weeks in
ways of putting the PFs at ease.
During December, 1966, and January, 1967i the
investigators visited 54 CAPs in the four tactical areas
of I Corps. (See Figure III-4. ) The principal investi-
gator provides in his report a helpful description of
the approach to each CAP.
Going to a compound we would at first
explain who we were and why we had come. The
project officer spoke informally with both the
Marines and PFs before questionnaires were even
mentioned. In this time we spoke generally of
CACl-92 life, the weather, fishing, etc. In
that introduction we made sure that we included
the simile, "Even brothers living together in
the same family do not always agree on every-
thing. Nor do they always appreciate how well
the other thinks of them. Sometimes it helps
to get feelings out into the open. Put it this
way, we are starting a school for Americans to
learn better how to live under the same roof
with Vietnamese. If you were setting up that
school what sort of things would you include . •
• , etc.?" Late in the questionnaire we
inserted a few requests for personal opinions.
In some units, however, it was still neces-
sary to assist the PFs by reading and explaining
each question. We tried to supplement by inter-
view in each case where educational level was
92CAC s Combined Action Company, the earlier






















obviously a problem. Many times these inter-
views were as productive as the most complete
questionnaire . 1 93 # 1 9^
Phase Fourt Report of American-Vietnamese Attitudes
at NCO Leadership School, Camp Hansen. Okinawa
Okinawa is approximately five hours from Danang
by military aircraft. The berthing and related facilities
of Camp Hansen, built to house more than 6,000 Marines,
are equivalent to facilities in Marine bases in the
"^Richard A, McGonigal, Report on Vietnamese
and American Attitudes in Combined Action Units , pp. 2-3,
^All Marines and PFs present in compounds were
surveyed by the appropriate questionnaire, (Many were
absent on routine assignments, patrols, or, in the case
of some PFs, family activities.) A total of 683 ques-
tionnaires were finally coded, of which 362 were for
Marines (a 55% sample of all Marines on CAP duty in I
Corps at that time;, and 281 were for PFs (a 19$ sample
of all PFs on CAP duty in I Corps at that time). Two
Vietnamese interpreters and two Marines were trained to
code the questionnaires for computer processing. Their
coding was audited by independent personnel, and discre-
pancies were considered minor. Final correlations and
tests for statistical significance were completed with
the assistance of the Operations Analysis Office at
Marine Corps Headquarters in Danang.
Efforts were made to account for the same vari-
ables involved in the September 1966 survey cited above,
both for Marines and for PFs, Examination of the final
form of the questionnaire used for the PFs reveals that
efforts were made to parallel it with the questionnaire
for Marines, but divergences were considered necessary for
reasons given above. Attempts to discern "cognitive dis-





United States, and a "Stateside** climate prevails within
the camp, although immediately outside its gates is a
typical "ville", with appropriate numbers of bars and
195friendly ladies-in-waiting, '** In other words, those en
route to Vietnam, delayed here for schooling or other
purposes, experience their final form of "Stateside" liv-
ing conditions (and relative luxury), and their introduc-
tion to various forms of Oriental culture, good and bad.
This culture appears at least superficially more like the
culture of South Vietnam than of the United States.
Those who have returned from South Vietnam, either en
route to the United States, or for temporary periods
before returning to South Vietnam, find themselves in
familiar "Stateside" living conditions (and relative
luxury), in part removed from the South Vietnamese cul-
ture, but in part associated with a culture which appears
in many ways similar.
The NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer) Leadership
School at Camp Hansen conducts leadership courses of
approximately two weeks in duration for enlisted Marines
from the rank of Lance Corporal through Sergeant. The
*°*We spent approximately five months in Camp
Hansen in 1 96^-1965 , visited there briefly in October,





majority (6l#) of the students are single, and the median
group consists of 20-21 year old Corporals, from an
approximately evenly distributed cross-section of the
United States. During the ten month period from October
1966 to June 1967, approximately 400 students attended
the school* Included in the curriculum were two hours
devoted to relations with the South Vietnamese (Personal
Response concepts), and training was attempted by way of
a "village simulation" exercise. School instructors and
staff members noted by way of informal observation what
they considered to be an "especially bitter" feeling
toward South Vietnamese on the part of students. It was
this observation which prompted the survey.
A sampling of 46 percent of all students attend-
ing the school during the 10 month period was surveyed.
Of this sample of 205 Marines, 101 had already served in
South Vietnam, 104 had not. The intent of the survey was
to identify the attitudes of all Marines surveyed, compare
attitudes of those who had served in South Vietnam with
attitudes of those who had not, and compare some of the
findings with findings accrued in the CAP survey cited
above. The same questionnaire used in the September 1966
survey in South Vietnam and in the CAP survey was used




Phase Five (Section One ) t Assessment of the Atti-
tudes of Third Marine Amphibious Force Toward the
Vietnamese, June, 1967
What was considered to be the success of the atti-
tude surveys described above, in terms of yielding data
bases for purposes of the Personal Response Project,
prompted the major survey undertaken in June, 1967. In
this instance, 3t5^1 Marine and Navy personnel or 5% of
the 70,7^8 on duty with the Third Marine Amphibious Force
in I Corps were surveyed, on what the investigators con-
sider a rigidly controlled sampling basis. Every Marine
regiment, air group, and major supporting unit in the
Force participated in the survey. Under supervision of
the principal investigator, some 40 officers and senior
non-commissioned officers helped collect and code data,
after attending classes concerning sampling control and
197data coding.
^ Since three surveys were conducted within the
same general time frame, we are considering them all as
"sections" of Phase Five.
^'The basic survey instrument was designed with
the help of Dr. Troy Paris, American Institutes of
Research, Seoul, Korea, and Professors John Howard and
Herbert Hyman of Columbia University, New York. The
instrument deviated to some degree from the September 1966





(one command had a near revolt until blood tests
were explained )» the conduct of Americans toward
female workers in the billeting areas and clubs
i
the attitudes of SNCO (Staff Non-Commissioned
Officers) supervisors and IRO (Industrial Rela-
tions Office; personnel • . .
If we choose to listen and to learn from
what these workers say we may expand our influ-
ence and win an increasing number of allies in
hamlets adjacent to our compounds. It is not an
exaggeration to suggest that each civilian worker
aboard our bases may have some fifty relatives
who are greatly influenced by nightly recounting
of fact and gossip from the day spent with
American servicemen
. • .
Above all else we should so educate our own
Marines that no worker ever has the excuse to
say he is "being scorned". The communication of
contempt in our own camps will cost us lives in
the fie Id. 1 98
At the time of this survey, June, 196?t some
2,300 Vietnamese civilians were employed aboard Marine
bases in I Corps. Of these, a sampling of 18$, or ^08
persons, were surveyed. The questionnaire instrument
used was an adaptation of that used to survey the PFs
in the Combined Action Platoons, as described above.
Even the introduction to the questionnaire is the same
as that to the PF questionnaire, with minor changes.
It advised the Vietnamese being surveyed that the Marine
Corps was opening a special school for Marines coming to






South Vietnam, to help them learn Vietnamese customs,
habits, and religion, and how to make friends with the
Vietnamese people. Since these Marines would be working
with the Vietnamese being questioned, their opinion about
199
the school curriculum would be appreciated.
While the report gives us a description of the
sample, in terms of age (11 persons were 16 years old or
younger, 11 were between 61 and 68 years of age, with the
median age at approximately 25 )» marital status (68%
married), number of children, Province origin, education,
military experience, and time spent working with Ameri-
cans, we are not told the basis of selection. We are
told, however, that the sample is very similar to that
taken from the Popular Forces surveyed, especially with
regard to education (over half the workers have had
less than three years of schooling, and 82.8^ advanced
no farther than the 6th grade). Only one worker in five
has had previous experience with the military, and the
majority are in their first year of working with
Americans.
^°A copy of this instrument is attached to this





All data was collected by two Vietnamese inter-
preters, one an ARVN Staff Sergeant, one a female
civilian. No Americans were present while the question-
naire was explained or administered. Questionnaires were
coded twice, the second time after a 1$% discrepancy had
been noted by the same two interpreters. The second cod-
ing showed less than »5% discrepancy.
Phase Five (Section Three ) i Assessment of Attitudes
Between USMC and Civilian Personnel Employed on U. S.
Bases in Japan. Okinawa, and Vietnam, July, 196
7
The rationale for this survey lay in the desir-
ability of comparing expressed attitudes of American
Marines and South Vietnamese civilian workers, whose
association to any significant degree is usually thought
of as beginning only on 8 March 1965t with that of
American Marines and indigenous civilian workers whose
200Tne title of this particular survey is slightly
and unintentionally misleading. Reference is made in the
report to the January, 1967, attitude survey of civilians
employed on Marine Corps bases in South Vietnam, which we
have described above, but this is not a report of another
— a July — survey of the same. Only Marines and civil-
ian workers in Japan and Okinawa were surveyed in July,
1967. Certain findings of this latter survey are com-






association began 22 years ago (Okinawa) and 16 years
ago (Japan), respectively. As the report puts it, the
January 1967 survey in South Vietnam was "like a snap
exposure of a particular flow of attitudes at one moment
201in time". It did not reveal whether attitudes were
improving or deteriorating. It was felt that reference
points might be provided if attitudes were sampled in
areas (cultures) where Americans had been engaged in
cross-cultural interaction over a greater period of time.
Camp Courtney, in Okinawa, and Iwakuni, in Japan,
were selected as sampling areas. We have seen something
of Okinawa (Camp Hansen), above. Camp Courtney differs
in certain respects. It has been the Headquarters for
all Marines in Okinawa, for many years, with the formal
characteristics and flow of official visitors which
usually mark headquarters. It is located closer to a
major, settled residential and commercial center than is
Camp Hansen, some 20 miles to the north (at least a one-




Assessment of Attitudes Between USMC and
Civilian Personnel







Iwakuni, Japan, is likewise a Headquarters
Command, in control of a Marine Air Wing. Its status has
fluctuated very significantly since 1965, when units of
the Air Wing deployed for combat in South Vietnam, It
is a base about which many American personnel seem to
have mixed feelings because of its relative remoteness,
"ville"-like environs, and, particularly since 1965,
relative unavailability of air flights to areas in Japan
which normally attract visitors and those on recreation,
e.g#, Tokyo. On-base living conditions are equivalent
to "Stateside" Marine air stations.
In each base, 120 Marines and 120 indigenous
civilians employed on Marine bases were sampled. In Camp
Courtney, this equalled 28$ of the total of eachi in
Iwakuni, 23$. The report tells us this was a "cross-
section" in each instance, but does not tell us the samp-
ling method used.
The survey instrument used was an adaptation of
the September 1966 questionnaire and that used for South
202
Vietnamese civilian employees. It was translated into
Japanese by skilled interviewers. Ryukyuan and Japanese
2 A copy of the instrument is attached to this





supervisors, respectively, explained the project to the
civilian employees. The report notes that the objective
was to acquire quickly "a 'taste* or 'feel* for the
relationships between Marines and civilian workers in
places where years of experience had affected attitudes",
rather than a "complex, sophisticated survey". ^
The size of the sampling was dictated by a desire for
simplicity. Frequent references in the report indicate
that the investigators were concerned primarily with the
phenomenon of "culture shock".
Phase Six (Section One ) t Attitude Study of PF Personnel
(in) USMC Combined Action Platoons. I Corps. Republic of
Vietnam, March. 1968
This preliminary report of March, 1968, describes
research actually conducted in the Spring of 1967 in the
CAP units. This research effort followed that which we
have already reported under title of Phase Three. Again
we meet what we are calling two "Sections" of research.
Section One employed what the reporter calls the
"Vietnamese Apperception Test". Section Two reports on
-^Assessment of Attitudes Between USMC and









Each evening during the two month survey period,
the interviewers translated responses to the TAT pictures
and "measured" them on three scales, one for each factor
in which the investigators were interested: responsibil-
ity, optimism-pessimism, self-image. Each scale ranged
in value from 1 to 5, (See Figure III-5.) Efforts were
"Members of the Popular Forces.
"Early in 1967 the Marines and PFs filled out
questionnaires for III MAF, giving their opinions
about their assignments in combined action platoons.
"Thanks to the good job done then, many improve-
ments were made. Since then PF salaries have been
raised, more equipment has been issued, and better
understanding has resulted between the Americans
and the Vietnamese.
"We are wondering that inasmuch as you did such
a good job then if you might be willing to help us
again.
"This time we are especially interested in
learning how you think the Popular Forces can take
a more responsible position in the leadership of
your community. We'd like to know your opinion
about what you think your hamlet needs most and
how you think the best way of getting it would be.
"Again, there will be no record kept of your
name. We are students from Saigon. We are
civilians. We work with the Marine chaplain.
We are here to help — not to investigate."
Attitude Study of PFs (in) USMC CAPs (Using Vietnamese
Thematic Apperception Test) , op.cit. , pp. 2-3»








The ultimate instrument combined from various
individual testing devices was used with a number of
South Vietnamese civilians and PFs. Since this progress
report gives us so little about procedures, however, and
informs us that most of the data collected has yet to be
processed, we shall attempt no further description of
this section of Phase Six. We cite it here, nonetheless,
for two reasons i (1) to demonstrate the variety of
in Turkey, Korea, and Thailand will be discussed below.
It will be recalled that the September, 1966, attitude
survey instrument was borrowed from Humphrey. ) It was
decided to develop an instrument which combined several
projective approaches. Relying on the work of L. B.
Szalay and J. E. Brent, the investigators devised a fif-
teen word Free Verbal Association test, a "social-
distance" scale, a modified critical incident device,
their own form of the TAT, and a modification of the
"Echo" test. (See, L. B. Szalay, Robert Walker, George
Schueller, and Jack Brent, Persuasion Overseas (Republic
of Vietnam Emphasis) (Washington, D.C.i The American
University, Special Operations Research Office, June
1965K) The TAT consisted of rough sketches of situations
involving Marines and Vietnamese people, which were
smoothed by a Vietnamese artist and translated into
glossy photographs. The Echo Test, borrowed from a
research project being carried on by General Research
Corporation, under the direction of Richard P. Barthol,
consisted, in part, of two key questions 1 (1) What is a
good thing that you could do which someone would praise
you for doing?i (2) What is a bad thing that you could do
which someone would disapprove your doing? Who would
disapprove? The Echo Test was used with a substantial
number of civilians, both adult and children, and PFs, as





efforts devised to refine and improve research instruments
in the Personal Response Project; (2) to introduce mater-
ials which we shall be referencing, if only to a limited
extent, in further discussion of other phases of the
project, (For example, this report does include a number
of sample TAT responses which we shall use for purposes
of comparison with those collected in Section One of Phase
Six.)
Phase Seven (Section One
)
t Report of 10% Survey of
American Marines and Navy Personnel Assigned to Marine
Units in I Corps, South Vietnam, February - April,W09
Using a modified form of the September, 1966,
survey instrument that we have been referring to from the
outset of our examination of the Personal Response Project,
investigators in Danang conducted what is, for combat
^The Field Research Project Officer for this
survey was Neil Stevenson. Almost simultaneously, a 10%
survey was conducted of Naval Personnel administratively
assigned to Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet, with
Headquarters in Saigon, but whose operational activities
extended throughout South Vietnam. We may designate this
latter survey Phase Seven (Section Two), but no data can
be made available concerning this particular effort. It





conditions, a truly massive survey. On a controlled
sampling basis, selecting every tenth man in a mess hall
line or a pay line, in commands representative of all
American Marine Forces in I Corps, they surveyed I0?o t
or some 6,400 personnel in I Corps at that time. 210
Findings
We have seen enough of the procedures used in the
various phases of the Personal Response Project research
efforts to admit of a methodological examination, and
this we shall offer at a later point. At present, it is
time to present the findings of each phase. These find-
ings shall be presented without comment or criticism,
which shall be delayed until we have evaluated the
methodological and procedural assumptions.
210Data collected from that survey is being pro-
cessed by two agencies, the Batelle Memorial Institute,
in Columbus, Ohio, on a commercial contract basis, and
the Statistical Analysis Branch, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. The latter effort






Phase Onet Religious and Ethical Value Systems
The most sophisticated report of this phase is
that entitled The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and
Fact , previously cited. This volume is devoted primarily
to factual data and explanation of religious and ethical
values as they pervade and shape the Vietnamese culture.
Such works as Understanding the Vietnamese , also cited
above, are somewhat simplified versions of the report
cited above, and emphasize the necessity of training and
orienting American personnel in the concepts enunciated
in the "Religions" volume. Therefore, our major concern
at this point is with the "Religions" volume.
The author treats ten discrete sets of religious
and ethical beliefs practiced in South Vietnam, but empha-
sizes that certain of these pervade all others. The ten
listed are i Animism, Vietnamese Taoism, Vietnamese
Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Roman Catholicism,
Protestantism, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao (technically t Phat Giao
Hoa Hao). At risk of oversimplification we have selected
what appear to us to be the sine qua non elements in each
religious or ethical code described by the author, and
radically synthesized his general discussions into highly






with the exception of the treatment of Animism, the
peculiar position of which suggests that we outline the
author's treatment of it here. His introductory statement
provides opportunity for insight into his entire approach
to religious and ethical beliefs in Vietnam,
Animism
Centuries of animism, ancestor veneration,
Hinduism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity, etc.,
have deeply etched the cultural influences in
Vietnam. Each of these religions has affected
the Vietnamese culture so that at the present
time behavior patterns and customs subtley, or
obviously, reflect these concepts. The Vietnam-
ese do not make the distinctions between secular
and sacred as clearly or precisely as do most
Westerners. Therefore the total life of the
Vietnamese peoples is much more affected by
religious concepts than seems to be the pattern
in America. The primary or basic religion of
Vietnam seems to be that of Animism. Animism
is the religious faith of nearly all the tribes-
people, or as the French called them, Montagnards.
Traces of Animism are found also in most of the
other major religious faiths in Vietnam today. ^H
The author frequently notes that Animism is often
called the "Peoples Religion", so broad is its influence.
The essential belief is that spirits, which are every-
where, can be appeased to create good or not create harm.
However, and we shall discuss the importance of this
211







finding below, the animist "does not view himself as a
helpless or passive victim of the invisible world". 212
Rather, he sees himself as capable of achieving his own
goals through the proper use of religio-magic formulae.
All existence is one, in animist belief, without
permanent divisions or distinctions between animate and
inanimate, human and non-human. Everything is
"contemporary". Non-ethical and non-moral in nature
or objective, Animism is practiced to create an atmos-
phere in which the spirits will comply with the will and
wishes of the practitioner, rather than that the prac-
tioner himself be transformed or changed. His aim is to
achieve the best advantage possible in struggling with
the invisible spirit world, in order to avoid harm.
Fear seems to dominate the animist' s life, determining
whom he will marry, where he will plant his crops, and
so on. Of its pervading influence in the life of the
animist and in all of Vietnam, the author finds:
Its presence is so strong in Vietnam that
few escape its influence entirely. So while the
animist may not have a formal creed or doctrine,
he cannot be classified as non-religious.
Religious beliefs control him much more than







Since man is controlled by his thought patterns,
his behavior is in accord with his value system. 21 3
General Observations
We may turn now to some of the more general obser-
vations presented as findings of this research effort.
The two sections of observations most useful for our
purposes are entitled, respectively, "Religious Discip-
line and Concepts Affecting Behavior" , and "Examples of
Religion in Everyday Life". Within these sections, in
turn, the number of findings far exceed the number we
can reasonably treat here, so that again we must select
pragmatically.
Under the first heading, above, the author
treats four major concepts i time concepts , family
concepts , concept of spirits and spirit-controlled
environment , concept of individuality .
The Vietnamese concept of time , except when
influenced by Western thought, is circular. Historical
events repeat themselves. There is little sense of
history, progress or goals. This concept of time com-
bined with poor diet and disease often leads to something







with their "Western" linear concept of time, with its
beginning, span of fixed events, and ending, its division
into B.C. and A.D., are motivated to change, improvement,
progress.
In regard to the family , it is reported that
every individual is taught his exact position in society,
so that there is little confusion about place, and few
decisions to be made. The individual is neither inferior
nor superior, he is part of the family, but also a part
of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. His life is bound by
those who lived before him, those living with him, and
those who will live after him. Business transactions
involve the entire community, with consequences for the
whole family, hence take time, and require consulting
even deceased ancestors. Security of the individual is
rooted in his accepted role, a role requiring loyalty
and conformity to prescribed rules, rather than efficiency
and productivity.
The concept of spirits and of a spirit-controlled
environment needs little comment beyond what we have noted
previously. The author reemphasizes the fact that belief
in good and evil spirits, both animate and inanimate, is






In relation to the concept of individuality t
it is pointed out that Confucian teaching, which makes
the individual merely a link between past and future
generations, contrasts with the Buddhist stress on
214individuality. In the latter, man is not his brother's
keeper, but each man must find his own way to Nirvana by
escaping the Wheel of Existence, and each individual
has his own Karma, which must be worked out for eventual
salvation through the merit of good works. The combina-
tion of Confucianism and Buddhism, in their Vietnamese
forms, lead to such ideas and behavior patterns as the
requirement to avoid showing anger, to agree to a
proposal, even with no intent to follow it, since con-
tradicting is prohibited, to avoid such material develop-
ments as industrial growth, capital investments, and
general economic progress, since these run contrary to
the belief that ultimate success comes only in denying
the drives which facilitate such developments.
21
^Mole considers the Buddhist doctrine that the
personal self is not real a paradox, since with no
individuality of the self, there can be no continuity of
the individual, and this, indeed, is what is taught by
learned Buddhists, At the same time, Buddha taught that
each man is individually responsible for working out his
own salvation, with the only authority for final truth the
intuition of the individual. Neat categories without con-





From the numerous "Examples of Religion in
Everyday Life" provided in the report, we shall limit
ourselves to two observations t one concerning the impact
of religious ideas on life in general and the cultural
values of the Vietnamese, and this we shall quote
directly? the other, a few remarks about women. We note
the latter comments first, and select them because refer-
ences to Vietnamese women are so common and so varied
in research reports and in the observations offered by
various reporters on Vietnamese life.
The author makes the rather reasonable point that
with so many cultures and societies in Vietnam, attitudes
toward women and their status fluctuate widely. "The
individual who seeks in a few words to describe their
life, place and influence in theory and fact is under-
pintaking an impossible task." * Factually, whatever the
theory, women play a vital role.
In regard to religion in general, the author
observes
»
• • • imported religious ideas have induced
permanent changes in the thought and behavior
patterns of the people, and have become so
deeply woven into Vietnamese daily life that
Westerners tend to disbelieve their eyes, and
21 *>





fail to comprehend the resulting value systems.
These ideas mixed with animism and ancestor
veneration from South Vina have formulated
the moral codes and standards. They have also
established the various rules and systems of
government, and have either promoted or hin-
dered the growth of arts, crafts, industry and
technological developments.
Until very recently, and in many areas is
still fact, the pogada, the wat, the shrine,
the communial house, the mosque, have been the
focus of village life. Birth, marriage, festi-
vals, death, lunar occasions, etc., as well as
health, posterity, travels, planting of crops,
house building, are all governed by religious
beliefs and ceremonies. The religious figures
of the community are important personages
because of either individual belief or commun-
ity pressure. Social approval is essential
to any Vietnamese, Many would rather die than
to be held in disfavor with family or community.
This would be the "sin" to many Vietnamese that
creates guilt, rather than the concept held by
many Americans that all men are accountable to
a supreme God. 2*"
~I






Phase Two i Survey of Marine and Navy Personnel Atti-
tudes Toward ARVN and PFs and Local Civilians. Ill MAF
TAOR. 217 September. 1966
General Findings
The report provides us first with three brief
highlights of findings. 218
(a) Across the III MAF TAOR there is a general
indication that only 37% of the Marines like the ARVN
and PFs and that only kj% like the local people. 21 ^
(b) While 72% of the Vietnamese in the Marine
TAOR generally like Americans, ^6% already feel that
Marines do not like them.
217
III MAF TAOR = Third Marine Amphibious Force
Tactical Area of Responsibility. (For our purposes, it
is sufficient to equate this with the simpler "All
Marines and Navy personnel attached to Marine units in
I Corps".
)
21 Report of Survey of USMC and USN Personnel
. . . Attitudes Toward ARVN. PFs, and Local Civilians,
III MAF TAOR . op.cit. , p. 2.
21 %ere and throughout the report, all percent-






(c) It is felt that S-5s and 0-2s are the most
critical groups in the process of attitude formation. 220
Next we are given the general findings within the
context of what the researchers considered to be the main
focus of the survey, the comparison of the group image
toward military and civilian Vietnamese with private
and personnel opinions of individual Marines or attached
221Navy personnel.
(a) The group image was found to have much
more negative weight than individual opinion.
(b) Individual attitudes are more affected by
group image as the individual spends more time in
Vietnam.
220Rank designators for all personnel surveys in
this phase and in subsequent phases are
:
E-l : Private 0-1 : Second Lieutenant
E-2: Private First Class 0-2: First Lieutenant
E-31 Lance Corporal 0-3: Captain
E-4i Corporal 0-4: Major
E-5: Sergeant 0-5: Lieutenant Colonel
E-6: Staff Sergeant 0-6: Colonel
E-7» Gunnery Sergeant)
E-8: First Sergeant ) and equivalents
E-9: Sergeant Major )
221.
This is the question of "cognitive dissonance"





(c) The only apparent countering force to the
group image is the maturity of senior staff non-
commissioned officers and more senior officers.
Specific Findings
V/e are now given correlations by variables (rank,
age, etc.), in terms of general and personal attitudes
expressed as like or dislike (Vietnamese military and
civilians). Since the terms like/dislike are obviously
vague and ambiguous, it seems pertinent to include at
this point data which the reporter includes later in his
report, those perceived attitudes or actions on the part
of Vietnamese which American personnel cited in response
to such survey questions as: "What two or three things
do you like or admire most (dislike or admire least)
about the ARVN, PFs, local people?" The most frequent
pop
citations are listed here. **
...
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their ability to work hard
make a lot out of little
their family life and love
of children




sympathy with their strain




their quiet pride and
dignity
their artistic ability
- their "apparent greed",
continual begging and
double price standards
- their "apparent untrust-
worthiness and lack of
patriotism"
- their lack of sanitation
- their uncooperativeness
- their letting their
younger children wander




- their corruption or apathy
toward corruption
Other than the people the following things were




a feeling of patriotism,
pride in fighting
communism and doing
something good for the
world
the opportunity to travel
and really get to know a
new nation of people
the rapid advancement in
rank
the weather and the food
were also mentioned as
likes
the climate (dust, heat
and rain)





jealousy toward the Air
Force and Army who get
liberty in our TAOR
separation from loved ones




In terms of such likes and dislikes, the author





Rank . Junior and very senior enlisted men and
officers from the rank of Captain through Colonel are
more favorably disposed toward Vietnamese. Sergeants
(E-5s) and Second and First Lieutenants are most
negative. The author considers these rank variables
the most significant observations of his study. We
reproduce his figure below as Figure III-6.
TAOR 22 ^, Years in Military Service, Age . The
author likewise finds variances in attitude in pro-
portion to the area studied, the number of years spent
in military service, and the age of respondents, with
youngest and oldest, those with less than one year
and more than twenty years' service having most favor-
able attitudes. Those stationed in the Chu Lai area
seem to differ from those in Phu Bai and Danang, and
so on. (See Appendix J for pertinent graphs.)
2
^Within the III MAF TAOR, explained prev-
iously, each command is assigned a specific tactical
area of responsibility. It will be recalled that the
areas sampled in this survey included Danang, Chu Lai,
and Phu Bai. Danang is Marine Corps Headquarters in
South Vietnam; Chu Lai is some 50 miles south of














Origin in the United States . In this and in
further reports, the point is made that attitudes toward
the Vietnamese seem to correlate with origin in the
United States, with the following, or a variant thereof,
offered as illustrative.




Southerners! Highest proportion of personal
likes over personal dislikes toward local civilians.
(c) Midwesternersi Slightly favorable individ-
ual attitudes toward local civilians.
22 The report includes as an appendix the States
represented in the sample and their breakdown by area.
For ease of understanding, we include the listing and
breakdown at this point.
Northeastt Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware
West: Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, California, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, Montana, Utah, Idaho,
Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas
South: Arkansas, Missouri, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida,
Tennessee, West Virginia, Virginia,
South Carolina, North Carolina, Maryland,
Kentucky
l_






(d) Northeasterners » Slightly favorable individ-
ual attitudes toward military and civilian,
(The differences are shown by graph as Appendix K.
)
Time Spent in Vietnam . 2 * This, too, is a variable
the author believes correlates positively with attitudes
toward Vietnamese and reiterates his belief in other
reports. The basic point he makes is that we learn to like
or dislike people in time. (See Appendix L for graph.)
School Years Completed . Positive attitudes are
found to progress with increased education, except for col-
lege graduates, who have, says the author, "an amazing




^A normal tour of duty at the time of this sur-
vey was 13 months.
The author of the report includes data also
on those on a second tour of duty in Vietnam, but it is
reported too vaguely to merit reproduction here. The one
significant finding seems to be that the pattern of like,
dislike, like seems to repeat itself. See pp. 15-16 of
report. Another set of data presented in a form too vague
for our use concerns correlations in terms of time spent
previously overseas, but not in Vietnam. The one signi-
ficant finding seems to be that those without any previous
overseas experience begin a tour of duty in Vietnam with
more favorable attitudes toward the Vietnamese than do
those with up to JO months previous overseas experience.
See pp. 19-20 of report.
22?Report of Survey of USMC and USN Personnel
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Phase Three: Vietnamese and American Attitudes in
Combined Action Units, March, 1967
General Findings
The report provides us with the following High-
lights of the Survey ,
(a) Marines in CAPs have markedly more favorable
attitudes toward both military and civilian Vietnamese
than do other Marines in I Corps, as seen below.
Marines Other Marines
Positive Attitude Toward : in CAPs in I Corps
Vietnamese Military (General) k?% Jl%
Vietnamese Military (Personal) 61 hk
Vietnamese Civilians (General) 57 37
Vietnamese Civilians (Personal) 70 hk
(b) The percentage of Marines in CAPs negatively
oriented is only one-fifth that of other Marines nega-
tively oriented in I Corps.
(c
)
Many PPs have more favorable attitudes
toward Marines than toward their own local civilians,
especially, in CAPs where PFs are not assigned to their
native hamlets,
(d) Cognitive dissonance between general and
individual attitudes on the part of both Marines and PFs





(e) Problems perceived by Marines as being pro-
voked by PFs include, in order of importance:
Poor sanitation practices
Dishonesty
Begging, Double Price Standard
Lack of motivation and training
(f
)
Problems perceived by PFs as being provoked
by Marines
i
Failure to give reasons for search and
interrogation (of Vietnamese)
Failure to explain background of American
attitudes on stealing, sanitation,
freedom, thrift
(g) Findings do not admit of grounds for estab-
lishing norms for selecting personnel for GAPs, but do
identify certain meaningful characteristics.
(1) Marines with the following character-
istics function best in the CAP environment: Come from
228
Southern or Northeastern area of U.S. ; are 21 to 24-
years of age j are E-2s, £-3s, or S-5s; have had either
less than eight years of school, or 12 to 13 years of
school; have not been overseas previously, or have been
overseas from four to six months.
The report notes elsewhere (p. k?) that origin
in the U.S. does not play a significant role in regard to





(2) Marines with least positive attitudes
come from the Par West of the U.S. 2 9, have had nine to
eleven years of school? are 18 to 20 years old; are
single.
(h) Images or mediators showing promise of


















Their love of children






Build the community pride
Steps to future vocations
(i) Time spent in Vietnam again appears to be a
significant variable in regard to attitudes toward
civilians. Attitudes become more favorable during the
two to seven month period spent in Vietnam, then less









during the one to five month period, then rise again at
the seventh month. 2 3
Specific Findings
The report provides so many generally excellent
histograms, both of demographic characteristics and of
tables of correlations, that the temptation to include
them here is strong. To do so, for this phase and
succeeding phases, would require inordinate amounts of
space, hardly justifiable in view of the availability
. . 231
of the unclassified original reports. Most pertinent
tables are attached as Appendix N.
The report points out, in relation to the assess-
ment of Vietnamese attitudes, that PFs were interviewed
after they had completed questionnaires, but that their
responses were not quantified. Most frequent complaints
verbalized included low pay, inability to work part-
time at home, lack of equipment. Most frequently feared
23°This finding is not included in the report of
"highlights"; it appears later in the report, p. 48.
2 3 1We shall make certain exceptions. For example,
the June, 1967, survey of 5% of I Corps Marines collates
data from earlier surveys and compares it with findings






was physical discipline. Highest and most frequently
repeated praise about Marines was their success in keep-
mg the Viet Cong away. J
Phase Four: American-Vietnamese Attitudes at NCO
Leadership School. Camp Hansen, Okinawa. October
1966 to June 1967
General Findings
In comparison with American personnel surveyed
in Phases Two and Three discussed above, this report
notes t
(a) Students from Non-Commissioned Officers
Leadership School "have the weakest positive attitudes
in all categories and the strongest negative general
attitudes toward both military and civilian Vietnamese".
(b) The corollary of this finding lies in the
fact that graduates of this school become Marine Squad
Leaders, and that less than one in five graduate with a
positive attitude toward the ARVN and PFs, and that
probably one-third graduate with strong negative
"I
^3 These assessments also provide some immediate






attitudes toward Vietnamese civilians. The author of
the report provides a table of comparisons. (See Table
III-l.)
Specific Findings
It will be recalled that the majority of American
Marines sampled at the school were Corporals, or E-4s
(61^), married (61%), between the ages of 20-21 years
(55^) t and from a relatively evenly distributed cross-
section of origins in the United States.
(a) To the two questions asking, respectively,
how Marines in general feel toward the Vietnamese
military, and how they personally feel toward the
Vietnamese military , two sets of responses were given.
Those who had not yet been in Vietnam were inclined to
have more favorable attitudes themselves, and to believe
that Marines in general have more favorable attitudes
than is the case with those who had already served in
Vietnam. The findings differ, however, in respect to
attitudes toward Vietnamese civilians. Those who had
served in Vietnam expressed more favorable attitudes
personally toward Vietnamese civilians than those not
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(b) Again what appears to be a significant
difference in attitudes by way of origin in the United
States is reported, especially in attitudes toward ARVN
and PFs. Westerners still lead in negative attitudes
toward Vietnamese military, but this time seem to have
more favorable personal attitudes. Table III-2 describes
personal attitudes by origin towards both military and
civilian Vietnamese. Numbers given are percentages.
Phase Five (Section One
)
t Assessment of Attitudes of
III MAF Marines Toward Vietnamese, June, 1967
(5% Sampling Survey)
General and Specific Findings
This report, significant by the size of the
sampling alone, presents several of its findings already
compared with findings synthesized from three earlier
surveys described above i the sampling of I Corps Marine
attitudes toward ARVN, PFs, and Vietnamese civilians
(September 2966); the sampling of Marines and PFs in
Combined Action Platoons, in terms of reciprocal atti-
tudes (March 1967)1 the sampling of Vietnamese civilian
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we have called, respectively, Phases Two, Three, and
Five (Section Two).
Again we are confronted with a massive amount of
data (3,5^! questionnaires multiplied by ten categories
of such variables as rank, age, education, etc., and/or
by as many combinations of variables as could be imagined,
although the report does not provide an analysis of co-
variance or other statistics of this nature). We must
again select pragmatically those findings most pertinent
to our purposes. We find these in the report's fifteen
Highlights of the Survey .
"
(a) How Marines feel about the local people:
Positive attitudes toward the local people
have increased. When asked, "How do Marines in general
feel about the local people?", some h9.\% now answered,
"Like" (an increase of 12$). When asked, "How do you
personally feel?", 55. 5# replied, "Like" (an increase of
11.5/,). See Figure III-?a.
(b) How Marines feel about the ARVNi
Thirty-five percent now project a general
liking for the ARVN, a gain of h% % and 39^ express a
2
-^Highlights presented here are taken from

































































~ipersonal liking, a loss of $%, Dislikes have dropped
toward the ARVN 12% in- both the general and personal
categories. See Figure III-7b,
(c) How Marines feel toward the Popular Forces:
"Projected" likes (general) increased
slightly; "projected" dislikes decreased slightly.
Personal likes, however, decreased by 9%, and personal
dislikes were reduced by only 9%» See Figure III-7c
(d) How time in country affects attitudes:
The 1967 survey shows the same kind of even
distribution by time in country shown in the 1966 survey.
"Again it was possible to plot a learning curve of
attitudes. (We learn to like or to dislike over a
period of time. )"
Shaded areas in the graphs below show
progress — either in increasing the "Likes" or in
decreasing the "Dislikes". See Figures III-8a, III-8b,
and III-8c.
(e) Gains and losses in attitude by rank:
Improvement is noted in attitudes of ser-
geants and lieutenants. Reversal is also noted among
captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels in personal
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Does eligibility for promotion make any
difference in attitude?
Those eligible for promotion are very
slightly more positive. Those who have been eligible
for promotion but not yet promoted for a period of twelve
to seventy-two months are appreciably more negative.
(g) Does location in Vietnam make a difference
in attitude?
Troops closest to the all-out fire fight
tend to be most compassionate toward local people. In
order of the most positive attitudes toward the local
people are troops from:
1. Dong Ha/Khe Sanh/Con Thien/Gio Linh
2. Hue/Phu Bai
3. Ghu Lai/Tarn Ky
4. DaNang/Dai Loc/Hoi An
Attitudes toward Vietnamese military follow a similar
pattern. In every TAOR , however, the attitude of the
once-moved-Marine is lower toward both civilians and
military than is that of the average Marine making his
first adjustment.
(h) Does Personal Response training make a
23^-
difference?





It would appear to make a large difference.
One regiment which did- not participate in Personal
Response training tested out 11. 8# lower toward civilians
and 14. Jfo lower toward the Vietnamese military.
(i) Does origin in the United States make a
difference?
The Marine from the Far West tends to be
especially critical toward the Vietnamese military and
the Marine from the South to be especially friendly
toward the local people. (This has been the trend in
three preceding surveys.)
(j) Does the Marine appreciate how the Vietnam-
ese feel toward him? (See Figure III-9.
)
No. He underrates their likes and overrates
their dislikes.
(k) Does education make a difference?
Yes. Those with less than seven or more
than nineteen years of education tend to be especially
critical of civilians. Those with only eleven years of
education (T=260) are more critical than those with
twelve years (T=19^9) by over five percent. Those who
finished sixteen years are even more critical. Seventy-
nine and four-tenths percent of the 3,5^1 Marines and


























































(1) Does age, time overseas, time in service
make a difference?
Yes. The separate factors of time in ser-
vice and previous time spent overseas tend to follow that
of age. After age thirty-five there appears to be an
increase of tolerance.
(m) What do Marines especially like or dislike
about the ARVN and the PFs? (Percentage who mentioned.)
(See "Likes/Dislikes" listed in Phase Two Survey, Sep-





2. They are cowardly. 10.8
3. They are lazy. 9.1
k. They steal. 7.3
5. They are not
patriotic. 5»°
6. They are greedy. 3.8
7. They are dishonest. 3.3
8. They are dirty. 3.2





(n) //hat do Marines especially like or dislike
about the local people? (Percentage who mentioned.)
1. They are
friendly. lk.7%
2. They work hard. 9.6






5. They are loyal. 3.1
6. They make do
with very little. 2.7
7. They have strong
families. 1.1
8. They are honest. .5
9. They are
religious. .2






1. They work hard. 27.6$
2. They are friendly, 27.1
3. They make do









7. They're generous. 1.9
8. They are honest. 1.4
9. They are loyal. 1.2




1. They are dirty. 25.3
2. Their greed,
begging. 16.6
3. Can't trust them. 8.2
4. They're lazy. 7.5
5. They're dishonest. 7.0





9. They are careless
toward children. 1.4
10. They are cowardly. .9
(o) Aside from the people what do Marines espec-
ially like or dislike about their assignment in Vietnam?
(Percentage who mentioned.)
Likes Dislikes
1. The extra pay. 23.0$ 1. The weather. 23.0:




3. Doing something "Chickened" rules. 13.1
for my country. 11.1 5. No liberty. 9.3
4. Combat experience . 7.2 6. Risk of combat. 5.1
5. Fighting commun- 7. Rules of
ism. 7.1 engagement. 4.7
6. Helping the 8. The food. 3.9
Vietnamese. 6.7 9. Loneliness. 1.4
7. US0 shows, etc. 6.0 10. Having buddies
8. Rapid promotions. 2.6 killed. 1.2
9. The weather. 1.2





Phase Five (Section Two)t Attitude Study of
Vietnamese Civilian Workers Aboard USMC Bases,
I Corps, Vietnam, June 196?
General Findings
This report cites only one major highlight,
namely, that civilian workers aboard the Marine Bases
in I Corps are more defensive and less positive in their
attitudes toward Americans than Vietnamese Popular Forces
in Combined Action Platoons.
Specific Findings
The Vietnamese civilian workers were asked
questions as noted below. •'-' Responses are given in
both numbers responding and percentages of respondents.
(a) Do Marines need extra instruction on:
Yes No No Answer
* * * * * l
Vietnamese Manners 254 62 22 5 134 33
Respect for Property 259 63 15 4 134 33
Buying at the Market 205 50 42 10 161 40
Spending Money 152 37 75 18 179 45
^3^See appropriate survey instrument attached to






(b) Do Vietnamese workers like the USMC?
Yes No Mixed No Ans.
* * #ti # * I—IT
Do Vietnamese workers
like the USMC? 260 64 14 3 33 8 101 25
Does the USMC like
the Vietnamese
workers? 222 54 16 4 43 11 12? 31
Do the local people
like the USMC? 233 57 17 4 28 7 130 32
Does the USMC like
the local people? 199 49 21 5 31 8 157 38
The report then offers comparisons between
responses to three of the questions in (b), above, and
responses given by Popular Forces surveyed in the CAPs,
as discussed previously. When asked:
(1) Does the USMC like your group?
PFs — Yes (70%)
Civilian Workers — Yes (54$)
(2) Does the USMC like the local people?
PFs — Yes (57%)
Civilian Workers — Yes (49$)
(3) Does your group like the USMC?
PFs — Yes (78$)
Civilian Workers — Yes (64$)
The report points out that whereas the Vietnamese
offered 61 examples of "funny happenings" occurring




between Americans and Vietnamese, they offered 132
examples of "sad happenings".
The Vietnamese workers were asked five key-
questions t What should Marines learn before coming to
Vietnam? What do you especially like about Marines?
What are some deficiencies of the Marine? What do you
think should be done to improve Vietnamese-American
relationships? What specifically should the Americans
not do? Responses were tabulated and ranked in order of
frequency given. They are attached as Appendix R.
Phase Five (Section Three): Assessment of Attitudes
Between USMC Personnel and Civilian Workers on U. S.
Bases in Japan, Okinawa, and Vietnam, July 1967
General and Specific Findings
This report presents its findings as compared
with the findings gleaned in Phase Five (Section Two)
survey discussed above, the study of Vietnamese workers
on Marine bases in I Corps, Using the same questionnaire
as the earlier study used, it organizes its data in
relation to seven of the questions asked. We shall




(a) How do the (indigenous) workers feel about
Americans?
Thirty percent of Japanese workers and 18$
of Okinawan workers think their groups like Americans.
These percentages are significantly lower than the 64$
of Vietnamese workers who think their groups like
Americans. The percentage of Japanese (53%) and
Okinawan {37%) workers who personally like Americans
is also significantly lower than the 78$ of Vietnamese
who personally like Americans. See Figure 111-10.
(b) How do the local people feel toward
Americans?
Civilian workers on Marine bases in Japan
estimate that only 15$ of the local people like American
Marines? those in Okinawa estimate that only 5$ of the
local people like American Marines; in Vietnam, the
estimate goes up to 57$.
At the same time, American Marines on each
of the same bases estimate that 62$ of the Japanese;
81$ of the Okinawansi and only 48$ of the Vietnamese
local people like American Marines.
(c) How do Marines feel toward civilian workers?







































































Marines express strong positive attachment
toward civilian workers. Civilian workers estimate
Marine attitudes toward them as considerably less favor-
able. See Figure III-ll.
In other words, Japanese and Okinawan
workers underestimate American Marine likes. Marines
overestimate Japanese and Okinawan workers* likes.
(d) How do American Marines appear to get
along with different age groups?
Civilian workers on bases in the three
areas responded as depicted in Figure 111-12.
(e) What do the workers suggest Marines do to
improve?
The number of responses of each type is
not given in the report, but type responses are listed
in order of frequency.
Japan
i
1. Learn some of our language, the basic greetings.
2. Hold school on our local traditions.
3. Teach local laws, civilian jurisdiction.
^. Learn not to order but to ask .
5. Remember your position as envoys.









































































































































7. Control behavior on liberty.
8, Practice equality.
Okinawa*
1. Hold school on local traditions.
2. Learn some of the language.
3. Hold school on local laws.
^. Rid yourself of superiority complex.
5. Remember your job as ambassador.
6. Do not discriminate by race.
7. Respect our women.
8. Associate more with nice people.
Vietnam:
1. Learn and respect our customs, habits,
religions.
2. Learn to resist communism and develop our
country.
3. Learn some of the language, live near the
people.
4. Learn not to scorn the people or our flag.
5. Learn how the Vietnamese consider politeness,
honesty.
6. Learn to protect peoples 1 lives and property.
7. Learn not to offend one's honor.






(f ) What do the workers suggest the workers
should do to improve relations?




1. Have more meetings within the offices and
shops.
2. Have more social gatherings between Americans
and Japanese,
3. Have more sports events together.
^. We should assist with tours to shrines, etc.
5. We should better control our young girls.
6. We should state our opinions more freely.
Okinawa t
1. Some of our people should be more cheerful.
2. We should invite Americans to our homes.
3. If we taught them judo/karate they might
better understand our inner spirit.
^. We should have more social events.
5. We should not offend the Americans.
6. It is not necessary for us to change.
Vietnam
i
1. Our own people should not distinguish about
the selection for the jobs.






3. We need our own better work rules.
**-. We should not be an embarrassment to the
Americans.
5. We should teach them our history.
The report concludes with a generous samp-
ling of excerpts from narrative comments made by Japanese
and Okinawans, as the report on Vietnamese workers con-
cluded with Vietnamese comments. These shall be adduced
at a later point as "commonplace observations", most
helpful in providing insights into what the quantified
data truly signified.
Phase Six: Attitude Survey of Popular Forces in
Combined Action Platoons (Using Vietnamese TAT),
March 1968
It will be recalled that in this research effort
260 PFs were given a questionnaire to collect "functional"
data, prior to their being given the "Vietnamese" version
of the Thematic Apperception Test. The collated res-
ponses to the functional data survey are given in summary
form in the report, and reproduced below. The results of
the TAT are provided only in terms of some excerpts from
some of the narrative responses to TAT picture #7, a few






part of the principal investigator. 236 A quick summary
of the functional data is provided by the author as
follows:
1. I prefer living in the city - llfo
town - 5
countryside - 84
2. I prefer to be in the Popular Forces - QQ%
Regional Forces - 12
Army of RVN - —
3. I prefer working in a PF unit with Americans - Q6%
without Americans - 14
4. In the combined action platoon I prefer it when
Americans and Vietnamese live in
separate buildings - 56%
the same buildings - 44
5. In the CAP I prefer it when Americans and
Vietnamese eat in separate buildings - hjfo
eat together - 57
6. On a patrol I prefer
being the point, a leader out front - Jk%
being an aidraan - 19
carrying the radio - 16
being a leader in the middle of the column - 33
an ordinary rifleman - 2
7. What I like best about a patrol is
catching the VG - ^7%
meeting new people - 7
protecting the people - 2M
t
getting to know the terrain - 21
2 3
"There are a few statistical tables given for
the TAT results, but without sufficient explanation. We
see little point in providing our own discussion of how
the TAT is scored, a discussion which would of necessity
be complex and elaborate if it were to make these tables
meaningful. At best, little would be contributed to the







8. What I dislike most about a patrol isj
walking too far - Jkfo
setting up an ambush - 14
the threat of an ambush - 3
being point, first man - 7
capturing the VC - 1
arguments with USMC - 2
the VC - 1
destroying caves - 1
dislike nothing - 37
9» In our CAP the discipline (punishment, fines, etc.)
should bet the same for PFs and USMC - $7%
different for PFs and USMC - 43
10. I prefer
moving from one hamlet to another every 30
days - 9fo
staying in one hamlet all the time - 91
11. The central government should give us medals
for bravery - 77%
the USMC should give us medals for bravery - 23
12. I think the best length of a watch at night is:
2 hours or less - 80^
3 hours or less - 14
4 hours or less - 1
over 4 hours - 5
13. I like best to stand watch at night by myself- 16%
with another PF in same position - 14
with a Marine in same position - 63
no difference - 7
14. If I think I have been disciplines unfairly I can
make my appeal by: seeing the village chief - lk%
the district chief - 8
the USMC sergeant - 1
nothing - 77
15. The best ways for Vietnamese to learn American
customs are to: learn the English language - 58%
make a personal friend - 23




16. The best ways for finding the most necessary
needs of the people in the hamlets are t
living with the people - k6fo
asking the cult committee - 8
asking the school teacher - 3
asking the hamlet chief - 3
asking the PFs - 22
asking the RD team - 1
NA - 1?
17. In what ways should the PF participate in local
projects? provide security - 5^6
give direction - 11
learn trades, then build - 2k
NA - 11
18. The best way to get support in local projects
is to j get the people on our side - 53$
ask the USMC - 21
see the district chief - 3
NA - 23
Samplings of Narrative Responses to TAT Picture #7 (With
Occasional Interviewer Comments) are attached to the
present text as Appendix S.
Discussion of Assumptions
As we did with the Sternin "values" study, so
must we now examine (a) the assumptions underlying the
research efforts of the Personal Response Project, and
(b) the assumptions inherent in the methodological
procedures. An evaluation of the findings we have
listed above, and of the various investigators* inter-
pretations thereof, will be provided later, and will be





Phase One: The Study of Religious and Ethical
Values in South Vietnam237
Not a great deal need be said here about the
major assumptions of this research effort. As we have
remarked concerning its methodological procedure, it is
in a quite different category from the attitude research.
Much in its assumptions is obvious on the basis of
common sense experience. That which can be reasonably
controverted is of a technical and complex nature beyond
the scope of this paper, and hardly intended by the
investigator himself.
The major assumptions of the study can be listed
simply enough
i
(a) Man's basic physical, mental, social, and
spiritual needs are universally the same, differing only
in the way they are expressed and satisfied.
(b) The reasons for this latter difference is
twofold:
(1) The value systems of a people or local-
ity are determined by varying geographical, historical,
economic, and religious factors
j
^''Reported in works previously cited, such as






(2) These various value systems then influ-
ence the manners, customs, and daily behavior patterns
of communities and individuals.
(c) A society of peoples cannot adequately be
understood, appreciated, or influenced without awareness
of just how these various religious beliefs and practices
are involved in daily life.
(d) There is often a vast difference between
authoritative expressions of religious doctrine and the
beliefs and practices of the people.
What need be said about such assumptions?
In regard to (a), we have discussed the fact that
even Levy-Bruhl, who had posited a profound difference
between the primitive and the modern, in the end seemed
to adopt a position not unlike that of this assumption.
The major thrust of the Allers essay we cited earlier
in this chapter supports the assumption, as does the
theme running through much of the work of Erich Fromm. 3
Clyde Kluckhohn seems to be saying much the same thing:
All human societies, from the "most primitive"
to the "most advanced" constitute a continuum.
Industrialization poses different problems but
also some of the same ones to Navaho Indians,
238See, for example, Fromm 1 s Man for Himself







Polish peasants, Siamese rice farmers, and
Japanese fisherman. 239
At any rate, whatever the complexities of argu-
ment among anthropologists, from a political viewpoint,
and that of relations between nations and among peoples
throughout the world, the 19^8 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of the General Assembly of the United
Nations gave at least pragmatic affirmation to the
assumption we are discussing, the Preamble asserted:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity
of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world • , ,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights
have resulted in barbarous acts which have out-
ranged the conscience of mankind • • • The
General Assembly proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard
for all peoples and all nations • • ,240
(Underlining ours.)
This is, after all, the intent of the Personal
Response researcher's assumption, as is evident through-
out his report — to emphasize the common worth and
dignity of all men, and their right to be considered
2
-^Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 19^9) t PP. 266-26?.
See, for further applications: Nehemia
Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights . Its
Origins. Significance, Application, and Interpretation








and treated with the equality due all human persons. He
is providing guidelines for Americans overseas in a
strange culture, rather than an anthropological defini-
tion of the condition of mankind.
Assumptions (b) and (c) might again be arguable
from the viewpoint of cultural anthropologists of varying
schools of thought. The pure "culturologist" might be
inclined to agree wholeheartedly, others might disagree,
oh.']
or agree with reservations. The emphasis on religion
might be thought exaggerated, but, unflattering though
they are to theology, such diverse observers as Auguste
Comte, for whom all intellectual evolution really pro-
ceeds from "the inevitable primitive dominance of
theological philosophy", and Claude Levi-Strauss, who,
while disagreeing completely with Comte and his succes-
sors, pays religion the equally dubious compliment of
2 See, Leslie A. White's section, "Culturology"
,
and David Bidney's section, "Cultural Relativism", under
the general heading "Culture" , in the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences , (1968), pp. 527t
et sqq .
242 . . . .
Auguste Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive ,





defining it as the "anthropomorphism of nature" 2 3, seem
to support, rather than reject, such an emphasis.
Assumption (d) is probably less an assumption
than a finding — a finding as certain in San Francisco
as in Saigon. The present author has for years person-
ally interviewed young military men and women who have
identified themselves for record purposes as members of
one or another religious faith, and has discovered hun-
dreds of times that many hundreds have no idea of "which
church they don*t go to"!
In all then, we find no serious problem in the
major assumptions of this research effort, and shall
address ourselves, rather, to its findings and interpre-
tations, in a later chapter.
Phases Two Through Seven: Surveys and Assessments
of Attitudes
Assumptions examined below are basic to all
phases of the Personal Response Project, but articulated
more specifically in relation to the various research
1
2
^Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1966 edition), p. 221. (It
is unlikely that Robert L. Mole, author of the report we
are examining, would appreciate such academic bedfellows.






efforts in the field of attitudes. Three prefatory
comments are in order,
(1) We are well aware that all reports on
attitude research that we have discussed are rough
"field reports". Data was collected under extremely
demanding and bluntly realistic combat conditions. Our
occasional reference to the vagueness, or ambiguity, or
other weaknesses in a report is a tribute to, in one
sense, rather than a disparagement of, the "realism"
of the report. It is an objective fact that certain
of the reports omit data which should be included, and
that much of the data is organized in a fashion which
makes interpretation quite difficult. It is also an
objective fact that, while the present writer has good
reason to question the old saw about the alleged absence
of atheists in foxholes, there are indeed very few com-
puters therein!
(2) Our primary concern is with the conceptual
approach to the field research on attitudes. Granted
the allowances decency requires for the conditions sug-
gested above, there is still precious little theoretical
justification offered by the investigators apart from





-ihypothesis on the distribution of innovators, followers,
laggards, et al. , in a normal population (in regard to
diffusion of opinions), Festinger's ideas about cognitive
dissonance, the notion of culture shock, the concept of
"communications flow", and a few related ideas. We
mentioned previously, for example, one investigator's
references to a "simple communication continuum",
involving the "image" or "mediator" hypothesis, and
noting that we do^t find these ideas simple at all!
We shall therefore raise some general questions about
the conceptual approach to these attitude surveys.
(3) Specific questions arise about certain
details in the methodological procedures in each of
the phases reported, and these shall be discussed
briefly. Most of these questions, however, are appli-
cable to all phase reports, so that we need not repeat
our comments for each report. The Phase Six (Section
One) report, however, introduces a substantially differ-
ent approach, by using the Thematic Apperception Test





-i(or the "Vietnamese" version thereof), and requires
2^5
separate treatment.
Attitude Survey Assumptions in Respect to a
Conceptual Rationale
We have noted that an important objective of
the attitude surveys was to develop a data base for the
testing and, where required, the correcting and refining
of a "communications strategy" designed to predict and
favorably affect the direction of attitudes. The Sep-
tember 1966 survey, for example, was considered success-
ful in serving "to confirm some portions and correct
other portions of that strategy of communication".
Reference to the Newman paper previously cited gives us
some understanding of the way in which Everett M. Rogers*
work on diffusion of innovations served as part of the
conceptual framework for the communications strategy
,
particularly in relation to defining most influential
-'Phase Six (Section Two), as we have seen,
reports its procedures and findings in such fashion as
to preclude our examining it, or presenting its findings
meaningfully. Phase Seven is insufficiently processed
for evaluation at present,
9Uf,
Phase Two Report , p. 1.





targets and the distribution of Innovators, Trial
Testers, Early Followers, Late Followers, and Laggards
in a normal population. Presumably, identification of
such makes it possible to concentrate one's educational
efforts on "change agents" who are most influential
with others and most likely to cooperate in diffusing
favorable attitudes. In his paper prepared for the
Batelle Memorial Institute, for example, McGonigal,
principal investigator for Phase Two and most succeeding
phases, cites with approval the claim of Rogers and
others that 16% of any group firmly resists any
innovation. McGonigal does not recommend directing
248
educational efforts at this group as "change agents"!
Let us see some of the things Rogers has to say
about opinion leaders and other aspects of the diffusion
of innovations, using the same work our investigators
cite, The Diffusion of Innovations . Under heading of
"What Is Known About Opinion Leaders", Rogers synthesizes
what he calls "the research evidence from several
~l
248Richard A. McGonigal, op.cit.
, p. 7. (The
"others" frequently referenced by both McGonigal and




investigators of opinion leaders". One striking
statement pertinent to the attitude reports we are
examining is based on the investigations of George C.
Homans, who found t "The leader must live up to the
norms of the group — all the norms — better than any
follower." Rogers says, apropos of this: "Opinion
leaders conform more closely to social system norms
than the average member." He gives the findings of a
number of other investigators to support this postulate,
in following pages.
Next, Rogers refers to Robert Merton's pointing
out that opinion leaders may differ as to the breadth of
spheres of influence. Some are "monomorphic" , exerting
influence only in narrowly defined areas, such as
politics or fashion; others are "polymorphic", and
influential in several areas. ^ The majority of
research findings, however, says Rogers, indicates that
"there is little overlapping among the different types
^Everett M. Rogers, op.cit. , p. 232. (In
examining Rogers* synthesis, we shall cite sources as
located in his work, rather than in the original from
which he, in turn, is citing.)
25
°Ibid., p. 233. et sqq.






of opinion leaders". He cites a Katz and Lazarsfield
study which concluded:
The fact that a woman is a leader in one
area has no bearing on the likelihood that she
will be a leader in another ... By and large,
• • . the hypothesis of a generalized leader
receives little support in this study. There
is no overlap in any of the pairs of activities.
Each area, it seems, has a corps of leaders of
its own. 252
Moving to Rogers* treatment of "adopter
categories", or "the classification of individuals within
a social system on the basis of innovativeness" , we do
find a detailed description of individuals along a
time continuum, classified on the basis of differences
between early and late adopters (or innovators and
laggards), as our investigators have pointed out in
regard to defining the target for attitude innovation
and diffusion. " It is interesting to compare Rogers'
table entitled "A Composite Picture of Adopter
Categories" 2^ with Figures III-2 and III-3» provided
by W. Warren Newman, of the Personal Response Project,
as previously reproduced on page 178 of the present
chapter.
252Ibid., p. 236.
253 Ibid., p. 236.
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use of mass media
Neighbors, friends, Very little
and relatives opinion lead-
with similar ship; semi-
values are main isolates
information source
Table reproduced from Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of
Innovations (New York* The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962),
p. 165.
Do the descriptions in the Rogers' categories fit
the Newman categories and the McGonigal findings in the
September 1966 survey of attitudes? The identifications
are not always clear. If, for example, one is a





"with less self-assurance" (Newman categories), he has
to have had a fair amount of time in military service.
This would accord with McGonigal's finding that Marines
' with from 4 to 9 years in service express the most
negative attitudes. Newman puts these individuals in
his "Late Followers" category. But would this fit with
Rogers 1 description of the "Late Majority" as "below
average social status t small operation; little speciali-
zation ; small income"? Not if one looks at the whole
structure of the Marine Corps.
In McGonigal's findings, the most negative group
are those between the ages of 26 and 30. Presumably,
the "most negative" would fit into Newman's and Rogers'
"Laggards". Indeed, Rogers does characterize his lag-
gards as oldest. Yet, at a later point, Rogers says
that what research findings there are indicate t
"Laggards are most likely to drop out of the social
system". 2~^ But this is hardly the age group which
drops out of the Marine Corps. On the contrary, this
age group is the "backbone" of the "career Corps".
Are we being piccayune? We don't think so. We
are simply suggesting that a more exhaustive analysis of
~l
2





the theory of Rogers "and others" might require us to
question whether surface similarities between diffusion
theory as Rogers and others present it, and the brief
.references to such theory provided by the Personal
Response research reporters justify the claim that the
attitude research has been conducted and may be inter-
preted within the conceptual framework of this theory.
This kind of question is required, we suspect, of many
research efforts which claim far greater pretensions




Before we leave the subject of opinion leaders,
we must cite, if for no other reason than the refreshing
candor of its title, a leadership research report by
Fred E. Fiedler, Frankly, we are not sure whether
Fiedler's findings support or weaken the Newman-McGonigal
concepts, but they are interesting, and, in some way, it
would appear, pertinent. Fiedler collected data from
three experiments and eleven different sets of task group
supervisors in five organizations, civilian, government,
and military (both American and Belgian), to test the
hypothesis that leadership and supervisory experience
correlate with supervisory performance as measured by
group effectiveness. The data did not support the highly
popular hypothesis — what Fiedler calls "the implicit
assumptions which currently guide personnel actions in
most organizations". See Fred E. Fiedler, Leadership
Experience and Leadership — Another Hypothesis Shot to
Hell (Urbana. 111. » University of Illinois, December
1968), p. 12. (We must confess to a lot of respect for
Fiedler as an investigator. This report is one of the
many in the series Communication. Cooperation, and Nego-
tiation in Culturally Heterogeneous Groups , of which he






The next construct the Personal Response attitude
researchers propose as basic to their objectives is that
of "cognitive dissonance", as developed primarily by
/ Leon Festinger. So, again, Newman says:
• • • many people will spontaneously seek
to reduce the tensions induced by a conflict of
group and personal attitudes or by a disparity
of public and private opinions. As Dr. Leon
Festinger has indicated in his work regarding
this "cognitive dissonance", efforts at disson-
ance reduction will frequently result in a
shift of attitudes in one direction or the
other. Well-designed communications can often
influence the direction of the shift. 257
The McGonigal references and explanations of
"cognitive dissonance" are scattered ad passim throughout
his research reports, but are always brief — almost
cryptic. For example, in the September 1966, or Phase
Two Report:
It is also noteworthy how the group image
seems to be one negative jump ahead of the
individual opinion except for the senior staff
(non-commissioned officers) and officers. The
way it is felt that one's buddies feel has a
direct and telling effect upon personal opinions.
Authorities call this cognitive dissonance —
the strain between private belief and actual
practice. People tend to try to reduce cognitive
dissonance by either changing their actions or
their beliefs. Our mission is to help personnel
reduce cognitive dissonance by drawing both








actions and beliefs into closer accord with
our fundamental beliefs about human life and
our reason for existence in the military. 25°
In his Phase Five (Section One) Report (5%
Sampling), McGonigal defines cognitive dissonance, in
passing, as "the difference between personal opinion and
what is thought to be the group opinion" • **
We are, once again, in sympathy with the fact
that field reports may be understandably limited in des-
cribing their theoretical underpinnings, especially when
readability is a requirement. But we must assure that
such economy of conceptual explanation does not imply a
naive understanding or use of the cognitive dissonance
postulate proposed by Festinger and others to whom we
shall now turn. If, after all, a major training effort
in techniques of attitude change for cross-cultural
interaction is to be based on research findings assumed
to identify attitude problem areas within the context of
cognitive dissonance theory, we must be careful that we
are not oversimplifying the theory. We already have
258 Ibid. , p. 7#
259pbid., p. 5. (McGonigal advised us in the^
summer of 1969, in personal conversation, that cognitive
dissonance theory provided the framework for his atti-
tude surveys and approach to cross-cultural interaction




enough problems in trying to understand both cross-
cultural interaction and attitudes.
The mention of attitudes at this point forces the
reminder that the Personal Response Project investigators
of attitudes have failed to give us a definition thereof.
Newman remarks, as we have seen previously, that the
Project "grew out of the realization that the behavioral
patterns and attitudes of people are a natural conse-
quence of their religious, cultural, and ethical convic-
tions and value systems" ; but this does not define
attitudes. We have also cited the Marine Corps instruc-
tion which explicitly interrelated an effort in "inter-
cultural attitude" with an understanding of "indigenous
cultural value systems, customs, and religious mores".
Still, no definition of attitudes. Neither of two
McGonigal papers we have cited, despite their titles,
offers a definitioni "For Want of an Attitude" and "Uses
260
of Cross-Cultural Attitude Research in Southeast Asia".
Since we faulted Sternin, to a degree, for an
inadequate definition of values , in his value study, we
260These papers are apart from his research
reports. They were prepared, respectively, for the
Batelle Memorial Institute, and the American Psychologi-






can hardly accept without comment the reticence of atti-
tude researchers to define attitudes. But, we must look
elsewhere for definitions.
Since the attitude surveys we are examining have
been conducted for purposes of cross-cultural communica-
tions (as well as improving the communication of desired
attitudes to and through opinion leaders), it is fitting
that we turn to writers in communications for definitions.
A useful passage is found in a paper by Daniel Katz,
which offers both a definition of attitudes and a number
of distinctions, in respect to beliefs, opinions, values,
and so on.
Attitude is the predisposition of the
individual to evaluate some symbol or object
or aspect of his world in a favorable or unfavor-
able manner. Opinion is the verbal expression
of an attitude, but attitudes can also be
expressed in nonverbal behavior. Attitudes
include both the affective, or belief, elements
which describe the object of the attitude, its
characteristics, and its relation to other
objects. All attitudes thus include beliefs,
but not all beliefs are attitudes. When specific
attitudes are organized into a hierarchical
structure, they comprise value systems . Thus a
person may not only hold specific attitudes
against deficit spending and unbalanced budgets
but may also have a systematic organization of
such beliefs and attitudes in the form of a
value system of economic conservatism. 2" 1
2° 1Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the
Study of Attitudes", in Reader in Public Opinion and Com-
munication , ed. by Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz





Another "communications" approach to attitudes
is offered by Erwin P. Bettinghausi
Regardless of the type of change the communi-
cator desires or of the changes that a researcher
observes, the assumption is that such changes do
not take place without a corresponding change in
attitude on the part of the receiver of communi-
cation. Current ideas of the process of persua-
sion rest on an understanding of the concept of
attitude change and on the ways in which attitude
change is revealed in observable responses • • •
Behavioral scientists • . • have found it helpful
to have a conceptual bridge between what an
individual does and the objects in the individual's
environment toward which he orients himself. No
one has ever seen, heard, tasted, or smelled an
attitude. The nature of attitudes is inferred
from the observable behavior of an individual.
A man hits the man sitting next to him in a bar,
and the bartender infers that negative feelings
are being displayed. Two people walk up to one
another, shake hands, slap each other on the back,
and a bystander infers that positive attitudes are
being displayed. In each case the attitude itself
is not what is demonstrated. The result of hold-
ing a particular attitude is demonstrated in the
behavior observed.
An attitude, then, is an individual's struc-
ture or organization of psychological processes,
and it has to be inferred from the behavior the
individual reveals. Attitudes are described in
terms of the favorability of the evaluation made
by an individual toward an object, person, or
event. The complete dimension extends from com-
pletely favorable orientations toward an event
through neutral to completely unfavorable orienta-
tions toward an event. The behavioral scientist
postulates a positive relationship between the degree
of favorability of attitude held toward an object 2g 2
and the behavior of the organism toward the object.
2^ 2Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Persuasive Communication








The Bettinghaus comments, it seems to us, are
especially pertinent to the Personal Response Project
objective of "changing" attitudes. However, most signi-
ficant in relation to attitude differences in the context
of cognitive dissonance theory are the observations of
the redoubtable Harry C. Triandis, one of the most per-
sistent investigators in the field of cross-cultural
interaction,
Triandis, as a preface to a theory of inter-
personal attitudes, offers a definition of attitude as
M
• • • a (enduring) syndrome of response consistency
with regard to (a set of) social objects". The point he
makes in respect to consistency is most relevant to the
attitude surveys we are examining.
This definition implies that the psychologist
observes some regularities in the relationship
between a set of similar social situations and a
set of similar social responses made by a parti-
cular individual. Thus, in order to determine
that a person P has an attitude toward another
person 0, it is" necessary to observe more than
one occasion in which (or the symbolic repre-
sentation of 0) and P are present in similar
social situations and P makes social responses
that show some regularity • • , Attitude measure-
ment depends on the observation of regularities
in the S's behavior when he is presented with
symbols that represent the social situations.
These regularities in S behavior are not des-






of interrelated dimensions is necessary in order




Triandis supports his multidimensional approach
with data from a number of empirical studies, including
three involving cross-cultural interaction.
In the same paper, Triandis points out that
advances made in the measurement of attitudes have been
accompanied by oversimplification in theoretical treat-
ment. He argues in favor of newly developing theories
of the multidimensionality of attitudes, with distinc-
tions between cognitive affective and behavioral compon-
ents the very least of the distinctions which must be
made, and with, in turn, various additional components
able to be discerned with the behavioral component. The
implications of such theories and of the findings of
empirical studies based on them, he says, indicate that
"it would appear naive to predict social behavior from
the measurement of attitudes, utilizing only one attitude
score. In fact, it appears necessary to obtain a number
2
^Harry c * Triandis, Toward an Analysis of the
Components of Interpersonal Attitudes (Urbana, 111.:
University of Illinois, July, 1966), p. 9. (Edition of
Defense Documentation Center, Defense Supply Agency,







of scores to describe each of the components of
attitudes".
In light of such comments by Triandis and a num-
ber of others who see attitudes as multidimensional and
capable of measurement only by means of batteries of
tests, we now face two conceptual problems, instead of
one. We must now ask not only if the attempt to measure
cognitive dissonance in the Personal Response attitude
surveys is ill-founded because of too naive an interpre-
tation of this phenomenon, but whether the effort to
measure any individual or group attitude by the ques-
tionnaires used in the surveys is futile because of the
inadequacy of the testing instruments?
We shall delay part of the answer to this second
question until we evaluate the findings and interpreta-
tions thereof in the next chapter. If, after all, we
see that a number of findings do seem to reveal
"attitudes" to an extent significantly greater than
chance, then we must say that something effective is at









But part of the answer may be found in examining
the origin of the basic questionnaire used, with modifi-
cations, in most of the attitude surveys. First, it was
not created, designed, pre-tested, or standardized for
use in South Vietnam. It was borrowed almost verbatim
from surveys conducted by Robert L. Humphrey, first in
the Near East (Turkey), then in Korea. ^ Secondly, the
Humphrey survey instrument was designed to collect data
which would reveal attitudes relating to Humphrey's
fundamental hypothesis i the common bond of human
nature. Humphrey developed his questionnaire (s ) in
the field, while engaged in efforts to improve relations
between Americans in Turkey and in Korea and the local
populations. To our knowledge, his published works give
no data on test construction, pretesting on an item-by-
item basis, standardization, or any of the academically
prescribed efforts to assure validity and reliability. '
1
2
^See, Robert L. Humphrey, op.cit. , Appendixes
D through M for questionnaires.
2^ Ibid
.
, See Appendix G for theoretical frame-
work respecting cross-cultural interaction.
2 ?We personally asked Humphrey in private con-
versation on 9 January 1969» in Washington, D.C. , if he
had anywhere published a description of this test con-
struction method and what distinction he makes between





Does any of this mean that the Humphrey instru-
ment as adopted and adapted by the Personal Response
researchers is necessarily invalid or unreliable? Not
at all. It does mean that we do not have the customary
checks for evaluating the instrument. Proved effective-
ness is obviously much more important than ability to
meet academic requirements. We shall have to evaluate
the instrument accordingly, using criteria other than
the usual checks.
Thirdly, we can say categorically that if the
instrument tests attitudes multidimensionally, there is
no evidence provided to show that it does so intention-
ally! If such testing does in fact occur, so much the
better, of course, but if so, the achievement appears
to be accidental.
It is time to turn directly to Festinger and
others, and to our first question, concerning interpre-
tations of the complex phenomenon called cognitive
"I
any such descriptions, or a "scientific" exposition of
his theoretical approach, and that, at the time he con-
structed the questionnaire (s) and published the works
we have cited, he had not distinguished between atti-
tudes and values. We received the impression that the
questionnaires were designed and constructed largely on
an ad hoc basis to meet extant needs, and matched care-







dissonance. Festinger's work, A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance , was published in 195?» as we have seen, but
many of its concepts were enunciated in papers in 1950
and 1951» and in a book, with Stanley Shachter and Kurt
Q 1 «~^ 268,269Back, in 1950.
M. Sheriff work, The Psychology of Social
270Norms
, Everett W. Bovard's paper, "Group Structure
271
and Group Perception" '
, and the particularly famous
Leon Festinger, et al. , Social Pressures in
Informal Groups (New Yorki Harper, 1950).
?6q
* ^These writings all paralleled those of others
working in the then newly-developing field of Group
Dynamics, in which Kurt Lewin was a leading pioneer. We
cite Lewin, specifically, because his background in the
most abstruse forms of mathematics, topology and hodology,
and his bent toward representing interpersonal relations
in terms of physics, such as vectors and valences, espec-
ially in relation to an individual's "life space", have
strongly influenced the entire field of group dynamics,
and may be seen at work in the concepts of the many who
approach political and international relations from a
behavioral science viewpoint. See, for example, Johan
Galtung's paper, "The Social Sciences", in Contending
Approaches to International Politics , ed. by Klaus Knorr
and James N. Rosenau (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1969). Robert A Dahl's older essay, "The
Concept of Power", in Behavioral Science . Vol. 2 (July,
1957)t pp« 201-215f is another example.
2
'°M. Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms
(New York: Harper, 1936)*
2^1Everett W. Bovard, "Group Structure and Group
Perception", in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology .






study by S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure Upon
the Modification and Distortion of Judgments" 2?2
, matched,
and in many ways supported, certain of Festinger 1 s
hypotheses. In other words, the concepts inherent in
cognitive dissonance theory were "in the air" of the
19^0* s and early 1950* s, so that Fe stinger and his
associates could write in 1950:
There is no question any longer that individ-
uals and groups do exert influences on others
which can and do result in uniform opinions and
behavior patterns • • . It has also been shown,
by a series of independent studies, that people's
aspirations and goal-setting behavior are strongly
influenced by information about how others behave
and their relationship to these others. 2?3
It was in a 1950 paper, "Informal Social
Communication", however, that Festinger began spelling
out his theoretical formulation of what was to become
the theory of cognitive dissonance. Discussing
pressures toward uniformity in a group, he suggested two
major sources of such pressure among people, namely,
social reality and group locomotion. In respect to
2?2S. S. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure Upon
the Modification and Distortion of Judgments" , in Groups
.
Leadership, and Men , ed. by H. Guetzkow (Pittsburgh:
Carnegie Press, 1951)»
2
^^Leon Festinger, ejt al. , op.cit. , Ch. 5, p. 203.
2?^Leon Festinger, "Informal Social Communication",







social reality, he observed that opinions, attitudes,
and beliefs people hold must rest on some basis for
validity, and proposed that one among many bases on
which subjective validity may rest is a continuum which
may be called a scale of physical reality. At one end
of the scale is complete dependence on physical reality.
He illustrated by pointing out that no amount of argu-
ment is going to convince an individual that a piece
of glass is unbreakable if he sees it smashed before his
eyes with a hammer. In other words, at the physical
end of the continuum, reliance on other people for the
confidence one has in one's own opinions or beliefs is
low, while dependence on physical reality itself is
high. At the other end of the continuum, we have zero
dependence on physical reality, but high dependence on
whether or not other people share an opinion or belief.
For example, no physical reality can determine that if
a loser had won an election things would be better than
they are. One's belief in this situation depends largely
on whether or not others share the belief. An opinion,
belief, or attitude, then, is "valid" or "invalid" to
the extent that it is shared in a group of people with




The second major source of pressure toward group
uniformity Festinger posits lies in the phenomenon of
"locomotion" in and out of groups. It is obviously not
necessary, he points out, that everyone in the world
agree with us. We tend to see people who don't agree
with us as inadequate referents. We likewise tend to
move into and out of groups in accordance with the
group's likelihood to agree with us. But to define
which groups are appropriate referents for a given
individual, or for a given opinion or attitude, is
extremely difficult, he notes, and is inherently circu-
lar, because of the locomotion phenomenon; that is,
because we tend toward a group which shares our opinions,
beliefs and attitudes, and an appropriate reference group
tends to be, precisely, a group which does share our
opinions, beliefs, and attitudes,
Festinger goes on to observe that where discre-
pancies in opinions, beliefs or attitudes arise among
members of an appropriate reference group, forces to
communicate will also arise. Moreover, the less physical
reality is available to "validate" opinions or beliefs,
the greater the importance of the social reality, the







It is the question of the determinants of when and to
whom a member communicates, under pressure of such
forces, and the reactions of the recipient of the com-
munication, about which Festinger hypothesizes in this
paper, offering an extended series of interrelated,
complex hypotheses. He concludes with a brief, but
pertinent discussion of emotional states in the communi-
cator — joy, anger, hostility, and the like — apart
from the forces considered in the hypothesis, and
related, in part, to theories of psychoanalysis.
In 195^1 Festinger offered another paper, much
more complex than the one discussed above 2?5, developing
the theory outlined in the earlier paper. This paper
is likewise important for our purposes because it add-
resses questions not only of opinions and attitudes, but
of abilities
. Distinguishing between an individual's
cognition (opinions and beliefs) about the situation in
which he finds himself and his evaluation of his abili-
ties — what he is capable of doing in the situation,
he points out that both have a critical bearing on his
behavior. We count 28 hypotheses, corollaries, and
"I
'^Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison





derivations proposed and discussed in relation to this
basic postulate. Space limitations preclude reproduction
of hypotheses and discussion here, but we might well
emphasize his conclusion, which advises us of what
might seem obvious, but which, in terms of the objectives
of the Personal Response Project and the purposes of the
attitude surveys carried out in its behalf, bears force-
ful repetition, to wit, that changing one^ public per-
formance is relatively easy, in comparison with changing
one's attitudes, opinions, or values. 2 ''6 » 2??
2
'
6 In his major work in 1957t The Theory of Cog-
nitive Dissonance , Festinger himself tells us that his
theory started with a hunch. The Indian earthquake of
193^ was followed by a mass of rumors predicting worst
disasters to follow. In an effort to explain these
rumors, Festinger hypothesized that they were intended
to justify, rather than to provoke anxiety. Many people
who had felt the shock of the earthquake, but had suf-
fered no harm themselves, and had seen no damage, exper-
ienced considerable fear. Without seeing anything to be
terrified about, they had to invent something to justify
the fear, or to "reduce dissonance" between their beliefs
(fears) and physical reality as they observed it. The
theory developed that cognitive consonance, in which state
our knowledge, opinions and beliefs about ourselves and
our environment are internally consistent, is psychologi-
cally comfortable, but that cognitive dissonance, in these
same respects, is psychologically uncomfortable, and
motivates an effort to reduce it in favor of some degree
of consonance. Festinger does not claim complete origin-
ality for his theory, and quotes such investigators as
Osgood and Tannenbaum ("congruence theory"), among others,
as paralleling his own work.
27?Martin Brouwer, of the University of Amsterdam,
I




Inherent in the many hypotheses about cognitive
dissonance posed by Festinger and others are premises
concerning communicator credibility and the "psychologi-
cal distances", or dissonance, between an attitude held
by an individual or group and opinions proposed by a
communicator. In a study of these premises, Brian A.
March points out that the "major finding of a majority
of relevant experiments has been a positive relationship
between a communicator^ credibility (expertise and
trustworthiness of motivation) and the amount of attitude
change resulting from exposure to his message". In
an experiment designed to test the predictiveness of the
amount of cognitive dissonance between audience and
"I
unawareness of a German-Dutch communications specialist
named Kurt Baschwitz, whose work long antedated that of
Festinger, Osgood, and others, and is strikingly similar.
Baschwitz presented his theory under the title of "need
of relief", of "need of balance". See Martin Brouwer,
"Mass Communications and the Social Sciences: Some
Neglected Areas", in People, Society, and Mass Communica-
tions t ed. by L. A. Dexter and D. Manning White (New York
The Free Press, 196^), pp. 562-563.
2
'Brian Andrew March, "Communicator Credibility
and Initial Attitude as Variables in Persuasion" (College
Park, Md.» University of Maryland, November 1968), p. 1.
(Technical Report No. 13 in series Cross-Cultural Inves-
tigation of Some Factors in Persuasion and Attitude






communicator, March administered an attitude question-
naire about American military and economic involvement
in the conflict in Vietnam to 222 undergraduates in an
introductory psychology course. After scoring the
attitude survey, he issued a statement about the war and
American involvement attributed to two different individ-
uals, Senator Frank Church and Representative Adam
Clatyon Powell. Senator Church was described in highly
respectable terms, Congressman Powell in pejorative
terms. Some subjects received the statement as attri-
buted to Church, other subjects received it as attributed
to Powell. All subjects were then asked to score the
alleged originator of the statement and the statement
itself for credibility, fairness and accuracy. Integrat-
ing his findings with those of many other investigators '^
t
he reports reconfirmation of "the well-established
relationship between communicator credibility and per-
suasive effect". 2 The high credibility communicator
(Church) enjoyed a decided advantage over the low
credibility communicator (Powell). Secondly, he reports
that subjects whose initial positions differed little
27 9ibid. , see pp. 4-7-^8 for examples.






from the one advocated changed very little, even with a
high credibility communicator. This is interpreted as
the "ceiling effect" — there is little room on the scale
for movement.
Thirdly, and importantly, he reports no inter-
action between credibility and the built-in discrepancy
in the situation where subjects* views differed either
moderately or extremely from the communicator's. Both
groups — moderate and extreme — changed to approxi-
mately the same extent when confronted by a highly
credible communicator, and not at all when confronted
by an incredible communicator.
This latter finding fails to support Festinger*
s
idea that there may be an interaction between discrep-
ancy and credibility. Festinger, with E. Aronson, pro-
posed the following thesis in i960.
Dissonance is experienced by an individual who
discovers his own position differs from the communi-
cator^. The magnitude of dissonance is a function of
the magnitude of the difference. Usually a communicator,
281 L. Festinger and E. Aronson, "The Arousal and
Reduction of Dissonance in Social Contexts", in Group
Dynamics t Research and Theory , ed. by D. Cartwright and





in an experimental situation, does not interact with the
audience, nor members of the audience with one another.
Hence, the individual is limited in the ways he can reduce
his experienced dissonance, Festinger and Aronson aver
that dissonance can be reduced in such a situation only
by the individual's changing his attitude toward the
communicator, or by derogating the communicator. If
through the former, the amount of change increases as a
function of the amount of difference. If through the
latter, derogation should increase as a function of the
amount of difference, also. March's findings do not
support this hypothesis of cognitive dissonance theory.
We shall content ourselves with one further
illustration of the complexity of cognitive dissonance
theory, and the diverse findings of various investigators.
J, 0. Whittaker reported in 1963 a series of experiments
investigating the influence of discrepancy on attitude
change, and found a "curvilinear relationship" between
discrepancy and amount of change. When initial attitudes
differed little from the communicator's position, little
attitude change occurred. When the differences were
moderate, maximum change occurred. When differences were





tudes were driven in the opposite direction from that
advocated by the communicator. 282 March's report does
not support these findings, either,
V/e have devoted this much space to discussing
the cognitive dissonance theory for several reasons.
First, the Personal Response Project attitude researchers
postulate it as an important conceptual parameter of
their studies, as we have seen, and justify the attitude
surveys in large part to identify problem areas and
problem people in terms of cognitive dissonance and for
purposes of designing means to reduce such dissonance
favorably. It is obviously important, then, that their
assumptions and research procedures should accord with
cognitive dissonance theory as enunciated by its
originators, investigators and proponents, and that
findings presumed to demonstrate cognitive dissonance
and provide means of discerning the reasons for such
dissonance, as well as the approach toward reducing it,
should likewise be truly meaningful within the framework
of the theory . Certainly the phase reports we have
discussed give us very few clues leading to a reasonable
J. 0. Whittaker, "Opinion Change as a Function
of Communication-Attitude Discrepancy", in Psychological
Reports






assumption that this is the case. On the contrary, what
little is said about the theory suggests an oversimpli-
fied interpretation, in light of those very few, of the
many possible, complex facets of the theory we have dis-
cussed. We are warned, then, that we must evaluate the
findings and interpretations thereof with particular
care.
Secondly, we have addressed this theory at some
length because of its general importance to the field of
politics, both domestic and international. Mere refer-
ence to such writings as Robert A. Dahl's "The Concept
of Power", Maurice A. Ash's "An Analysis of Power with
Special Reference to International Politics", Herbert
McCloskey and Harold E. Dahlgren's "Primary Group
Influence on Party Loyalty" 28 ^; V. 0. Key's "Public
Opinion and Democratic Politics", Curt and Gladys Lang's
284
"The Mass Media and Voting" ; Milton J. Rosenberg's
The Dahl, Ash, and McCloskey-Dahlgren essays
may be found in S. Sidney Ulmer, ed., Introductory Read-
ings in Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1961).
284
The Key and Lang essays may be found in
Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz , eds., Reader in
Public Opinion and Communication (2nd ed.i New Yorki





"Images in Relation to the Policy Process" 28^, and a
broad spectrum of related works, is sufficient to sug-
gest the importance of the theory to a very wide variety
of political issues.
Finally, we have discussed cognitive dissonance
theory in this fashion as a reminder of a point heavily
stressed in our Introductory chapter, that complexities,
ambiguities, and very frequent disagreements typify much
social and behavioral science at this stage of develop-
ment, and research projects which casually reference
given theories, or aver blithely that So-and-So has
"demonstrated", or "definitely proved" a particular
hypothesis, not infrequently reflect wishful thinking
or even inadequate understanding on the part of the
researcher.
Further cognitive dissonance studies will be
introduced, particularly those addressing cross-cultural
situations, when we examine the findings of the attitude
surveys in the following chapter.
9The Rosenberg essay and many others may be





We must proceed now to a very brief discussion of
culture shock. As we have noted previously, many inves-
tigators have reported varying aspects of this phenomenon,
and much of the literature on the subject reminds the
reader that it was K. Oberg who first described it. 286
We must observe frankly, however, that while we
have read many dramatic descriptions of culture shock,
and listened to impassioned pleas about the necessity of
preparing Americans for the experience, we have the
uneasy feeling that it is a phenomenon harder to disprove
than to prove; that is, it has every appearance of a
construct on which may be blamed a wide variety of
undesirable experiences, attitudes and behavior, without
anyone's being able to discount such attribution. We are
inclined to agree with G. M. Guthrie, who, while holding
to the phenomenon (which he calls culture fatigue), notes:
In spite of the fact that many unfortunate
episodes have been attributed to this process it
has not been the object of field study • • .
This would be a difficult area of study since
K. Oberg, Culture Shock and the Problem of
Adjustment to a New Cultural Environment (Washington,






it would involve a quasi-psychiatric evaluation
of people in the field at a time when they were
under the stress of an unsatisfactory adjustment
• . • In the absence of incidence data and
other documentation we are obliged to offer a
description of culture fatigue based on obser-
vations and scattered anecdotal accounts from
the literature ... In summary, we can say that
there is need for on-the-spot studies of the
stress of individuals involved in assistance
activities. The data available are impressionis-
tic and dramatic but they do not tell us much
about the process of unfavorable and ineffective
reactions nor do they point to remedial steps. 287
Guthrie does offer one observation, however,
overlooked in much of the literature, and important to
the Personal Response Project. He points out not only
that "the generally negative attitude toward host
nationals spreads to include almost all aspects of the
society, so that the afflicted one comes generally to
dislike everyone and be unable to conceal his attitudes",
but that he may likewise direct his hostility and dis-
satisfaction toward fellow Americans. "The generally
pessimistic evaluation of the situation leads to a
vicious circle in which associates respond unfavorably,
eliciting further negativism from the one who is under-
going the ordeal." 2 In our examination of the attitude
28?George M. Guthrie, Conflicts of Culture and
the Military Advisor (Washington, D.C.: Institutes for
Defense Analyses, Research and Engineering Support Divi-
sion, November 1966), pp. 39-^0.
I
,




survey findings, it will pay us to see if perhaps this
explanation of certain types of behavior may be appli-
cable, should other explanations seem questionable.
The Vietnamese TAT
The report of the survey undertaken with the
Thematic Apperception Test tells us quite honestly that
the investigators were not at all sure what it would
produce. Moreover, having used it, they report that
they "are not completely sure" of what they have, and
ask that their conclusions be taken as tentative at
best. We are told, too, that Vietnamese graduate
students trained in projective testing techniques by
Dr. Worchel not only administered the test to Popular
Forces, but evaluated the narrative responses on scales
designed by the investigators.
Again we accept and sympathize with both the
modesty of the investigators and the difficult circum-
stances of their field research. But occasionally these
fragmentary contributions, offered with numerous dis-
claimers, have a way of slipping unobtrusively into a
^Attitude Study of PFs. USMC CAPs (Using Viet-







final tally of how many people were tested in how many
different ways that all seemed, somehow, to add up to
something important. If a research report is printed
at all, it must pretend to contribute something . So we
must examine it to see if we can at least figure out
what the something is! Bad research, using bad instru-
ments, should not be reported at all.
What do we have here? First, V/orchel himself
did not even use the "trained Vietnamese students" to
evaluate the Vietnamese TAT he designed in Vietnam. He
sent completed TAT cards back to the United States,
where they were scored "by groups of trained graduate
290
students in psychology and political science". For
those unfamiliar with the instrument to have responses
evaluated by these same Vietnamese students is daring,
at least!
Secondly, while there is a wide variety of
socring techniques extant for the TAT, there is consider-
able confusion about what the scores (or evaluations)
mean. In this case, the investigators say they were
2 ^ Philip Worchel, et al. , A Socio-Psychological
Study of Regional/Popular Forces in Vietnam (2 vols.;
New York: Simulmatics Corporation, September 1967),





interested in communication factors, hence asked the
Vietnamese student evaluators to evaluate TAT cards on
scales of responsibility, optimism, and self-image. The
connection is less than clear. Further, v/hile the inves-
tigators might fit their "scales" into the context of
one of the better-known techniques (such as David
McClelland^ use of the TAT to score "Need Achievement"),
even then they would find themselves in a tenuous
position. Magda B. Arnold's overview of such techniques
is less than optimistic.
"
Thirdly, as R. S. Lazarus observes, to predict
behavior from the TAT alone is impossible. 2 ^2 He and
others point out that the relationship between a verbal
response to a TAT picture and actual behavior is simply
beyond calculation. That Worchel is very well-aware of
this is clearly demonstrated by the fact that he admin-
istered an open-ended questionnaire, two projective tests
(TAT and Dream Reports), the Self-Anchoring Scale, and
^ Magda B. Arnold, Story Sequence Analysis (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 3-13«
2 ^2R. S. Lazarus, "A Substitutive-Defensive Con-
ception of Apperceptive Fantasy" , in Contemporary Issues
in Thematic Apperceptive Methods , ed. by J. Kagan and






a set of Sociometric Items, and then attempted to cross-
validate these with interviews and other means.
Fourthly, the Personal Response researchers used
the TAT in what they explicitly call an attitude study,
whereas Worchel used it and accompanying instruments to
test motivation, needs and frustrations, and aspirations,
besides attitudes . In other words, attitudes were
derived from the sum of data collected on a variety of
factors.
Fifthly, all of Worchel* s testing was done with
Regional Forces, Popular Forces, wives of both, and
civilian villagers, some 80<& of whom admitted to having
no contact with American forces. The Personal Response
research was conducted among PFs who live, work, and
fight beside American forces.
Sixthly, Worchel warns of the tremendous problems
of translation peculiar to American tests in non-American
cultures, a problem particularly acute with the TAT and
similar projective tests. He cautions especially about
the care needed if content analysis is applied to
translated material. In fact, he attempted to avoid
cultural distortion by adhering to manifest content in




r nprojective test is looking for something beyond mani-
fest responses. Further, in manifest responses one must
always guess about what is said because "socially
acceptable", and what is truly believed. Worchel gives
an example of another problem — what he calls "the
culturally associated reluctance of the Vietnamese to
express negative feelings". They resort to describing,
hypothetical situations. "For example in answer to the
item asking 'What in your unit do you not like?*, many
respondents replied in such ways: 'If there were
quarreling and drinking, I would not like it'." ^
We see no such guidelines in the report we are discuss-
ing. Face-value interpretations of the translations of
narratives as given could obviously mislead, without
such cautions.
Finally the TAT itself is a tricky instrument,
even when used in its native English, as a clinically
diagnostic tool, on a personal interview basis. The
present writer, trained in clinical psychology and in
both the psychodynamic theories underlying the test and
the techniques of administering it, has used it fre-
quently enough to respect it, on the one hand, and feel
2






persistently uncertain about it, on the other. His
uneasiness is not unusual, as the Arnold work cited
above testifies. A careful examination of Worchel's
report does not convince the present writer that a
"Vietnamese version" has been adequately tested for
validity and reliability. The further manipulation of
the Vietnamese version by the Personal Response research-
ers hardly contributes to this writer's confidence in the
29^
whole business.
At the outset of this section, we noted that
our primary interest was to evaluate the assumptions
of the attitude surveys from the point of view of their
conceptual merit. V/hat we have tried to do is to out-
line in greater detail than the investigators have done
in their reports the theoretical frameworks within which
they believe themselves to be working. We are not at
all sure that we have satisfied ourselves; that they
are, indeed, as thoroughly in accord with the theories
involved as they sincerely feel. The major test will
come in an evaluation of their findings and interpreta-
tions. To this task we now proceed, and to the parallel
2 ° The principal investigator, Richard A.
McGonigal, advised us in personal conversation that he
holds some 3,500 (sic?) narrative responses collected




task of evaluating the findings of the "value" study-
by Sternin and his associates, comparing the several
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FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS EVALUATED
Review
Thus far we have presented a good bit of
material, some of it complex. There has been a certain
amount of repetition and overlapping. The repetition
has been deliberate, in an effort to provide ease of
reference; the overlapping is inherent in the attempt
to examine related concepts.
A review is in order, to bring into focus the
significant elements of what we have been discussing,
so that we may clarify what must be done in the present
chapter and in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter I we pointed to the need for a con-
ceptual synthesis, or theoretical framework, in the
field of cross-cultural interaction. From the view-
point of the political scientist, who recognizes that
the domestic body politic involves interaction between
and among persons of different sub-cultures, and that
the international body politic involves interaction






need is apparent. From the viewpoint of the policy-
maker, who must find means of effecting harmonious inter-
action between Americans in significant positions abroad
and "host" peoples, the need is both obvious and acute.
Although a synthesis is lacking, there are extant
a number of conceptual approaches to cross-cultural
interaction. To help in evaluating these empirically,
we have examined two studies directly and a number of
others indirectly. The first major study was Sternin's
investigation of values of rural South Vietnamese, The
second was a series of discrete but related investiga-
tions of values of South Vietnamese and attitudes of
both South Vietnamese and Americans (with brief looks
at Japanese and Ryukyuans), and is reported in eleven
rough field reports, which we divided roughly into seven
Phases. 295
^Henceforth, we shall frequently refer to
Phase One, on values, as the Mole Report, and to all
successive phases, on attitudes, as the McGonigal Reports,
even though other investigators were also involved. It
should perhaps be noted here that there does not exist
a single volume including all these reports, or a syn-
thesis of findings. Our presentation required that we
comb through each rough field report individually, and






We explained why we selected the Sternin, Mole,
and McGonigal reports as typical of cross-cultural inter-
action studies, and used each as a frame of reference
within which we could conveniently review related studies
per transennem . Because we consider these studies
typical, and because we object (Chapter I) so strenuously
to the furtherance of possible error by those "reviews
of the literature" which reference studies very super-
ficially, without examining them adequately, we examined
the Sternin, Mole, and McGonigal reports in some detail.
The assumptions and methodology of the Sternin
study were criticized at greater length and in more
detail than were those of the Mole and McGonigal studies,
not because the latter studies have some intrinsic merit
which exempts them from such an evaluation, but because
of several factors inherent in the studies themselves.
The Sternin study is neatly "packaged", the two-volume
report well organized, the assumptions, procedural
methods, findings, and interpretations carefully expli-
cated in logical sequence. The McGonigal reports are
less well organized, with ten field reports attempting
to present longitudinal research efforts, with repeated





stand alone. There is little regularity in modes of
presentation, only scattered references to conceptual
assumptions, casual presentations of procedural methods,
inconsistencies in reporting findings, and similar
weaknesses. It is virtually impossible, therefore, to
examine these reports by way of the approach made poss-
ible by the structure of the Sternin reports.
Secondly, it is frequently difficult to dis-
tinguish, on the one hand, between assumptions and proce-
dures in the McGonigal studies, and findings and inter-
pretations, on the other. For example, the phenomenon
of culture shock is presented as both a finding of the
surveys and a cause of the findings. Again, cognitive
dissonance is hypothesized as an explanation of the
differences between group and individual attitude
expressions, yet several of the research efforts seem
to be an effort to prove the cognitive dissonance
phenomenon.
The Mole studies, as we have previously suggested,
present a problem to anyone trying to evaluate procedure.
Much of what has been said, good and bad, about the parti-




collecting. 2 9" As we have noted, his findings in general
have mustered a great deal of whatever support one con-
siders "arguments from authority" to contribute. We
accepted certain of his assumptions at face-value, in
part because of the preponderance of professional anthro-
pological support, in part because of their common sense
nature (recognizing the tenuousness of this criterion),
in part, very frankly, because we can*t argue about
everything !
However, whatever inadequacies may be found in
terms of the extent of criticism of the Mole and
McGonigal studies, in comparison with that presented
for the Sternin study, should be corrected in the examin-
ation of findings and interpretations which lies ahead.
On the other hand, neither these nor any other
of the studies have been discussed as ends in themselves,
or because we are interested in disputing or approving
them as an academic exercise. Our goal is to evaluate
current conceptual approaches to cross-cultural
interaction. We would not be satisfied with evaluating
2 9"See, for example, Victor Barnouw, Culture and
Personality (Homewood, 111. t The Dorsey Press, 1 Q63)»
Part Two, Ch. 11 and 12 i also, Abram Kardiner and Edward






theory merely by way of other theories. ( Idem per idem
non definitur . ) We want to contribute empirical data to
such an evaluation — data accrued from research. We are
interested in learning the ingredients of effective,
harmonious interaction between peoples of diverse
cultures. Without field research input, it is unlikely
that these ingredients could be discovered. Hence the
reason for our addressing the studies cited above.
We have been using South Vietnam as a "field
laboratory" for several reasons, including, among others:
from a policy-making viewpoint, we have a critical need
and vested interest in South Vietnam? from a research
viewpoint, we have in fact conducted extensive research
in South Vietnam; from a political theory viewpoint, we
can assume that at least some of the findings in South
Vietnam may be applicable to cross-cultural interaction
in other parts of Southeast Asia, and, perhaps,
universally. For both political science and policy
makers, the words of Carlos P. Romulo are pertinent.
It makes little difference whether the
penguins of Antarctica know anything about
the squirrels of Rock Creek Park. But it
makes all the difference in the world whether
the American people understand the crowded






Asia's destiny, the world's very survival,
may depend on such understanding on your
part. 297
Preview
The Romulo citation leads us again to the point
which can hardly be expressed with sufficient emphasis,
which is essential to this entire paper, and which will
be the primary focus of our attention henceforth. A
conceptual framework for cross-cultural interaction may
not be built merely on findings about values and
attitudes. It must rest to a considerable degree on
findings about cross-cultural overt behavior . It must
be able to hypothesize about behavior, to be able to
say, crudely, at least thisi "If a member of one
culture does or does not do such-and-such in reference
to a member of another culture, such-and-such a response
probably will or will not occur." The Romulo reference
to "understanding" the peoples of Asia is extremely
meaningful if it is interpreted to reflect behavior
related to understanding; otherwise, it is meaningless
and dangerous.







This may appear to be a uselessly-repeated
truisnii yet there is a great deal of nonsense uttered
about the magnificent attitudes and superb behavior
toward "indigenous peoples" which would inevitably accrue
"if we only understood them". Ina Corinne Brown des-
cribes the foolishness of this cliche in her Understand-
ing Other Cultures .
The notion that if people would just get
to know one another they would be friends and
everything would be all right is as dangerous
as it is sentimental. Getting to know people
is a necessary prelude to understanding and
respect, but such knowledge alone will not
resolve our differences or insure our liking
people whose ways are alien to us. Persons
may know one another very well and yet be bitter
rivals and equally bitter enemies. Nor does a
common race, religion, language, nationality,
or culture insure friendliness or good will as
numerous civil wars, rebellions, and intergroup
conflicts attest. The sober truth is that
different peoples must learn to get along
?
pn
together whether they like one another or not. " y
This is extremely important to the ultimate objec-
tive of this paper, the development of guidelines for a
conceptual synthesis for cross-cultural interaction.
Such a synthesis can be reached only if we bridge the
gap between value/attitude abstractions and concrete,
"real-life" behavior. As Robert J. Foster puts it:
29° ina Corinne Brown, Understanding Other







Effectiveness in a cross-cultural situa-
tion is likely to be built on an accumulation
of many minute acts such as those which reveal
indifference, attitudes of superiority, preju-
dices, and so forth, which isolated from each
other have little significance. 299
In other words, all the dynamics of behavior
occurring in cross-cultural interaction are important,
not merely what the participants value, or what their
unexpressed attitudes are toward each other. The
bridge we mentioned needing is not self-evident. It
must be built. For example, one problem in the interpre-
tation of the Mole findings lies in assumptions that
behavior which could be attributed to values held, must
be so attributed, or is obviously so attributable. The
immense body of literature on behavior exists precisely
because behavior is such a complicated business, and
motivation is so difficult to discern. Behaviorist
schools of psychology have developed in large part as
declarations that underlying motives for observable
behavior are, in fact, indiscernible, a concept we need
not accept to recognize it as a reflection of the com-
plexity of the problem.
^^RolDert J. Foster, Examples of Cross-Cultural
Problems Encountered by Americans Working Overseas: An
Instructor's Handbook (Alexandria, Va. : HumRRO, George





This complexity is a very important affair. A
basic assumption in every major approach toward devising
conceptual frameworks for cross-cultural interaction, and
toward trying to effect harmonious cross-cultural inter-
action, is that we have in fact identified , are in the
process of identif?/ing t or are capable of identifying the
values (value systems) of the cultures involved . It is
further assumed that favorable reciprocal attitudes on
the part of participants toward the two or more variant
cultures involved in cross-cultural interaction is at
least important, if not essential, to harmonious
interaction. But neither of these postulates, possibly
very valid in themselves (but at any rate not to be
controverted within the limitations of this paper), does
or can argue that an individual who holds certain values
and/or attitudes will act (behave overtly) in a given
way in a given situation, or, conversely, that overt
behavior in a given situation is immediately understand-
able if the observer is simply aware of values and/or
attitudes of the actor and only these. The isolation of
values from habits, or vice versa, or of either from
other variables in the totality of the "real-life" cross-






the isolated variable meaningless. In terms of cross-
cultural interaction, to know that a South Vietnamese
aniraist "values" a given tree as the abode of a given
spirit is as meaningless as an isolated piece of data as
it is meaningless for Romulo's penguins to know about
his squirrels. It is at best a piece of knowledge. It
is not of itself understanding. It is not of itself
obviously relevant to cross-cultural interaction.
As the emphasis of the preceding paragraphs
indicate, in the evaluation of findings and interpreta-
tions we are about to begin, we shall be interested in
what they may tell us about the totality of behavior,
not merely what they may yield in respect to values and
attitudes or other behavioral dynamics unobservable in
themselves. We are interested especially in any guide-
lines which may be formulated for the prediction of
behavior, in line with our objective of seeking a concept-
ual framework for understanding cross-cultural interaction
and hypothesizing behavioral probabilities in cross-
cultural situations. For these reasons, we shall pursue
the following procedures.
First, we shall examine and comment on each set





consistency, their congruity with one another, and
their consonance or discrepancy in respect to related
studies and currently accepted hypotheses.
Secondly, we shall examine the available content
of responses in the McGonigal studies for what they
reveal about American and Vietnamese behavior in South
Vietnam.
Thirdly, we shall invoke a technique widely used
in examining "real life" behavioral situations to examine
a representative sampling of such interaction situations
in South Vietnam. Both the technique and the nature
and source of the interaction incidents to be examined
will be explained when used.
The Sternin Values Study300
We previously quoted Triandis to the effect that,
in exploring implicit norms and values, a great deal
depends on the meaningful interpretation of results. We
are reminded of this when we note that Sternin considers
his two "exciting" findings to be (a) that the variables
of age, sex, and education make a significant difference
in Vietnamese value orientations, and (b) that religion
^ For summary of findings, see our Chapter Two,




appears to make no difference,^ 01 We cite Sternin's
observation at this point because it so well introduces
our approach to his findings, namely, that "findings"
really become such primarily in their interpretation .
We shall point out later in this report, for example,
possibilities for interpreting these demographic vari-
ables quite differently. Until interpreted, data are
still just data. This is an important point because
the tendency in much modern research is to emphasize the
differences between "raw data" and "processed data", as
though the latter, by way of computer technology,
automatically becomes "meaningful data", or "findings".
It is perhaps very late and very naive to insist that
this is not the case, and that both before and after
"processing" data becomes meaningful by interpretation,
viewpoint, bias, selectivity, discrimination, the
Weltanschauung of the investigator.
Sternin has done us a real service in providing
us with his view of the meaning of his data, and has gone
even beyond this by illustrating the applicability or
usage of his findings in efforts to program communica-
tions strategies des igned to effect harmonious and
3 In personal telephone conversation with the







productive relations between Americans and South
Vietnamese, and to influence the latter to act in a
manner presumably favorable to both South Vietnamese and
302
American interests, not only by way of weakening the
Viet Cong, but by gaining popular support for the
national government in order to stimulate the nation-
building process. One illustration is provided by the
proposal of a hypothetical "scenario" describing how the
value orientations data could be used in a psychological
operations setting. We shall address this shortly. A
second helpful illustration is provided by way of a
series of recommendations for appealing to and favorably
influencing the Viet Cong within the context of the
value orientations data. This, too, we shall review, 3°3
Both illustrations serve as guidelines to assure that we
are examining what Sternin and his associates intend in
their "findings" , so that we are not misinterpreting
them, and serve, as well, to place the values discussed
in behavioral situations, as we have suggested is so
3°%e shall be working out of both volumes prev-
iously described, the Sternin Volume and the Havron
Volume (of which Sternin is a co-author), mindful that
both volumes report what we are calling the Sternin Study.
3
-^Pages 72 to 75i Chapter Two, of this paper,
list the Sternin findings which are applied in the illus-





important to conceptualizing cross-cultural interaction
(even though, as we recognize, of course, the situations
are hypothetical).
In addition to these two detailed illustrations,
we are provided with discussions of an extant American-
developed "national psychological operations plan" and
of nation-building. Both discussions address their
respective topics in terms of the applicability of values
data.
Value Orientations and a Psychological
Operations Program
An Illustrative Scenario
Calling this section of their report "An Illus-
tration of the Uses of Cultural Data in a Psychological
Operations Program", the authors postulate that an Ameri-
can has been assigned to work with a province chief and
his staff in conducting psychological operations in the
Mekong Delta. Demographic characteristics of area
residents generally reflect those characterizing the
three hamlets studied by Sternin — Binh Hanh, Binh Dinh




and Thanh Due. If we "profile" the province chief des-
cribed ad passim throughout the scenario, we find that
he is the "modal personality" reflecting a kind of mean
of the demographic characteristics and the value orienta-
tions and variants reported above — even to the "mean"
reflected in the Taxonomy of Concerns used only in Binh
Fanh.2 * He is neither too young nor too old for
"generation gaps" in either direction. His actions
"are in keeping with commonly-held Vietnamese values".
He can work harmoniously with different kinds of people,
see good in everyone, is respectful of religious leaders
and teachers, helps people influence conditions around
them, accepts and encourages innovations of proven
worth in agriculture and business, represents extensions
of existing methods to control the environment, and so
on. He is pragmatic in taking advantage of opportunities
to satisfy needs of the moment, but respects tradition
and custom. The forms of his actions are as much a mat-
ter of concern as are the results. We can readily recog-
nize in the province chief, in other words, the Buddhist-
3
^We actually worked out such a profile in the
rough, and it "fits" the data, as the statisticians would
say, and the province chief of the scenario. What the
authors seem to be doing here, quite legitimately, is
using a kind of Weberian "ideal type", both to create the





Catholic-Cao Daist, situation-oriented recognizer of
human goodness in appropriate areas of activity, whose
formalistic orientations do not preclude flexibility in
the appropriate variants, and whose decision-making is
presented in such fashion that each of his constituents
feels that his own individualistic decision-making
rights are merely extended by the decisions formulated
(not made) by the province chief. In all, quite a
fellow! 306
Now how is our American to "advise" this prov-
ince chief? It is suggested that the chief help develop
popular support for two Saigon-initiated programs,
namely, a Vocational Training Program and a Family
Reunification Program (anent families separated by
military operations). The first step is to devise a
communications strategy, and this, in turn, requires
"I
-* Students of Max Weber will find a remarkable
similarity to the province chief in Max Weber's pre-
eminently qualified politician, whose "decisive psycho-
logical quality" is in "his ability to let realities work
upon him with inner concentration and calmness". We are
not at all sure, however, that he could say today what he
said in 1918: ". • . it is only in the Occident that we
find this kind of professional politician in the service
of powers other than the princes" • See Politics as a
Vocation , in From Max Weber , ed. by H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (New Yorkt Oxford University Press, 19^6),
pp. 115 and 83. See also, Harold Lasswell's various





analyzing the two programs for their accord with
Vietnamese value orientations, determining what the
inherent values are, which should be emphasized, which
may present problems. Aspects of the programs supported
by broadly held values must be the ones selected and
displayed. Specific messages must both fit in with the
present situation and tap traditional beliefs and values
which can be used as precedents.
The authors aver that the Vocational Training
Program, in accordance with these guidelines, would pro-
ceed according to certain themes, which we shall present
in syllogistic form,
I. Activity Orientation
A. Vietnamese are achievement oriented in the field
of business.
Vocational training provides economic opportunity.
Therefore: Vietnamese will accept the vocational
training program if communicated in terms of
economic opportunity.
II. Man-Nature Orientation
A. Vietnamese youth prefer to control their
environment.
Vocational training gives the individual greater








A. Vietnamese are situation (present) oriented.
Changing times require appropriate training
to adjust to changing needs.
Therefore —«—
•
B. Vietnamese are tradition oriented.
Historically, they have changed to adjust to
changing needs (as historical illustrations can
demonstrate).
Therefore -.
C. Many youth are future oriented.
Future challenges require present training.
Therefore •
However, the authors point out, there are weak-
nesses in the Vocational Training Program in terms of
value orientations. For example, most Vietnamese have
low future orientations? but t a training program by
nature is geared to planning for the future. Therefore
. Again, youth are more dominance oriented than
elders in the man-nature orientation, and more oriented
to expressiveness than elders, who seek achievement, in
the activity orientation. Therefore, a theme which might
win one age group might lose another. Hence, separate





The authors see a different set of problems in
respect to the Program for Reuniting Families, hence
would have the American advisor recommend that the
province chief concern himself with the following con-
cepts and themes,
(1) Existing societal structures emphasize
strong family union, and the reunification program would
strengthen these traditional structures,
(2) Psychological satisfactions would be immed-
iately experienced by all members of a reunited family.
(3) Returning family members, in some cases,
could improve family income, so that economic benefits
would be readily seen and immediately felt (situation
orientation in business matters).
However, again there are problems.
(1) Vietnamese youth and their elders hold
fundamentally different values. Reunification of fami-
lies will probably provoke value conflicts, e.g., older
people would prefer activities yielding a sense of
achievementi younger, activities yielding a sense of
self-expression.
(2) Older people feel relatively unable to change





keys to handling situations. Youth become involved for
the sake of involvement, and examine problems in terms
of here-and-now implications.
(3) Confronted with decisions to be made, older
people turn to respected community members with decision-
making authority. Within the family, elders expect to
decide family matters. Youth want to make their own
decisions.
These and similar problems require stressing
themes aimed at easing the readjustment problem between
young and old, primarily trying to get elders to provide
opportunities for the young. Elders must therefore be
shown that to do so is both appropriate and profitable.
One such theme would be that family unity fits
in with older activity Orientations (achievement), in
that youth's actively participating in the family's
business activities in responsible roles will contribute
profitably, and that having a returning son "follow in
his father's footsteps" will perpetuate the family
interest. The corollary of this theme in approaching
youth would be that business activity offers them a good




Another theme would stress family unity as a
source of satisfaction. For the elders, the participa-
tion of their family's younger members in community
affairs would enhance family prestige and business.
For the youth, community participation would be repre-
sented as challenging and exciting.
Value Orientation Findings, the Viet Cong
and the Chieu Hoi Progranr
The authors make the point that the value
orientations data make it "difficult to understand why
the Vietnamese have been characterized throughout their
long history as revolutionary zealots". Their
willingness "to work and sacrifice for a distant future
political state predicated on abstract concepts of
justice is out of character for most of the typical
peasants of the Mekong Delta", if the values findings
are correct, namely, that they are low goal or future
oriented.-^ 7 However, their xenophobic history is said
~l
^ 'Program aimed at converting the Viet Cong to
the Saigon Government.






to demonstrate their hatred of foreign intrusion in their
personal affairs, and is offered as the undoubted reason
why Viet Cong fight so strongly against the American-
supported Saigon government (although the authors do add
that a lowly Viet Cong recruit is probably drawn to the
Viet Cong because of the potential for increased prestige
and excitement). Seven rather detailed descriptions of
the implications of values findings for communications
approaches to the Viet Cong are now provided by the
auxhors. We shall synopsize them,
(1) Vietnamese are present and achievement
oriented, Viet Cong military losses and similar
failures have increasingly forced them into a
"pie in the sky by and by" position, unable to
promise immediate victory and its fruits. This
position violates the present value orientation.
Further, the more the losses, the less satisfac-
tion of the achievement value orientation is
experienced.
(2) Vietnamese are situation and economic-
achievement oriented. The Saigon government is
becoming increasingly more able to provide better
economic opportunities now than a Viet Cong-
promised land reform program, presented as an
ideal principle and the fruit of participating
in a glorious new political state. Rewarding
Hoi Chanhs (Chieu Hoi Program converts) by
giving them immediately profitable economic oppor-
tunities would attract a large number of the
unconverted Viet Cong.
(3) Vietnamese youth are individualistic,
expressive, and low cooperation oriented. The
Viet Cong is an authoritarian organization,





discipline, and uses "self-criticism" sessions
inimical to Vietnamese values, which reject
peer-oriented criticism.
(4) Vietnamese view man as a mixture of
good and evil or basically good in their human
nature orientation. Therefore, Viet Cong
should not be painted as evil, but as misled.
To brand them as evil not only contradicts the
Vietnamese human nature value orientation, but
offends the Viet Cong*s family that may be
trying to persuade him to convert.
(5) Vietnamese idealize strong family life
and maintenance of the ancestral family line,
strongly flavored by Buddhist and "ancestor
worship" traditions. An appeal to Viet Cong to
return to the family bosom should be fruitful.
Within the same quasi-religious orientation, the
idea that the Government forces are sanctioned
by the will of Heaven, and timing appeals to
reach the Viet Cong immediately after allied
victories, or in conjunction with air strikes
or natural disasters, should also be fruitful.
(6) Vietnamese are present situation
oriented especially in politics, hence should
not be reluctant to shift toward the winning
side. Evidence of American and Saigon Govern-
ment strength, or of changes in the awarding of
favors from Heaven, should make it easy for
Viet Cong to convert without compunction.
Defectors must be able to rationalize their
defection to themselves. Situational changes
should provide that rationalization more readily
than appeals to an act of will based on having
been "enlightened".
(7) Vietnamese are economic achievement and
situation oriented. Paying Hoi Chanh to contact
their unconverted friends, or paying Viet Cong






Value Orientation Findings and the "National
Psychological Operations Plan"
The authors now discuss the implications of their
findings for the United States Military Assistance
Command's "National Psychological Operations Plan".-'
A paragraph from the Plan is quoted, then exam-
ined for compatibility with rural Vietnamese value
orientations. The paragraph reads:
Convince them (the people) that the fledg-
ling Republic of Vietnam reflects the natural
and naturally imperfect process of historical
change and development toward a distinctly
Vietnamese but modern revolutionary society,
offers to each Vietnamese opportunity to
advance within, and to influence the course of
the revolution, and this represents the only
true and realistic hope for the advancement of
national and personal aspirations .311
Leaving aside questions of intelligibility of
such language to the 90% rural Vietnamese who have not
been educated beyond the 6th grade, and of insults to
their sensibilities (e.g., calling them a "fledgling"
republic), the authors point out a number of concepts
which reflect American, rather than Vietnamese, values.
310Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office, Vietnam
(Memorandum Serial Number 1858, 4 March 1966),





The cyclical time concept of Vietnamese and
others in Asia conflicts with the concept of a "natural
but naturally imperfect process of historical change".
The Western idea of government as evolutionary is not
meaningful in the context of a political philosophy which
sees political systems change cyclically rather than
deve lopmentally
.
Content analysis reveals that the entire para-
graph is based on three underlying cultural themes:
future orientation, achievement, and individualistic
decision-making. The Sternin findings suggest that
future orientation in general is notably lacking among
rural delta Vietnamese, and practically non-existent in
regard to political or community affairs, in which their
commitment is situational, or present oriented. Hence,
appeals must be geared to the concrete present, not the
abstract future. Further, while achievement oriented
in economics and business, they are not so oriented in
politics, which is viewed as oriented toward maintaining
harmony and for satisfaction derived from the process
itself, not toward achieving goals for people. The
Vietnamese would not see automatically that a strong




personal aspirations. Appeals must emphasize how he
can realize such aspirations by supporting the
Government, Finally, in contrast with American stereo-
types of Asians, the Vietnamese are notably individualis-
tic decision-making oriented, hence offers of opportunity
to "influence the course of the revolution" or to the
advancement of national aspirations are not very mean-
ingful.
The authors offer their own revision of the
quoted paragraph, to bring it into consonance with their
values findings.
The present Republic of Vietnam is a
revolutionary society in the stage of organiz-
ing all interests and groups so that each
Vietnamese can have security, prosperity and
enjoyment for himself and family. Cooperation
with the Government of Vietnam brings these
satisfactions to each individual. 3*2
Value Orientation Findings and Nation-Building
Finally, the authors offer guidelines for the
Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Teams dispatched to
rural villages to engage in a number of programs oriented
toward nation-building. The authors see their value





problems addressed by these teams: the problems of
leadership in effecting harmony, and the problems of
existing distrust on the part of the people. It is
pointed out that teams have grievance committees. Values
findings show the Vietnamese view of political leaders as
having the duty to create harmony. The grievance commit-
tee must, therefore, take quick action on grievances, in
order to restore harmony. The team image will be
enhanced, and team members can address other problems.
Vietnamese value orientation findings indicate
a low cooperation orientation. This provides a particu-
lar obstacle in creating trust among the people. The
teams must try to change traditional habits and to
develop a spirit of cooperation. This requires selecting
tasks in which both team members and citizens working
together will produce results which can show the advan-
tage of cooperative effort. However, this may mean a
re-ordering of priorities, hence a conflict, since
Vietnamese economic situation orientation would lead
the citizens to opt for fulfillment of tasks predicated
solely on economic needs.
The next nation-building issue involves projects





not future oriented, the recommendation is that projects
should establish intermediate, easily recognizable mile-
stones of progress. Finally, leadership problems are
created by the fact that youth are more variable in their
value orientations than their elders, tend to be more
dominant, more individualistic, more expressive, and
loss trusting of present political forms. At the same
time, their very tendency to vary more than elders in
value orientations suggest that they may be more readily
influenced. All such characteristics of the young must
be kept in mind by the leader who would attempt to
effect the political and community participation essen-
tial to nation-building.
These notes conclude the authors 1 guidelines for
a communications strategy for Americans interacting
with South Vietnamese to achieve results favorable to
both cultural groups. The guidelines bespeak the authors'
interpretation of the values data yielded by their study.
We must now retrace our steps to evaluate the inter-
pretations of the data, or the "findings". Should they
prove accurate, we shall have taken a step toward
"predictability" in respect to cross-cultural interaction





We have tried to reflect faithfully the authors*
presentation and interpretation of findings, despite
abbreviating them substantially, and noting only those
germane to the interests of this paper. To us, these
findings and the applications made of them seem excess-
ively "fuzzy" and so ambiguous that we must question
them#
We criticized assumptions and procedural methods
in an earlier chapter, expressing particularly our fear
that the Taxonomy of Concerns, which the authors them-
selves feel essential for discriminating among content
areas in Value Orientation categories, was tested on
such a limited sample (120, in one hamlet), and appeared
to be marked with such other weaknesses, that it left us
feeling quite insecure about its use. That fear seems
to be justified in the interpretations presented above.
As we shall demonstrate shortly, virtually every
Vietnamese value characteristic revealed by the Taxonomy
of Concerns and the Value Orientation Schedule could be
applied with equal ease, for example, to Americans.
The "scenario" presented above, the discussion of voca-




for favorably influencing the Viet Cong, the estimates
of the potential for nation-building, are all purportedly
rooted in the values findings. But we must ask if the
authors do not tend to fit the findings to each situation
examined, rather than actually demonstrate that the
described situation reflects the findings. If value
findings are this flexible, it is difficult to see them
as critical variables or the key to every culture, as
Kluckhohn considers them.
In the following paragraphs, we shall examine
the findings, interpretations, and explanations pre-
sented above, asking especially how they specifically
discriminate between South Vietnamese and Americans or
other peoples. Our questions and comments at this point
will be quite general, and based in most instances largely
on commonplace observations and what appears to us to
be common sense experience, so that, with one exception,
we shall not try to support them by evidence from other
313
studies, statistics, or similar means. J •* Such evidence
will be offered in the section to follow this one. For
the moment, we feel that some broad generalizations,
313 • .J
-"tfe shall adduce Almond and Verba* s Civic





some speculations, in the form of questioning the dis-
criminative usefulness of the Sternin findings is in
order. In both this section and the one to follow, we
shall be questioning very roughly whether the Sternin
study does, in fact, yield Value Orientations, whether
these are, in fact, specific to the South Vietnamese
(or those surveyed), and, if either question must be
answered negatively, what the study (and the value
studies it typifies) contributes to a conceptual frame-
work for cross-cultural interaction.
Generalizations and Speculations
In the human nature orientation, most notable
is the finding that only a small proportion of Vietnamese
feel that their fellow men are basically inherently evil.
In this same category, forty percent feel that the econo-
mic and business activities of men stem from a nature
mixed of good and evil. Some believe that human nature
in regard to political activities is inherently good;
some, inherently evil. We are given an application of
the findings to the Viet Cong, and told not to brand them





Do we have any significant evidence that
Americans look at human nature differently? In a study
31/+
we cited previously^ , Peter Nordlie compared 120
American students of the Army's Civil Affairs School at
Fort Gordon with the Vietnamese surveyed in the Mekong
Delta. He addressed only the content areas of
government/community and economics/business. While we
believe his sampling to be far too small, and the
Taxonomy of Concerns far too weak an instrument, even
if we accepted them at face value we would find that
in respect to economics and business more Vietnamese
see human nature as good than do Americans, whereas in
government and community, the opposite is the case.
Is it obvious that value orientations differ in
these areas? It is not at all obvious to anyone who
reminds himself of the political history of South
Vietnam, a history told too frequently to need repetition
here. When the French destroyed the mandarinate adminis-
tration that assured a kind of loose unity of villages,
each village turned inward more and more. Primary
political power today lies in the hands of the province
chief, and many province chiefs never visit any of their
3 See our pages 165-168 •
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villages, except for a highly ceremonious handing out
of gifts. They have been seared and scarred and torn
apart by war for a quarter of a century, have repeatedly
had to pay taxes to Saigon, to the Viet Cong, and to
local officials simultaneously.
What we are getting at here is not an effort on
our part to evaluate various Vietnamese governments and
politicians, but to question what the survey on value
orientations of rural South Vietnamese really means.
Forty percent allegedly saw human nature as good in
governmental and community affairs, others saw it as
good, evil, or mixed. In 1959 and i960, Almond and
Verba completed their widely publicized cross-national
study of five Western nations — the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Outside the
United States, the highest percentage who "took pride"
in their government and political traditions were in
England, some ^6%. In Mexico, 30%; Germany, 7%t and
Italy, 3%, "took pride".
In the Nordlie study, some 25?S of the Vietnamese
saw human nature as good in respect to economics and
business, while only about 12$ of the Americans saw it




the American respondents "took pride" in government and
political traditions, only 23% "took pride" in the
American economic system. Ten percent of the British,
33% of the Germans, 3% of the Italians, and 2k% of the
Mexicans "took pride" in their respective economic
systems.
Let us reflect on the Almond and Verba figures
briefly. The survey was done in Germany in 1959. The
Berlin V/all was erected in 195^» Low as was the per-
centage finding pride in their government in 1959, in a
grotesquely split country, with the grim reminder of
the wall and its inconveniences, how much lower might
the percentage have been in 195^? how low had the survey
been taken during the Nuremberg Trials in 19^6? How
high might it have been during periods of the Nazi
regime and World War II? By 1959i the British had
suffered the humiliating defeat of the 1956 Suez Canal
expedition, and the day of British dominance in the
Middle East was gone. The United States was surveyed
in i960. Suppose it had been surveyed only a few years
later, with the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and
Martin Luther King filling Americans with a sense of




violence of the latter sixties, or during the televised
uproar of the Democratic Convention in Chicago?
V/hen we speak of Germany, Great Britain, the
United States, we are speaking of Western nations, each
one of which has at one time or another been publicized
as the greatest and most glorious power the world has
ever known. Surveyed at various times, under various
circumstances, it seems quite likely that the respective
peoples of each would see their governments in brilliant
colors. But the sun that would never set on the British
Empire "set", and the popular perspective of government
very possibly changed unfavorably with the event. Nor
is it likely that even 23/S of men in bread lines or
selling apples in the early thirties in the United States
would have been proud of their country's economic
activities.
What are we really asking here? We are asking
if the Sternin survey revealed "value orientations" —
deep-rooted, life-style ways of looking at things. If
so, and if value orientations are the all-important tools
for discriminating among cultures, does their survey
reveal anything unique about the culture of the rural




ways of looking at human nature . as such, for example,
or does it merely demonstrate that rural South Vietnamese
look at government much as others do, with mixed feelings
depending largely on the state of affairs at any given
time?
Moving on, we are told in respect to the man-
nature value orientation findings, both as enunciated by
Sternin and as woven into the applications on nation-
building, above, that the desired alternative for the
rural South Vietnamese is harmony, and the authors
observe
i
If it is so, as this data would suggest,
that very few people feel man should attempt to
dominate or control his environment by means of
political activity and institutions, then this
finding would seem to have far-reaching implica-
tions for efforts to get the Vietnamese involved
in nation-building programs. 315
Why must the requirement that a politician effect
harmony be interpreted as an impediment to nation-
building? What was the campaign plea of 1968, but that
the winner must "bring the people together"? What was
the emphasis of the 1969 inauguration address, but to
lower our voices that we might hear what others are
saying? Would the obviously self-aggrandizing, self-




oriented politician, obviously contemptuous of the
people, obviously creating, rather than quelling,
dispute, obviously unconcerned about national and/or
international harmony, be elected to the presidency of
the United States, or to a significant position in one
of the states or other political communities today?
'/hat do terms like peaceful coexistence, and "sitting
down at the conference table" convey, if not efforts to
promote harmony?
It is evident, of course, as the authors note,
that their survey was taken not among a politically
active sampling, in terms of national government. Thus,
it should be equally evident that the findings from
such a sampling can hardly be compared with findings
among military officers and government officials sur-
veyed by Nordlie at Fort Gordon, particularly when the
sampling is of students in a civil affairs school, one
of the primary purposes of which is to prepare them to
assist developing countries in nation-building! Were
~1
3 In this and in following paragraphs where we
compare Vietnamese and American virtues and foibles,
there is no intention to cast aspersions on either
Vietnamese or American peoples. The point we are trying
to make is that interpretations of expressed attitudes
and behavior are often quite as appropriate in respect




the same survey made of a matched sampling in the
United States, with identical socio-economic and other
demographic characteristics, what results would be
yielded?
The psychological operations scenario presented
above, addressing the question of a vocational training
program, makes much of the man-nature, time, and activity
orientations, stressing the Vietnamese orientation
toward meeting here-and-now needs, wanting to dominate
nature to their own advantage, not geared to the future,
or to planning and saving. How American the picture
seems to be, in so many ways! Late 1969 and early 1970
have seen insistent emphasis on federal budgets,
restrictions on deficit spending, "tight money" arrange-
ments, with extraordinarily high rates of interests
involved in financing the building and buying of homes
and similar consumer products. Congressional concern
has been evidenced about the widespread usage of credit
cards and the unsolicited distribution of the same by
industrial and business agencies throughout the United
States, at a time when the federal government is attempt-
ing to develop a climate of saving. A number of programs




as those of the Office of Economic Opportunity, have
failed for one reason or another in the United States.
If popular appellations mean anything (and they are
rarely used intensively by major advertising agencies
if they don't), current emphasis in the United States
317is on the M now M generation!^
In two of the three hamlets surveyed in the
Sternin study, the majority of residents own their land.
This is not so in the third hamlet for the obvious
reason that it is populated by refugees. It seems
difficult to equate land-owning or planting crops with
lack of future orientation. It would undoubtedly be
difficult to support statistically, but one can probably
say with reasonable assurance that "owning a little
piece of land" is not an unusual dream on the part of
a large number of Americans, and owning one's house and
land seem to be symbols of security for many.
~l
3 'It could, of course, be argued that present
or situation orientation differs radically from a "now"
orientation (using the latter term in its 1970 connota-
tion), and it could also be pointed out that the cyclic
view of time does not preclude "plateaus". If anything,
however, it seems to us that such observations merely
emphasize the questionability — or at least the grave
difficulty — of trying to categorize any peoples'






What of the scenario proposed above about the
program for reuniting families? Is there any more
universally symbolic a concept in the United States
than that of the family hearth? In song and story, life's
deepest meanings are allegedly found only in the home:
"Home is where the heart is" \ "Give me a house by the
side of the road"; "Be it every so humble, there's no
place like home". Even the negro slaves were romanti-
cized by Stephen Foster and millions of naive Americans
in terms of "Way back home". The little nest somewhere
in the west, or the dustier roads and crustier pies found
in one's own home town are all idealizations of similar
concepts. Nor are such concepts confined to Americans.
An Englishman's home is his castle, we are told, and
Ulysses found ten years of extraordinary traveling
hardship but a moment, in comparison with the joys
awaiting him at home.
In other words, if a unified family is a char-
acteristic of a value orientation, how does it discrimi-
nate Vietnamese from others? And if attempts at reuni-
fication of families are fraught with difficulties, how
does this situation differ from that extant in the






away from home towns (e.g., mining areas), where they
might well prefer to stay, but where economic viability
is virtually impossible. The present writer has been
deeply involved for many years in the problems of
American servicemen who find it immensely difficult to
readjust to parental discipline and other characteristics
of their familial home after having served in radically
different milieus away from home. The World War I
song: "How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm after
they've seen Paree?" raised what was not by any means
a merely facetious or superficial question.
In relation to these readjustment problems
involved in reuniting families, the authors point out
that elders turn to respected community members with
decision-making authority (although the dominant value
orientation is forraalistic, rather than peer-oriented),
whereas youth want to make their own decisions. We
would wonder if a closer examination of youth might not
reveal that stating they want to make their own decisions,
and the making of such decisions may be quite different
phenomena. Too much has been written about the power
of peer-groups in the United States, and their influence






We could adduce virtually innumerable illustra-
tions of the way in which Americans could be categorized
as tradition oriented on the one hand (the symbol of
George Washington^ cherry tree speaks volumes) i situation
oriented, on the other (the "now" look), harmony,
expressive, formalistic, dominant, submissive, achievement
oriented all at once, or at different times, in different
ways. In other words, we do not see in the scenario
about vocational training or family reunification, or in
the guidelines for nation-building described above, or in
the more formally presented findings previously cited,
any revelations from the Sternin study which would differ-
entiate rural South Vietnamese from Americans, or con-
clusive evidence that the study reveals "value orienta-
tions" at all. We shall return to this latter point.
At the moment, we shall examine the findings as applied
by the authors to the Chieu Hoi program.
It is difficult to understand the claim that an
appeal to Viet Cong based on value orientations toward
the present or toward achievement orientation would be
effective because they characterize Vietnamese. The
Viet Cong have endured one setback after another. Many






considered to be the "sell-out" of the 1954 Geneva
Conference, yet 16 years later they are still fighting,
still sacrificing, still determined. Younger Viet Gong,
if one accepts the Sternin finding that youth are
expressive oriented, rather than achievement oriented,
may well find in the Viet Cong life the adventuresome,
daredevil challenge that the "expressive oriented"
would presumably seek. Further, the Marxian conflict
of resolutions approach is perhaps nowhere better
epitomized than in the Mao Tse Tung doctrines of pro-
tracted conflict, in which both patience and eagerness
find expression simultaneously. Further, it appears to
be, in large part, the organizational discipline of the
Viet Cong which has accounted for what success they
have had. Surely many Vietnamese knew before they
joined the ranks that discipline was a hallmark. If
they joined, not because of the abstract appeal of
Communist ideology, but because of xenophobia, as the
authors suggest, it would appear that they were looking
precisely for an organized, hence disciplined, vehicle
for "driving out the enemy". Moreover, a very large
number of "hard core" Viet Cong have been trained in





and fought side by side with North Vietnamese regular
forces. The manner in which North Vietnamese have per-
severed through the devastating bombings they have
endured (even if coerced to persevere), as well as the
unquestioned professionalism of their regular armed
forces, hardly testifies to situation orientation, or
to individualistic and low cooperation orientations.
Once again, the data can seem to admit of too
many possible interpretations to be truly discriminative
of rural South Vietnamese value orientations. When we
turn again to the authors 1 guidelines for nation-
building and learn that the low cooperation index of the
Vietnamese value orientation suggests both distrust on
the part of the people and the need for effective
leadership, we must ask if these characteristics might
not reflect a high degree of political sophistication,
and a considerable degree of ability to profit from past
experience? The vogue for several years in the United
States has been for major corporations to assign their
executives to training in various leadership seminars,
executive management seminars, sensitivity seminars, and
so on. For years, the United States Armed Forces have




thrust of both military and civilian training efforts has
been to school "leaders" in both attitudes and techniques
designed hopefully to effect greater cooperative effort
on the part of military personnel and civilian employees.
Many military personnel and civilian employees of major
corporations, in turn, believe they have had good reason
through the years to distrust authority in their
respective fields. How many coal miners trust mine
owners and operators? How many even trust their own
union officials, especially when they see a defeated
candidate for the union presidency assassinated?
Virtually every American official in South Vietnam,
military or civilian, has witnessed the critical need
for leadership training in the armed forces and in
government administration. Indeed, Diem, Ky, Thieu,
and many others have been forced to rely on former
residents of North Vietnam to fill administrative
positions, because so few trained leaders have been
available in the south (many who were available were
killed by the Viet Cong).
What do these speculations suggest — that the
South Vietnamese surveyed are not distrustful of






that this may well be a sophisticated recognition of a
fact of life, not a value orientation which distinguishes
them from Americans or others.
Finally, in respect once more to the "National
Psychological Operations Plan", it is argued that value
orientation findings show that unless an appeal is made
on the basis of the fact that Vietnamese can realize
their own aspirations by supporting the government, it
will be ineffective, and that an appeal based on the
advancement of "national aspirations" reflects American,
rather than Vietnamese values. We must question this
finding, too. It is tied in with the finding about the
Vietnamese political orientation concerning which, in
conjunction with findings on other value orientations,
the Sternin Volume reports:
The high formalistic (decision-making based
on authority) component suggests a readiness to
accept direction from whatever governmental
machinery exists. This combination of value
orientations (high harmony, situational, express-
ive and formalistic) would appear uniquely suited
to adaptation to and survival in a constantly
changing political environment. It would appear
particularly ill-suited as a basis on which to
create institutionalized political stability.
3
iy
If these comments be true, how do they distinguish rural
South Vietnamese from other peoples? John F. Kennedy's





famous inaugural address seemed to be famous precisely
because it called for new frontiers, to wit, those
explored by asking "not what your country can do for you,
but what you can do for your country". Unless Americans
had been practicing something akin to the opposite of
that sentiment at that particular time, would the
Kennedy plea have seemed so new, so exciting, so
challenging? Are executives of major corporations
uninterested in their own aspirations when they vote
for a Republican administration, and the assumed tax
benefits and similar advantages which will accrue in a
conservative situation? Do civil rights supporters and
labor forces vote for a Democratic administration simply
for the sake of the "nation"? If value orientation
findings indicate that South Vietnamese are likely to
accept direction from extant government machinery, do
the same value orientations account for the decline in
electoral interest in the United States since 1890?
Notes on Specifics
It will be remembered that the Sternin study
attempted to probe rural South Vietnamese value orienta-




a discriminative device, that is, they reveal life-style
modes of responses to universally experienced concerns,
(b) rural South Vietnamese value orientations differ
from American value orientations. Aware of the need for
more specificity than provided by their adaptation of
the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck value orientations instru-
ment, Sternin and his associates developed their Taxonomy
of Concerns, but used it in only one of the three hamlets
studied. Our general examination of the data yielded
by both instruments, the VOS and the T/C , as interpreted
and applied by the authors, leaves us with many questions
about what they have really discovered. In the section
to follow, we shall formulate our questions more speci-
fically and offer findings of related studies which
seem to justify our asking the questions.
Our primary question, of course, is whether the
instruments used did in fact reveal true value orienta-
tions, or, if they did, whether the value orientations
of South Vietnamese are not remarkably similar to those
of Americans. If the former is not true, the problem
is serious for all who would study values empirically
as critical to any effort to conceptualize cross-cultural




and Strodtbeck instrument (with minor modifications) was
the best they could find, and that the Taxonomy of
Concerns was the best instrument they could devise within
research limitations imposed on them. If it should be
true that South Vietnamese and Americans have the same
basic value orientations, then a substantial amount of
theorizing and a goodly number of cross-cultural training
programs begin with a false premise. We shall explore
these questions in examining the findings which are
given under the headings of Values and Values and
Demography, respectively.
In order to test their hypothesis that variations
in value orientations are associated with variations in
demographic characteristics, the authors collected
demographic data, assuming that the young might be
expected to have different values from the old, less
educated would differ from better educated, males from
females, and so on. In Table IV-1 , below, we see that
demographic characteristics and value orientations are
correlated in certain ways. Of forty possible relation-
ships portrayed here, ten were found to be statistically
significant — the ten pictured.-^ 7
3 %ee also Table II-2, in our Chapter II, p.





SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS*
Demographic Human- Man-
Characteristics Nature Nature Time Activity Relational
Sex X X








X = x significant beyond p .01
Taken from Sternin Volume , p. 73, Table V-9.
Of the eight demographic variables, four are shown
as significantly associated with at least one of the value
orientations, sex, age, education, and occupation. Not a
single demographic variable, however, is pictured as
correlated with the human nature orientation.
This appears to us to be an extraordinary finding,
although the authors do not comment. The one issue most





literature, and which dominates most training material
designed to prepare Americans for activities in other
cultures, is that of human nature itself: "Is it basic-
ally the same all over the world, or is it not?"
Descriptions of varying customs and habits, differences
in dress, eating practices, working methods, religious
activities, and similar behavior, important though they
may be , are totally subordinate to the primary question:
"Are these people basically the same as we are, or are
they not?" We previously cited examples of comments
made by Americans in Combined Action Platoons that we
visited in November of 1969t and buttressed these exam-
ples by others taken from taped interviews and other
sources. Repeatedly in these comments one finds the
phrase, "Once you get to know these people, they're the
same as we are", or its equivalent. For the American
living intimately with the South Vietnamese, this is the
critical finding, not the customs, or habits, or prac-
tices mentioned above.
Clyde Kluckhohn supports our assertion that the
primary question is one of what people are, not what
they do.
We don't know ourselves very well. We talk







We vehemently assert that it is "human nature"
to do this and not to do that. Yet anybody who
has lived in the American Southwest, to cite but
one instance, knows from ordinary experience
that the lav/s of this mysterious "human nature"
do not seem to work out exactly the same way for
the Spanish-speaking people of New Mexico, for
the English-speaking population, and for the
various Indian tribes . . • Only when we find out
just how men who have had different upbringing,
who come from different physical stocks, who
speak different languages, who live under differ-
ent physical conditions, meet their problems,
can we be sure as to what all human beings have
in common. Only then can we claim scientific
knowledge of raw human nature. It will be a
long job. But perhaps before it is too late we
will come close to knowing what "human nature"
really is — that is, what the reactions are
that men inevitably have as human beings,
regardless of their particular biological or
social heritage. 320
In his handbook on cross-cultural problems
encountered by Americans in other cultures, Robert J.
Foster discusses efforts to prepare Americans for their
assignments, and points out that the trainee "may be
curious about facts and figures on the country, its
customs, climate, geography, and so forth", but that
the frequent, tempting rationalization that may be most
critical to success or failure lies not in these areas,
but in the trainee's belief: "After all, people are
really pretty much the same everywhere once you get to
know them and goodness knows I get along with people."
320c lyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (New York:







(T)here is evidence that those who are least
effective in their relationships with national
counterparts and who demonstrate little insight
into their overseas experience are the ones who
claim no difficulties in their personal relation-
ships and who tend to minimize the importance
of the cross-cultural dimensions. 321
In his work on cultural conflicts and the military
advisor, George M. Guthrie strongly supports Foster's
observation. 322
The basic question about the universal sameness
or dissimilarity of human nature has been a crucial
issue in the approach of the Personal Response Project.
A McGonigal paper we have previously cited reveals his
particular bias by its very title, "Breaking the Myth
of the Asian Mind", Admitting the many problems of
communicating with and understanding Asians (South
Vietnamese), McGonigal' s basic premise in this paper
and in the expository sections of each one of his
research reports that we have cited is that human
nature is, precisely, human nature, fundamentally the
same all over the world. Perhaps we may come to know
3 Robert J. Foster, op.cit. t p. 3.
* George M. Guthrie, Conflicts of Culture and
the Military Advisor (Washington, D.C.: Institute for





a people only by "peeling off" one layer at a time of
the various customs and habits which disguise their
inner beings, but we can be sure that beneath those
layers the core human nature is the same as ours.
On the other hand, project officers of the
Personal Response Project prepared in Washington a pro-
posed publication, Just as Different on the Inside -^ -,
whose very title, again, reveals its bias, quite the
opposite of McGonigal's.
The manuscript of this proposed publication was
sent to a number of authorities in the fields of
anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, religion,
and other areas on which cross-cultural interaction con-
cepts depend. Replies and reviews ranged from unreserved
support of the basic idea that people differ not only in
externally observable ways, but "on the inside", as well,
to complete disagreement with the concept. The latter
perspective is illustrated by the following excerpt
i
Simply tell the men all you can about the
beliefs, practices and aspirations of the people
of S.E. Asia. Help them to be able to identify
the Theravada and Mahayan strains in their cus-
toms and beliefs — or the Cao Dai, or Hoa Hao,
3 23chaplain corps Planning Group, Just as Differ-
ent on the Inside (Washington, D.C.j Mimeo, Marked:





or Confucian, or animistic; help them to under-
stand that these people have a long history, a
literature, music, art, and preferred forms of
recreation; help them to understand that these
people are caught in a rapidly changing world
in which they long for the benefits of education
and of technology, but don't want to lose much
that they cherish; let them understand that
these people are driven by a new nationalism,
and by a burning hatred of colonialism — and
do everything in your power to get our men to
see the people of Asia as people, basically .just
like us in their hopes and fears.
_
Different in




The point we want to make here is that, regard-
less of one's viewpoint about the similarities or dis-
similarities in human nature, it would appear that if
the way in which a people evaluate human nature can be
considered one of five major concerns of all peoples
everywhere, hence rate a value orientation of its own,
we must be reasonably sure that the "best instrument
available" to tap that orientation accomplishes its
purpose. Hence, we must raise eyebrows when we see
findings indicating that viewpoints about human nature
in rural South Vietnam do not vary with any demographic
characteristics
.
^ Kenneth W. Morgan, Professor of Religion,





This lack of significant correlation between any
demographic characteristic and views on human nature
seems to make even more tenuous the interpretations and
applications of the findings in the "scenario" and in
various guidelines for psychological operations and
nation-building we have discussed above. There we were
repeatedly reminded that the Taxonomy of Concerns dis-
covered that more people viewed human nature at work in
government and community matters as predominantly good,
but more also saw it as evil. '.Ye are reduced again to
the problem of the small sampling size of the one hamlet
in which the T/C was used, and observe, in addition,
the problem that despite their awareness of this, the
authors suggest that "because the variations in value
orientation are associated with differences in universal
demographic characteristics — age, sex, level of
education — there is some evidence that these value
differences may well be manifest in other hamlets through-
out the Mekong Delta". J
But how can we extrapolate in this fashion? If
we learn that in a "Buddhist" hamlet, Binh Hanh, the
demographic variable religion does not correlate with a




single value orientation, or with a single content
area within any of the value orientations (something
only the T/C could detect), how can we aver that the
same lack of correlation would prevail in the "Catholic"
or in the "Cao Dai" hamlet? In their short history, for
example, the Cao Dai have been famous for political
activity. Does it not seem likely that had the Cao Dai
hamlet been tested on the T/C , religion and human nature
engaged in government activity might have correlated
highly, and that human nature might have appeared exclu-
sively good in this area of activity?
Similar questions could be raised about the lack
of correlations between any of the other demographic
characteristics and human nature. In a study of United
States Army Officers' estimates of the opinions of
Koreans, for example, it was reported that both educa-
tional level and year of birth were meaningful
variables. It will be recalled that the McGonigal
attitude surveys likev/ise reported significant correla-
tions between favorable/unfavorable attitudes toward
the Vietnamese and education and age. In the Sternin
^^ Alexander R. Askenasy, Perception of Korean
Opinions: A Study of U. S. Army Officers' Expertise
(Washington, D.C.i American University, Center for




study, age correlates more significantly than any other
variable with four of the five value orientations. In the
interpretations and applications of the findings prev-
iously described, repeated reminders are issued, distin-
guishing between beliefs and values of youth and those of
older people. Again it seems singular that youth should
consider human nature itself neither better nor worse
than do their parents, if they depart radically from
parental and other older views in the four other value
orientations.
When Sternin and his associates describe varia-
tions in the human nature value orientation, as we have
seen, they lean heavily on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's
references to our alleged Puritan heritage in America, and
variations based on our affiliation with or departure from
that heritage. In a survey of American "activist" youth
begun in 1965» it was reported that one of the widest
"generation gaps" occurs between youth who reject the
"Puritan ethic" and parents who purportedly hold to it
and fear its breakdown in American society. These youth,
in turn, differed significantly with parental views in
327
every other "value orientation".
32?Richard Flack, "Student Activists: Result, Not





In a study which we shall be discussing at a
later point, Kemper W. Baker finds Vietnamese Catholics
tend to credit Americans with "diligence** and "sincerity"
more frequently than do Buddhists and "Ancestor
Worshippers" • Whether or not these characteristics
might be included in the human nature value orientation
we cannot say, but again it seems strange that religion
correlates neither with the human nature nor any other
value orientation in the Sternin findings, a phenomenon
which surprised the authors themselves.
In trying to discern why no demographic charac-
teristics correlate with the human nature value orienta-
tion, we turned back to the Value Orientation Schedule
used and examined the questions asked of respondents in
respect to this particular value orientation. Our sus-
picion is that at least three problems in the instrument
account for the negative findings. First, there is very
frequent overlapping of questions in this category with
questions in other categories, especially man-nature,
and relational. We shall look briefly at four examples
^ 2 Kemper W. Baker, A National Stereotype: The
American in South Vietnam (Mimeo without bibliographical





of questions proposed specifically under the human nature
value orientation.
(1) "One time a man failed to fulfill an obli-
gation. Different people talked about it."
The respondent is then given four possible
responses, one assumed to reflect the view that human
nature is good; the second, that human nature is either
good or evil; the third, that it is both good and evil;
the fourth, that it is evil. He is asked to select which
response, purportedly provided by someone else, was
probably correct.
(2) "Four men were talking about someone from
another community like your own. They had heard of an
incident where a man had shown bad manners."
The same procedure is followed.
(3) "Some people were talking about a man who
had done a very good thing."
Same procedure.
(4) "Some people were discussing why they pun-
ished their children."
Same procedure.
It appears rather obvious to us that respondents





orientation), family fidelity (a relational orientation),
peer-oriented decisions, as opposed to authoritative
decisions (a relational orientation), man's control or
inability to control nature (a man-nature orientation).
We do not find it difficult to imagine that, confronted
with similar questions in other value orientation cate-
gories, and having tried to respond, the respondents
could assume that there would be no need to repeat their
views t Further, we can imagine considerable difficulty
in scoring responses of this type. Simply because one
has asked the question under the heading of human nature
value orientation (and we must remember that questions
were posed verbally), he has no guarantee that the res-
ponse will be delivered in the same context.
Our second reason for suspecting fault in the
instrument is rooted in the fact that the multiple choice
responses made available to respondents structure the
reply potential to the degree that the respondent is
given virtually no opportunity to express a truly personal
viewpoint.
Our third reason for concern lies in the results
of a study reported by Wilson and Nye in a paper we have






values empirically. The investigator was Lawry W.
Harding, who explored the possibility that questions
expressing generalizations of no particular concern to
the respondent, dealing with abstract possibilities, may
yield relatively meaningless responses, "Real" problems,
used appropriately in a test, might arouse the respond-
ent's personal interest and stimulate reflective thinking
which might yield more meaningful responses. Empirically
testing his hypotheses, Harding reported that:
• • • more useful information may be secured
from tests which present practical specific situa-
tions to which subjects react than from tests of
the generalized type. Specific situations appear
to involve the personal interest and ego of the
subject to a greater degree than do abstract
statements. The degree of ego involvement directly
affects attitudes and values, if one may judge
from these findings. 329
Harding's findings mean tro us that, given appro-
priate anonymity and/or protection, an individual asked
very specifically what he thinks about John Doe's getting
drunk last night, or running around with someone else's
wife, or beating his own, is likely to give a more
energetic reply than if asked about a hypothetical some-
one who did something relatively innocuous. If, in





addition, the wife John Doe had selected for his dalli-
ances happened to be the wife of the individual being
questioned, the energy of the answer would probably
intensify quite significantly. The point seems to us to
be especially valid if the people in the area questioned
were somewhat test-wise, as we suggested in Chapter II
might be the case. Further validation of the point
might be found in the length of the test, previously
discussed also. Virtually every experienced interviewer
knows that responses tend to get shorter and rather
obviously more lackadaisical if a test seems to be
running on forever.
Our concern about the reported lack of correla-
tions between demographic characteristics and the human
nature value orientation has several ramifications. v/e
recall a statement by anthropologist E. T. Hall to the
effect that one of the most vicious problems in our
relationships with the peoples of South Vietnam is our
notendency to think of them as "gooks".-^ There hardly
lives an experienced and concerned military officer who
has not torn away at the hair on his own head in frus-
tration over the damage done by his personnel by either






verbal or tacit demonstrations that they consider South
Vietnamese, Koreans, or other Asians and Orientals "gooks".
This goes right to the heart of the question about the
universality of human nature. Black militant Eldridge
Cleaver admitted in 1968:
. • . not too long ago it was my way of life
to preach, as ardently as I could, that the white
race is a race of devils, created by their maker
to do evil, and make evil appear as good . . •
that the white race was soon to be destroyed by
Allah, and that the black man would then inherit
the earth, which has always, in fact, been his
• . • Having renounced the teachings of Elijah
Muhammad ... I have tried a tentative compro-
mise by adopting a select vocabulary, so that
now when I see the whites of their eyes, instead
of saying "devil" or "beast" I say "imperialist"
or "colonialist", and everyone seems happier. 331
In other words, there is a critical difference
between what we consider people to be (what their nature
is), and what they do. Within this context, how would
rural South Vietnamese look at Americans? Would they
see human nature as good, evil, or mixed? Although the
Sternin study does not report any television sets in the
three hamlets studied (we have seen them in rural hamlets
in South Vietnam), it does report that no respondents
expressed a preference for international news on their








radios, although very high percentages (32, 48, and 29)
did express preferences for national news, in the course
of which, we can reasonably assume, a good bit reaches
them about Americans. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
propaganda, of course, is often vitriolic about Americans.
Many writers have insisted that the peoples of South
Vietnam lump us together with the French they detested.^
If favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward
Americans are based on observed American behavior, then
favored behavior could be increased? unfavorable,
decreased. But if Americans are viewed as inherently
bad, let us say, our cross-cultural interaction problem
is much more complex. From the inherently evil, only
evil can come; everything we do would have to be suspect.
Moreover, if the viewpoint about American nature does
not vary with demographic characteristics, in this
respect, at least, psychological operations scenarios,
such as the one provided above, would not require multi-
dimensional approaches geared to different ages, sexes,
religions, and so on.
132JJ This hypothesis is so much a part of popular
reporting and books on Vietnam, that sources need not be
cited. Our own book, A Chaplain Looks at Vietnam (New






We shall pose one further complexity concerning
the human nature value orientation, related to, but not
identical with, the "gook" problem cited above. Norman
Cousins summarized in 1966 the arguments of a number of
critics of American bombings of Vietnam. His and their
position was that bombing could do nothing but alienate
us further from Asians, historically bitter about white
discrimination against yellow and brown men. Referring
to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he averred that the primary
Asian criticism was levied, not at the use of the weapon
itself, but in the fact that American white men used it
against peoples of another race, whereas, he says they
maintain, it would never have been used against white
333men. -^
Our differences with Mr. Cousins on this issue
are not germane here. What is germane is the implication
that white men consider black, brown, and yellow men as
something less than human. Frank Tannenbaum's book on
the Negro in the Americas discusses the history of slav-
ery in the Western Hemisphere, and gives considerable
evidence to support the view that early attitudes toward
33-%orman Cousins, The Saturday Review; Editorial






In other words, the question is again one of
human nature. If one sees a particular group or sub-
group as something less than human, then he is justified
in selling its members as property, breaking up families,
and so on. In the context with which we are immediately
concerned, if South Vietnamese are something less than
human, or if they see themselves, or some of them see
others, or Americans see them, as chattel, then we are
confronted with the stereotype so frequently heard about
their attitudes toward battle, toward taking care of
their children, tov/ard life in general, namely, that
"Orientals (Asians) consider life cheap" . ^
In short, in the interests of a conceptual
approach to cross-cultural interaction, we could v/ell
wish that the one area in which much more information
night have been yielded would have been that of the value
orientation titled human nature.
-^•^As we shall see, one of the reasons frequently
given in the McGonigal studies for Americans disliking
Vietnamese is that they neglect their children. We won-
der if this is not a case of preconditioning by stereo-
type, through stories about Mongol hordes, yellow masses
hurling themselves into enemy guns, Chinese babies left
to die, or drowned, and so on. Of course, other explana-
tions are possible, one being, for example, that to Ameri-
cans any way of treating children but the "American" way







That neither religion nor ancestor worship
correlates significantly with any one of the value
orientations is equally perplexing. One might find an
explanation in the postulate advanced "by Kemper W. Baker,
in the study we have cited, and by other observers,
namely, that adherents to various of the religious creeds
extant in South Vietnam are often believers in name,
rather than in fact, and share common cultural practices
which transcend their weak religious beliefs." This
could be so, of course, but it fails to account for
several important phenomena.
The present writer has rather carefully researched
the exodus of the nearly one million North Vietnamese
Catholics who left North Vietnam in 195^» Such are the
residents of Binh Dinh hamlet, investigated by Sternin.
The writer has talked personally, at length, v/ith eye-
witnesses of the exodus, and v/ith many such refugees
themselves. -'->' He has little doubt of what both eye-
witnesses and refugees have told him, namely, that the
majority of Catholics left North Vietnam because of
" Kemper VV. Baker, op.cit. , pp. 83-85.
" For example, Bishop Joseph Chi, of DaNang,
who was the official recorder in North Vietnam of the





religious convictions, or, at least, because they knew
that their religious title marked them for persecution
or death in North Vietnam. The present writer had been
advised well before the 1968 TET offensive that the
Catholics of Hue were earmarked for assassination.
During the TET offensive, they were assassinated. Of
many hundreds of Viet Cong studied by Ithiel de Sola
Pool, only one was listed as Catholic. ^ Once again,
it seems extraordinary that neither the Value Orientation
Schedule nor the Taxonomy of Concerns revealed any
correlations between residency in a Catholic hamlet and
any one of the value orientations.
Very much the same question could be raised about
the 3uddhists and the Cao Dai, particularly in terms of
the man-nature orientation. Romano Guardini points out
in Per Herr that Buddhism is basically a natural
religion. As the Mole study observes: "Philosophically
. . . Buddhism ties man to the universe eternally —
339
past, present and future". ' Through Karma, man is
believed to be the sole creator of his circumstances.
~f
' Ithiel de Sola Pool, et al. , Improving the
Effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program (Cambridge , Mass .
:
Simulmatics Corporation, 1967)1 3 volumes.
-1




Buddhist spokesmen aver that Buddhism has the responsi-
bility to provide advice, guidance, humanitarian goals
and values to society and to governments, and supports
war from time to time when believed necessary. The Cao
Dai, as we have noted above, have demonstrated their
activism in political and military affairs repeatedly,
and have, at the same time, developed an organizational
structure in South Vietnam equalled, probably, only by
Catholics.
Sternin and his associates note that all three
hamlets preferred dominance over the environment to
submission or harmony, but observe with surprise:
"What is unexpected and hence particularly interesting
is the fact that this preference is strongest in the
Buddhist community and weakest in the Catholic ."-^
Once again we suspect inadequacies in the ques-
tions posed to respondents, as well as misinterpretations
of replies. V/e turned once more to the actual Value
Orientation Schedule used, and found under the Wan-Nature
category such statements as » "One time a man had a lot
of livestock. Most of them died off in different ways.







same type structured potential comments we discussed
previously were offered to the respondents. We feel that
both the statements and the proposed responses are sub-
ject to the same criticism we applied to the procedures
used in respect to the human nature value orientation,
but with additional problems. One must be aware that as
a Christian faith, Catholicism does teach submission to
the Divine Will (Thy Will be done on Earth as it is in
Heaven) to understand the submissive-dominant behavior.
It likewise teaches that God helps those who help
themselves. Had the respondents been asked the equiva-
lent of the question Christ put to the lawyers of his
day: "Which of you having a donkey or an ox (a water
buffalo) fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, would not
drag him out?", one wonders how submissive the replies
might have been. Had the Buddhists who set themselves
aflame in the public squares of Saigon been asked why,
their reply might well have been framed in terms of a
submissiveness which dominates much more forcibly than
any overt act of aggression. Indeed, without implying
that any of these religions promotes or leads to neurotic
behavior, the difficulties inherent in distinguishing





the categories resorted to by psychiatrists and
psychologists, e.g., passive-aggressive behavior!
In brief, then, if Hole and the many observers
he consulted about his findings are correct, namely, that
religious and ethical values dominate the life of the
Vietnamese, it seems again strange that the Sternin
instruments would have detected no correlations between
religion and any of the value orientations. Thomas IV.
Shea, Jr., describes the immense barriers to socio-
economic development in the District of Malabar, on the
Southwest coast of India, where, despite 2,000 years of
continued contact between agricultural producers and
merchants, the Hindu caste system has kept various
Malabar peoples in a primitive state of development.
Taboos and the myriad other facets of the caste system
have made socio-economic development almost impossible.
Our point is that Mole and others have insisted that
religious and ethical values (and often taboos and super-
stitions) pervade and largely dominate Vietnamese life.
Why, then, do no correlations reveal themselves in areas
outlined above?
^^Thomas W. Shea, Jr., "Barriers to Economic
Development in Traditional Societies: Malabar, a Case
Study" , in Development and Society: The Dynamics of
Economic Change , ed. by David E. Novack and Robert Lekach-




Continuing our question about potential similari-
ties between value orientations of South Vietnamese and
Americans, we refer again to the Sternin statement quoted
above, to the effect that the high expressive orientation,
the high harmony emphasis and the high formalistic com-
ponent in the government/community content areas of the
value orientations, indicating emphasis on participating
in the political process, rather than concern about the
result, the readiness to shift positions to minimize
discord, and the readiness to accept direction from
existing government machinery, all combine as contra-
indications of a basis on which to create institutional-
ized political stability. The authors include among
obstacles to political development and nation-building
the here-and-now motivation of achievement orientation,
the tendency not to cooperate with others in joint
undertakings, and related problems.
Lane's "Common American Man"
The description of such value orientations is
strikingly like that given by Robert E. Lane, in his





What He Does". 3**2 Under title of -Cultural Premises-,
Lane sets the tone of his approach with a quotation from
Bertrand Russell^s Proposed Roads to Freedom .
The great majority of men and women, in
ordinary times, pass through life without ever
contemplating or criticizing, as a whole, either
their own conditions or those of the world at
large. They find themselves born into a certain
place in society, and they accept what each day
brings forth, without any effort of thought
beyond what the immediate present requires*
Almost as instinctively as the beasts of the
field, they seek the satisfaction of the needs
of the moment, without much forethought, and
without considering that by sufficient effort
the whole condition of their lives could be
changed .3^3
In his exceptionally extended discussions with
and depth interviews of fifteen American working men, he
gives us such insights as the response by the bookkeeper
when asked what the word "freedom" made him think of«
"Well, it's a kind of an overworked word, I guess ,"^
Yet this is the word Max Lerner calls -one of the most
important in the American consciousness- # 3*o Lane goes
1
3^2Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New Yorki
Free Press of Glencoe, I96I ).
343Ibid ., p. 283.
Ibid., p. 17 • (Subsequent references will be
made ad passim , in order to avoid a plethora of unneces-











on to discuss freedom at length, and makes such down-to-
earth observations that in the case of some working men
"the First Amendment offers less freedom (that is, opens
fewer options for choices important to them) than would
a good public-health insurance company" • And he adds
meaningfully i HAnd this is Eastport, not Karachi,
Stanleyville, or Port-au-Prince ."
Lane's discussion of man's relationship to
government includes a quotation from Geoffrey Goreri
"With practically no exceptions, Americans regard their
own government as alien t they do not identify themselves
with it, do not consider themselves involved in its
actions, feel free to criticise and despise it."^
Of the common man in Eastport, Lane tells us that they
were pretty discouraged by the idea of doing something
about any big problems. "Our policy's dictated by
Washington." "If you do speak up . • • there's nothing
done about it — they just go ahead." Lane takes issue
with those like Erich Promm, William Kornhauser, and
Sebastian De Grazia, who argue that the loss of community,
the Gemeinschaft society, and an integrated and coherent
Ibid. (From Geoffrey Gorer, The American




slavery strongly influenced current attitudes toward
black peoples. Tannenbaura sees three major influences
in the Western Hemisphere in respect to slavery — the
Dutch-English, the French, and the Spanish-Portugese.
The latter never lost the idea that the slave remained
always a person, capable of buying his freedom, and
retaining the essential elements of moral worth making
freedom possible. He was never considered as chattel,
or unanimated property. In the Dutch-English system,
however, pursued by the planter in the West Indies and
in the American Colonies, there were neither religious
nor legal provisions for the slaves, so that the legal
issue involved was settled by legally defining the slave
as chattel. The French in South America held concepts
closer to the Spanish and Portugese.
Of the United States, Tannenbaum says:
The Negro was considered a slave by nature,
and he could not escape his natural shortcomings
even if he managed to evade their legal conse-
quences . . . This distinction had been drawn
in absolute terms, not merely between the slave
and the free man, but between the Negro and the ~~^
white man's community in which the Negro resided.
33 Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen: The Negro





belief system have created malaise, anomie and alienation.
He avers that it is the very absence of community which
makes democracy possible. Arguing that community senti-
ments make for close, enduring loyalties, immobility,
traditionalistic ways, a reinforced encapsulated moral
code, and solidary relationships among men (its great
virtue), he points out that the men who must make the
system called democracy work must shed the qualities
of the community man, assuming the lonely role of the
independent, isolated individual. "In the nation-state
some identity diffusion and a touch of anomie is neces-
sary for democracy to survive. " (The tendency toward
an individualistic orientation on the part of South
Vietnamese was regarded as inhibitive of nation-building
in the Sternin report.
)
What the above paragraph means to us is that the
psychological scenario which emphasizes cooperative
effort, community planning, and similar techniques may
be calling for precisely the opposite of what nation-
building requires. Who really knows? Is De Grazia
right? Is Lane right? Does the common man in Eastport
differ radically in his value orientations from the
common man in Binh Hanh? We could cite similarities and




random, simply by flicking through Lane^s work. When he
attempts a matrix of Eastport* s values and cultural
premises, and, again, when he attempts to compare Western
Liberalism with Traditionalist Thought and Experience,
we get the feeling that he is uneasy, must fit his data
to his tables and figures, must try to allow for as many
inconsistencies as regular patterns. Indeed, we are
immediately reminded of the efforts we have described
above to interpret and apply the Sternin data to a
multitude of psychological operations. The Lane study
seems very much more authentic when it concentrates on
presenting what the common men of Eastport say about
themselves, and what they say is quite as ambiguous and
ambivalent, quite as vague and inconsistent, quite as
difficult to categorize as what the South Vietnamese say
347
about themselves.
3^7we are aware of no depth-interview study in
South Vietnam of the magnitude of Lane's Eastport study.
An interesting piece of work was done, however, by
psychologist Walter H, Sloate, during 1966, when he
spent seven weeks in Sotth Vietnam, depth-interviewing
four South Vietnamese, He spent from ten to fourteen
hours each week with each interviewee. Unfortunately,
the Sloate findings could be interpreted either to sup-
port or to disclaim Sternin 1 s value findings. The same
ambiguities appear in the interview responses that appear
in the Lane interview responses, Walter H. Sloate,
Observations on Psychodynamic Structures in Vietnamese






A final comment about the Sternin interpretation
of the government/community orientation of the South
Vietnamese and their seeming lack of promise for politi-
cal stability and nation-building, this time from a more
formal viewpoint than Lane^. V, 0. Key, Jr., reminds
ust
• • • for the student of politics, the
questions raised by a consideration of electoral
participation are by no means trivial. Examina-
tions of popular participation in the political
process may suggest crucial insights into the
nature of the political order ... An extremely
small turnout may reflect lack of faith in the
democratic process among those who stay at home.
It may also result from a widespread belief that
affairs are proceeding so well that people need
not be deeply concerned. 3^8
In September of 1967» some 83 percent of the
registered voters of South Vietnam went to the polls des-
pite widespread Viet Cong threats and accomplished acts
of terrorism, many of which can be attested to person-
ally by the present writer.
Finally, a citation from Herbert McCloskey's
essay on consensus and ideology is in order. McCloskey
3 V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics. Parties, and Pres-





reports data taken from a national study of political
actives and supporters, in 1957-1 958, The first sample
was of 3,000 political leaders \ the second, of 1,500
adults in the general population. Among other findings,
McCloskey reports
i
It is plain • • • that Americans are, ver-
bally, at least, both confused and divided in
their reactions to the political system. Many
feel themselves hopelessly ineffectual politi-
cally* Approximately half perceive government
and politicians as remote, inaccessible, and
largely unresponsive to the electorate's needs
or opinions. About the same proportion regard
politics as squalid and seamy, as an activity
in which the participants habitually practice
deception, expediency, and self-aggrandizement.
Yet by a curious inconsistency which so fre-
quently frustrates the investigator searching
the data for regularities, 89«6 per cent express
confidence that the government will do what is
right. However strongly they mistrust the men
and the procedures through which public policies
are fashioned, most voters seem not to be
greatly dissatisfied with the outcome. 3^9
We return to one of our earlier questions. Do
the Sternin findings reveal value orientations unsuitable
for political development, or do they reveal a highly
sophisticated, politically shrewd populace? Organized
efforts to effect a nationwide training program, begun
^^Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in
American Politics*1 , in Political Opinion and Electoral
Behavior: Essays and Studies , ed. by E. C. Dreyer and




in 1966 by the South Vietnamese themselves, resulted
in training 65,000 youths to become can bo , members of
Revolutionary Development Teams. By 1969, 4,000 had
been killed and about 2,000 captured by the Viet Cong,
yet ^5,000 continue working in hamlets today. In
February 1969# after one year of research, another
national training program was initiated by the President
of South Vietnam, to train nearly 63,000 village
officials in administrative skills and in ways of
eliciting efforts from village residents to work for
their own economic, political, and social development.
Response by the end of I969 was such as to suggest that
rural South Vietnamese are not so concretized in a
particular life style, or so conditioned to specific
value orientations, that concrete evidence of personal
concern by the national government, explicit training
in administrative know-how, and honest distribution of
funds to make socio-economic development possible will
not effect such development, with corollary consequences
such as transportation and communications facilities
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which appear to facilitate nation-building.
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We turn now to the applications of the Sternin
findings to appeals to the Viet Cong, as outlined above.
The basic assumption of these appeals, of course, is
that the Viet Cong are basically the same as the South
Vietnamese in general. Appeals to the Viet Cong to con-
vert to the side of the national government should be
more effective if formulated within the context of the
Value Orientation system which characterizes the South
Vietnamese at large. (We shall not strain here at the
fact that, despite their reminders in earlier delinea-
tions of their findings that the data is based on the
sampling of only three hamlets, and that the Taxonomy of
Concerns was used in only one of these, the authors are
extrapolating rather extensively by proposing that the
findings be applied to psychological operations designed
to affect Viet Cong in general.) Let us assume that if
the South Vietnamese at large are, in fact, characterized
by the Value Orientations findings above, the Viet Cong
reflect substantially these same orientations.
The latter assumption might be tested, we would
think, in several ways. The Viet Cong themselves could
be questioned about their own values. The South Vietnam-






opinions of the Viet Cong. Reasonably verifiable des-
criptions of Viet Cong behavior could be examined to see
what values it seems to reflect. Additional approaches
could be used, but these should suffice for our purposes.
The Chieu Hoi Study
We have previously cited the study of Viet Cong
"returnees" by Ithiel de Sola Pool and his associates.
This investigation of the Chieu Hoi , or Open Arms Program,
carried out in 1966-1967, informed us that during 1966,
20,2^2 former Viet Cong surrendered to the South Vietnam
Government. This figure represents approximately 4-00
returning Viet Cong per week in 1966. By April of 1967,
the number of returnees had increased to 1,000 per week,
and de Sola Pool projected a return of Jf0,000 by the end
of 1967. The point in citing these figures is that they
unquestionably represent a broad sampling. The authors
frankly admit, however, that the Hoi Chanh, or returnees,
they interviewed do not represent a random or represen-
tative sample in the statistical sense because of several
biases 1 they were picked on the basis of availability
and assumed value of their information, they were defec-








Nonetheless, the Hoi Chanh were asked, among
other questions, why the Viet Cong had appealed to them,
why they had rallied, what appeals could be made to
other Viet Cong — questions which coincide with those
discussed in the Sternin study relative to appeals
within the framework of value orientations. Besides
reviewing the studies of others, the authors tell us
they conducted 84 lengthy depth interviews with
returnees, 205 shorter interviews with as representative
a sample of recent returnees as possible, hundreds of
informal interviews with returnees, four psychoanalytic
type case studies, visits to the majority of Chieu Hoi
Centers, conversations with many Vietnamese and American
officials.
On the basis of these investigations, the
authors list recommendations for improving appeals to
extant Viet Cong, and related purposes. Findings and
recommendations are organized into two sections in
accordance with the authors 1 estimates of relative
priorities. In the top priorities, we find certain
recommendations, particularly Number One, which seem to
support the Sternin recommendations based on his value







Psywar should never diabolize or insult
the VC, especially in leaflet drawings, and
should direct criticism to the VC^s failure to
carry out its promises, rather than at the VC
programs themselves, which most VC perceive as
basically good • • • 351
This recommendation would seem to fit the Sternin
finding that rural South Vietnamese see man as basically
good, or as a mix of good and evil, so that emphasis on
evil, or failure to treat the Viet Cong with the respect
due human nature, would be self-defeating. It would
seem to fit, too, the Sternin recommendation that rural
South Vietnamese are present-oriented, so that the Viet
Cong failure to carry out promises is a better target
than the VC programs themselves. Within the same situa-
tion orientation, however, one finding of the present
study is in partial agreement, partial disagreement with
the Sternin finding. Bounties are said to have a mixed
effect, since Viet Cong will rarely rally for money
alone. On the other hand, it is said that monetary
inducements might balance the scales in favor of rally-
ing on the part of those Viet Cong who have already been
emotionally converted, and might appeal particularly to
women, "whose role is that of hard headed realist in
351





Vietnamese culture" • Further, we are told that bounties
should be offered to women for bringing in their men —
a situation oriented appeal if we have ever heard one!
De Sola Pool and his associates find the Viet
Cong xenophobic, a trait attributed to them in the
Sternin report, but add that the American image is none-
theless generally positive among them. Moreover, the
de Sola Pool study finds that hardship and family
separation are common reasons for rallying (the Sternin
emphasis on strong family life), and that "the desire
for a better life" (the Sternin "expressive" orientation
among the young) is likewise a common reason* In line
with Sternin* s discussion of the family reunification
program, with its difficulties because of the "generation
gap", we note that tensions in the Viet Cong include
those between young and old. Finally, it is said that
VC rally against the Viet Cong, not for the government,
so that praise for the government often has little
impact. Sternin assumed that this would be so, but based
his assumption on lack of orientation toward political
stability of the type which correlates with interest in
a national government.
Negative support for the Sternin recommendations




be found in the fact that none of the specific recommen-
dations offered by the de Sola Pool investigators is in
direct conflict with those of Sternin.^ 2 The Chieu Hoi
study does aver that higher Viet Cong cadres are ideo-
logically and politically oriented, and that appeals must
be made to them on these grounds, a finding which would
appear to conflict with Sternin findings, except that
the variable of long-term subjection to Communist ideo-
logical and political training is required before an
individual can become a higher level cadre, so that we
"in the second volume of the de Sola Pool study,
one finds a number of observations on Vietnamese culture,
religious and ethical values, family life, adolescence,
discipline, and related topics. A number of these obser-
vations support the Sternin findings j a number support
theses contrary to the Sternin findings. We have omitted
these from discussion primarily because it is not at all
clear that the observations are based on all the survey
data and interviews. Some of the most significant points
made are attributed to the Sloate study which we have
previously cited (in relation to Robert Lane's study).
The Sloate report contains data on only four interviews.
Sloate himself states of his study i "One of the limita-
tions of this research is well documented here, simply
that of not having enough cases to generalize from. What
position does the role of the good child play in the
hierarchy rebellion? Is it a cultural pattern that per-
tains to all — rebels and conformists alike, or is it
indeed a dimension of personality unique to the protes-
ters?" (Pp. 36-37) Indeed, one can find in the Sloate





are not really talking about "typical" rural South
Vietnamese when we speak of these cadres .3*3
The CBS Study
It is not clear that we get the same picture of
the Viet Cong when we ask the South Vietnamese peoples
themselves what they think of the Viet Cong, In October
and November of 1966, a public affairs study was initiated
among the civilian population of South Vietnam, in an
effort to learn, among other things, the feelings of the
people about the war and the groups engaged in the
hostilities, and about the hopes, concerns and aspirations
of the people themselves. A total of 1,5^5 interviews
were conducted from 24 November 1966 to 1 February 1967,
We shall select from the highlights of findings those
which appear pertinent to the Sternin study and to our
present purposes, and present these in a numerical list-
ing, without thus implying anything about their order of
importance.
353some sample excerpts of Viet Cong returnee
responses to interview questions are attached to this
manuscript as Appendix T.
^^The People of South Vietnam t How They Feel
About the War . A CBS News Public Opinion Survey (Prince-
ton, N.J.t Opinion Research Corporation, March 13, 1967).
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(1) "Most people feel that the responsi-
bility for the continuation of the war rests
with the VC, Communist China, and North Vietnam
in that order, "355 Women, those of relatively-
poor educational status, and those in II Corps
tend to be more likely to blame the VC for the
war.
(2) People disapprove of VC primarily
because of their terrorism, sabotage and atroci-
ties, saying that they kill innocent people and
open their stomachs, that death follows them
wherever they go, that they exploit the people,
take things belonging to the villagers, force
farmers to pay high land taxes,
(3) One person in six admires something
about the VC, These see such admirable traits
in the VC asi they propagandize for the libera-
tion of the country, they are not corrupt, do not
accept bribes, serve their cause gallantly in
severe hardships, do not allow great gaps between
rich and poor35° f help villagers build hamlets,
stand up against U.S., have made Vietnam a focal
point for the world,
(4) The overwhelming majority of people (83%)
said their lives would be much easier in a govern-
ment controlled area, than under VC control,
(5) Nearly 75% of the people expressed a
preference for a post-war government free of any
participation by the VC National Liberation Front,
(6) Over half the people completely approve
of the (then) Ky government. Ten percent criti-
cize the government in some way. Eighty-three
~|
355ibid ,. p. 11.
356Anent the rich-poor issue, it is interesting
to note that the de Sola Pool study found that one com-
mon reason for Viet Cong who had formerly recruited from
rich families to rally was that they were discriminated




percent want reunification with the North after
the war wnds "very much". The desire is stronger
among people of age 30 and younger. All favoring
reunification tended to add that they wanted a
non-Communist reunified government.
The CBS sample was divided into urban and rural
targets, with approximately half the respondents in each
category. Of the latter, 130 were from Dinh Tuong
Province, the province of the three hamlets studied by
Sternin.
We do not feel that there is any way of knowing
how many, if any, of the South Vietnamese interviewed in
the CBS study may have been Viet Cong sympathizers, or
actually members of the Viet Cong infrastructure.
Certain responses antagonistic to the government could
obviously be attributable to this situation. We simply
do not know. It would appear, however, that both from
the traits of the Viet Cong found admirable by some
respondents, such as their wanting to make Vietnam a
focal point for the world, and from the repeated indica-
tions of support for the Saigon government and for a
unified North and South Vietnam, that the South Vietnam-
ese are not the non-nation-state minded, or politically
unresponsive and unsophisticated people the Sternin study






While the CBS findings seem neither to support
nor to disprove the values explicitly imputed to the
Viet Gong in the Sternin and implicitly in the de Sola
Pool recommendations, the fact that zero percent of
respondents felt they would be better off under Viet Cong
control, seems to counterbalance the fact that one out
of six find something to like or admire in the Viet
Cong, The absence of such responses as, "The Viet Cong
are just like us", or other responses suggesting that
they are good people at heart, but simply misled, or
driven by economic motives or similar orientations, might
be interpreted as conflicting with the two studies cited
above.
The RAND Study
Between February and mid-April of 1968, the RAND
Corporation did a study of the Viet Cong movement, with
357Victoria Pohle the senior investigator. The study
focuses on the Viet Cong TET offensive of January, 1967,
emphasizing VC political tactics and the responses of the
people to the offensive. Interviews were conducted with
35?victoria Pohle, The Viet Cong in Saigon t
Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive (Santa




425 local residents of Saigon and Gia Dinh Province. We
shall provide, once again, those findings pertinent to
our present purposes.
We are told that while some people supported the
Viet Cong in Saigon during the offensive, most lower and
middle class interviewees seemed primarily concerned with
their own welfare, and behaved accordingly. They tried
to avoid confronting the VC, and were afraid of the
consequences of confrontation, but complied with minimal
VC demands, e.g., for food and shelter. Generally, they
did not offer active support to either the VC or the
government forces.
On the other hand, many upper-class citizens,
Catholics, persons associated with the government or
with the United States, avoided contact with the VC
through fear of arrest or assassination. Only Northern
Catholic refugees living in groups under strong local
leadership consistently sought to resist the VC actively
or aid the government. Interview data are said to indi-
cate that persons particularly sensitive to, or fearful
of, what we might call "collaborator** type activities
between the United States and the Viet Cong or Hanoi





to the likelihood of Viet Cong control of South Vietnam,
are most likely to belong to one of the following groups
t
Northern Catholic and Buddhist refugees, upper-class
wealthy citizens, middle-class Catholics, Hoa Hao and
Cao Dai, present or former members of the government or
the armed forces or police and their relatives, United
States employees*
In respect to future political events in South
Vietnam, the author interprets the data as implying that,
with the exception of most of the groups cited immediately
above, it appears likely that the general populace in
Saigon, and possibly in other urban areas, will remain
passive in the conflict between the government and the
Viet Cong, supporting neither one actively.
To help give a "feel" for actual interview
responses, we present here excerpts from thos provided
by the author.
After they took ray husband outside, a young
fellow about 18 years old aimed a scimitar at
my neck. He was about to chop it, but I begged
him for my life ... My children saw what
happened, and they screamed and screamed. The
leader was waiting outside i he yelled in» "What
are you waiting for, just liquidate her so we
can go now; don't waste time talking." But it
was a blessing for me because the young fellow
said, "Run into hiding at oncej I would kill you
if I saw you again. "358





It was on the third day of Tet when the VC
came to our area. They guarded the street,
checked houses and ID cards, and forbade us to
leave. Soldiers on leave were arrested and
shot on the spot • • • All I know is that they
would search the people, and they woiild shoot
at any secret police, capture any GVN soldiers.
Ordinary people weren't arrested, but weren't
allowed to leave the area. Veterans and dis- _- Q
abled veterans were tied up and kept prisoners. 3 -> y
The VC came to my area a few days before the
engagement with ARVN (February 2). They killed
three people and left their corpses and heads
lying at a coffee shop nearby. In the next night
they killed three civilians. I don't know what
crimes these people committed. I only saw the VC
throw their corpses in the street and forbade any-
one's passing that place .360
• • • some of them looked carefully at the
pictures we hung on the wall trying to find
whether any of my family was a soldier. Near
my house four persons were killed by the VC when
they came to check their family registration
books and identification cards because these
victims were ARVN soldiers. The VC also tried
to stop us from leaving. 361
Some of them sneaked into the area. They
fired into the houses on the two sides of the
main road while running, and thus inflicted a
lot of damage on the people • • • The VC knew
very well that the people in Xom Moi were very
anti-Communist, and that they wouldn't be able
to use the people for their purposes. 3°
2









From 1952 until the Tet offensive my area
had always been a peaceful area? no fighting
and no attacks, and it was easy to make a living
there, I think the reason the VC attacked my
area was that our fields and gardens were fertile
and the people were prosperous, and the VC wanted
to collect taxes from the people, but first they
had to intimidate them by a show of force. There
were no other ways that the VC could convince the
people that they should pay taxes to th.em.3o3
Table IV- 2 will further help us in getting a feel
for the attitudes of the people toward the Viet Cong,
since it indicates irhat kind of behavior they reported.
To relate the findings we have been presenting
to the Sternin value orientation findings, we suggest
the following:
(1) The fact that lower and middle class South
Vietnamese allegedly were more concerned with their
personal welfare than with the issues of the conflict,
and that they complied with minimal Viet Cong demands
would seem to support the Sternin finding that they are
situation oriented. We must confess, however, once
again, that we see little discrimination value in such
a classification, since in every war a substantial number
of the population meets the minimal demands of the enemy,









DESCRIPTIONS OF VIET CONG TERROR
AGAINST GVN PERSONNEL
(Number of Incidents Interview Reports)
R eports of Reports of
VC Searches Arrests Descriptions
fo r GVN or
i Personnel
or of
Area ARVrs Kidnappings Assassinations
Saigon
1st and 2nd
districts 2 1 2
3rd district 15 1 7
5th district 13 4 9
6th district 6 4 3
7th and 8th
districts 9 4 5
Go Vap District
Gia Dinh City 1 - 1
Binh Hoa City 1 1 -
Thanh My Tay 1 1 -
Thanh Loc 3 1 3
An Nhon 10 5 11
Villages in Tan
Binh District 2 - 1
Villages in Hoc
Mon District 1 2 2
TOTAL 64 24 44
Each column represents the total number of interview reports
in that category. One interview may be represented in more than
one column, but is represented only once in each column even if it
reported more than one incident. Separate incidents are reported
separately even if they described the same incident.
Searches are not "terror", of course, but they do frighten
people, and are therefore included.







because they have virtually no alternative but grave
injury or death. The American Revolution saw its own
share of this type cooperation.
(2) The fact that Northern Catholic refugee
groups consistently sought to resist the Viet Cong and
aid government forces seems to support our previous
contention that the absence in the Sternin findings of
any correlation between religion and any one of the
value orientations appears to be extraordinary.-^ * (It
will be recalled that the Binh Dinh residents of the
Sternin study were Northern refugee Catholics.)
(3) The fact that persons most sensitive to and
fearful of "treachery" on the part of the United States,
in the form of collaboration with the Viet Cong or with
Hanoi, and to the political consequences which would
follow, in terms of control of South Vietnam by the Viet
Cong or by a coalition government, would most likely
36**see John J. O'Connor's, A Chaplain Looks at
Vietnam , previously cited, for substantial evidence of
forced support given the Viet Cong by South Vietnamese.
3 ^An additional factor might be, of course, that
the Catholic resistance was attributable not to their
being Catholics , so much as their being already considered







belong to Northern Catholic and Buddhist refugee groups,
or to the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, or be middle-class
Catholics, again seems to justify our surprise that the
Sternin study reveals no correlations between religion
and any value orientation, (We have noted the political
and military intensity of the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao
are possibly even more militant. Both, however, are
primarily religious sects. We have also referenced the
Buddhist political activities.)
Furthermore, it again appears to us that Table
IV-3 represents a politically sophisticated and shrewd
populace, although we are aware, of course, that the
respondents are primarily urban, rather than rural,
dwellers as in the Sternin survey. The fact that 57$
of respondents gave affirmative answers to one or more
of the first eight options, respecting Viet Cong purposes
in the offensive, seems to us to reflect very consider-
able political insight. These options are quite similar
to those opined by United States intelligence activities
and highest echelon American and military authorities.
3 The present writer has discussed the Viet
Cong purposes with several of these authorities, and









POPULAR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE VIET CONG'S
OBJECTIVES IN THE SAIGON TET OFFENSIVE*
% of 36 5
Number of Interviewees
Viet Cong Purpose Interviews Responding
1. Urban disorder, terrorization of
people, destruction of GVN
military installations
2. Economic disorder and sabotage
3. Limited military objectives
4. Political-psychological aimed at
impressing local population with
VC strength and security threat 15 4
5. Political-psychological aimed at
weakening, dividing, demoralizing
the GVN 20 5
6. Psychological impact on U.S. /world
opinion
7. Combination of 1, 4, 5 or 6 to force
GVN to accept negotiations and/ or
coalition government with NLF 12 3
8. Combination of 1, 5 or 6 to force U. S.
to negotiate, to accept coalition
government, or to withdraw; or to
improve VC bargaining position with
U. S. during negotiations 12 3
9. Linked with general offensives against
SVN urgan areas and new "phase" of war 27 7
10. Generate popular uprising in Saigon 12 3
11. Topple GVN and seize control of Saigon 23 6
12. "Last gasp" or act of desperation 10 3
13. Interviewee doesn't know and doesn't
understand VC purpose 106 29
14. Interviewee hesitated or refused to
answer the question 11 3
28 8
*






We see little in a "face-value" examination of
Table IV-2 or in Table IV-3, describing terrorist activi-
ties of the Viet Cong, to support any finding that
respondents saw the Viet Cong in the favorable light
recommended in the Sternin guidelines for appealing to
the Viet Cong to rally. We see little in the excerpts
cited from the interviews themselves to support a
psychological communications program based on the assump-
tion that the Viet Cong share the values Sternin reports
as characterizing rural South Vietnamese.
The Simpson Study
We shall briefly address one further study
related to the Viet Cong and to their values as possibly
interpretable by their behavior. The investigator,
Howard R. Simpson, has had some fifteen years of intimate
experience with guerrilla warfare, with the French in
Indo-China, with the British in Nigeria, with the
Algerians, with the past and present guerrillas in Viet-
nam — the Viet Minn, the Viet Cong.
3 ^Howard R. Simpson, The Guerrilla and His
World i Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare






We have combed Simpson's study for support of
the Sternin value orientation findings as characterizing
the Viet Cong, We have been unable to support Sternin 1 s
assumptions. The same is true in relation to the Viet
Minh. On the contrary, Simpson supports our personal
observation, previously expressed, and the observation
of innumerable experienced American military personnel
we have consulted, to the effect that the Viet Cong are
almost infinitely patient, precisely the opposite of the
situation oriented characteristic imputed by Sternin.
Living under extremely severe physical and emotional
conditions for years, and hunted day and night by Viet-
namese armed forces and Americans alike, they appear to
be almost incredibly persistent and flexible. Simpson
cites a number of incidents he has witnessed to demon-
strate not only the Viet Cong patience, but that of
Vietnamese command forces, as well.
In two other areas, we find conflicts with the
Sternin value orientations. One concerns the question
of seeing the Viet Cong as basically good, polite, imbued
with cultural traditions and customs allegedly charac-
terizing the rural South Vietnamese studied. The other





political planning, or to the kind of political develop-
ment that leads to nation-building.
In regard to the first of these issues, we quote
Simpson at some length.
It often comes as a surprise to find the Viet
Cong so quick to claim credit for acts of terror-
ism that have taken many innocent lives, a major-
ity of them Vietnamese. But the Viet Cong have
had years of active experience. Their goal is
that of the classic terrorist — to inspire fear
resulting in a psychological paralysis that can-
cels the people's desire to participate in govern-
ment organized programs.
In the early 1950' s a bomb of great force
exploded in the heart of Saigon in front of the
Opera House (now the National Assembly), It had
been timed to go off at a busy hour, and its
principal victims were the small shoe shine boys
who made the steps of the Opera House their
headquarters. The bomb also killed or mutilated
a number cf French and Vietnamese civilians. It
was a bloody incident and it received wide
pictorial coverage in the world press.
This attack was immediately labeled as a
Vietminh atrocity and the French Information
Service gave it additional publicity. The Viet-
minh did little to refute these charges. Several
years passed before the blame for the incident
was squarely placed on the leader of a Cao Dai
dissident group unassociated with the Vietminh.
Up to this time the Vietminh had profited, in
their own way, from the false mantle of guilt.
They had falsely, but effectively, demonstrated
their power to strike with force and at will in
the heart of a heavily controlled symbol of
colonial presence, the city of Saigon. They had
falsely, but effectively, shown that their action




falsely, but effectively, embarrassed the
French authorities and made their Vietnamese ^
ft
and Chinese collaborators highly uncomfortable. 360
In other words, the Viet Cong seem to capitalize
on being viewed as evil.
In regard to the second issue mentioned above,
Simpson tells us how the Vietminh soldier was bombarded
with messages from on high, and assured, along with the
coolie working along the supply routes in Dien Bien Phu,
in such fashion that he felt the eyes of the world were
upon him. "They were no longer dying anonymously in an
isolated mountain valley. They were being honored as
the vanguard of international communism. "3°9 He cites
General Vo Nguyen Giap's message to these guerrilla
fighters and "coolies" in respect to Dien Bien Phu.
Our enemies admit that "if the flag of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam comes to float
over the fortifications of Dien Bien Phu, the
situation in Indochina will know important
changes, that will resound throughout Southeast
Asia" • • • They do not hide their uneasiness
for, if France loses the battle, she will be in
a bad position at the Geneva Conference • • •
In France, all the leading newspapers print news
of Dien Bien Phu on the front page. L'Humanite,
~l
368 Ibid .. pp. 32-33-






organ of the French Communist Party warmly
applauds the victory of our people • • • 37°
Such communications seem hardly the appeal to
make to the purely "present" oriented.
In sum, we would say that the studies of Viet
Cong and South Vietnamese interaction we have cited, with
the exception of the de Sola Pool study, which offers
somewhat ambivalent support, do not generally support
the Sternin value orientation findings. The de Sola Pool
study could be used to contradict, as well as to support,
the Sternin findings, and simply seems to be too ambig-
uous itself to help clarify any other studies. See our
footnote on page 411.
Investigating Behavior
Thus far we have examined in rather cursory form
some of the expressed attitudes of South Vietnamese Viet
Cong ralliers, and of South Vietnamese citizens concern-
ing Viet Cong activities. Our objective was to try to
discern whether these expressed attitudes and described
activities might provide "face value" support for the
37 Ibid,
, p. 23, Citation is from Vo Nguyen
Giap, Dien Bien Phu (Hanoi* Editions en Lengues





Sternin findings and the general approach to cross-
cultural understanding that his efforts typify.
Our task now is to apply somewhat more technical
procedures. We have noted previously that we feel the
need of a holistic approach — an examination of the
totality of observable or measurable behavior. While we
do not delude ourselves by believing that the complex
dynamics involved in the totality of human behavior and
interpersonal relations — values, attitudes, intelli-
gence, personality, opinions, heredity, environment, and
multiple other factors — can be revealed in toto, we do
feel that the closer we can come to observing values,
attitudes and other human factors expressed in actual
observable behavior, the deeper our understanding of
these components of behavior will be. If this be true
in a single cultural milieu, or in the study of a single
individual, it should be at least equally true in a
cross-cultural interaction situation.
We have sufficient data available to allow at
least preliminary investigation of values and attitudes
expressed in observable form in cross-cultural interaction







Attitudes of Vietnamese Toward American Marines
We have reported several McGonigal studies of
expressed attitudes of South Vietnamese toward Americans.
One of these studies (June 196?) investigated attitudes
of Vietnamese civilian workers toward Americans* Of
the Vietnamese working on Marine Corps Bases in I Corps,
18#, or *f08, were surveyed on a controlled random samp-
ling basis. The attitude survey instrument used
(Appendix E) included a number of questions designed
to elicit qualitative responses descriptive of American
371behavior toward the Vietnamese workers. Examples
of such questions are» "Would you please give an
example of a good thing (a poor thing) which an American
may have done with a Vietnamese person?" "Would you
please give some reasons why you like (dislike) the
Marines?"
Raw data for the responses to questions of this
type were collated, subjected to a preliminary content
analysis by a team of Americans and Vietnamese, grouped,
and arranged in rank order of frequency of favorable and
^Specifically, questions 3i ^» 5# 6, 8, 13,





unfavorable responses given, Jt We have, in turn,
subjected the data so presented to our own content
analysis, and regrouped the responses to combine favor-
373
able and unfavorable responses. J Our rationale is
simply based on the assumption that if ten respondents
prefer honest behavior, and five respondents dislike
dishonest behavior, then it is reasonable to conclude
that fifteen respondents prefer honest behavior to
dishonest behavior. ^' On this basis, we have developed
"I
-" 2We verified that this was the procedure fol-
lowed by personally querying individually and separately
two Personal Response Project Officers in Washington,
D.G., January 1970.
373J
^We used a simple, single unit and sequence
method of content analysis as described in Harold D.
Lasswell and associates, Studies in Quantitative Seman-
tics | Language of Politics (Cambridge. Mass.t MIT Press,
19^9) • Ch. 6. While we manipulated the data manually to
achieve our own content analysis and rank order, we were
able to do this only because of the basic machine compu-
tations and general analysis completed by McGonigal and
his associates.
^ Obviously, we lose a certain amount of scoring
accuracy in this process, since we have not tried to dis-
criminate the degree of intensity of a preferred or dis-
liked characteristic. For example, to classify such a
response as, "Marines should be more honest in keeping
their promises", requires a value judgment. Does the
respondent accept a degree of dishonesty in exchange for
more honesty? "Marines should not drink too much". Is
this a vote for total abstinence, moderation, or occasion-
ally accepted drunkenness? This difficulty in discrim-
inating degrees of intensity is partially inherent in







a list of behavioral characteristics which the South
Vietnamese workers say they prefer in Americans whose
behavior they have observed. We have not developed such
a list, however, to discern Vietnamese attitudes toward
Americans for the sake of learning about American
behavior. Our objective is to discover what values are
cherished by Vietnamese. The conceptual framework for
our approach is based on a value investigation hypothesis
proposed and tested by Richard Christie and Robert K.
Merton. 3?*
Merton, Christie and a number of other investi-
gators-^ 7 recognize many problems in trying to discover
the values people really hold, as distinguished from
those they say or pretend they hold. Merton and Christie
explored certain of these problems with medical students,
and report!
highly sophisticated procedures applicable only to raw
data, not to data already analyzed. (Of course, "no
response" could be interpreted as "neutral" •
)
^Richard Christie and Robert K. Merton,
"Procedures for the Sociological Study of the Value
Climate of Medical Schools", in Journal of Medical
Education . 33(10) (1958), pp. 125-153.







One way of discovering values held by-
students, it would seem, is simply to ask each
of them about their values and have them tell
you. But the direct question has severe
limitations. For certain kinds of values the
student will reply, even under conditions of
insured anonymity, not in terms of values he
actually holds, but in terms of those he feels
he should hold. In other cases he does not
know which values he holds — he is not capable
then and there of expressing them — and he,
like most of us, must be helped to express them
... we find that students do not intend to
mislead deliberately when they report what
they should believe rather than what they do
believe. Social and cultural atmospheres are
largely created by what members of the group
believe to be the appropriate thing to believe
ans say and do. 377
The authors hypothesized that medical students
asked to rate the attributes of the "ideal physician"
would indirectly express their own values. For example,
provided with a seven point continuum ranging from
highly unsociable to highly sociable, they would reveal
their own ideal of a physician, by checks along this
continuum, as characteristic^ sociable or unsociable.
Their experiment with medicat students tended to verify
their hypothesis, and seemed to help solve some of the
problems involved in direct questioning about an individ-
ual's own values..






Applying the Christie and Merton hypothesis to
the Vietnamese civilian workers, we should be able to
postulate that what they express as desirable or desired
characteristics in American behavior (or undesirable and
undesired) reflects their own values. If this be true,
a profile of desirable or desired characteristics of the
"ideal American" drawn by the Vietnamese should reveal
what they would consider to be the "ideal Vietnamese".
Certain objections to this reasoning are obvious.
It could be objected, for example, that the Sternin
Value Orientation Schedule questioned respondents
obliquely, rather than directly, so should have met the
Merton and Christie requirement. However, as we sug-
gested previously, the Sternin instrument seemdd to
suffer by proposing hypothetical and abstract questions
which provoke no sense of urgency or immediacy, or ego-
involvement for the respondent. Lawry W. Harding
reported a testing experiment, for example, in which
he found thati
Specific situations appear to involve the
personal interest and ego of the subject to a
greater degree than do abstract statements.






attitudes and values, if one may judge from
these findings ,378
On the other hand, it could be objected that if
Vietnamese are hesitant to express their feelings
directly, it seems quite possible that civilian workers
would be especially hesitant about expressing pejorative
attitudes toward their employers, or those representing
379their employers.^' 7 Moreover, the favorable responses
might reflect what they think the Americans wanted to
hear. We really can't answer this objection fully,
because we simply don f t know. Since a substantial
number of pejorative comments were expressed, however,
the problem may not be too serious. It will be recalled
that the Japanese and the Ryukyuans didn»t seem to "pull
any punches" when asked about American behavior.
A third objection is that we are using data
gleaned by way of an attitude questionnaire whose valid-
ity and reliability may still be in question, namely,
the Humphrey instrument we discussed previously. We
have no fully satisfactory answer to this objection
37oLawry W. Harding, "Experimental Comparisons
Between Generalizations and Problems as Indices of Values",
in Journal of General Psychology . 38 (1948), pp. 33-3^
•
379we are reminded of Worche^s injunction about
interpreting Vietnamese evaluations and their tendency to







either, but we shall offer partial answers when we
return to a study of the McGonigal reports. (Our frank
bias is that the instrument did yield at least sufficient
"s ingle-dimension" attitude data in the survey of
Vietnamese civilian workers to justify our using it to
make the broad generalizations we make, and to compare
these with generalizations based on other studies we
shall introduce below.
)
The rank order of American behavioral character-
istics preferred by the South Vietnamese civilian workers
is furnished here as Table IV-4.
Continuing on the assumption that the preferred
behavior characteristics expressed in Table IV-4 reflect
values held by the Vietnamese surveyed and the population
sampled, our next step was to try to categorize these
"values'* in accordance with Sternin f s Value Orientation
Schedule. Again, of course, we were dependent on value
judgments in classifying responses as shown in Figure
IV-1 below. Several responses are classified in multiple
Value Orientations.
Aware that the farther we try to extend our pro-
cedure, the more we risk distorting the original data,





BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTES SOUTH VIETNAMESE
PREFER IN AMERICAN BEHAVIORb
Frequency of
Behavioral Attribute Responses
(N = 408) a
Respect Vietnamese Customs and Religions 423
Treat Vietnamese with honor, politeness and equality 36 3
Fight against and help unite Vietnamese to fight
against Communism 296
Help and guide Vietnamese in constructing and
developing country 293
Obey Vietnamese laws and moral standards 226
Practice honesty 138
Respect lives and property 108
Do not discriminate in respect to religion or race 99
Practice sacrifice and generosity 89
Respect old age and like children 85
Treat Vietnamese workers equally and help train
for advancement 47
Help keep down cost of living 35
Distinguish between loyal Vietnamese and Communists 30
Respect Vietnamese independence and freedom 24
Practice such virtues as (miscellaneous): Work hard;
Fight bravely; Act merry 50(total)
Obviously this rank order is very tenuous since it depends both
on how one analyzes responses and how one groups them. For
example, "equal treatment of Vietnamese workers" which is in
eleventh place in our list might well be included in the category
that ranks second, "treat Vietnamese with honor, politeness and
equality". We emphasize again that all procedures of this type,
not simply ours, involve value judgments. To pretend otherwise
is to engage in spurious "science".
Derived by collating lists of responses to questions put to Viet-
namese asking which actions they liked and/or recommended, dis-
liked and /or recommended against on the part of Americans in or en
route to South Vietnam. (See Personal Response Project Attitude
Surveys
,









Respect Vietnamese Customs and Religions
Treat Vietnamese with honor, politeness and
equality
Obey Vietnamese laws and moral standards
Respect lives and property













Respect Vietnamese Customs and Religions
Treat Vietnamese with honor, politeness and
equality
Help and guide Vietnamese in constructing
and developing country
Help fight Communism










Help and guide Vietnamese in constructing
and developing country
Treat Vietnamese workers equally and help
train for advancement
Help keep down cost of living
Relational
Treat Vietnamese with honor, politeness and
equality















Fig. IV- 1. --(Continued)
(Relational) (Variant)
Do not discriminate in respect to religion Individualistic/
or race Peer-Oriented
Respect old age Formalistic
Treat Vietnamese workers equally and Individualistic/
help train for advancement Peer-Oriented
Respect Vietnamese independence and freedom Individualistic
Practice sacrifice and generosity Peer-Oriented
Same as preferred behavioral attributes listed in Table IV-4;
here viewed as Vietnamese values on basis of assumption that
behavior" we prefer in others reflects our own values. Classifica-
tion schema is that of Martin I. Sternin's Value Orientation Schedule.
Our rationale for classifying all responses in this category as
good is that the responses seem to suggest that the Vietnamese see
their own nature as good, hence deserving of respect, honor, and
similar considerations practiced toward them as persons. It could
be argued with equal merit that the Vietnamese emphasize the desir-
ability of respect, honor, and similar considerations, not because
they see human nature as good, but as evil, or, at best, mixed. In
this view, it would be imperative to treat others with utmost respect,
etc. , to try to avoid the conflicts which men are so prone to pre-
cisely because they are evil. We recognize the merit of this pro-
posal, but suggest that for our purposes here the differences in such
a reclassification would not be significant, in that our immediate
objective is to evaluate Sternin's findings in comparison with the
findings of others. If we changed our classifications, we would still
meet discrepancies between Sternin's and others' findings; the dis-
crepancies would simply occur in different categories. Moreover,
we could likewise argue that all of the Sternin findings which suggest
that the Vietnamese see "good" in certain areas would have to be
questioned in the same way, and possibly considered as "evil", or
ii jti
mixed .
c Included under Activity rather than under Human Nature because
the responses it represents seem to reflect such desiderata as,
respect us as skilled workers, punish failures without favoritism,
help us improve ourselves, treat and pay us according to our respec-





the "fit" of our Value Orientation classifications shown
in Figure IV-1 against what we have previously called
the "integrated schema" which combines Sternin^ Value
Orientation Schedule with his Taxonomy of Concerns. This
process yields Figure IV-2, below.
Turning to the highlights of Sternin* s findings,
cited above, we can make certain rough comparisons with
our "inferred Vietnamese values" as we have classified
them in Figure IV-2.
(1) In the government/community content area,
Sternin finds a distinctive pattern of orientation
variants: harmony, situational, expressive, formalistic.
In the same content area, we have estimated orientation
variants as: good (human nature, missing in Sternin),
dominance, situational, goal-oriented, achievement, peer-
oriented, individualistic.
(2) In the personal/social content area, Sternin
finds a combination of orientation variants which he
feels suggest the presence of psychological stress in
interpersonal relations, namely, the presence of high
dominance, low expressive, and the absence of harmony.
In this content area, we find good human nature orienta-




r Fig. IV-2.—Inferred Vietnamese Values Classified
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Individual-
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L
ft = Our estimate of category into which each set of in-
ferred values may be fitted.
*"Values" derived by process reflected in Table IV-4
and Figure IV-1, above. J
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formalistic, peer-oriented, and individualistic orienta-
tion variants. We entered no responses in the man-nature
category, hence are missing data on dominance and harmony
variants.
(3) In the economic/business content area,
Sternin finds t achievement, dominance, formalistic
decision-making orientation variants. We find* good
(human nature variant missing in Sternin), achievement,
peer-oriented, individualistic variants.
(*0 Sternin makes the general observation that
neither goal-oriented behavior nor peer-oriented
decision-making is a significantly characteristic value
orientation in any content area. We have classified both
variants as characterizing government/community behavior,
along with situational, achievement, and good human
nature variants.
Figure IV-3, below, shows in schematic form rough
comparisons provided above.
In this single very rough test, then, as Figure
IV-3 shows at a glance, the inferred Vietnamese values
gleaned from the procedure we have described accord in
two instances with Sternin* s findings, namely, in the




r Fig. IV-3.—Sternin's Value Findings Compared
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time value orientation, and in the area of economics/
business as related to the activity value orientation.
(We show partial accord with his VOS findings about human
nature. We classify all our responses as good . Sternin
finds good and mixed predominate.)
Whereas Sternin finds, therefore, that in
governmental/community activities, the interest of the
Vietnamese is in the act of participating in the politi-
cal process, rather than in the result, we see their
interest in dominating and controlling their circumstances,
building a future, seeking goals, valuing cooperative
effort as well as individual achievement — very definite
results.
While Sternin sees a dominant approach in
personal/social affairs, and a resultant interpersonal
tension, we see an emphasis on traditional courtesy and
respect, a desire for personal inner-development, and
a desire to maintain formal family and societal
structures, but in cooperation with others, and encour-
aging individual and equal rights for all.
And where Sternin sees economic and business
activities oriented toward controlling circumstances,





we, too, see an effort to control circumstances and the
orientation toward achievement, but we also see coopera-
tive effort through peer-orientation, as well as individ-
ualistic decision-making.
By way of important general observation, where
Sternin sees lacking two of the most important value
orientations for nation-building — goal-orientation and
peer-oriented decision-making — we see both of these
strongly expressed in our classification of inferred
Vietnamese values. Indeed, the frequency of responses
expressing admiration for those who help construct and
develop the country, help everyone unite to fight
Communism, avoid discrimination, treat everyone equally,
and practice similar virtues, would seem to suggest a
people who very much value working together toward the
common goal of a free, independent, secure nation, in
which every individual is treated equally, regardless
of religion, race, or similar diversities. One might
suggest that this sounds like a people with highly
democratic aspirations!
We are very much aware, of course, as we have
repeatedly emphasized, that our procedure has been quite
crude. Certainly its findings can not be used to dis-




unquestionable validity for the Christie and Merton
hypothesis. We claim even less for our adaptation there-
of. It seems fair to note, however, that our procedure
might have resulted in further support for Sternin's
findings. That it did not may be a function of our using
different coding in our content analysis, or in our using
different — and quite possibly inappropriate « value
judgments in classifying, in the Value Orientation Sche-
dule and Taxonomy of Concerns schema , what we have called
the inferred Vietnamese values (those attributes they
prefer in Americans).
Moreover, and of exceeding importance, Sternin
has carefully reminded usi
Special caution should be exercised in
interpreting the implications of these findings.
They are based on a relatively small sample of
rural ethnic Vietnamese (in the Mekong Delta).
Persons actively involved in regional and national
politics were not represented in the sample and,
consequently, generalizations to this level of
political affairs may not properly apply. 3°°
Our sample was taken from a population approxi-
mately 400 miles north of the Delta region, and represents
Vietnamese who are employed on American bases, rather
than working farms or selling merchandise. There may,





indeed, be very significant differences. At least we
are again reminded of the extreme care which must be
exercised in conducting, interpreting, and attempting
to apply the results of research in the field of cross-
cultural interaction. Generalizations are a constant
occupational temptation!
The most striking difference that we see between
our "inferred Vietnamese values" and Sternin 1 s value
findings, however, cuts through procedural issues and
remains even when we return to our raw data, whether or
not the Christie and Merton hypothesis or any of our own
procedures are valid. The Vietnamese workers we have
reported on make frequent, strong reference to the
war — security, fighting Communism, brave warriors,
etc. We find no such references in the Sternin report,
except by way of the hypothetical scenarios proposed
to illustrate the applicability of his findings to
psychological operations. Sternin gives no indication
that the Mekong Delta Vietnamese studied made any refer-
ences to the war themselves. This seems most significant
to us, and possible even the acid test of reality in all
findings considered.
One source of input into the discussion which
seems to support our comments made immediately above is
447

the CBS Public Opinion Survey we have previously cited.
It will be recalled that a sampling of 1,5^5 South Viet-
namese civilians (of voting age) were surveyed through
the facilities of the Center for Vietnamese Studies, in
Saigon, and that Dinh Tuong Province, the province of
the Sternin study, was included in the sample, as were
provinces much farther north (in II Corps), although
there were none in I Corps, Asked about Americans, the
Vietnamese respondents said very many of the same things
they said in the McGonigal study we have been discussing.
Generosity, sacrifice, bravery, and various other vir-
tues were cited as preferred, or the absence of the same
disapproved. The attributes involved were remarkably
similar to those in our list, with emphasis again on the
war, the fight against Communism, and similar issues.
Continuing with our use of McGonigal findings,
and following the same procedure employed to infer Viet-
namese values (attributes preferred in Americans), we
have analyzed the June 1967 attitude survey of the $%
sampling of American Marines and attached naval personnel
in I Corps.™ This survey yielded responses of 3,5^1
^ We selected this survey because it was con-
ducted at approximately the same time that Vietnamese
civilian workers were surveyed.
Vf8

Americans expressing their attitudes toward Vietnamese,
in terms of preferred or disapproved behavior. The ques-
tions posed concerning the Vietnamese were similar to
those posed to the Vietnamese concerning the Americans.
Using the same Christie and Merton hypothesis, and
analyzing the content of the responses in the same way,
we developed the following list of attributes which
Americans say they prefer in actual Vietnamese behavior,
or would prefer in Vietnamese behavior. Hypothetically,
then, we have a list of behavior characteristics which
reveals American values, or what Americans would consider
the ideal American . Our rank order of frequency of
responses is given in percentages (n=3,5^1)i in Table
IV-5 below.
We shall make no effort to classify these
inferred American values in any kind of value schema,
nor will we attempt any but "sight" correlations between
this list and the list of inferred Vietnamese values or
Sternin findings. In too many ways, we are comparing
"apples and oranges", to admit of statistical correla-
tions.
Further, the circumstances of Americans in






Vietnamese. Americans have no families present, hence
no wives, or daughters, or sisters to be insulted or
violated. Naturally, they will not feel provoked to
express an attitude on such a matter. American laws are
not an issue ; American security is not at stake in the
same wayi building the future of America is not involved.
TABLE IV-5














Make sacrifices (make do with little) 12.8
Maintain strong family life 7.1
Act intelligently 3»°
Demonstrate artistic ability 1«1
Practice religions 0.2
Despite the differences reasonably attributable
to differing circumstances, however, it is interesting
simply to make a few "sight" comparisons. Both lists —







such attributes as hard work, honesty, bravery, genero-
sity, respect for religious activity, sacrifice, good
family life. Attributes are not listed in the same rank
order in each list, but at least they are present in
both lists.
How may we interpret this? One possible conclu-
sion seems to be that, allowing for radically different
circumstances, Americans and Vietnamese may have many
values in common. Another may be that the Americans in
I Corps see the Vietnamese there differently from the
way Sternin sees those in the Mekong Delta.
Pertinent information of interest in light of
our efforts to derive the lists presented above is pro-
vided in the study on stereotypes made by K. W, Baker,
and cited previously. Baker has drawn upon a UNESCO
International Poll relating to stereotypes and tensions
which lists French and British responses concerning
Americans, as well as American responses about Americans.
Baker presents these listings alongside his own list of
responses of South Vietnamese concerning Americans. The
1,172 Vietnamese respondents represent a sampling of
broad geographical areas, including I Corps (our sample)
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and My Tho (headquarters for the Sternin survey). Our
Table IV-6, below, reproduces the listings provided in the
Baker report and the two listings we have presented above.
To comment cursorily on the lists in Table IV-6,
we might simply note the following
i
(a) Were one to H translate H negative (presumably
disapproved) attributes suggested by each group of respon-
dents into positive attributes, that is, characteristics
they would prefer present in Americans, the two UNESCO
lists and the Baker list would reflect a significant num-
ber of characteristics found in our two lists developed
from the McGonigal data. For example, it seems reason-
able to assume that those who disapprove of Americans as
domineering , would prefer that Americans treat everyone
as equals.
(b) If the Christie and Merton hypothesis holds,
and we make the "translations" suggested above, we should
see in these lists the preferred values of each set of
respondents.
(c) It is interesting to see in the Baker list
the references to American social, economic, military,
and political aid. Baker himself observes that his list
reflects "the consequences of war time interactions" .3°3
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The Critical Incident Technique
Calling upon a different set of data now, we turn
to a different empirical procedure for discerning atti-
tudes and values as revealed in observable behavior, the
"critical incident" technique.
J. C. Flanagan, who devised the technique, des-
cribes it as follows:
(The critical incident technique) consists
of a set of procedures for collecting direct
observations of human behavior in sucn a way as
to facilitate their potential usefulness in
solving practical problems and developing broad
psychological principles. The critical incident
technique outlines procedures for collecting
observed incidents having special significance
and meeting systematically defined criteria. 3°^
Flanagan defines and explains a critical incident itself
as follows:
(The critical incident is) any observable
human activity that is sufficiently complete in
itself to permit inferences and predictions to be
made about the person performing the act. To be
critical, an incident must occur in a situation
where the purpose or intent of the act seems
fairly clear to the observer and where its conse-
quences are sufficiently definite to leave little
doubt concerning its effects.3°5
3^J. C. Flanagan, "The Critical Incident Techni-
que", Psychological Bulletin , 51 (July, 195^) • See also,
for example, L. M. Stolurow, ejt al., Critical Incidents
With Heterocultural InteractionsTUrbana, 111.: Univer-







An experienced student of the technique, W. Warren
Newman, tells us
t
The critical incident technique eliminates
the collection and dissemination of opinions,
hunches and estimates and provides, instead, a
record of specific behaviors which can be care-
fully studied as a means of isolating those
factors which either antagonize, or facilitate
understanding and cooperation between, individuals
or groups across cultural barriers, 38°
He goes on to cite the studies of U. H. Foa and others,
which suggest that role behavior differentiations are
critical to the interaction process and more difficult
to learn than differentiations based on political,
economic, and religious factors, and points out that
the critical incident technique can provide insight
into the role behavior factor of the cross-cultural
interaction process.-^ '
One of the better known usages of the critical
incident technique to analyze behavior components in
cross-cultural interaction situations is that employed
W. Warren Newman, New Dimensions in the Use
of the Critical Incident Technique in Cross-Cultural
Interaction Training! A Study-Proposal (Washington, D.C.i
Chaplain Corps Planning Group, U, S. Navy, undated),
p. 22.
38 ?U. H, Foa, et al. , The Significance of Role
Behavior Differentiation for Cross-Cultural Interaction






by Robert J, Foster. ^ Offering a number of examples
of critical incidents in cross-cultural settings, Foster
attempts to illustrate how the values, attitude, and
behavioral patterns they reflect may be classified in
terms of a typology of cross-cultural problems.
The framework for this typology consists of
seven categories, but Foster points out that these are
not conceptually autonomous t they are mutually inter-
dependent, and overlap. Foster likewise offers a classi-
fication of American values which frequently contrast
or conflict with non-Western values. This classification




Both the seven categories Foster uses in his
typology and the eleven conflictual "American values" he
lists have much in common with the Sternin Value Orienta-
tion Schedule adapted from Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck,
^ Robert J. Foster, Examples of Gross-Cultural
Problems Encountered by Americans Working Overseas t An
Instructor's Handbook (Alexandria, Va.t HumRRO, George
Washington University, 1965).
-* ^Robin M. Williams, Jr., is among the most
frequently cited authors for his list of American values.
See his American Society 1 A Sociological Interpretation






with its three variants for each orientation. It will be
sufficient for us to list the titles used, respectively,
in his typology and American values classifications to
reveal the meanings of each.
The categories of the typology include: The
Assumption That Our Way is the Natural Wayi Cultural
Resistance to Innovation? "Non-Cultural" Resistance to
Innovation; Unanticipated Consequences of Planned
Change i Problems in Communication and Perception; The
Resolution of Cross-Cultural Problems; Role Definition
and Adaptability,
The list of American conflictual values includes*
™ Control of Environment (what Sternin would call
dominance ) ; Progress; Materialism; Personal Success;
Autonomy; Puritanism; Moralistic Orientation; Humanitar-
ianism; Time Orientation; Scientific Orientation; Inter-
personal Behavior (openness, friendliness, informality,
as opposed to formality and "face").
" An interesting observation about these values
is that a comparison of the list with a list of racial
stereotypes of 100 American college students who evalu-
ated Americans in 1933 reveals near-identity between the
two. Further comparison, this time with an evaluative
list of Americans offered by Moslem Arabs in 1963, reveals






We have previously expressed our own bias to the
effect that values, attitudes, and other dynamics not
directly observable may perhaps be best discerned by way
of an holistic approach — a study of the total behavioral
situation, to the degree possible. The critical incident
technique appears to provide considerable help toward
making this approach. It seems especially suited to
provide insight into what Harry C. Triandis calls
"subjective culture M , and into what Edmund S. Glenn
calls "behavioreraes". Since we shall be working with
both concepts in our treatment of conceptual approaches
to cross-cultural interaction in the next chapter, brief
descriptions at this point will serve a dual usefulness.
Triandis defines subjective culture as "an
individual's culturally determined way of thinking,
feeling and intentions to behave in certain ways in
particular social situations" #™ Relevant variables
include culturally determined norms, norms obtained from
reference groups, role perceptions, involving ideas about
behaviors appropriate in various role relationships,
cognitive-affective components. Behavior itself he
^^Harry C. Triandis, "Toward an Analysis of the
Components of Interpersonal Attitudes", in Attitudes. Ego-
Involvement and Change , ed. by Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif





defines as a function of behavioral intentions, habits,
and reinforcement expectations. Cognition, influenced by
cultural and reference group norms, is defined to include
i
(a) what events are to be reacted to as though they are
the same (the categorization process )i and (b) what
events H go together" (probabilistic relationships between
categories). Finally, he assumes that
• • • subjective culture is modified through
experiences involving rewards and costs and other
environmental events which modify both the ideas
concerning what is appropriate and the cognitions
and affect that a person brings to a cross-
cultural confrontation. 392
As we understand Triandis, subjective culture
seems to include everything mental, emotional, religious,
ethical — or cognitive/affective (although we would
include, with Talcott Parsons and others, "evaluative")
— that an individual takes into and expresses in cross-
cultural interaction, and which is, in turn, constantly
being modified by environmental feedback.
Edmund S. Glenn extends this concept, in a sense,
in discussing what he calls "behavioremes" — definite
forms of behavior shared among members of a society or
sub-society. He points out that all modes of communica-
tion in a society have in common these behavioremes, and
392Harry C- Triandis, op.cit. . p. 229. .
460

men act as "co-subjects" when participating in the same
communicative activity, such as in naming, or in group
ritual, in which situation they act together on a real
or assumed object. This co-subjectivity is what makes
it "easier to define society in terms of communication
than communication in terms of society" .3°3
If Triandis and Glenn are right, we should see
in critical incidents two major phenomena: (1) the
participants go into the "incident" with all the
cognitive-affective components of their respective
subjective cultures, behaving in culturally determined
ways, categorizing events in the incident and what cer-
tain events seem to mean in terms of other events, and
are modified by the incident cognitive ly and affectively?
(2) events taking place in the incident will be des-
cribed by participants reporting these events in terms
of "behavioremes" shared by, hence intelligible to,
members of their own culture.
-^
-'Edmund S. Glenn, Cognitive Structures. Culture
and Social Organization (Newark, Del.: University of
Delaware, 1969), pp. 8-9. Glenn cites Karl W. Deutsch's
The Nerves of Government as an effort at defining society





We can possibly go a step further, and hypothes-
ize that only those incidents which made a cognitive-
affective impact on the observer, hence changed him to
some degree, and that he feels capable of describing in
Mbehavioremes M will be reported. Two reasons for sug-
gesting this hypothesis may be found in the context of
the incidents we analyzed. First, more than 90$ of the
incidents in our sampling were reported by observers
who had been away from Vietnam for periods ranging from
one week to three years, yet these incidents remained
with them as highlights of this time in Vietnam,
Secondly, most of the observers reporting incidents
preface or conolude their reports by such comments as:
"This gave me completely new insights into the Vietnam-
ese", or M From then on I took a different approach", or
"Americans coming over here will discover through inci-
dents like this that they have to do things a lot
differently"
.
Keeping these theoretical formulations in mind,
we turned to the critical incident and used it in accord
with the following procedures. First, we culled from




r ndescribing interaction between Americans and South
Vietnamese.39^95.396.397,398
By random sampling, we selected 20^, or 200
incidents, and subjected these to coding and content
analysis similar to that used in deriving what we have
called above the Vietnamese and American "inferred
values". The sample critical incidents reproduced here,
in random order, are offered as illustrative of the
incidents we analyzed and help us achieve a feel for
the approach itself and for the cross-cultural inter-
399
action behavior such incidents express.
3°NRobert J. Foster, op.cit .
39*5J
^Lorand Szalay, Robert Walker, George Schueller,
Jack Brent, Persuasion Overseas (Republic of Vietnam
Emphasis) (Washington, D.C.i The American University,
Special Operations Research Office, June, 1965).
39 Debriefing Reports provided by Asia Training
Center, University of Hawaii, and the Agency for Inter-
national Development, ut supra .
™' Vietnam Questionnaire for Chaplains . Trans-
mission by letter of Chief of Naval Personnel, CPG:EJH:
lp over PI 730/6 7 t dated March 15, 1967.
398J * Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook , ut
supra
.
3""see Appendix U for multiple samples of criti-
cal incidents we processed. Specific incidents included
here were all submitted by American Chaplains in I Corps
in response to Vietnam Questionnaire for Chaplains , cited






A senior air force officer, an advisor to the
Vietnamese Air Force, was having dinner one even-
ing with his counterpart at the VNAF Officers'
Club. Following dinner, his counterpart asked
if he would like to learn a game. He said that
he would, and another officer joined them for the
game. The American officer was to play the third
person, assisted by his counterpart. As the game
progressed, the American officer felt that he was
getting the hang of it but his Vietnamese friend
continued to direct many of his moves* He finally
became quite frustrated ana he turned to the
Vietnamese and said, "I think I'm beginning to
understand. Let me do it now!" The Vietnamese
rose to his feet and offered his hand, replying,
"I'm glad you feel that way. That's exactly the
way we feel!
"
We had a young lady who worked in our exchange
who was a most pleasant individual. She was
seventeen years old, unhappily married to a man
whom her family had selected, and the mother of
a little nine month old girl. Some people in
Vietnam look at prostitution as a means of earning
a living, which is sad reality is true. One of
the issues of Playboy magazine published some
pictures of nude Vietnamese women. One day this
young woman indicated to one of our officers that
she was in trouble and needed some assistance.
Apparently someone had taken one of these pictures
which resembled her very closely, enlarged it, and
showed it to her family. Her family was at the
point of disowning her and were in fact about to
kill her because she had defamed their name.
She was being beaten when the officer arrived at
Unclassified reports are on file in the Office of Chap-
lain Corps Planning Group, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.,





their home. He was shown the picture and
informed that her brother was out borrowing a
gun to kill her. Her family thought that she
had been lying about her job and that she was
in fact serving as a prostitute in our cantonment.
The officer recognized the picture and asked for
30 minutes to secure a copy of this magazine to
show the family that someone had misled them.
Only after he returned with the magazine was her
family convinced of the truth. To many families
this would have meant little or nothing, but to
this woman's family it was a matter of life and
death.
The rule which I observed to be broken most
often was lack of respect for the elders. On
one occasion, particularly, this disregard for
local custom was almost disastrous for one of
our corpsmen. We were on a Med Cap in the
Village of Hoa Lac and had taken along several
different kinds of items to be passed out to the
people. The corpsman's preoccupation with the
children and neglect of the elders, especially
the Chief, was almost his undoing. Instead of
presenting the large sack of candy and other
goodies to the Chief for distribution to the
children, the corpsman began to pass out these
things to a few of the cute little ones with
whom he had been talking. In seconds he was
mobbed by over a hundred screaming, shoving
people. He was backed up to a small concrete
platform around the base of a flagpole, and before
he could broadcast the rest of his goodies two
boys climbed the flagpole behind him and were
grabbing the items from his hands before he could
throw them into the crowd. He could easily have
been injured in the press. This incident completely
destroyed the effectiveness of that Med Cap and
several future attempts to win the friendship of




Often times the Vietnamese will get a good
laugh from our "insults". On one occasion I
attempted to tell the lady of the house, in
Vietnamese, what a fine mother, cook, and home-
maker I thought she was. What I said, in effect,
was that I thought she was M a good mistress" t in
the western sense of the term. Instead of anger,
though, the whole household roared with laughter,
because they knew me j they knew my unfamiliarity
with the language i but they appreciated my blun-
dering attempt at identifying with them.
~l
On one occasion, while helping with the
building of a school on the Island of Cu Lao Re,
with a bit more emphasis than usual I was attempt-
ing to get some action on the part of the Vietnam-
ese. The Vietnamese priest smiled and replied,
"Tomorrow will come, Father. Tomorrow will come."
In an attempt to "culturize" our personnel,
I arranged for a dance to be conducted. With the
assistance of the Director of the Saigon Inter-
national House an evening was set and many of
the "nicer" girls were invited to act as hostesses.
The whole affair bombed. The music was slow and
agonizing, the sailors, on excellent behavior,
found it too hard to communicate, and most of the
girls brought their brothers — or boy friends!
For some reason or another shyness prevailed and
the hope for a oasis of better understanding
went out the window.
I am pretty sure that our men, though desiring
to learn, couldn't quite cope with the music, the
girls, and boy friends. Undoubtedly they returned
to the more familiar sounds of "To Do Street".
The importance of bargaining was illustrated
when a building was to be built for 3d Battalion,




a local Vietnamese builder and Marine Corps
representatives. The Marine Corps representa-
tives told him what they wanted, and he told
them the cost per square meter to build such a
building. He was asked for a better rate, so
another meeting was scheduled. In the meantime,
he was to check on the price of materials, wages,
etc. At the second meeting he presented a better
cost figure for building the building and more
details of the construction were also presented.
A third meeting with two or three representatives
from both sides was arranged i the builder lowered
his price and again more details of construction
were agreed upon such as t time of construction,
materials of construction, and method of payment.
He started construction but suddenly stopped.
Members of our battalion had told the personnel
of another battalion of the cost of construction.
The other battalion demanded the same price.
The Vietnamese builder insisted that a separate
agreement be made for each unit after meeting
for discussion and bargaining. This was agreed
upon and construction started again.
~l
I can remember a rough, rugged Bosun 1 s Mate
First by the name of . This fellow,
totally ill-equipped in formal educational
background and certainly unknowledgeable about
the culture of Vietnam was faced one night with
a crisis that few men face in a lifetime.
From dusk to dawn there was a curfew on the
rivers of the Mekong Delta. Any traffic detected
during curfew was to be challenged and if evas-
ive tactics were used the order was "prepare
for action".
About 0130 in the morning
^
and his
PBR crew spotted a sampan on the river. Through
their starlight scope they could detect people
aboard. In accordance with orders the sampan
was challenged. Though there were no evasive
tactics taken by the sampan neither was there a




sampan alongside. It was a critical moment that
called for a quick decision. These fine sailors,
under good control, moved alongside and took
aboard two Vietnamese women and a child. Ten
minutes later, BM
, in the open cockpit
of his boat delivered a new baby into the world.
Three days later I had the privilege of
riding the same boat with the same crew to the
Sa Dec hospital where mother and baby were picked
up and returned to their village.
~l
While visiting one of my Companies in a for-
ward area, I noticed a solitary Viet Cong suspect
sitting within a barb-wire enclosure awaiting
interrogation. As I approached him, I noticed
that he was a man in mid-forties with the classic
weather-beaten features of a person accustomed
to outdoor labor. He was idly fingering a
piece of line as he waited for time to pass. I
motioned to him to hand me the line whereupon
I proceeded to tie a "midshipman's sheepshank" —
a rather elementary knot learned in Boy Scout
Camp years before. Immediately the man's eyes
brightened and a wide grin appeared on his face
as he fingered the knot. He shook it, tugged at
it, stretched it, etc. He then gestured for me
to show him the steps in tying the knot. This
I did until he was able to duplicate the feat.
He thereupon took the line and carefully pro-
ceeded to show me his favorite rope trick. Three
half-hitches were placed side-by-side in the palm
of his left hand and with the right hand the far
end of the rope was passed through the half
hitches giving the impression that three knots
would evolve. But to my surprise the line came
out straight. This amused him a great deal and
by signs I indicated my desire for step-by-step
instruction in learning his trick. We then
moved on to other knots until my repertoire was
exhausted.
Throughout our contest not a word was spoken




the lesson taught to the crowd of Marines who
gathered around to observe our contest was
effective in its simplicity. Every individual,
regardless of his station in life, is a unique
creature of value and dignity.
~l
Once I was left to meet a Buddhist chaplain
that was high up in the Buddhist hierarchy in
the Tarn Ky area. He spoke very little English
and I spoke no Vietnamese. The interpreter
he had along that day was very poor. How was
I going to entertain him after the formality of
serving cokes in my office? I hit upon the idea
of showing him the library and the recreation
hut. The library didn f t interest him but the
recreation hut did. I beat him soundly in ping
pong and then he turned around and beat me in
shuffleboard. It was the first time he had ever
played the game. He was delighted! There was
always a warmth between us after that day and
my "assessments" towards his numerous projects
were always quite moderate.
The Vietnamese people have built some walls
that have caused hostility. For example, after
being warned that help would be fired from the
galley if they persisted in stealing the food,
they drove a truck to the frozen food locker
and began to load their vehicle. The Commanding
Officer fired the involved help. The Vietnamese
then organized a "union" and picketed the base.
The town of Cat Lo was then put off limits by
the OinC and through pressure, negotiations with
the town chief enabled new help to be hired and
the town was put back on limits. Our men
resented the stealing and the picketing. These





A small village near to one of our small
outposts, Aroa, had been over-run, and the
people had lost many of their possessions, few
though they may be. I was quite close to the
people of the village, and had visited them
many times in the previous weeks. They had
even accepted me into their homes and through
a long and involved initiation, into their
tribal unit. Naturally I wanted to help them.
We gathered material from our own sources and
resources, and on a regular Resupply Run flew
the materials out to the Outpost. In the mean-
time the Public Information Office felt that
this would make a good human interest story, so
they decided to send a photographer along.
After landing at the outpost, we moved the
"gifts" by carry-all and pack down to the village.
Once there we began the distribution, and the
photographer took pictures. The people all
received their gifts with a polite smile, but
all did not seem to be right. All of us there
felt something that could not be explained. It
was as though we really weren't wanted. Finally
the answer came. "Chaplain", said one, "you are
a Christian, and have told us so. Many times
you have said that a Christian does things with-
out seeking a reward. Now you come in our time
of need, and with you is a photographer who
takes pictures, and who will use them as
propaganda. We feel that this is payment enough
for your gifts to us."
~l
Content Analysis of Critical Incidents
Analysis of incidents of the type illustrated
above yielded an extensive list of themes describing
Vietnamese behavioral characteristics as perceived by




characteristics which Americans believe to be attributed
to Americans by Vietnamese, and themes describing the
characteristics that Americans feel Americans should
demonstrate in interacting with Vietnamese. The tables
presented below provide representative themes gleaned
by the analysis, without by any means exhausting the
entirety of themes found in the content.
We can examine these tables from several view-
points. For example, we can compare the lists of themes
with those offered by UNESCO, Baker, McGonigal and
others, as presented earlier in this paper. We find
a number of similarities. The lists in the tables below
are longer, and seem to reflect a greater variety of
characteristics and more nuances. This could be attri-
butable to the use of different ways of collating lists,
of course, or it could suggest that deriving themes
from behavioral incidents yields more variety and
subtlety.
Another approach is to fit the critical incident
content into the Sternin Value Orientation Schedule.
Recognizing that much of the content can fit several
categories, and that classification of this type is






SOME SOUTH VIETNAMESE BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS




















































Yielded by content analysis of critical incidents
reported by Americans as cited in Footnotes 39^- to







SOME CHARACTERISTICS PERCEIVED BY AMERICANS











Immoral (conduct with Viet-
namese women)















Yielded by content analysis of critical incidents as






SOME BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS WHICH SHOULD BE
EXERCISED BY AMERICANS (AS RECOMMENDED
BY AMERICANS)*
































Yielded by content analysis of critical incidents as





largely arbitrary, we do, nonetheless, see some utility
in this procedure, as we shall discuss below. A Value
Orientation Schedule of Sternin*s type, so developed,
without the Taxonomy of Concerns, is here presented as
Table IV-10.
The Value Orientation Schedule gives us a very
crude picture of "life styles" of cognitive-affective-
evaluative responses to social objects, and appears
somewhat useful for this purpose. It seems reasonable,
for example, to equate such related characteristics as
adaptability, cooperativeness, resentment of those who
are too aggressive, patience, and similar responses as a
patterned way of trying to harmonize with those elements
of the environment which one believes can not or should
not be changed immediately. It seems equally reasonable
to equate hard work, concern for education, and related
responses to a life-style of trying to control the
environment as firmly as possible.
Without a Taxonomy of Concerns, we can not
compare life styles of responses in given content areas
(government/community, etc.) with Sternin's findings.
This would be possible by classifying all our critical





Sternin uses, but we feel that this is precisely one of
the defects in his approach. Such categories do not
seem to reflect "real life".
For example, if we examine an incident in, let
us say, the content area of economics/business, and try
to factor out value orientations exclusive to this
content area, without exploring the contextual dynamics
at work, we end up with a lifeless skeleton. Let us
examine very briefly an economic/business type critical
incident included in the illustrative incidents above.
One incident describes theft, a union-organizing effort,
401
and picketing. Certainly there is nothing "submis-
sive" or "harmonious" about these activities. They are
situation and individualistically oriented. At the
same time, union organization is effected only through
peer-orientation. Moreover, the issue was settled only
when the Americans appealed to the village chief, hence
to traditional and formalistic orientations. The chief
yielded because his area had been put off limits, so
that business would be lost (a situation-orientation
issue )•





The point we are making is basically the point
made by F. Kluckhohn, co-author of the original Value
Orientation instrument adopted with minor modifications
by Sternin. Giving her rationale for a set of categories
such as the Value Orientation instrument provides,
Kluckhohn emphasizes the variants within these categories.
There is • • • too much stress — implied
when not actually stated — upon the unitary char-
acter of value orientations. Variation for the
same individual when he is playing different
roles and variation between whole groups of per-
sons within a single society are not adequately
accounted for. More important still, the emphasis
upon the unique of the variable value systems of
different societies ignores the fact of the
universality of human problems and the correlate
fact that human societies have found for some
problems approximately the same answers. Yet
certainly it is only within a frame of reference
which deals with universals that variations can
be understood. Without this framework it is not
possible to deal systematically with either the
problem of similarity and differences as between
the value systems of different societies or
the questions of variant values within societies
...
^02
It is this "variation for the same individual
when he is playing different roles" , and "variation
between whole groups of persons within a single society",
which we believe to be revealed more clearly in the
2Florence Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Variant
Cultural Value Orientations", The Social Welfare Forum





critical incident technique than in approaches like
Sterni^s. We seem to find in incident contents broader
expression of personality dynamics, including values
and attitudes , than in any type value or attitude
survey. We seem to find, too, what Triandis and Glenn
are talking about, namely, the tendency for the report-
ing observer to fit events together to interpret them
within his own frame of reference — his subjective
culture — but a frame of reference modified by ne
very participation and ego-involvement in the incident
he is reporting. He is continually defining and
redefining his own social orientation by way of the
communicating process, his input into the incident,
the feedback from the incident and efforts at resolution,
the reporting of the incident in co-sub jectively intelli-
gible terms.
This discussion leads us back to our use of
McGonigal data earlier in this chapter, and forward to
a consideration of the McGonigal findings in general.
Reflecting back for the moment, we see that in our
derivation from the McGonigal data of what we called
"inferred values" of Americans and Vietnamese,





attitudes concerning what Americans should do or not do ,
what Vietnamese should do or not do (or what both had
done or should not have done). In other words, we
addressed those American and Vietnamese behavioral
characteristics observed in behavior. That effort had
much in common with our later investigation of behavior
by way of the critical incident technique. ^
The McGonigal Findings
Preamble
This "behavioral involvement factor** we consider
to be of major worth in the McGonigal studies. Every
individual surveyed was ego-involved with the Vietnamese
about whom they were expressing opinions or attitudes.
This does not mean that every response to every question
was rooted in a specific behavioral incident. It does
mean that virtually all the responses were rooted in
the general reality of the social milieu in which the
respondents functioned, of which they were a very vital
part, by which they were habitually affected, and from
which feedback continually modified their entire
-%e shall return to the critical incident





behavioral response systems, their whole "psyche", all
their cognitive, affective, and evaluative reactions.
We do not refer to culture shock as that term has been
used in the McGonigal reports to describe reactions to
Vietnamese cultural differences, or as used by others
to describe responses to the cultural strangeness of a
new environment. We refer specifically to the unique
climate of life in the peculiar combat environment
which is South Vietnam in the minds of men who serve
there. We feel that McGonigal and others have possibly
underestimated the importance of this environment as
the significant "independent variable" it is. It
requires at least brief discussion if the McGonigal
findings are to be evaluated in context.
We can introduce a discussion of the peculiar
socio-psychological climate of Vietnam by drawing again
upon the sampling of critical incidents discussed above.
The observer reports
i
Although McGonigal does report in his Septem-
ber 1966 survey that "Two thirds of our people (American
Marines) have violent dislikes or mixed feelings best





One deaf-mute boy of about 12 had been
befriended and fed by members of one of our
companies for several months* During the same
period of time, several of the men in the com-
pany had been seriously wounded by small anti-
personnel mines just outside the perimeter of
the company camp. One day the deaf-mute boy
was discovered setting one of the Hbooby traps"
•
Cokes sold by the children were sometimes found
to contain poison or ground glass, so the Marines
were forbidden to buy them on that account.^5
Despite the thousands of incidents that could be
reported revealing the most favorable behavior possible
on the part of both Vietnamese and Americans, the
incident cited above can be paralleled by far too many
others of the same type to permit the development of a
climate of universal trust. The question of "trust",
in our opinion, is one of the most critical questions
to be asked by those who would understand attitudes
expressed in Vietnam. The closer one comes to being
inserted into the country, the more explicit become
the warnings to which he is exposed, to the effect that
he must have "eyes in the back of his head", he must be
constantly alert, there is no way of distinguishing
between friend and enemy, between loyal Vietnamese,
Viet Cong sympathizers, active Viet Cong, and members
of the Viet Cong infrastructure.




In the vast majority of instances the American ^
in Vietnam has never fought in a war previously, so that
real combat is itself a new and obviously threatening
experience. More importantly, he has never been in a
situation in which he has been led to believe that
everyone and everything is a potential killer. The
present writer, for example, participated in pre-
embarkation training sessions in a jungle-type area of
Okinawa before entering Vietnam. He has also been an
instructor in programs designed to prepare young enlisted
men and newly-commissioned officers for life in Vietnam,
and has witnessed the strategy and tactics employed in
preparing military personnel in general for the exper-
iences of guerrilla warfare. One is warned that the
latch to a hamlet gate may be booby-trapped, hence
should not be approached directly. At the same time,
one is warned that the clever Viet Cong may have
finessed the wary American by assuming that the American
might avoid a direct approach to the latch and enter a
hamlet in another wayj the Viet Cong, one is told, may
have booby-trapped the "other way", on this assumption.
We are confronted, in other words, with a situation




must decide whether or not the food available is worth
the possible shock he may receive by stepping on the
grid to reach the food. 6 The grid is not always
designed to shock \ but the rat can never be certain in
advance
•
How is the relatively young, relatively inexper-
ienced American to interpret such a situation, for
example, as that described by another critical incident
reporter?
While traveling over two roads in areas
under pacification, I and others have experienced
garbage being thrown at us, being spat at and
upon, having threatening gestures made, as well
as being told, in English, to M go home". All of
this in areas where our troops were being blown
away, shot in ambush and sniped at — all with-
out retaliation. Because of these hateful
expressions "ray concern" about those whose
spittle is rolling down my cheek becomes some-
what less than passionate.^ ?
We cite this particular incident because of its
reference to the unavailability of the opportunity for
retaliation. Two common phenomena generally agreed upon
by psychologists and other observers are the dynamics
We are not implying, of course, identities
between men and rats, but only that the situations des-
cribed are similar in terms of anxiety-provoking
ambiguity.





of the frustration-aggression equation and of displace-
ment. There can be little question about the frustration
developed by incidents such as these. Unless consciously
managed by the most tolerant of individuals, the frustra-
tion will convert itself into aggression. Against whom
will the aggression be directed? Almost invariably it
will be directed in the safest direction — against
persons or things with least power to retaliate i the
impersonal thing called "the country" j the Vietnamese
people at large; the "gooks"; an individual Vietnamese
civilian, when no observers are present? the Vietnamese
laundress, maid, waitress. The unknown, the potential
terror that can be provoked at almost any time by the
Viet Cong, the mortar rounds that explode in the night,
without warning, in "secure" areas — these and thousands
of minutiae create the environment, the climate, in
which many Americans live.
Howard R. Simpson describes the situation well:
Although pure fear is the first and most
common reaction to terrorism, it is usually
accompanied by feelings of impotence and frus-
tration. The law of an "eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth" may be universal, but, when
applied to the victims of terrorism, it lacks
practicability. The desire to strike back is
normal, but one must first find the terrorist
to lay claim to his eye or his tooth. Even a





operates with a thin margin of success. When
terrorists strike, the surviving victims can
seldom take weapon in hand and track them down.
They must rely on the forces of order. This
is an impatient reliance that demands quick
results. When results are lacking the initial
hate for the terrorist is diluted with frustra-
tion and resentment. This negative mixture is
often directed at the authorities.^ ^
In Vietnam, the "authorities" are both American
and Vietnamese. The restraints imposed by American
authorities, to prevent chaos and wanton damage to the
innocent, may provoke considerable resentment. The
present writer has accompanied American Marine patrols
ordered to keep their weapons free of ammunition unless
and until actually fired upon. The delay between being
fired upon and loading one^ weapon for return fire may
be fatal. The present writer has been in control areas
of artillery units when they received requests from
infantrymen under hostile fire, or who had spotted the
enemy, to "lay on" artillery fire. Delays coincident
to assuring that the area is cleared of innocent
civilians and that appropriate Vietnamese authorities
have approved, have resulted in loss of American lives,
or the departure of the enemy unscathed. The fact that
Vietnamese continue to till their fields while Americans





fight, that Popular Forces have been known to break and
1
run when assaulted by the enemy, that students demon-
strate in Saigon against the war and the American
presence, that Vietnamese Army forces have ostensibly
not borne their share of the fighting — such circum-
stances can readily inevitably provoke frustration, with
resentment and aggression against the Vietnamese
authorities.
It is impossible to ascertain how much of this
"climate" affects the responses of Americans to attitude
surveys. We previously cited the hypothesis, in our
discussion concerning the cognitive dissonance effect
and group pressure, that the more "physical" the reality
of an object, hence the more immediately testable, the
less the individual needs, relies upon, or is influenced
by group pressure or opinion. In Vietnam the American
is confronted frequently by immediately Observable and
"testable" physical reality. He may have seen Popular
Forces break and run from a fight, with the result that
his Marine buddy has been killed. He may have seen
things stolen, graft practiced, a deaf-mute child set a
booby trap j he may have been spat upon and had garbage





a "secure" area and been awakened by the mortar rounds
that killed some of his best friends. These are
"physical" realities. These are "critical incidents".
If there is any merit in the Triandis postulate we
presented earlier, the "feedback" from his environment
continues to shape and reshape his "subjective culture",
his attitudes, his entire approach to the cross-cultural
situation. He may be infinitely forgiving, kind,
patient, understanding. He may exercise heroic virtue
in interpreting the reasons behind the physical reali-
ties he has witnessed. But he has witnessed, has
experienced, has been a very vital part of them. It is
surely naive to assume that he can express attitudes
as detached as those expressed by the housewife whose
tastes about detergents are being surveyed.
This we find to be an unresolved question which
must be asked about the basic questionnaire instruments
devised by Robert Humphrey and modified for use by
McGonigal and others. The Humphrey questionnaires had
been given widespread cross-cultural use, in Turkey,
in Korea, in Thailand, before usage in Vietnam. The
questions asked do seem to tap opinions and attitudes,





was developed in a non-combat situation. Differences of
customs, tastes, manners, moral and religious practices,
and all the misunderstandings which accrue therefrom, are
quite real, of course, and quite worth understanding.
But, hostility toward a Turk who has cheated you in a
taxi fare negotiation, and the hostility that arises from
constant frustration, lurking fear, the shadow of the
unknown, the witnessed death of one's friends, seems to
us to be hostility which differs not merely in degree,
but possibly in kind. We must at least raise a question
about the equivalency of a testing instrument, or its
reliability, in differing circumstances. We believe
that this has immensely important implications for
training programs, as we shall discuss in the next
chapter. *
In this respect, it is interesting to review the
literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Algeria.
Many of the French forces in Algeria during the war which
lasted from 195^ to 1962 had served in Vietnam until
"in a sense, of course, it is not the test
instrument itself which is in question, but the answers
to the questions. Theoretically, the test might need
only the inclusion of a factor which allows for issues








Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference. Their descrip-
tions of interaction with Algerian residents and the
attitudes of suspicion and distrust, with resultant
bitterness against both the insurgents and the French
authorities, are strikingly similar to what we have been
attempting to portray about Vietnam in the paragraphs
above .M0
In brief, if there exists anywhere an example
of Merton's "self-fulfilling prophecy", it exists in the
circumstances of Vietnam, where pre-entry emphasis on
relating constructively to the Vietnamese is so inter-
twined with emphasis on trusting no one, that it becomes
increasingly difficult either to relate or to trust!
We shall discuss these factors further, below.
Evaluations
Section One .
With this preamble, we may address the general
and specific findings in the McGonigal reports.
^10Space precludes our exploring this area even
superficially. We refer, however, to such works as Paul
X. Kelley's French Counterinsurgency in Algeria 195^-1962
»
Military Victory-Political Defeat (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala. t Air War College, Report No. 3777. 1969).
Our references are to page numbers in the





It will be recalled that the series of Personal
~l
Response Project attitude surveys, in which McGonigal
was one of the primary investigators, was undertaken to
determine! (a) What are the existing attitudes of
American Marines and Navy personnel in I Corps toward
Vietnamese? (b) Where do the greatest problems exist?
(c) How does the learning of these attitudes take
place? The conceptual framework within which answers
to these questions were sought was based on Festinger's
theory of cognitive dissonance, theories of Rogers and
others on the diffusion of innovations and "target
analysis", and various theories of culture shock. The
McGonigal studies must be evaluated, then, in terms of
these stated objectives and on both the merits of their
theoretical formulations and their consonance with those
formulations.
While we have previously presented the major
findings (and many of the minor findings) from each of
the studies, for the sake of completeness and to demon-
strate the attempted longitudinal nature of the surveys,
it would be obviously impractical to attempt to evaluate
every piece of data and every interpretation in every





1967, in which he presents the findings of the sampling
of 5% (3*5^1) of American Marines and Navy personnel in
I Corps, provides adequate summaries of the several sur-
veys which preceded it, beginning with the 1% survey
reported in September 1966. The 1967 report, moreover,
uses the same basic technique for gathering data and
the same procedures for collating and interpreting it
as are used in the other surveys of American attitudes,
and is therefore sufficiently representative for our
purposes.
412
Figure III-7a presents apparent changes in
attitudes accruing between September 1966 and June 1967*
When asked how Marines in general felt about the Vietnam-
ese civilian populace, respondents in 1966 had estimated
that 35$ of all Marines liked the people j in 1967»
respondents estimated that U>9,1% liked the people.
When asked how they themselves felt as individuals, in
1966, kk% said they liked the people; in 1967» 55*5%
said they liked the people. And just as "likes" appar-
ently increased, so "dislikes" apparently decreased
between 1966 and 1967. Further, the number of "mixed"
estimates and responses also increased.





In respect to the Vietnamese Army, respondents
estimated that 35^ of all Marines like these soldiers,
a gain of h% over 1966j but only 397S of the same respon-
dents said that they personally liked the Vietnamese
soldiers, a loss of 5^ from 1966. However, "dislikes'1
in both categories decreased, and the number of "mixed"
responses in both categories increased.
Finally, respondents asked about the Popular
Forces estimated in 1966 that yi.% of all Marines liked
them. However, respondents expressing their own personal
likes for Popular Forces in 1966 numbered kk%, while in
1967 such respondents numbered only 35$» In both cate-
gories, once again, "dislikes" decreased, and the number
expressing "mixed" feelings increased.
Now McGonigal notes two things about these
comparisons. He considers the increase in "mixed"
responses a healthy sign, suggesting that those who had
previously expressed a dislike for different classes of
Vietnamese have now begun to take another look, are less
sure of themselves, are more open-minded. He notes
secondly that, "except for likes toward the ARVN and
PFs, there is an amazing continuation of the same degree
of cognitive dissonance ..." J He continues*
~l




One might conclude that attitudes toward
the ARVN and PFs are hardening but that there
is still plenty of "running room" for more and
wiser efforts in attitude improvement. More
who now express dislikes can be "pushed up on
the fence" and more who are "on the fence" can
be coaxed to come down on the positive side
of the fence.^^
This is as appropriate a point as any at which
to observe what appears to us to be the similarity
between the McGonigal interpretations and the Sternin
interpretations of datat Both are marked by a flexi-
bility that allows of a wide variety of conclusions.
In the Sternin "scenarios", for example, which were used
to illustrate how his findings oould be applied in com-
munications strategies involving Americans and Vietnam-
ese, we observed that virtually every postulate was
qualified by exceptions and reservations imposed by the
number of possible variables in the target population.
We see at this point in the McGonigal report, and shall
see repeatedly throughout the report, the same require-
ment for exceptions and reservations. He is discussing
only three classes of Vietnamese: civilian, Army,
Popular Forces. To note an "amazing continuation" of







toward the ARVN and the PFs is one way of looking at it.
Quite another way, however, would be to note that in two
out of three significant areas of concern, the "cognitive
dissonance" phenomenon did not occur (or occurred in a
reverse direction).
The same is true in regard to interpreting
"mixed" responses. If in 1966 some respondents expressed
positive dislike who in 196? became uncertain and
expressed mixed feelings, the same trend appears in
regard to positively expressed "likes" in 1966 which
have been converted into mixed feelings in 1967. The
loss of "like" to "mixed" can certainly be interpreted
as pessimistically as the loss of "dislike" to "mixed"
can be interpreted optimistically, or as a "healthy
sign"
.
The real problem, however, both at this point
and in respect to every variable studied, is that the
surveys are longitudinal in only the broadest sense of
the term. To be meaningfully longitudinal in the context
of concern here, the successive surveys would have to
have been made of the same population. This is simply
not the case, for several obvious reasons. By definition,





not select the same subjects selected by a previous
-random" sampling. Again, the 1% sampled in September
of 1966 and in successive surveys were selected from
much smaller geographical areas than were those sampled
in 1967. Thirdly, and most importantly, personnel in
Vietnam are rotated in such fashion that it is virtually
impossible to survey the same personnel even two days
in a row, much less many months apart. The "turnover"
rate of personnel in Vietnam is as high as 60% in a
year.
It is highly inaccurate, therefore, to infer from
the data of successive surveys that respondents who
expressed particular attitudes in one survey expressed
different attitudes in a succeeding survey. One can talk
only about the responses, not about the respondents.
This problem is highlighted when one finds
McGonigal asking the question 1 Does training in the
concepts of the Personal Response Project make a differ-
ence in attitudes? Responding that it apparently makes
a large difference, he supports this position by noting
that a regiment of Marines was given no Personal Response
training and, when tested in 1967t expressed unfavorable





more frequently than did others tested in I Corps, The
author himself notes immediately, however, that other
factors may have influenced their responses, such as the
performance of the Vietnamese Army units with whom they
operated, the number of mines and booby traps they
encountered, and so on. We add to this emphatically that
the rotation factor is of utmost importance. How many
men returned to the United States from this regiment
during the period involved? How many new men reported
from the United States? How many men were transferred
from units where they had been subjected to Personal
Response training into this particular regiment? How
many were transferred from this regiment into units
where they received such training? We simply do not
know, so that, once again, we can opt for any one of
several possible interpretations of the data.
The author advises us in this report that we
learn to like or dislike over a period of time, and
emphasizes the "time in Vietnam" factor in other reports
as a significant variable affecting attitudes. Again,
we are confronted with the potential for several diverse
interpretations. We discussed above the frustration-





Does the individual actually learn to like or dislike
Vietnamese, or do his feelings about his general condi-
tion fluctuate? When asked in 1966 what things they
disliked about their Vietnam assignment besides the
people, respondents cited the climate (dust, heat,
rain), the risks of war, death of friends, harrassment
of troops, separation from loved ones, apparent lack of
consistent national policy, disagreement with military
rules of engagement, lack of liberty, jealousy toward
American Array and Air Force personnel who get liberty.
It seems to us quite possible that what the author is
interpreting as learning to like or dislike the people
is really an expression of frustration at the time,
displaced toward the "safest" object.
Sociologist Charles Moskos found patterns of
change in an Army infantry platoon that he studied in
Vietnam similar to the pattern reported by McGonigal.
Moskos, however, seems to attribute the changes to such
factors as personal anxiety, the excitement and antici-
pation of arrival in Vietnam, followed by changes induced
by the circumstances of combat, rather than by learning
about the Vietnamese people themselves, until, by the





experienced veteran, with the pride that is experienced
thereby, and until the tenth month or so, when he
experiences the well-known phenomenon in all military
assignments throughout the world — "short-timer's fever".
This may well represent the "culture fatigue" phenomenon
described by Guthrie, who points out how hostility
spreads to include almost all aspects of the society,
including Americans,
The issue is certainly important in terms of the
development of training programs and the separation of
"target audiences". If changes in feelings are primarily
a function of the environmental circumstances themselves,
and the common emotions of homesickness and similar
factors, rather than attitude changes related to learn-
ing to like or dislike the Vietnamese or any other
people, it would appear that our training problem is
one of helping men handle their frustrations and other
emotions in ways other than displacing them toward the
people (which, in fact, they may not actually do
behaviorally anyway, despite verbally expressed atti-
tudes ) •
Questions of interpretation are not the only





such variables as rank, age, education, and origin in
the United States to be quite important. He notes that
whereas between 1966 and 1967 the attitudes of sergeants
and lieutenants improved dramatically, a distressing
reversal took place in the attitudes of captains, majors,
and lieutenant colonels in respect to the local people,
(In 1966, the sergeants and lieutenants constituted the
largest number expressing unfavorable attitudes, and
higher ranking staff non-commissioned officers and more
senior officers were the only notable "countering force"
to this negativism.) In respect to education, we are
told that those with less than seven years or more than
nineteen years of education tend to be especially criti-
cal of Vietnamese civilians, while those with only
eleven years of education were more critical than those
who had twelve years, and those with sixteen years had
the highest incidence of unfavorable attitudes. Age,
too, is a variable affecting attitudes, which the author
collates with time overseas and time in the service to
yield a "maturity" factor, with those over thirty-five
seeming to increase in tolerance.
But let us examine the data in terms of numbers





obvious. Looking first at the rank variable, we find
that almost 15% of the sample is made up of "sergeants
and lieutenants" , while less than J% is made up of
captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. In respect
to the education variable, we find that those with
less than seven years constitute less than 1%\ those
with eleven years, 7*3%t and those with sixteen years,
3.876. The sample against which each of these three
groups is basically being compared, however, those with
twelve years of education, consists of 55% of the total
population sampled. In the age variable, we find that
only 5,5%, or 196 of the 3,5^1 surveyed, are over 35
years old, as against, for example, 58»7%$ or 2,076,
who are 21 or younger.
Statistically, these distributions simply will
not do. One can hardly achieve the same random "normal"
distribution among 1%, or 38 persons, who have completed
less than seven years of education, and 55%, or 19^9
persons, who have completed twelve years of education.
This same statistical discrepancy is true of the other
variables cited above. Quite simply, the author is
attempting to use data obtained by random sampling as
though it had been obtained by stratified or stratified




What does this mean in practical terms? It
means that of 3f5^1 surveyed, variables were distributed
in what would be for the Marine Corps a relatively nor-
mal fashion (actually skewed in favor of youth, but
this would be normal in the Marine Corps), and that at
each point on the distribution curve certain numbers
were certain ages, ranks, etc. It does not mean that
liking or disliking Vietnamese is a function of any
one of these variables. To discover that among 38
persons with less than seven years of schooling we find
fewer expressions of favorable attitudes toward Vietnam-
ese than we find among 1,9^9 persons who have completed
12 years of education yields us no true comparisons
based on education. This, too, is an important issue
in terms of "target analysis" , if one is seeking specific
groups in most need of training, or who may be most
influential with others.
We shall address one further variable that the
author cites frequently, that of origin in the United
States. He points out in the report under discussion
that there remains a strong tendency, revealed in three
previous surveys and verified in this one, for Marines





Vietnamese military and for Marines from the South to be
especially friendly toward civilian Vietnamese, Upon
closer examination, however, we do not find nearly such
clear-cut differentiations as those found by the author.
To discuss each of his tables would be to spend a dispro-
portionate amount of space on this particular variable.
We shall content ourselves with a few examples.
In the 1966 report, we are given a number of
variants. Far Westerners present the "most negative
group image against Vietnamese", Southerners hold "the
highest ration of personal likes over personal dislikes
toward local civilians", Midwesterners have "slightly
favorable individual attitudes toward military and
civilian", as do Northeasterners. Yet we are told at
the outset of the same report that only yi% of Marines
like Vietnamese military and only h^% like the civilian
populace in the first place. Is it really meaningful
to determine that Southerners dislike Vietnamese least ,
or, rather, even more esoterically, that fewer Southern-
ers giving their personal feelings about Vietnamese say
they dislike Vietnamese than is true of Marines from
other parts of the United States? Or is it really





that "Marines in general" from the Far West dislike
Vietnamese most, which is what "negative group image"
means in cognitive dissonance terminology? (Even if
true about Marines from the Far West, they do not get
grouped geographically when assigned to Marine units,
so that collating a "negative group image" from the
responses of individual Far Westerners, or from what
other individuals believe of Far Westerners, seems
fanciful indeed.)
At the risk of excessive tendentiousness, we
feel it worthwhile to make two further observations
about this variable, because it seems to be the stuff
of which dreams, or myths, are made in attitude surveys.
In checking the tables the author supplies, we
can discern what he interprets as significant differ-
ences effected by this variable. We reproduce one
such table.
As the author explains before presenting his
tables, if statistical computation (he uses the Chi
Square) warrants rejection of the hypothesis, a
"significant difference" can be assumed between the
~1





categories being investigated. He notes, too, that
statistics frequently use the ,01 or .05 level of signi-
ficance as a criterion. We are perplexed when a sight
evaluation shows us that 701 Southerners are involved and
637 Far Westerners, and that, of these groups, 242 express
mixed feelings in each case, while 123 more of the South-
erners like Vietnamese civilians than dislike them,
TABLE IV-11
HYPOTHESIS 1 PERSONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS CIVILIANS
BY PERSONNEL FROM DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE
U. S. ARE DISTRIBUTED THE SAME






Simple arithmetic reveals, then, that we are trying to
derive a statistic on the basis of a difference of 38
persons, when even the original numbers of subjects dif-
fer by 64 persons. Our perplexity over the effort to











author's conclusion. Achieving a Chi Square of 6.24
which yields a significance level of 0.60, he states:
"We would again say that this was a 'significant' differ-
ed 6
ence." Since he has already observed that the .01
or the .05 level of significance is commonly used, his
acceptance of the .60 level is puzzling indeed.
Our second and final observation on this point
relates to the March 1967 report of the Combined Action
Platoons, in which report the author notes that Marines
who "function best in (a) CAP environment" come from the
Southern or Northeastern area of the United States,
whereas Marines in CAPs "with least positive attitudes"
come from the Far West. Here we confront the pitfall so
common to research in cross-cultural interaction,
Whitehead's "fallacy of reification". This is one reason
we have spent so much time on this particular variable.
First, the investigators become intrigued by the reappear-
ance of a phenomenon in successive studies. The next
step, as we emphasized in Chapter One, is to suggest a
"trend", without carefully checking to determine whether
the "trend" is actually an artifact of the testing instru-
ment or the interpretation of the investigator. It is
416





not long, then, before a suggested trend becomes an
observed and/or "demonstrated? fact. In the current
instance, we have what has been interpreted as consis-
tently expressed attitudes now equated with effective
function
. The implication, of course, is that Marines
can be selected for assignment to CAP units on the basis
of origin in the United States. The assumption is that
those from the South will "function" best.
We have previously discussed the fact that
behavior can not be predicted on the basis of attitudes.
How a man feels and how he performs are two different
things. Moreover, as of the present date, we have
developed no reliable criteria for determining which
Marines have "functioned" best in CAP units, nor have
we even defined what we mean by effective functioning
in a CAP unit. McGonigal provides no such criteria.
Assumptions and extrapolations in as complex an area as
this contribute little. '
'In this area, we are somewhat aware of the
reality of the situation. In 1969* we ourselves were
asked to study the CAP Program on behalf of Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, in part to try to determine criteria
for measuring effectiveness of units themselves in carry-
ing out assigned missions, in part to develop criteria
for measuring the effectiveness of individuals within
the units. That study is still underway. In 1 96 7-1 968,





We feel that these observations suffice for a
general conclusion about the variables discussed above,
as found explicitly treated in the 1967 report which we
consider representative of all the other surveys of
American attitudes, and found ad passim in the author's
other reports. Nor do we believe that the author has
provided sufficient evidence to identify "problem
persons" in terms of the variables investigated, which
was one of the objectives of the studies.
Section Two ,
However, we have thus far addressed only one
facet of the author's studies, that dealing with what he
suggests to be significant variables in terms of effect
on attitudes. Despite the emphasis in his reports on
these variables, we suspect not only that the findings
in their regard are questionable, as we have suggested,
of a commercial contract. His report yields no criteria.
In December 1969, Bruce C. Allnutt reported still another
study undertaken for related purposes under commercial
contract. The present writer has not only examined this
report carefully, but discussed it personally in some
detail with the author, without arriving at criteria.
See, Robert D, Campbell, A Marine Counterinsurgency Sup-
port System (Alexandria, Va.« Matrix Corporation, 1968)1
and Bruce C. Allnutt, Constabulary Capabilities of the
United States Marine Corps t The Counterinsurgency
Mission , Vol. It The CAP Experience in Vietnam (McLean,






but that of themselves they are of minor importance, as
we shall point out in discussing cross-cultural inter-
action training, at a later point. What strikes us as
truly important about the studies is the consistency of
expressed attitudes and the substantive content of
responses.
In this area of the studies, little or no inter-
pretation is required. Marines are asked forthrightly
what they like or do not like about Vietnamese. Viet-
namese are asked forthrightly what they like or dislike
about Americans. Granted the possibility of a "polite-
ness factor" in the Vietnamese responses, and a "test
wary" factor on the part of Americans, there are enough
blunt and even pejorative responses given by both
cultural groups consistently enough to compensate for
such inhibitive influences.
We have noted above that the probability of
reaching the same American personnel by surveys several
months apart is remote. Assuming, then, that three
different sets of American respondents were involved in
the September 1966 survey, the survey of CAP units in
March 1967, and the 5% survey of June 19&7$ it is






substantially the same. This is true not only of
expressed attitudes in regard to the Vietnamese people,
but in respect to other aspects liked or disliked about
assignment in Vietnam,
Further, given some variations in responses to
fit the varying circumstances, the attitudes expressed
by Vietnamese civilian workers on Marine Corps bases and
Vietnamese Popular Forces in Combined Action Platoons
are quite consistent. Both the Vietnamese civilians
and the Popular Forces have substantially the same
recommendations in terras of things they would like
Americans to learn before coming to Vietnam, and behav-
ioral patterns they would like to see Americans practice
in Vietnam. We have discussed at some length above the
worth of these responses in terms of "inferred values"
of those who make them, but they seem to have equal
utility when considered as expressed attitudes of the
respondents, rather than inferred values.
It appears to be especially significant that
attitudes and recommendations expressed by Ryukyuan
workers in Okinawa and Japanese workers in Iwakuni, in
response to the question, "What do the workers suggest
Marines do to improve?", are almost identical with those




In view of our earlier discussion concerning the
use of the critical incident technique, we find consider-
able utility in the questions in the survey instruments
used for both Americans and Vietnamese which ask, in one
form or another t
Think back to a recent time when you, or
another American observed by you, were involved
with a Vietnamese in a situation which was
especially harmful to (useful in improving)
U.S. -Vietnamese relations. Describe what actu-
ally occurred. Tell briefly what the outcome
was, and why the interaction was unfavorable
or harmful. Your description should include
facts about what actually happened, not merely
impressions or opinions.
The respondent is further asked to describe the
background situation, tell who was involved, by title or
other descriptive information, not by name, exactly what
happened, and what the outcome was.
We see in the format of this question the basic
ingredients of the data collecting phase of the critical
incident technique. The illustrative critical incidents
the author presents in his June 196? report are attached
to our appendix of other illustrative incidents.
In addition, however, McGonigal derived from the
content of the analyzed critical incidents the open-end






question responses, the expressions of likes and dislikes,
and the recommendations offered by Vietnamese and Ameri-
cans anent ways for each group to improve, respectively,
a list of stimuli and stimuli integrations for Americans,
the same for Vietnamese, a list of mediators (images) for
both, and a list of response integrations for both.
Brief illustrations will serve to clarify these concepts,
419Stimuli and stimuli integrations for Americans: 7
Stimuli
Garbage















Stimuli and stimuli integration for Vietnamese
i
Stimuli
Marine with hand on child
Marine with tape recorder
Marine buying ice
Marine bandaging old roan








































Why waste my time?
I could give him some-
thing.
I could teach him.
Maybe I'll ask him.
He may hit me.
I could give him some-
thing.
They don't know every-
thing.
In these stimuli, integration, and response
concepts, we can recognize a contribution to the holistic
approach we discussed above. Both (or all) parties in
the interaction situation are thinking, evaluating,
being affected by each other, by the environment, by the
"behaviorernes" with which they would communicate to a
fellow member of their own culture the situation con-
fronting them, in all its minutiae. The use of these
concepts likewise accords with the definition of attitudes






syndrome of response consistency with regard to (a set
of) social objects." As Triandis reminds usi "Attitude
measurement depends on the observation of regularities
in the S's behavior when he is presented with symbols
that represent the social situations,"
The McGonigal findings which we have been evalu-
ating in the section immediately above were put to a
rather critical test by Robert D. Campbell, while inves-
tigating cross-cultural interaction in a counterinsur-
420
gency system. Campbell reports that he familiarized
himself with the McGonigal findings and tested certain
of them (the critical incident content and the like/
dislike lists) in the following way. Selecting from the
critical incidents reported by McGonigal and from other
sources (some of the same observers we ourselves used),
he combined critical incidents in an instrument with
paired lists of like/dislike words arranged in accordance
with Osgood's Semantic Differential method, which we
have previously discussed. He pretested the entire
instrument with 2,7^4 respondents, including enlisted
and officer Marines in both the United States and
^20Robert D. Campbell, op.cit. . pp. 66-7b and






Vietnam, He then administered the refined, or pre-
tested, instrument to 53^ Marines in Vietnam, of whom
502 were enlisted, and 32 were officers. Respondents
were asked to select possible solutions to problems posed
by the critical incidents, and to identify behavioral
characteristics of the participants in the incidents.
In respect to the like/dislike lists, they were asked
to pair opposites, to make possible the measurement of
"psychological distances" between words. In brief,
Campbell reports that his findings substantially sup-
ported the McGonigal findings, in terms of Marine atti-
tudes toward Vietnamese and Marine discernment of
Vietnamese attitudes toward Marines.
In summarizing this section of our evaluation,
we suggest that the McGonigal surveys have provided suf-
ficient evidence to identify certain attitudes involved
in cross-cultural interaction in Vietnam, one of the
stated objectives of the study. Further, his findings
appear to be useful in terms of evaluating conceptual
approaches to cross-cultural interaction in general, and







In an earlier chapter we discussed the theoreti-
cal framework within which the Personal Response Project
attitude surveys were undertaken. The official Project
resource materials we consulted advised us that the
collection of data on customs, religions, and value
systems of Vietnam, and on the reciprocal attitudes of
Americans and Vietnamese, has been used as a data base
for an educational and communications strategy. The
basic communications strategy, it was explained, was to
be carried out in "three interrelated steps t the seg-
mentation of the target, the discernment of opinion
leaders, and the linkage of target personnel, attitudinal
problems and types of communication" • All this we have
seen previously, and have credited to the appropriate
sources,
A passage we did not cite previously, however,
now merits attention.
First, the target personnel had to be
selected on the basis of a growing knowledge
of the ways in which negative attitudes in
Vietnam were learned and reinforced. Valid
and statistically significant surveys • • •
revealed a distinctive pattern of attitudinal
trends and reversals which indicated the





would most likely produce the greatest results
most quicklyT^21
It is to be noted that this statement was pub-
lished in 1968, almost one year after all the attitude
surveys we have discussed had been reported (with the
exception of the 1968 10?S survey not yet processed).
We again confront the mystique of surveys and the magic
of figures. On the first page of the first attitude
survey undertaken, September 1966, we are told, as we
have seen above, that one of the three objectives of
the survey was to determine how the learning of existing
attitudes takes place. Despite all the questions asked
and correlations attempted, we have been able to find
no significant evidence in this or in any succeeding
survey that the question has been answered. Indeed, as
we shall discuss below, the question of how any. atti-
tudes are learned, positive or negative, in or out of
Vietnam, is highly complex, and if the attitude surveys
in Vietnam have led to a "growing knowledge" about this
phenomenon, the reports have successfully concealed the
evidence thereof.







Equally noteworthy is the statement that the
surveys have identified personnel among whom modification
efforts would most likely produce the greatest results
most quickly. We remarked above about McGonigal's
optimistic assertion that an increase in -mixed" feelings
from one attitude survey to the next is a healthy sign,
and provides excellent opportunity to negotiate the
holders of such feelings into more favorable attitudes.
Our remarks included the unfriendly notation that the
opposite is equally possible.
The assumption that correlations by certain
variables identifies the desirable target audience was
left with little support when we examined the sampling
methods and statistical procedures used to claim signi-
ficance of such correlations. Had we wanted to extend
our remarks along these lines, the evidence would have
shrunk even more. For example, page 2 of the September
1966 report tells us as one of the highlights of the
survey that it "is felt that E-5s and 0-2s are the most
critical groups in the process of attitude formation
and need positive assistance immediately". This cer-
tainly may be the case, but if the assertion is based





out that of 500 subjects whose responses were tabulated,
only eight were 0-2s (First Lieutenants), Perhaps a
statistical argument could be made that the E-5s, who
made up 55 of the sample population, "need positive
assistance immediately", but nothing in the survey demon-
strates that they are a critical group in attitude
formation.
We are beating this horse rather mercilessly
because we're not at all sure that he is dead! In the
introduction to the present chapter, we observed that
the attitude surveys seemed to be designed as much to
substantiate the theory on which they claim to be based
as to collect data meaningful within the framework of
the theory. Having presented all the major findings,
examined their assumptions, albeit somewhat cursorily,
and evaluated the findings, if somewhat sketchily, we
are frankly at a loss to identify a consistently theoreti-
cal approach, using either Rogers' diffusion of innova-
tions or Festinger's cognitive dissonance.
What seems to us to be the case is that the
sponsors and investigators of these attitude studies,
recognizing certain dynamics at work in behavior





phenomena in terms of innovation and dissonance theory.
We are somewhat afraid that this unduly resembles the
"lamppost 1* approach to research that we cited in
Chapter I of this paper. Let us examine this possibility
briefly.
What facts have actually appeared in the atti-
tude surveys to support the hypothesis of the cognitive
dissonance effect? The reports describe what appears to
be a trend in respect to responses to such questions
as i How do you think Marines in general feel about the
Vietnamese? The trend (not unbroken, as we have seen)
seems to show relatively consistent discrepancies
between sets of responses. Usually, not always, respon-
dents seem to consider that "Marines in general" are
more negative toward Vietnamese than are the individual
respondents themselves. In scoring, processing, and
quantifying these sets of responses, the investigators
choose to classify one set of responses as "General",
and the other as "Personal", and to refer, in turn, to
the "General" responses as the "group image".
Now this terminology is quite confusing, and
helps one believe that he is dealing with a true cogni-





such is the case. The responses consistently grouped
in all the reports as general are not general at all.
Indeed, if any set of responses could be considered
general, it would be the collected responses of all
those who state what they personally think about the
Vietnamese and other social objects. What the reports
call "general" is the collection of responses by
individuals stating what they think "most Marines"
believe or feel. Translating this, in turn, into
"group image" creates problems of its own, as we shall
see in discussing attitudes.
The above is not an exercise in semantics.
What it demonstrates is that the studies suggest a
discrepancy between what individuals say they believe
and what individuals say they think that Marines in
general believe. Obviously, since "thinking" is involved,
we can use the term "cognitive", and since a discrepancy
is involved, we can use the word "dissonance", if we
care to, but this is not necessarily the dissonance
postulated by Festinger and others j it is simply a
discrepancy, a difference.
In our earlier review of cognitive dissonance





dissonance by proponents of the theory. Dissonance is
uncomfortable, as consonance is comfortable. We tend to
rid ourselves of discomfort, to get comfortable. If to
do this requires us to change either anr opinions or
our behavior, we may tend to do either. We need not
necessarily do either. If we don't do either, and the
issues are important enough, or the pressures to conform
are severe enough, we may suffer certain conflicts, or
tensions. This may or may not give rise to what
Festinger calls "locomotion" or movement, out of one
group into another, if this is possible, and if a group
is available which shares our beliefs or attitudes.
This, itself, of course, is a problem, since, if left
to ourselves, he notes, we tend toward association with
people who share our beliefs and attitudes, so that the
group we are already in, with which we now find our-
selves in dissonance, hence uncomfortable, is the group
we have most in common with. The individual's ability
in such a situation — what he is realistically capable
of doing — has a critical bearing on his behavior.
Pausing at this point, we ask what the discrep-
ancy discerned in the reports discussed above has to





McGonigal states quite specifically that the mission of
the Personal Response Project is to help personnel
"reduce cognitive dissonance by drawing both actions
and beliefs into closer accord with our fundamental
beliefs about human life and our reason for existence
in the militaryM , and in his September 1966 report
draws our attention particularly to the chart which he
says "contains the most significant observations in
this study" • The chart is said to reflect findings
that the individual sees his peer group as more negative
in attitude toward the South Vietnamese than he is,
and attempts to make his expressed opinions and behavior
consonant with theirs.
We examine the chart in question and find only
discrepancies , with no evidence whatsoever of efforts
on the part of the individual to change attitudes or
behavior. Nor do we have any measures in any of the
studies that individuals feel "uncomfortable", one of
the essential characteristics of "dissonance". Questions
in the survey instruments which ask respondents what
they think should be done to improve relations with the
Vietnamese, or what good or bad things they think have





determining a "discomfort" index, but they could be
construed in many other ways, as well, and, factually,
the reports do not interpret them in terms of "discomfort".
Further, when Festinger speaks of choosing one's
own "referent" group, and of the process of locomotion
which may accompany cognitive dissonance, he is describ-
ing phenomena which are, perhaps, detectable, or at least
researchable, in the Vietnam setting, but which have
certainly not been researched or detected in the studies
we are discussing, or in any other studies we are aware
of. What options has a Marine in combat for changing
his referent group? If he is in a large unit, head-
quarters type situation, he may be able to group himself
with preferred individuals during certain periods of
any day. For the most part, his work group, training
group, those he is billeted with and otherwise assigned
to are determined for him. If he is in a small unit
combat situation, his options are even more restricted.
He can feign illness, suffer a psychosomatic disturbance,
experience a true neurosis, deliberately wound himself,
violate enough rules to have himself replaced, desert,
or in some other abnormal fashion remove himself from






set of circumstances, he has relatively little choice
about the group of which he is physically a member. The
impact of cognitive dissonance in respect to the various
forms of locomotion we have described above could con-
ceivably be studied. It has not been studied in Vietnam,
to our knowledge, and certainly not in the studies we
have been considering.
The question of dissonance in the Festinger
framework involves relationships between an individual
and his referent group. What we are told in the atti-
tude surveys, however, is that individual Marines state
that "Marines in general " . or "most Marines" believe
such-and-such. Marines in general, or most Marines,
are not necessarily his referent group, his squad, his
platoon. It seems quite possible, indeed, that the
smaller the group in which he himself functions, the
more likely that "Marines in genaral" or "most Marines"
refers to the large units, the "faceless masses", the
world outside his own tight little unit. The present
writer has witnessed this phenomenon many times when
functioning with Marine units or aboard Navy ships.
Most individuals who have had experience in military





(and, often enough in nostalgic retrospect, even for
the misfit), one's own unit is always the toughest, the
bravest, the best, in every respect. Sailors in the
confined spaces of a destroyer, with hardly more than
200 men on board altogether, may engage in extensive
inter-division feuding. The deck division may consider
everyone else in the ship an enemy . When ashore, virtu-
ally every man wearing the name patch of the particular
ship involved is prepared to defend the entire ship to
the death against sailors from other ships!
The Festinger assumption is that the individual
in dissonance with the group knows the other members
who purportedly hold different beliefs. The individual
Marine respondent who speaks of Marines in general, or
most Marines, need have no personal knowledge of who
such others may be, and may feel no need to conform for
that reason.
A particularly abstruse measuring problem in
attempting to discern by longitudinal studies that
attitudes have in fact changed because of cognitive
dissonance is germane to the McGonigal studies. When
we discussed the early development of Festinger* s theory,






study" by S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure Upon
the Modification and Distortion of Judgments". The paper
is reproduced in virtually every important anthology
on group behavior, but one of its important implications
is frequently lost. The paper reports precisely what
its title states, namely, the effects of pressure on
.judgments
. The experiment involves efforts to induce
individuals to resist or to yield to group pressures
when perceived to be contrary to fact . The Asch paper
has strongly influenced the direction of experimental
work on individual and group perception, but somewhere
"in translation" what we think is an important part of
the message is lost, namely, that changing judgments
and changing attitudes are two different things. We
hypothesize that no change of attitude was brought
about in the Asch experiment, even though some individ-
uals expressed judgments contrary to perceived fact, in
order not to suffer dissonance with the majority.
An experiment designed to test a hypothesis
quite similar to ours was conducted by Paul Hiniker,
4-22
with Chinese in Hong Kong. Hiniker attempted to test
422paui Hiniker, Chinese Attitudinal Reactions
to Forced Compliance t A Cross-Cultural Experiment in







empirically two mutually contradictory theories about
Chinese in a forced compliance situation. One was the
cognitive dissonance theory, the other a characterologi-
cal theory. The latter theory, briefly, holds that
"what is characteristic for the modal Chinese personality
on the three basic psychological issues of conception
of self, relation to authority, and handling of primary
conflicts" is deeply rooted in the three interrelated
formal elements of the Confucian code, namely, face,
filial piety, and proper conduct according to status* 2 3
The experimental objective was to test "the
attitudinal effect on a Chinese of making a public
statement contrary to his private opinion under induce-
ment by an authority figure". The experimental
results failed to support dissonance theory, which pre-
dicts a change in attitudes under this kind of stress.
The characterological theory was supported in its pre-
diction that Chinese will readily comply, and will com-
ply more under more inducement, but their ability to
maintain a separation between an "overt formal behavior
level" in their thinking, together with the other
423Ibid., p. 11.





-iConfucian code characteristics cited above, results in
compliance without attitude change, *
We are suggesting that if, in fact, changes are
being witnessed by the McGonigal longitudinal studies,
we may well be witnessing changes in expressed .judgment ,
rather than in true attitude . One escape from the
dilemma of being unwilling to change one's behavior or
one's attitude in a group is to change one's expressed
judgment.
Some of the complexity of the factors discussed
above appears when we compare a highly definitive dictum
we previously cited as being issued by the widely-known
anthropologist E, T, Hall, to the effect that an immense
amount of the burden of the war in Vietnam and our
involvement is attributable to our thinking of Asians
as "gooks" , with the reported incident which we quote
here.
During the monsoon while on an operation I
walked into this gook (sic) store with my trousers
torn from my crotch all the way to the bottom of
my trousers, Papa-san told me to take the trou-
sers off and gave me a new pair. Something the
Corps had not done in ten days of torn trousers,
Papa-san made a friend of me.** 2"
^25Ibid,, p. 63.






It is especially interesting to note that
McGonigal cites this particular incident as "favorable",
in his collection of critical incidents. What does it
reflect? Few efforts have been more consistent to rid
military personnel of the use of a term than the efforts
to obliterate "gook" from the "overseas man's" lexicon.
The term is virtually a bete noir to all cross-cultural
interactionists! Now when the reporter of the above
incident is urged by someone in authority not to call
Vietnamese "gooks", if he in fact complies, what does
his compliance really mean? Has he changed his attitude?
If the above incident is meaningful, his current atti-
tude toward "Papa-san" is fine. If the well-known
"halo effect" phenomenon has any validity, his attitude
toward the "Corps" is now substantially less favorable
than toward "Papa-san", but it would be a representative
of the Corps urging him not to call "Papa-san", his
new-found friend, a "gook". Perhaps he would change the
name, perhaps not. We suspect that at most a judgment
would be involved, rather than an attitude — a judgment,
in this case, to go along with the Corps representative's
urging. We must still leave open the possibility that





recount the story about the "friendly gook" who gave
1
him new trousers.
Returning to a direct evaluation of the "cogni-
tive dissonance" reported by McGonigal and others in
the Personal Response Project studies, we must note
that we are given modest evidence only of an apparent
discrepancy . We see no support in the studies for the
claim that a cognitive dissonance effect is at work,
or that attitudes are in fact being changed. We do
accept the possibility that judgments may have changed,
and that this may account for the increase in "mixed"
responses in successive surveys, but since we are still
confronted by the wide diversity of variables we
discussed previously, and the all-important fact that
it is unlikely that more than a fraction of the same
individuals were tested in successive surveys, even
the possibility of changed judgments must remain an
open question.
Moving to a consideration of the "diffusion of
innovation" theory purportedly involved in the findings
reported, and its corollary, the communications strategy
of identifying target personnel who either most need







training, or who will most influence others, we find
much the same situation we find in investigating the
claim of the cognitive dissonance effect.
In our earlier discussion of the theoretical
assumptions of these studies, we pointed out that there
is considerable difference of opinion about opinion
leaders, and under what circumstances individuals are
influenced by communicators. Communicator credibility,
for example, as March reported, had varying degrees
of influence in proportion to opinions already held.
In discussing the Sternin assumptions, we made the point
that in the so-called "two-step flow" of communication,
a respondent is often influenced by the social level of
the communicator (a problem when Saigon University
students survey rural Vietnamese). In other words, there
is a wealth of research which suggests that identifica-
tion of opinion leaders is extraordinarily difficult.
One must know as much about the individuals to be influ-
enced as about the influencers, as much about relation-
ships of group members to one another as about their
relationship to the group leader, as much about what is
of critical importance to each individual at a given time





A few examples from communications literature
will suffice to illustrate how complex the problems are,
and how divergent are the opinions of investigators in
the field,
Elihu Katz reported on the hypothesis of the
"two step flow of communication" derived from an analysis
of the decision-making process during an election
campaign. The hypothesis held that instead of reaching
the "masses" directly, mass communications first reach
"opinion leaders", who, in turn, pass on what they have
heard and read to those with whom they are influential.
The hypothesis seemed to have healthy overtones for a
democratic society, since it implied that people are
still most successfully influenced by a give-and-take
exchange with others, rather than directly by the mass
media, as had been assumed.
Katz says about the hypothesis:
Of all the ideas in The People's Choice
(the analysis of the election campaign), however,
the two-step flow hypothesis is probably the one
that was least well documented by empirical
data. And the reason for this is clear: the
design of the study did not anticipate the
importance which interpersonal relations would
assume in the analysis of the data. Given the
image of the atomized audience which characterized





thing is that interpersonal influence attracted
the attention of the researchers at all. ^27
He then describes some of the many studies con-
ducted during the years to test the hypothesis, and finds
that each study yields a dynamic of the communications
process that other studies had missed or ignored. One
such study, an effort to identify those who influence
voters, is illustrative. Katz says of it:.
• • • the design of this study • • • makes
use of the initial interviews almost exclusively
to locate opinion leaders and hardly at all to
explore the relationships between leaders and
followers. Once the leaders were designated,
almost exclusive attention was given to classi-
fying them into different types, studying the
communications behavior of the different types
and the interaction among the leaders them-
selves, but very little attention was given to
the interaction between leaders and the original
informants who designated them.^28
In reporting on still other studies testing the
same hypothesis, Katz says they "revealed that the
opinion leaders themselves often reported that their
own decisions were influenced by still other people".
He goes on to observe t
^2?Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communica-
tion", in The Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.
i








It began to seem desirable, therefore, to
think in terms of the opinion leaders of opin-
ion leaders. Secondly, it became clear that
opinion leadership could not be viewed as a
"trait" which some people possess and others do
not • • • Instead, it seemed quite apparent
that the opinion leader is influential at cer-
tain times and with respect to certain substan-
tive areas by virtue of the fact that he is
"empowered" to be so by other members of his
group. Why certain people are chosen must be
accounted for not only in demographic terms
(social status, sex, age, etc.) but also in
terms of the structure and values of the groups
of which both adviser and advisee are members. ^29
Remaining with the issue of leaders and opinion
influencers, it is certainly fair to say that there is
a general tendency among observers of the social scene
today, in and out of the military, to attribute over-
whelming influence to peer-groups in American society,
particularly among the young. It is assumed to be
virtually a truism that the young are much more readily
and intensely influenced by their peers than by seniors
or elders. David Riesman probably summarized or
reflected the general tendency fairly when he remarked,
as recently as October 19691 "As adult authority dis-
integrates, the young are more and more the captives
of each other." *
429lbid .. p. 97.
^3°David Riesman, "The Young Are Captives of
Each Other", in Psychology Today . Vol. 3, No. 5 (October






Influenced by this trend of thought, we expend
considerable energy in developing training devices pre-
sumably oriented to the "in" thing among young groups,
on the assumption that the young accept what other
young affirm. For example, the present writer was asked
to evaluate a "psychodelic sound and light" experiment
designed to develop a training method to influence favor-
ably the young Marines embarking from Camp Pendleton,
California, where they receive pre-embarkation training
for entry into Vietnam, The entire project was con-
ceived on the basis of the assumption that flashing
lights, loud noises, and "hip" language are "in- with
youth today. Therefore • • •
Yet in 1968 in an experiment with University of
Illinois undergraduates, Martin M. Chemers and David A.
Summers believe they found that, while member-to-member
affective relations are important to a group, member-
to-leader affective relations are more important!
On the other hand, while military officials under-
standably assume that officially appointed leaders (non-
commissioned officers and officers) influence groups and
affect their performance in proportion to the leader's
own training and experience, Fred E. Fiedler and Martin
l_M. Chemers report in a 1968 study of military officers _j
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in an experimental situation findings similar to what
Fiedler had previously reported about Belgian officers,
that performance under these officers was not significantly
better than performance under untrained recruits.
In trying to determine those most in need of or
most receptive to cross-cultural interaction training, we
meet as many problems as in trying to identify opinion
leaders. Reporting on wartime studies in communication,
for example, Carl I. Hovland makes some interesting dis-
tinctions that complicate our problem.
One characteristic of the individual which
is almost always found to affect the impact of
communication upon attitude is intellectual
ability. In our studies in the military setting
we found that brighter individuals were more
likely to have their opinions changed by a communi-
cation than were the less intelligent when the
opinion was based largely on factual information.
When, however, the acceptance of the material was
the principal determinant of attitude change, the
less intelligent were more apt to be influenced,
since they tended to accept practically anything
communicated to them. In contrast, brighter
individuals were a great deal more skeptical. 3 2
^ Fred E. Fiedler and Martin M. Chemers, Group
Performance Under Experienced and Inexperienced Leaders
i
A Validation Experiment (Urbana, Ill.i University of
Illinois, 1968).
3 2Carl i, Hovland, "Changes in Attitude Through
Communication" , In Journal of Abnormal and Social






This observation takes us back to the Festinger
remarks about the "reality continuum", and the tendency
for individuals to use their own judgment when a
physical, testable reality is involved, whereas they must
rely more on others the farther the issue is from the
physical. As we have noted, in Vietnam there is a sub-
stantial area of "physical reality" which can be tested
by every individual. Opinions expressed by communicators,
no matter how credible they may be, which seem to con-
tradict the individual's own experience with "physical
reality" are unlikely to be accepted, regardless of the
intelligence of the individual. It is unlikely, for
example, that even the most credible communicator could
convince an individual that every Vietnamese is trust-
worthy, if he has just had his leg blown off by a grenade
thrown by a Vietnamese youngster to whom he had given a
pocketful of candy a moment earlier. On the other
hand, it may be possible to convince the very same
individual that most Vietnamese are trustworthy, despite
the boy responsible for his losing a leg. It's a complex
business.
We previously noted that despite the many fac-






fact is that a substantial number of relatively untrained,
quite "ordinary" young American Marines function effec-
tively and achieve excellent relations with Vietnamese in
the Combined Action Platoons. We suggested that this
fact does not necessarily simplify understanding of the
dynamics of cross-cultural interaction; it may, in fact,
make them even more difficult to understand. If one
tried to collate all the hypotheses available on inter-
personal relations, he would almost certainly discover
that many of them demonstrate that the harmonious inter-
action achieved by Marines in Combined Action Platoons
is impossible to achieve! We do not say this facetiously.
A quite sophisticated effort to define criteria of cross-
cultural interaction effectiveness which researched
some of these hypotheses concluded with the assumption
with which it had begum •• . . . that willingness to
continue working together was the most important single
433ingredient of effective interactions."
Again we pause briefly to reflect on the Personal
Response Project studies. Despite their emphasis on
433Dean K. Froelich, An Experimental Criterion
of Cross-Cultural Interaction Effectiveness! A Study of
Military Advisors and Counterparts (Washington, D.C.i







Rogers* diffusion of innovations theory, what evidence
do the attitude studies offer that they really attempt to
weave their way through the maze of hypotheses about
opinion leaders, early followers, late followers, laggards,
or others? What do they have to say about the intelli-
gence of the audience to whom proposed training is to be
directed, or about interpersonal in-group relations, or
about whose opinions influence the opinion makers, or who
are the real leaders within groups, officially appointed
leaders, or those who have assumed leadership roles?
Once more we must ask if the "lamppost" approach is not
involved? It is always possible, and often fruitful, of
course, to "theorize backwards", that is, to ask what
hypothesis observed behavior might support. In a sense,
this is the basic approach to all theory. But this is
quite different from approaching data, hypothesis in
hand, and trying to make the data fit the hypothesis.
We remarked above that we would briefly discuss
the question of attitudes and of "group image", since we
have been told that the attitude surveys have helped us
understand how negative attitudes are formed.
First the concept of "group image". As we have







of the collected responses of individuals concerning
what they think that "Marines in general" think. What
impact on the individual does that "group image" really
have? How "real" is it to the individual?
The most detailed and comprehensive study per-
tinent to our purposes here that we have seen is that
reported by Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt. In
their 52-page analysis of images, they present and
illustrate the findings of a wide variety of observers.
We shall not attempt to synthesize the findings. We
cite them primarily to emphasize once again that we are
dealing with extraordinarily complex phenomena when we
discuss "group images". We will quote here, however,
from the authors' conclusions, and suggest that the
statement quoted is relevant to the entire Personal
Response effort.
Our findings tally well with (other
research results) attesting to the resistance
of human thinking and imagining to sudden
environmental pressures. Men cling to their
earlier memories and character. They call upon
the support of their social groups to defend
their images and beliefs. They distort many
of their perceptions and deny much of reality,
in order to call their prejudiced souls their
own*
Yet we must dissent from findings that make
man seem too completely a creature of his




to their neighbors, of admiring reference
groups of their betters, and of submitting to
dominant elites are subject to the same limita-
tions. Men conform, admire, and obey largely
within the limits of the images and habits that
they have learned earlier and that they have made
into a part of their inner selves. If a dominant
minority suddenly runs counter to these inter-
nalized images and beliefs of its followers, it
may quickly cease to dominate .^3^-
We shall not attempt at this point a detailed
discussion of attitude formation and change, since much
of our chapter on conceptual approaches to cross-
cultural interaction will be so oriented. We assume
that the claim that the attitude surveys in Vietnam have
contributed to our understanding of how negative attitudes
are formed is based on the assumption that individuals
change their attitudes to conform with the "group image",
in order to relieve the discomfort of cognitive disson-
ance. We have already suggested that we see no evidence
in the studies that individuals have actually felt this
discomfort, or that they have changed attitudes. We have
observed that some of them may have expressed changes in
judgments, for one reason or another, but we really have
no significant evidence that even this has occurred.
"1
^ Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects
of Events on National and International Images'*, in
International Behavior , ed. by Herbert C. Kelman, ut





We might take the time here, however, to empha-
size that those attitudes which represent whole value
systems do not yield readily to change. Attitudes which
reflect but a single congitive component, if this is in
fact ever the case, devoid of affective or evaluative
components, probably change more readily. But frequently
what appears to be attitude change is a change in per-
ception, Vasso Vassilou and his associates report, for
example, that 62 Americans living in Greece were tested
after being exposed to an ethnographic essay on Greek
culture. The data indicates that learning occurred, but
offers no evidence in improvement of intercultural
attitudes. The authors observe that it seems that inter-
cultural perception becomes more accurate in such cir-
cumstances, but intercultural affect remains unchanged. -*5
Discussion of attitude formation, positive or
negative, must include an account of the functions
attitudes perform. Daniel Katz tries to group them
according to motivation, and develops four categories:
the instrumental, adjustive, or utilitarian (upon which,
he maintains, Jeremy Bentham constructed his model of
^^Vasso Vassilou, et al. , Intercultural Attitudes
After Reading an Ethnographic" Essay t An Exploratory Study




man, and of which modern behavioristic theory is an
expression) | the ego-defensive, in the Freudian connota-
tion of the termi the value-expressive i and the knowledge
function. Katz saysi
Stated simply, the functional approach is
the attempt to understand the reasons people
hold the attitudes they do. The reasons,
however, are at the level of psychological
motivations and not of the accidents of exter-
nal events and c ire urnstancesT Unless we know
the psychological need which is met by the
holding of an attitude we are in a poor posi-
tion to predict when and how it will change
• • • And while many attitudes are predomin-
antly in the service of a single type of
motivational process . • • other attitudes
may serve more than one purpose for the
individual. ^3" (Underlining ours.)
Coupling these comments with those of Deutsch
and Merritt, above, about the depth of internalized
images, and with what we have previously discussed about
stereotypes, perception, and the apperceptive mass, we
may conclude that learning how attitudes form and change
requires learning about many related factors.
We have been severe in our critique concerning
the discrepancies between articulating and actually
"using" a theoretical framework in the attitude surveys,
^6Daniel Kat«, "The Functional Approach to the
Study of Attitudes", in Bernard Berelson and Morris
Janowits, op.cit. . pp. 57-58 (Reprinted from Public




and of the failure to provide evidence that hypotheses
have actually been explored empirically by the studies
purportedly based on them. We have also been severe in
our critique of what appear to be oversimplified formu-
lations of highly complex concepts, and of what appears
to be a rather naive management of statistics to demon-
strate correlations which in fact have no statistical
meaning.
At the same time, we believe that it is per-
fectly legitimate to test "hunches", to interpret data
at face value, to ask people what they think and accept
their responses without inordinate speculation over what
they "might have meant". Aware of the multiple pitfalls
in ordinary opinion polling and the various reservations
which must be applied to interpreting results, we still
accept the findings of such polls as helpful guidelines,
unless so bizarre as to require cautious questioning.
We consider the Personal Response Project attitude sur-
veys in this light. As we have noted above, we believe
that they provide some valuable information, that they
tell us what large numbers of Americans in Vietnam think
about themselves, about the Vietnamese, about the circum-





They also tell us a lot about what the Vietnamese think
of themselves and of Americans. We firmly believe that
if many of the recommendations made by both Americans
and Vietnamese were put into effect, substantial improve-
ment in intercultural relations would accrue in Vietnam.
We also believe, as we shall see later, that the sur-
veys give us a great deal of information with which to
evaluate conceptual approaches to cross-cultural inter-
action.
What we object to in our evaluation of the
surveys is that they do not tell us what they apparently
think they do. They do not achieve their own stated
objectives of discerning how attitudes are learned,
how cognitive dissonance develops, how it can be iden-
tified, how we can discern who most needs cross-cultural
training and who will most profit thereby. They do not
tell us what demographic variables correlate with what
attitudes, although they say they do. In other words,
we fault them, precisely, not for what they offer, but
for trying to be much more esoteric and sophisticated
about what they offer than their investigations either
437
warrant or require.
^3?We have discussed our critique of the samp-






We have intentionally reserved for this final
and very brief section a brief evaluation of the Mole
findings.
We have previously noted that Mole consulted
with, and had the substance of his many findings corro-
borated by, an unusually large number of scholars in the
field, the names of some of whom we listed. As we
remarked at that point, one's acceptance or rejection
of such corroboration depends in part on one's attitude
toward "argument from authority". V/e saw, too, that
appeals to authority can boomerang. We cited one
evaluation of unpublished materials based on Mole's
findings which advised us that the entire concept is
wrong and will deepen the separation between Americans
and Asians. In response to the same request for evalua-
tion which was rewarded by the above, came a letter from
the same Edmund S. Glenn whose notion of "behavioremes"
we used earlier, and whose work on cross-cultural
interaction will be discussed in our next chapter.
Affirming that both he and an associate, "our Far-Eastern
Officer, E. J. Hemphill, who points out that survey find-
ings were intended to be used as "cues", rather than as




cross-cultural communication specialist", had reviewed
the materials, Glenn stated » "Let me say first that I
find the brochure excellent, both in conception and
execution. The usefulness is likely to be considerable
and the execution is highly professional."^®
Turning to the Mole findings themselves, we shall
discuss only one characteristic which, in our minds, may
well suggest that Mole and many other observers begin
their investigation of the Vietnamese with a more stereo-
typed bias than they seem to realize. In a publication
which extends and elaborates on findings reported in the
publications we have previously discussed, Mole goes
into considerable detail about "the Chinese world view",
as well as, again, the traditions of Taoism, Confucianism,
Hinduism, Buddhism, and other beliefs and practices, to
provide a preface and a context for discussing certain
Vietnamese concepts and practices. J
3 Letter to Project Officer, Personal Response
Project, Washington, D.C., August 19» 1966. We repeat
that these evaluations were not specific to Mole publica-
tions themselves, but to an unpublished manuscript,
Just as Different on the Inside , based almost exclusively
on the Mole findings.
-^Robert l. Mole, Vietnamese Time Concepts and





Without at all attempting to gainsay the
importance of these ethical and religious influences on
the life and behavior of the Vietnamese, we wonder, as
we wondered about certain of the Sternin assumptions, if
stereotypes about Chinese have so pervaded the mental set
of those who investigate the Vietnamese that findings are
colored thereby. The major thrust of the Mole treatment
of the Chinese, for example, is that man is a correlate
of nature, and that "while the clock may regulate the
factory, the railroads and industry, the vital events of
life, such as birth, death, marriage, etc., are still
2j40governed by cosmic force".
Most Vietnamese, we are then told, share a cosmo-
logical belief (with various corollaries related to time,
nature, etc.) inherited in part from the Chinese "Great
Tradition", in part from the various "Eastern" religions
discussed above.
A Time Magazine essay of 1966 is related. The
essay takes pains to disclaim belief in the "fiction" of
the "Asian mind", then goes on to describe "The Way of
the Bamboo", wherein Vietnamese, with others, are again




"Western" moral and ethical values subordinated to the
avoidance of friction, and so on. How valid is this
stereotype of the Asian, in general, the Chinese, in
particular, and the Vietnamese, who have supposedly been
so deeply influenced by the Chinese?
We refer to only one study, but it provides at
least a quick glance at two groups of "Asians", the
Chinese and the Laotians. The investigator, J. M.
Halpern, reminds us that throughout the countries of
Southeast Asia, "the Overseas" Chinese play a crucial
role and in many cases a dominant one in commerce,
industry and banking, and cites a report describing
conditions in Laos as early as 1900.
Just about everyone engages in trade in
Laos, in highly variable proportions, to be
sure, and each according to his resources.
There are, however, real merchants, business-
men and traders who are the middle-men between
the native producers and the exporters in
neighboring countries or on the coast. The
greater number of these and also the most
active ones, are the Chinese, then come the
Hos and the Burmese. They may act either on
their own account, or in behalf of a small
local syndicate, or again as representatives
of Chinese or European houses established in
the ports.^1
"1
^J. M. Halpern, The Role of the Chinese in Lao
Society (Santa Monica, Calif. 1 RAND Corporation, 1961).
HaTpern's reference is to Lucien de Reinach, Le Laos




Halpern goes on to tell us
i
Not only do Chinese operate shops in many-
villages but they also loan money. The villagers
often feel they can obtain lower rates from the
Chinese than they can get from their own clans-
men. Actually, the rate is the same, but the
Chinese are willing to take their interest pay-
ment in rice at the next harvest. Psychologically
speaking, a farmer would rather part with 100
pounds of rice at harvest time when he has thou-
sands, than 100 kip in cash when he has practi-
cally none.^2
A brief survey conducted in 1959 showed
that the Chinese operated 7^9 or almost
exactly 50 per cent of a total of 1550
businesses. The other 50 per cent is divided .
.
among Lao, Vietnamese, Thai, French and others. 3
Halpern then observes that most large enterprises
have Chinese capital and/or management, and cites a
Chinese who, when asked if he feared restrictive legis-
lation of the Lao government, replied that he would then
merely pay a Lao for the use of his name, and perhaps
hire a few Lao to sit around his shop. The author
concludes with an observation of interest for our
purposes t
There is no doubt that the Chinese (in
Laos) regard themselves as superior. In western
cultures Chinese are stereotyped as being very
1
could imagine
+2As thoroughly an American a practice as we





polite, quiet and self-effacing while in coun-
tries such as Lapp, they are often aggressive
and overbearing,^**
Actually, most extant Personal Response Project
training materials now in use have been developed on
the basis of the Mole findings. In these materials one
finds a major emphasis on the importance, not only of
respecting the Vietnamese "way of life", understanding
his ethical and religious values, and recognizing his
right to the belief in and practice of these values,
but on the observance of Vietnamese customs and manners.
It was interesting to the present writer to observe the
degree to which these emphases have permeated behavioral
patterns at "official" levels of Americans in Vietnam
on the occasion of his most recent visit in latter 1969*
On that occasion, he accompanied ranking American Marine
officers on visits to rural hamlets, where the Marine
officers, with hands before their chests, graciously
bowed to the Vietnamese they greeted, rather than extend-
ing their hand in the familiar American form. Mole's
own interpretations of his findings offer explanations
of such customs and manners within the context of the
ethical and religious values which we reported above.





Without being unduly irreverent, however, we
feel that we must take note of a particular taboo which
the Mole reports invite to our attention, and which we
are reminded to avoid, namely, that of sitting with
crossed-legs while talking with Vietnamese. On
28 September 1969, we watched South Vietnam's President
Thieu engage in a discussion of "Issues and Answers"
concerning Vietnam and the war, for the benefit of
television viewers of the United States. Interviewers
Frank Reynolds and John Scali sat solemnly in the
presidential presence with their legs crossed, as did
the President himself! ^
^^Of course, President Thieu may have crossed






CURRENT CROSS-CULTURAL INTERACTION THEORIES
AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES
Introduction
We have noted that in the Spring of 1968
there was held in Washington, D.C., a conference on
446
research in cross-cultural interaction. The confer-
ence participants included representatives of several
447 . .disciplines. Several of the participants have been
cited in earlier chapters of this paper in respect to
various of their research projects.
This chapter will concern itself with extant
conceptual approaches in the field of cross-cultural
interaction, and, while it will not confine itself to
the Washington conference for source materials, the
papers of that conference will be central to the
Sponsored by Group Psychology Branch, Office
of Naval Research, and Chief of Chaplains, United States
Navy, 29 April - 3 May £968.
^The list of participants and summaries of





448 ~Idiscussion. In our first chapter, we noted a pro-
liferation of research in cross-cultural interaction. A
great deal of this has been prompted by the war in
Vietnam and similar engagements in other parts of the
world, wuch of it has been prompted by increasing
American activity -- commercial, military, diplomatic,
educational, recreational — all over the world, with a
resultant increase in close association between Americans
and other peoples. And a substantial amount of such
research has been prompted by an increasing awareness
of the importance of the personal and interpersonal in
the entire field of international relations, an aware-
ness resulting in part from the development of a mutual-
ity of interests among political scientists, psychologists,
sociologists, anthropologists, and others in related
disciplines.
As is often the case, research has outrun theory,
largely because of sudden and severe pressures placed
upon social scientists to supply "quick and dirty"
answers to highly complicated questions and to develop
All references to these papers will be to
appropriate pages of the volume, Conference on Research
in Cross-Cultural Interaction (Washington, D.C.t Chaplain








"instant" training programs for individuals being
assigned to highly sensitive diplomatic, military, or
economic advisory positions in other lands, small groups
and teams assigned to such assistance efforts as Peace
Corps activities, huge masses of military forces involved
in new forms of military engagement, in which interper-
sonal relations with indigenous peoples are often more
critical than applications of traditional military
strategies and tactics. In some instances, of course,
research has outrun theory because of the commercial
interests of the researchers, the lack of cooperation
and coordination among disciplines, the tendency to accept
research designs and research reports at face value,
the failure to translate useful research findings into
action programs, and similar causes discussed in our
introduction.
In our earlier chapters, we essayed to analyze
representative research that has been carried out. We
selected two projects for analysis because we consider
them representative of research in cross-cultural inter-
action, typifying both virtues and faults in much of the
44-9
research in this field. Moreover, one project was
^9in late 1969, the Advanced Research Projects





primarily oriented toward values , which have occupied
the attention of a number of investigators and theorists,
while the other was primarily oriented toward attitudes ,
which have likewise been the center of a great deal of
attention, v/hile both projects were carried out in
Vietnam, which we used as a "laboratory" for the focus
of the present paper, we believe that findings examined
and concepts discussed are relevant to the entire field
of research in cross-cultural interaction. Indeed, our
major objective in studying these two reports directly,
and a number of others indirectly, was to accrue suffi-
cient information and achieve enough insight to be able
to evaluate current conceptual approaches, which rely
in whole or in part on the type research we have been
examining for empirical support of hypotheses already
developed, or for cues, trends, reports of observed
phenomena, field experience, and just plain "ideas"
United States to convene in Washington to discuss and
program research in interracial relations in the military.
The research findings adopted as guidelines by the assem-
bled scientists were those provided by the McGonigal
studies, and the research procedures of those studies
were adopted as the model for a five-year research pro-
ject to be carried out in four areas, two in the United
States, two overseas. It seems reasonable enough, in the
light of such events, to consider the McGonigal research





which may be analyzed conceptually for their potential
in developing exploratory hypotheses and generally
advancing theoretical formulations.
It is interesting to note that, while several
theses were repeated in one form or another in successive
papers of the Washington conference, there was no general
acceptance of any one set of postulates presented, nor
was the "high-level synthesis of the field" achieved
that had been one of the hopes of the conference. It is
equally interesting to observe, however, that unanimity
did appear in one significant area, namely, in the
recognition that theory and practice must be thoroughly
complementary and interdependent when we deal with the
realities of systems of human culture and interaction
between them.
Space limitations preclude our discussing every
paper of the conference. We shall treat in some detail
each of several papers, however, and reference most.
Our procedure will be first to present a fairly compre-
hensive synopsis or outline for each paper most pertin-
ent to our concerns (no abstracts were provided for the
conference), listing its most salient points and




elements of each paper and compare them with those of
the other papers of the conference, in search of
congruity. Thirdly, we shall suggest which hypotheses
appear most promising in terms of developing a conceptual
synthesis or formulating a theory for cross-cultural
interaction. Throughout our discussion we shall concern
ourselves with and be alert to the applicability of
theory to practice, particularly in respect to training
programs for Americans engaged in cross-cultural
interaction 'overseas'.
Synopses
The Analysis of Culturally Determined
Social Behavior ^
The starting point of this paper is that the neg-
lected area of cross-cultural interaction research and
theory isi "V/hat is meant by effective social behavior
in a cross-cultural context?" Wot all behavior is
^50
Gloria L. Grace identified k5 approaches to
cross-cultural interaction training. See Gloria L. Grace
and N. A. Hofland, Multi-Media Training for Cross-Cultural
Interaction (Santa Monica, Calif . 1 System Development
Corporation, April 1967).






relevant, but that behavior of the individual which is
mediated or maintained by contact and interaction with
other human beings, which he labels "verbal behavior",
but which includes non-oral aspects of behavior maintained
by social reinforcers. This type behavior must be ana-
lyzed, and the analysis used to generate training
programs. The author elects a functional analytic scheme
which he feels makes possible the analysis of the
culturally determined contingencies which establish and
maintain social behavior. The four general categories
of events he identifies as controlling or determining
behavior are economic, governmental religious, and
educational. Situational variables can be studied v/ithin
these four categories.
Two additional notions important to the analyti-
cal scheme are now adduced: Skinner's "audience" and
"contingency". An audience consists of people who
surround an actor or an individual and provide reinforcers
controlling his behavior. There are many such audiences,
each with characteristic verbal repertoires serving as
effective consequences for the individual's behavior.
Other terms for verbal repertoires are norms ,





shaped and maintained by a three-term contingency
process. The contingency terms are » the form of the
environment , the behavior itself , the consequences of
the behavior. These terms are usually translated as
discriminative stimuli , operants , and positive or
negative reinforcers . All culturally determined events
can be described within this analytical framework.
With an analytical framework established, one
turns to the applied or engineering aspects of cross-
cultural interaction. The initial problem is to state
the objectives for sending people overseas or for having
contact with members of other societies. Why is an
individual doing what he is doing? The second analytic
step is to establish base-line rates (e.g., how many
nationals does an individual contact during a working
day, how long does he spend with them, what do they do,
etc.?). This step helps us identify events which main-
tain the individual's social behavior. Thirdly, we ask
what each party finds positively or negatively reinforc-
ing about the social contacts identified. With base
rates (discriminative stimuli) and relevant consequent
events (reinforcers) established, the fourth step is





individual's behavior can be manipulated to produce
changes and strengthen behavior to be maintained by new
audiences. This fourth step the author calls engineering
new repertoires of behavior, and proposes the means of
achieving it. Before doing so, however, he pauses to
consider some desirable outcomes of training, pointing
out that analysis of culturally determined behavior must
include procedures for determining effects of subsequent
training and for directly manipulating relevant variables
which maintain in strength the behaviors modified.
Every American assigned overseas is sent as a
change agent , and should be taught to function as a
behavioral engineer. He should therefore be trained to
perform a functional analysis of his own behavior, and
the behavior of those with whom he works, in accordance
with the analytical scheme outlined above. Training in
this analytic capacity is one way to assure positive
outcomes of overseas operations. This is one training
step.
The second and single most important training
step is to prepare individuals as autonomous members of
a new verbal community, with an oral set of operations,





either by way of using it themselves or effectively
using interpreters.
The third training step (and the second most
important) is to prepare the individual to behave func-
tionally with respect to the new relevant variables con-
trolling his behavior, that is, to prepare him for cul-
ture shock. The author defines culture shock as dys-
functionality caused when commonplace reinforcing events
for verbal behavior have been set aside or removed and
replaced by other relevant parameters. Culture shock
behavior can be controlled ultimately by arranging
contingencies for maintaining the individual's effective-
ness overseas and immediately by positive or negative
reinforcers (punishing withdrawal behavior or rewarding
behavior incompatible with withdrawal). The author
recommends positive reinforcers, especially economic
(bonuses). Whatever the contingency arranged, it is
important that the overseas agent be supported contract-
ually by the assigning agency.
The next question pursued is that of procedure
for accomplishing the three training objectives stated
above. There is no single best strategy. The best cri-




Effectiveness must be defined in terms of desired results
(which returns us to the earlier question of why people
are sent overseas ) • Once the determination is made of
the final form of desired behavior, relevant variables
can be isolated, and the required behavioral engineering
accomplished.
One proved method of successfully accomplishing
the three essential training objectives is the process
called self-confrontation, which may be engineered by
way of a number of training techniques (e.g., role-
playing). Research results indicate that this process
has a high probability of success in meeting operational
training requirements for ease of maintenance, of
degree of control over behavior, and of being subjected
to empirical tests of effectiveness.
The author concludes his paper by asking his
fellow scientists to recognize the need for effective
cross-cultural interaction approaches, not only in
respect to Americans overseas, but in relation to our
domestic environment in the United States, and to ask
themselves about their own skills in communicating with
and analyzing the plight of the poor, and about what






and the ghetto dweller. He appeals, in other words, for
"commitment to the rather nonscientific aspects of human
behavior" which will make scientists bring their expertise
to bear on the monumental problems of both international
and domestic cross-cultural interaction. ^2
Training for Leadership in Cross-Cultural
Dialogue i The DA-TA Model
"
The author orients his paper to problems that
arise between what he calls distinctive cultures! rich
and poor, black and white, administrations and populations,
managements and personnel, and similar categories, whether
in international or domestic settings.
He proposes a model program for training leaders
in cross-cultural interaction, based on the assumptions
that i the essence of human interaction is communication,
the simplest model of human communication is the dialogue,
cross-cultural dialogue always involves difficulties in
interpreting the significance of information conveyed and
in conveying information so that its significance is
understood.
^2Ibid., p. 25.






The first essential step in developing sustained
effort to improve interaction performance in domestic
and foreign intercultural settings is to train leaders
in the use of technical and conceptual tools for analyzing
and improving cross-cultural dialogue. The basic teach-
ing principles for this purpose are found in the DA-TA
model, so called because it combines Demonstration
through Action with Theoretical Analysis .
All culture systems are coherent and continuous,
with distinctive historical identities despite change and
upheaval, says the author. All culture systems involve
a multiplicity of elements in constant interaction. The
complexity of enduring natural systems of culture pre-
vents definitive analysis or prediction of consequences
of cross-cultural interaction or foreseeing and planning
for culture change and multi-culture contact. In all
cross-cultural oontact, unexpected responses will occur
on both sides of the interaction. Training must there-
fore be directed toward effectiveness in the interaction
process itself, with continued attention paid to data
of ongoing experience.
DA-TA training principles are based on experi-
mental evidence that knowledge about culture and
567

communication acquired without experience through action
impedes adaptation essential to the skill necessary for
intercultural dialogue. Extensive training without
experience in what is known about a culture, including
language training, establishes assumptions and models
in trainees 1 minds through which field experience is
then filtered, so that adaptation to the complexities
of the field situation, especially when it is changing,
are impaired. Those trained in the language and culture
of host countries, without experience, become helpless
and shnoked when events contradict established expecta-
tions. The challenge of intercultural communication is
best met by training for adaptation to the process of
communication, not by a structure of knowledge about the
audience. Training for process skills requires encour-
aging adaptive abilities. Conceptual tools which may
assist in adaptation are selected by the learner for
their utility in improving his skill. This approach is
vital to problem-solving in social action, which is
always laden with indeterminacy.
The first step of the DA-TA approach is demon-
stration through action, and the necessary experience can




playing, demonstration films and instruction, etc. The
most impactful action experience is one of deliberate
initiation of dialogue with some community representing
a communication culture different from any previous
experience of the trainee. This differs radically from
the standard mode of intercultural communication in
structured societies involving unquestioned assumptions
and mutual stereotyping. Trainees must be foreed
into such dialogue through powerful sanctions, since
resistance is severe and anxiety about the action is
high.
The purpose of the first step is to bring the
trainee against the reality of cultural differences and
social communication barriers through his own action.
He is required to observe the chosen community and
prepare plans for access and initiation of dialogue,
which are then reviewed and analyzed by the training
group. A phased model for an extended episode of dialogue
is then developed, the trainee selects conceptual tools
and attempts to enter the community to engage in deliber-
ately induced dialogue. The action experience accrued in
the dialogue is analyzed theoretically in the training






Wedge considers this interplay between action
experience and theoretical analysis to represent a con-
tinuous feedback of dialogue, exemplifying intrapersonal
and intragroup rehearsal for the communicative acts of
intercultural dialogue. This he calls the central
training issues communication skills are learned through
action in continual, sequential, and cumulative acts
with successive approximation to goals of mutual intel-
ligibility by adaptation in terms of feedback. He illus-
trates the DA-TA training model by diagram, (See Figure
V-l.)
Training groups are reported to have discovered
that access to certain tightly boundaried groups such as
homosexuals, hippies, and drug-users required an
"introducer** ? other groups such as prison convicts, unwed
mothers, dock workers, and State Police units responded
negatively to "introducers'* from their communities and
imposed tests of personal integrity. It was hypothesized
that the difference lay in whether the groups were based
on mutual support or mutual fear.
The author tells us that, in order to introduce
the chain-reaction required by the DA-TA procedure, he
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of the process in which trainees were entering, since
the American student demands closure of instructions
before engaging in action. It is necessary to inculcate
the realization of ambiguity of signals and meanings in
intercultural communication, since the aim of training
is to enable trainees to identify and correct errors,
not to avoid them. "Critical incidents" have proved
useful for the purpose. Once the concept of ambiguity
is achieved, the major theoretical propositions of cross-
cultural communication are enunciated. There are five
such propositions, or central ideas.
(1) Social communication is the flow of informa-
tion from one person to another as signals assigned
meanings by the participants. Information, signal and
meaning are each extended concepts, and their product is
a cumulative structure of significances assigned the
message by the audience.
(2) Perception is a trans-active process. Mean-
ing is in the "eye" of the beholder.
(3) Communication culture is a system of shared
habits and channels of communication systematically trans-
mitted to and reinforced among members of a community,




(M Community is a boundary-maintaining system
of social organization within which individuals identify
themselves as members and perceive non-members as out-
siders. In the political community , membership involves
authoritative discipline.
(5) Dialogue is the process of sequential infor-
mation exchange between interacting participants, which
is intercultural if distinctive communities are involved.
Distinctive communities involve distinctive meaning
systems. Effective intercultural communication there-
fore requires adapting to the host community in sending
and receiving signals. Adaptation is based on inter-
preting host participant responses as feed-back
information.
The emphasis in all these propositions, the author
points out, is on dynamic systems and processes. Form
and content of given cultures are avoided, to avoid struc-
turing expectations. The purpose is to provide an elemen-
tary language of discourse. The propositions become real
for the trainee in actual dialogue and action experience.
Following such, component elements of communication cul-
ture are categorized and various culture forms are des-
cribed, but the five propositions above provide the frame-





The actual dialogue and action experience takes
place in a "contrast*1 culture of the trainees choosing
— any one of the large number of communication sub-
communities found in any community. As the dialogue/
action experience episode begins to draw to a close,
initial anxiety has usually been replaced by an attitude
of appreciation for the sub-community and its problems
and a sense of partisanship: a sense of understanding
and respect for the sub-community on its own terms, and
usually reciprocal liking, coupled with clear recognition
of differences of outlook.
Six phases are identified in each dialogue/
action experience episode i scouting, access, exploration,
interest-interaction, termination, and evaluation. The
scouting phase involves the difficult task of careful
non-participant observation of a chosen sub-community,
while planning, but prior to attempting, access. Concern-
ing the scouting phase, the author reports advice often
given by community observers i "Forget what you think you
know or you'll offend our values — if you are really
interested in our people, they'll teach you about






involved, he maintains that maximum preparation for on-
site learning is ear-familiarization and memorizing of
up to one hundred words, including the number system.
The access phase is the most critical step in
the process, since consequences in a given community can
be permanent, so that there is little for major error.
The point of entry depends on the structure of communi-
cation flows, with hierarchical communities requiring
approval at the top, relational communities requiring
it by way of middle-level gate-keepers, and consensus
communities at the base level. The author believes that
effective communication flow seldom follows bureaucratic
lines in modernizing communities, so that matched
counterpart assignments will probably be misleading.
Role definition is simplified because it is pre-
determined that the communicator is an outsider, a fact
which must be remembered consistently. One's problem is
to present himself in acceptable and comprehensible terms
to the host community, which wants to know what he wants,
why he is there, how long he will stay, etc. These
questions must be answered honestly in styles and forms
of the local culture. At the same time, the outsider
who presents himself as such is allowed a certain lati-




ignorance and seeks help. If he fails totally, however,
he must withdraw. Persistence in the face of community
rejection is most destructive to interaction programs.
Exploration requires the communicator to suspend
his own purpose-orientation, and to identify the interests,
concepts, and concerns of the host community. The author
says that a principal source of friction in intercultural
programs is the asking of the question, "How can we induce
change?", instead of, "What does the community want?".
The author avers that every community wants something
from outside its own boundaries.
In the interest-interaction step, problems of
mutual interest and concern are identified, and the
process of joint endeavor established. It is at this
point that the communication leader begins to operate
between cultures. The ideal outcome is a more or less
permanently established and institutionalized system for
continuing interaction. The development of inter-system
institutions is important for the interdependence of
societies.
The termination process should be anticipated
from the outset, with the communicator defining the




of his future commitments to the dialogue, to avoid
~1
disappointment and resentment through unfulfilled
expectations. Our culture accepts clean breaks, Other
cultures do not, so that appropriate leave-taking is
designed to memorialize a relationship and mourn its
passing. The psychological consequence of proper leave-
taking is identification with the departed. Finally,
evaluation following deliberately induced cultural
interaction is an obvious but seriously neglected
necessity.
The author concludes his paper with a summation
of the elements of communication culture, pointing out
that while it is impossible to teach the range of know-
ledge about cultures as subject matter, the heuristic
application of knowledge can be learned, and should be
communicated by true experts in the relevant hard core
essence of their field. The major components entering
into human social communication and the resources
representing the core of expertise are six in number:
(1) Psychological knowledge (image development,
perception, values and attitudes, preconceptions and
stereotypes , etc • ) •
(2) Language, as the heart of human communica-





time, and gesture as culturally specific vehicles of
information.
(3) Social structures and functions (boundaries,
roles, channels of messages, criteria of credibility,
etc, ).
(^) Recognition of shared conventions, belief
and value systems learned through knowledge of culture,
and its history and mode of transmission.
(5) Political components of societies (patterns
and exercise of authority, etc.).
(6) Process of communication itself.
Reemphasizing the need for and the role of trained
leaders in resolving problems of intercultural communica-
tion, and pointing to the contributions that have been
made and can be made by various disciplines, the author
observes
i
But let me be brutally clear on one point
i
the combined social sciences have only crude and
fragmentary knowledge of the processes and ele-
ments of culture and human communication. We
know only enough to make a start and I am here
suggesting systematic approaches to still poorly-
mapped territory. ^3
5





An Analysis of Cross-Cultural Interaction
and Its Implications for Training
*
In examining the total field of cross-cultural
interaction, the author finds that scientists in the
field have been exploring uncharted territory without a
map, and proposes his paper to suggest the outline for
such a map. His procedure is, first, to discuss some
dimensions of problems in intercultural contact i secondly,
to examine some current psychological theories relevant
to the problems and sketch the outline of the proposed
map? thirdly, to review an approach ased at the Univer-
sity of Illinois to study and improve cross-cultural
interaction. ^' He introduces research findings in
support of each phase of his procedure.
The two major characteristics of intercultural
contact are
i
^^Harry c. Triandis, Washington Conference
Report , pp. 55-^»
->?We have examined several University of Illi-
nois studies in our earlier chapters. These and others
to which the author refers have been carried out in con-
junction with an on-going project generally entitled,
"Communication, Cooperation, and Negotiation in Culturally
Heterogeneous Groups". Principal investigators are




(1) Intercultural contact often leads to nega-
tive stereotypes. This is true, says the author, even
where two cultures are recially similar and have relatively
similar socioeconomic systems and religious traditions.
(2) Negative stereotypes are a complex function
of cultural similarity. Psychologists have demonstrated,
in respect to the transfer of learned motor skills, that
maximum positive transfer is achieved when the new
situation involves the same stimulus and response, and
maximum negative transfer when the same stimulus requires
a very different response. When a very different stimu-
lus is involved, the response required makes no differ-
ence i neither positive nor negative transfer accrues.
Since social behavior is obviously a skill, it should
follow similar laws, hence the following hypotheses and
their corollaries are proposed.
Hypothesis I t Cross-cultural interaction skills
follow the same laws as motor skills. Hence, maximum
positive transfer should occur when cultures are similar
and the same behavior is required. If cultures are
extremely different, neither positive nor negative trans-
fer occurs. Where cultures are superficially similar





will occur than when cultures are superficially dis-
similar (e.g., America/Britain vs. America/India).
First Corollary t Similar cultures requiring
similar behaviors will lead to easy intercultural con-
tacts; similar cultures requiring different behavior will
lead to very difficult intercultural contacts; dissimilar
cultures, regardless of behaviors required, will lead
to intercultural contacts of intermediate difficulty.
Hypothesis II i Cross-cultural training is very
specific. Discomfort and negative transfer occur when I
leave a situation in which I am cross-culturally trained,
and enter a different social system. A person less well-
trained might experience less discomfort or negative
transfer. But learned patterns of language behavior can
be transferred effectively within the same language
family (e.g., Italian to Spanish). In this sense "cul-
ture areas" are like language families. Hence,
Hypothesis III i Interaction skills can be trans-
ferred within limited culture areas. Specific cultural
maps of the world based on socio-cultural similarities
are needed. Anthropological maps describing cultural
similarities are too broad, based on all aspects of






questions, one of which concerned the theoretical
position for constructing facts and theories of cross-
cultural knowledge. The author proposes a theoretical
position guided by the method of coraponential analysis.
This method suggests analysis of behavior at three
different levels i the cognitive, the role, the event
levels. The issues developed in the present paper
focus on the need to prepare Americans for cross-
cultural interaction and include i cultural self-
awareness, cognitive knowledge, variations in behavior
and the abstract level of knowledge in the field of
cross-cultural communication.
The Problem of Cross-Cultural Interaction
Analysis yields three sets of factors concerning
Americans in cross-cultural interaction: (1) technical
competence, (2) language speaking ability, (3) cross-
cultural communication. The first two need no discussion.
Competence may normally be assumed. Language is gener-
ally essential, and its contribution to effectiveness
obvious, although instances have been claimed in which
language facility is a handicap. Cross-cultural communi-





behavior of individuals in a host culture. Americans
overseas function as agents of innovations. Because of
the requirement for considering the vague and ubiquitous
cultural dimensions involved, precise specifications of
the role to be played by the American can not be provided.
No extant coherent theory of cross-cultural interaction
successfully integrates the factors of technical compe-
tence and language with the social, cultural, political,
and psychological aspects of the American's job overseas.
The advisor in a foreign culture (unlike conventional
military forces or businessmen representing large
corporations) is deprived of a familiar organization for
guidelines and insulation against uncertainties of a
foreign culture.
The Construction of Knowledge in Cross-Cultural
Communication i Theoretical Position
The social science theorist has available three
sets of reference points defining his theoretical position.
Behavior or action is basic data for each. In the first
position, behaviorism, behavior serves also as the
theoretical terms of explanation to a large degree. The





actor and develops cognitive principles predictive of
his actions. The cognitive principles are assumed to
govern the individuals action. The decision-making
model, or so-called calculi of transformations of state,
is one frame of reference within which cognitive princip-
les are organized and linked with action. The third
position generates theoretical terms for describing
regularities of observable behavior. Naturalistic or
statistical descriptions are conceptualized in terms
such as institutions, society, social structure, etc.
This approach is normative and sacrifices information,
gaining in generality, but losing the predictability of
the cognitive approach. The more extensive the cover-
age, the more remote the connection with specific
behavior. The three positions are not mutually exclu-
sive, nor does any one exist in pure form. The cognitive
approach is most appropriate for cross-cultural communi-
cation, since persons communicate with persons, not with
societies, roles, or statuses. Hence, it is more impor-
tant to know the principles by which members of a culture
perceive the world, make decisions, and evaluate in
given social circumstances than to know the social
structure or kinship system of a society in accordance




The Construction of Knowledge in Cross-Cultural
Conununicationt Culture and Internal Forms
Culture is a system of internal forms character-
istic of an individual which he shares with other members
of his collectivity • If two individuals share the same
cognitive systems, they share the same culture. The
components of the cognitive system are called internal
forms to avoid confusion with personality theories, or
with concepts of attitudes, traits, etc. One extremely
important aspect of many internal forms is that the
actor himself is unaware that these actually govern his
behavior. Therefore, the internal form refers to
analysis of an actor's behavior by an observer, rather
than to introspection by the actor. Internal linguistic
forms strikingly illustrate the actor's lack of aware-
ness of internal forms. The average English speaker
is unaware of the existence of linguistic forms, but
employs them without error, and even when aware of forms,
cannot introspect and confront them; there is no cogni-
tive or affective process or structure which the
introspector can identify as the form governing the





In cross-cultural communication, the chief con-
cern is with internal forms which may underlie linguistic
forms related to characteristics of the language and to
predispositions of native speakers of English. Induction
and deduction as patterns of thinking represent internal
forms, and while they lack the precision of linguistic
forms, nonetheless these patterns of thinking, assumptions
and values govern the behavior of individuals and consti-
tute the content of cross-cultural communication when
considered from the reference points of componential
analysis.
Since concepts presented above are only crude
approximations describing the system of internal forms
we assume govern behavior, it is required that their
explicit connections to behavior be established. In
this connection, we must ask how theory can handle varia-
tions of behavior and of internal forms, since the
inductive individual is some times deductive.
The Construction of Knowledge in Cross-Cultural
Communication i Variation of Internal Forms and
of Behavior
Cross-cultural communication theorists often over-






national character movement. The same individual will
behave from time to time as if governed by different
internal forms. The same is true of groups, and if we
attempt to analyze such a system as American culture,
we find that virtually any statement made is subject
to reservations and contradictions. The analysis of
culture according to internal forms must be qualified
in two main ways to permit theory to accommodate varia-
tions of behavior assumed to be regularities rather than
exceptions. The first qualification is based on the
assumption that a cognitive position does not treat
behavior exhaustively. The second involves the nature
of conceptual terms and their level of abstraction. A
concept must be abstract to be conceptually equivalent
in two or more cultures. It must be defined without
referring necessarily to specific behavior from which
culture is inferred. A sufficiently abstract level of
analysis makes possible the construction of basic human
problems which all men have to solve, as pointed out
by F. Kluckhoh^s value orientations. The variants
possible within each value orientation are present in
every culture, but each culture shows a preferred or
dominant orientation, so that cultural differences are





The concept of a dominant predisposition makes
it possible to handle cultural diversity, since all value
orientations are assumed to be present in any culture.
Objections of exponents of cultural variation are thus
overcome. The Kluckhohn idea can be extended to assert
that all orientations are necessary in a culture, so
that, if a culture is defined at the level of the
individual, as is the case in this paper, each individual
contains in some form all possible cultural predisposi-
tions. This extension poses new theoretical difficulties
which require further description of internal forms
composing the cultural system.
The Construction of Knowledge in Cross-Cultural
Communicationt Conceptual Equivalence and
Superordinate Forms
Value orientations are interdependent, so that
an orientation in one culture is not necessarily the same
as an orientation in another culture. One cultural
system may organize experience by either peripheral atten-
tion or to complete omission of a term crucial to another
culture. Orientations, therefore, are not like super-





of a culture (e.g., American), can accommodate to the
1
meaning of variants in an orientation in another culture
and translate it into terms intelligible in their own
culture, providing reliable data is obtained for classi-
fying such meanings accordingly. But it must be remem-
bered that obtained classifications have different
implications in each culture.
Constructing superordinate forms is extremely
difficult. Internal forms must be devised which are
conceptually equivalent in two or more cultures, and
equivalence must be judged in terms of relevance and
significance to the overall system of internal forms.
Superordinate forms apparently can not be constructed
without a complete command of two or more cultural sys-
tems, although we do know that two cultural systems
combine to produce a third culture (as bilingualism
generates a combined way of processing information
diverged from the process associated with each language).
The study of third cultures seems promising for explor-
ing the construction of superordinate forms. The prob-
lems inherent in constructing superordinate forms are
behind what becomes the common approach — to search for






However, "differences" are meaningful only when relevant
behavior is identified. What we really do is to identify
some relevant behavior and categorize it. This process
yields such information as, for example, that the behav-
ior can be understood by an internal form which categor-
izes the individual in one of the variants of a value
orientation, e.g., as oriented to past, present, or
future. Since differences may contain other dimensions
of differentiation as well, however, such categorizing
would provide only one approach, or one answer to a more
generic question, only one position on a dimension
addressing itself to the organization of activity.
The Construction of Knowledge in Cross-Cultural
Communication t Role and Event
The generality of any statement about an individ-
ual's cognitive structure must be carefully restricted.
We must observe the often overlooked principle of the
"definition of domain", sometimes referred to as "activity
systems", "the neglected situation", "events or circum-
stances", or equivalent terms to delimit the domain of
relevance. A cognitive approach which assumes an inter-
action system between an individual and a social environ-




terms "role" and "event" may be used to refer to differ-
entiations of the social environment. While writers such
as C. Kluckhohn assume the viewpoint that there is a one-
to-one relationship between values and behavior, hence
expect that the culture bearer, the individual, possesses
internal forms which represent both roles and events,
this paper assumes that an individuals internal forms
are not sufficient to predict his behavior until the
social environment is differentiated in terras of both
role and event. While there are several reasons for
this assumption, one significant one is that the little
research available on behavior from the point of view of
a situation or event suggests that it is one of the best
ways of considering differences between what is gener-
ally called Western culture and Chinese culture. Further,
the event approach is ecological, hence provides measure-
able and observable factors which define it.
The paper now considers the content of a cultural
system, American culture and contrast cultures.
American Culture
Everything said above, particularly about the
individual's frequent lack of awareness of his own inter-




instructing Americans in cross-cultural communication is
to construct knowledge of American culture. At present,
Americans are instructed in and expected to understand
other cultures without an understanding of their own,
American culture may be described on the basis
of three major categories of internal forms i cognitive
forms, assumptions, values. Cognitive forms refer to
basic aspects of abstract cognitive processes lacking
substantive reference. They may be grouped under time,
space, essence-energy, and relational concepts. In
respect to time, Americans are oriented toward the future.
In respect to space, the utilization of which seems to
represent important cultural differences, formal causes
and correlational thinking occur in American culture
frequently, not so frequently in Chinese culture.
Spacial displacement of persons in interpersonal rela-
tions involves this dimension of space. In respect to
essence-energy, Americans reduce the universe to matter,
or things; in some other cultures, the universe is a
network of living forces. In respect to relational
concepts, which are the cognitive forms most clearly
referring to processes rather than structures, Americans





deduction and quality, and to comparative judgment, where
two concrete and essentially equivalent entities are
compared, and absolute judgment, where a concrete entity
is judged against an abstract standard.
Assumptions , values , and norms of behavior are
more concrete than cognitive forms, hence occur with
greater variation in the behavior of a given individual.
Assumptions are abstract, organized, and general concepts
which pervade an individual's outlook and behavior, and
represent an individual's cognitive predispositions to
pattern the phenomenological world] they are usually con-
sidered an aspect of the world and not a cognitive
imposition upon it, so that the individual usually does
not recognize cognitive -assumptions imputed to him. They
are inferences of the outside observer's analysis of the
individual's behavior. Assumptions and values often
merge, and are often indistinguishable from each other.
Values are more concrete, discrete, and specific, contain
the quality of "oughtness", and are more readily avail-
able to the individual's awareness. Cognitive forms merge
with assumptions and values, and the combination of all
constitute a cognitive system of culture useful for
analyzing the behavior of members of specific societies
I





Assumptions, values, and norms of behavior fall
into five substantive groupings i the perception of the
self and individual, the perception of the world, motiva-
tion, modality of relations to others, and modality of
activity.
The dominant perception of the self and individ-
ual in American culture is generalized, identified with
the biological and psychological individual, and does
not include many ascriptive terms found in other cultures,
e.g., position in society, family, profession, etc, •
Emphasis on the individual results in tendencies to
resist formal authoritative control. Contradictory
perceptions of the self exist side by side and are seen
usually in concrete situations rather than in contra-
dictory concepts, e.g., the Puritan doctrine in American
culture of the inherent evil of man has been a prevalent
force, but usually has existed side by side with empha-
sis on man's perfectibility.
The dominant American perception of the world
assumes it to be material, rather than will, essence,
spirit, or process, and that man should exploit it for
his own material benefit. Elsewhere man is perceived





for harmony with it. (The idea of private property
emerges from a combination of the dominant American
assumption which leads to an emphasis on material aspects
of existence and American self perception.) Exploitation
of the environment is associated with the value of
progress, self-determination, etc.
The American motivational pattern is concretely
expressed in the concept that man is what he achieves,
which contrasts with the dominant pattern of ascription
elsewhere. In the ascription pattern, status of the
individual is more important. American tendencies to
evaluate others according to their achievements leads t«
fragmenting personality, and separating intents, thoughts
and acts, instead of treating the human personality as a
whole. Americans perceive the world as open, with
unlimited possibilities, with achievement limited only
by the individual's energy and effort. In some parts of
the world, the world is seen as closed, and the individ-
ual's external achievements are considered limited and
prescribed by his community or tradition.
American modalities of relations are marked by
equality in social relations, the avoidance of social





reciprocities. Friends and acquaintances are changed
when the American moves or changes jobs. Business and
social interactions often depend on direct contact with
others, rather than with a third party. Americans may
have many friends, but there is a depersonalized charac-
teristic about friendship. These various modalities
differ in some other cultures.
The dominant modality of Americans is doing, in
contrast to being and being-in-becoming. The value of
keeping busy is related to doing. The focus of decisions,
motivations, actions and responsibilities is in the
individual. In some cultures the dominant form of
decision-making is by pre-determined categories. The
decision-maker's function is to classify a given event;
his actions follow from the results of that classification.
Anticipation of the consequences of possible courses of
action does not usually determine the decision.
All above descriptions refer to dominant charac-
teristics most frequently found as cognitive characteris-
tics among Americans. Alternative predispositions may be
found as variations in the same Americans and in other
Americans as dominant patterns. Componential analysis




~lpositions best characterizing American dominant varia-
tions and positions best characterizing dominant varia-
tions of other cultures, as points on a unidimensional
continuum. A final possibility to be considered here in
relation to the dimensions discussed above is their use
in constructing artificial or synthetic cultures for
training purposes.
Contrast Cultures in Training in Cross-
Cultural Communication
Using American culture as a reference point on a
given dimension, polar positions have been identified and
various cultures analyzed to determine which can provide
the example nearest to each polar position. The aggre-
gate of a set of polar positions is called contrast
culture . There are two contrast cultures, which provide
theoretical or conceptual models of cultures useful in
clarifying issues of cultural differences and of cultural
integration. It is hard to understand a culture in terms
of itself, particularly one's own culture. Contrast
cultures help Americans by providing extreme points of
difference from which they can look upon American culture.
In training groups for cross-cultural interaction, con-







to different countries, and, even in the same political
region, political boundaries do not always coincide with
cultural boundaries.
Of various useful training techniques available,
the simulation method using culture contrasts is recom-
mended as the best means for representing cognitive
cultural differences. It consists primarily of arranging
six cross-cultural encounters between an American and a
foreign counterpart. The American behaves in a culturally
relevant manner by engagement with an advisor's role and
spontaneous participation in the encounter with the
foreign counterpart who, the American mistakenly believes,
is also role-playing. However, the counterpart is an
actor trained in a set of cognitions, assumptions and
values called "contrast culture abstract" and "contrast
culture concrete". These have been systematically derived
from aspects of American middle-class male culture and
provide maximal contrasts to the typical middle-class
American's cognitive structures and processes. The inter-
action between cognitions and role events helps provide
the restriction of "domain" discussed above. It like-
wise hleps demonstrate the manner in which various





of the most seriously neglected areas of research into
cross-cultural differences. The trained counterpart in
the interaction who is reflecting a composite and synthe-
tic American culture systematically derived represents
"contrast American" culture by providing a mirror image.
The various characteristics of coraponential analysis
discussed above are involved in analyzing aspects of
American culture. Included in the development of the
composite and synthetic American cultures are the value
orientations and variants and the conceptual positioning
of Americans at given points along the continuum previ-
ously described.
The paper concludes with extensive and detailed
descriptions and explanations of contrast cultures,
illustrative usages of the simulation technique, and an
explication of an entire instruction program in cross-
cultural communication actually conducted by the author. 3
^The complexities of contrast-culture training
and the detailed description of an actual instructional
program are beyond the scope of this paper. The concep-
tual foundations are germane and have been adequately






Toward the Specification of a General Adaptation
Process In Americans Overseas
The basic assumption of this paper is that the
primary objective of cross-cultural training is to teach
good judgment. Good judgment consists of doing "right"
things and avoiding "wrong" things. Right and wrong are
in the eye of the beholder, hence good judgment in a
foreign context is delicate. Retention of facts about
the history and vital statistics of a host country is
relatively unimportant. What is important is to be aware
of the sound reasons behind the high level of generality,
or ambiguity, in defining Americans 1 objectives overseas.
Specific concrete accomplishments are not ends in them-
selves | they serve functions. Many apparently different
outcomes are functionally equivalent. Specific skills
tailored to specific field objectives can not be identi-
fied or imparted. The aim of cross-cultural interaction
training is to teach good judgment.
Good judgment involves the ability to recognize
that what we know is right may be inappropriate at the
moment. It also involves the abilities to: retain one's
"f
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-Jcomposure when this is recognized i size up a situation
using all information at hand and act accordingly;
accept the consequences of those actions without distort-
ing them, so that real learning can occur.
All observers enter a foreign culture with
implicit premises which determine what is observed.
These premises include convictions, expectations, atti-
tudes, needs, plans, etc., which constitute a frame of
reference within and against which various aspects of
daily experience are viewed as relevant. This frame of
reference is called pre-entry set.
Pre-Sntry Set
Three components of pre-entry set are important
in determining what will be noted and reacted toi
cultural values, social roles, personal characteristics.
Cultural values are deep emotional commitments, often
unknown to the possessor, shared with people of his own
heritage, depended on in crucial ways. They are an
abiding set of agreements providing members of a culture
with a common basis for assessing the relevance of
events and giving meaning and direction to their lives.






the degree to which an individual's value system differs
from that of his hosts, he will misjudge them and their
perception of events, and vice versa. The things each
perceives as important can not be so perceived by the
other.
Social roles are sets of expected behaviors for
people performing in various social capacities. The
expected behaviors are associated with the social capa-
city, not with the individuals in them. Sets of behavior
are considered appropriate for individuals in social
roles, e.g., a man as "father". Members of a society
must agree on which behaviors are appropriate or
inappropriate. Individuals entering a foreign culture
convinced that certain feelings are "right", and there-
fore expected in a given situation, develop feelings-by-
expectation accompanied by whole programs of action-by-
expectation. These programs are called upon when spon-
taneity seems dangerous. Spontaneity is most dangerous
when its basic assumptions are suddenly discovered to be
inappropriate
•
Knowledge of the dissimilarities between
visitor's and host's array of roles and functions they




state of threat, dependence on predicted social behavior
can freeze action alternatives so that no options are
perceived and one tends to return to the safety of prior
conditions.
Personal characteristics refer to the particular
ways individuals handle the emotions accompanying life's
variations. They may be called "response styles".
Personal characteristics are the individual's most
visible and immediate concern, determine how he treats
others and, to a great degree, how they treat him. They
determine his acceptability to the people with whom he
is working more than does any technical skill, and
determine the course of his learning overseas more than
any prior training.
Preliminary Sensitization
Entry into a foreign culture is usually accom-
panied by a "heightened awareness" or "state of
readiness" without apparent focus or purpose. It tends
to disappear as the visitor turns attention to purpose-
ful acts and relationships. It is as a general state
of suspended judgment in which the visitor holds all






even clearly felt desires. Observations and reactions
modify this state in a short time. The observations
confirm or disconfirm existing expectations as they prove
to be new,
Disconfirmation of expectations and the arrival
of the unexpected produce the first adaptive reactions.
These observations seem more impactful when made during
purposive behavior. They are the visitor's initial
cultural confrontations.
Foreshock and Adaptive Reactions
Foreshock is the discomfort in recognizing that
small things do not happen as they are expected to, and
is the dawn of cultural awareness, the realization that
the host people who look and act differently also think
and feel differently. The reactions signal the first
manifestations of the visitor's response style and the
overt beginning of his adaptation process.
True Shock and Adaptive Reactions
Foreshock is terminated by more serious confron-
tations and reactions. Shock reactions vary in inten-






(1) Culture shock is a passive reaction, which,
with Americans, involves a sense of helplessness and fear
465
of losing control. These involvements seem related
to American inability to tolerate prolonged ambiguity
and tendency toward taking action.
(2) Culture blindness is a passive shock reaction
in which the visitor remains impervious to his environ-
ment.
(3) Excessive intellectualization is a passive
shock reaction involving excessive introspection and
analysis of every facet of experience j it is the opposite
of spontaneity.
(4) The Pollyanna Syndrome and Cynicism involve,
respectively, the special disposition to see only the
positive side of the host culture, or to see only the
evil side. There is some evidence that the former may
be transformed into the latter.
(5) Crisis Precipitation involves taking action
which virtually and clearly guarantees difficulties in an
effort to relieve the stress of living with prolonged
ambiguity.
-\/e previously included a lengthy excerpt from






(6) Zealotry is a means of avoiding the emotional
stress of cultural confrontation by way of excessive
devotion to work or "causes'1
.
(7) Going native is to assume virtually all the
habits of the hosts. It invariably reveals a strong
distaste for one's own culture and a rejection thereof.
The Learning Process
The cultural adaptation process consists of the
continuous repetition of the sensitization-shock-
accommodation cycle. Shock reactions serve three func-
tions in respect to learning to adapt x (a) they impede
the insight gaining process by distorting or limiting
the availability of evidence i (b) they serve as a refuge
within which the visitor can prepare for renewed
exposure ; (c) they themselves offer a basic source of
evidence about the individual and the cultural events
which impact on him.
Learning focuses on two sets of phenomena as the
above-cited cycle is repeated: the individual's own





The Personal Exploration Process
Self discovery is a hidden process in which the
individual rarely uses feelings as a form of evidence
of what is going on within himself despite their being
the virtually exclusive source of direct evidence. This
seems to be because of role playing, whereby in ambigu-
ous or threatening situations people attempt to react
according to certain recommendations rather than risk
spontaneity. This effort to experience the "proper"
feelings which fit preconceived notions of how they
ought to feel in the circumstances would be revealed
by honest self-examination. The same phenomenon is
true of behavior. Behavior models accompany affect
models, and are composed of complex and reliable pre-
conceptions of what one should do in specific circum-
stances.
The personal exploratory process is concerned
primarily with discovering these two disparities
i
between how one feels as opposed to how he expects and
wants to feel* and between what he does as opposed to
what he expects and wants to do.
The use of cross-cultural simulation in training






disparities the trainee himself employs. In simulation
exercises, trainees often feel and act in ways other
than ways they had planned to.
The Cultural Exploration Process
Foreshock and later true culture shock are reac-
tions to the absence of material to substitute for dis-
confirmed, hence discarded, expectations. The cultural
exploration process constitutes a positive reaction to
fill the void. It starts with groping behavior, or the
search for information in trivial issues, simply for
reassurance. It progresses to more systematic inquiry
about more meaningful content. Comparisons are made.
Hypotheses begin to form. Hypothesis testing comes
next, first by way of verbal questions, then by way of
behavior. At this point, the individual has come full
cycle. He is learning about his host culture by com-
mitting himself to actions, which again makes him vulner-
able to failure, disconfirmation, and renewed shock.
Acculturation Versus Sophistication
In the acculturation process, the host system







and three generations under good conditions. The
individual who begins to undergo acculturation begins
by partaking of the rewards of the host culture and
finding fulfillment in it. Increasing utilization brings
increasing dependency and commitment. Then the visitor
begins to experience the same impediments experienced
by the hosts. Things once seeming important no longer
do j other things become newly significant.
In some rare individuals, acculturation takes
the form of awareness of alternative systems with only
selected commitments to either, or cultural sophistica-
tion, the analogue to going native. The cultural sophis-
ticate suspends commitment to either his own or his
hosts' system, recognizing that goals are made impor-
tant by peoples 1 agreeing (if unknowingly) to treat each
other in certain ways depending on one's success in
achieving those goals.
In his conclusion, the author states that the
cultural adaptation process functions mainly when three
preconditions are meti true cultural contrast, ambiguity
of situational directives, the occurrence of the
unexpected. Our history consists of the mechanisms we





ambiguities, and cope with cultural differences. The
systematic exclusion of those conditions which foster
the cultural adaptation process seems vital to the life
of social systems. Because society suppresses those
conditions, cross-cultural interaction training is neces-
sary and should offer what society can not — an oppor-
tunity to experience the cultural adaptation process as
fully as possible.
Analysis and Evaluation
We shall now attempt to analyze and evaluate each
of the papers synopsized above, with a view to "factoring
out" what appear to be viable and useful postulates.
The Analysis of Culturally Determined
Social Behavior
Introduction
Since certain concepts enunciated by Eachus in
this paper are of general import in respect to all the
papers considered, we shall devote more space to dis-
cussion than would be the case were we to evaluate only
those postulates specific to his own theoretical formu-




concepts serve as underlying assumptions in several of
the other papers, even if not articulated explicitly as
such by the authors. To a degree, then, we shall use the
Eachus paper as a framework within which we shall examine
seme of the postulates of the other papers, as we used
the Sternin and McGonigal reports (but to a greater deg-
ree) as vehicles for examining related research projects.
The desirability of this approach reveals itself
almost immediately. Eachus' s paper begins with an empha-
sis on "non-oral aspects of behavior maintained by social
reinforcers" , an emphasis expressed or assumed in most
of the papers studied here and in virtually all modern
cross-cultural interaction literature.
The Silent Language
Obvious as it appears that oral communication is
only one aspect of cross-cultural interaction, and that
the involved individuals' total behavioral patterns com-
municate in addition to, or despite, oral communication,
this awareness began to be enunciated in the literature
at large only after the appearance of anthropologist
E. T. Hall's The Silent Language .
^66£dward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Garden
I






Since Hall's and related ideas have been so
widely disseminated in latter-day cross-cultural litera-
ture, it seems unnecessary to delineate them further at
Fawcett Premier, Edition 7, 1966.) The thrust of Hall's
approach to culture and cross-cultural interaction is
that every country in the world, and various groups with-
in each country, "speak" a non-verbal language. This
"silent language" is used at every moment of every day,
but most Americans are little aware of using it at all.
It consists of the elaborate patternings of behavior for
handling time, spatial relations, attitudes toward work,
play, and learning. (The parity with Value Orientation
concepts is obvious, of course.) We constantly communi-
cate our "real feelings" by way of this silent language.
Sometimes other peoples interpret our silent language
correctly, and we, theirs ; more often not. Many diffi-
culties in cross-cultural interaction arise from unaware-
ness of or misinterpretation of the silent language
involved. Hall speaks of the "Vocabulary of Culture",
and adduces the findings of anthropologists on language
systems to support the potential of a vocabulary of
culture. Whereas relatively little had been learned in
the past about infra-culture (the behavior preceding
culture which becomes elaborated into culture as known
today), or about culture in general, anthropology achieved
considerable success in respect to one dominant thread of
all cultures — language. Modern linguistic science has
been able to discern how this success was achieved, and
this discernment has led to the establishing of criteria
in relation to other systems of culture. But the criteria
in respect to language systems, Hall avers, are operation-
al, that is, quite firm, from an anthropological point of
view.
On the basis of these "firm criteria", which are
said to reflect and be reflected in all the rest of cul-
ture, Hall has identified ten separate kinds of human
activity which he has labeled Primary Message Systems .
Only the first involves language, and it need not. All
the others are non-linguistic forms of the communication
process, and, since each is enmeshed in the others, the





this point. They should be kept in mind in relation to
the other papers, and particularly in respect to the Mole
studies, to which the "silent language" is fundamental.
Culturally Determined Contingencies
Returning to Eachus, we shall now discuss his
four "culturally determined contingencies which establish
and maintain social behavior", or categories of deter-
minants! economic, governmental, religious, educational.
Eachus would fit the behaviors of any identifiable group
in any culture within this scheme of categories, in v/hich











10, Exploitation (use of materials)
Each of these, says Hall, is pervaded by biology, can be
examined by itself, and gears into the overall network of
culture. Everything man does ultimately involves inter-
action, which is at the hub of the universe of culture.
(See pp. 42, et sgj.. , for list and explanations.) Hall
points out that various analogies have developed which
reflect some of the concepts outlined above, for example,
that of overt as contrasted with covert culture, or






specific behavior can be classified according to its
relevance for specific typographies of behavior occurring
in the social context.
There is certainly some utility in such a cate-
gorical framework; the efforts to develop classificatory
schemes is very common. Again we are confronted,
however, with problems of interpretation. This is evi-
dent in the example Eachus provides of the military
attache in a foreign embassy who engages in various
social behaviors for strictly governmental reasons. The
overriding variables establishing and maintaining his
behaviors in the larger social context are economic ;
he gets paid for what he does. On some occasions, some
of his verbal repertoire is determined by ethical ,
religious , and educational variables.
Observable Behavior and Motivation
V/e have previously discussed the temptation of
trying to predict with certitude specific behavior in a
given situation by way of real or assumed knowledge of
an actor's attitudes. The opposite temptation
^^Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's Value Orientation






characterizes classification approaches, and seems to
mark Eachus 1 s approach here, the temptation of trying
to define with certitude the actor's specific motivation
on the basis of observed overt behavior. How do we know
that the dominant variables determining the military
attache's social behavior are economic? The present
writer has associated with many professional military
officers whose financial income from private or
familial sources was far greater than their military
income, and others whose earning potential outside the
military context far exceeded their actual earning
potential in military service. The conscious motiva-
tions of such officers have included patriotism (govern-
mental, in the Eachus categories) to a "liking for the
life", the psychic income of doing something "meaningful",
the intimate social milieu provided by the military life,
adventure, and other factors difficult to fit into any
of the Eachus categories, and certainly not in the
economical. Perhaps some are motivated by a desire to
flee familial responsibility, to live lives as roues,
etc. Does their acceptance of a pay check demonstrate
that economic considerations are the overriding variables?





-idemonstrate that such service is the raison d*etre of
their behavior?
How could we categorize the motivations of the
professional politician? Harold Lasswell postulates the
deprivation-compensation equation in accordance with
which power is the overriding value outcome sought. Into
which of Eachus's categories could we fit the behavior
of the politician striving for power or the behavior
of the politician in exercising power? In the latter
instance, we could presumably fit his observable overt
behavior into the government category, but this would
not necessarily explain his motivation. In the former,
is it even meaningful, much less accurate, to fit the
power-striving effort of the politician into the govern-
ment category?
In a less esoteric but perhaps even more compli-
cated vein, one might ask about behavior related to
political socialization of children. In respect to
children, David Easton and Robert Hess raise the question
about special orders of transmission of different kinds




system. They are unable to answer the question
clearly or definitively for several reasons, one of which
is of immediate interest to us, namely, that it is so
difficult to differentiate empirically the various
levels of the system. It is assumed that the earliest,
most emotional attachments to the community are primarily
the results of rituals with cognitively little meaning
for children, but emotionally awe-inspiring. An example
is the pledge of allegiance to the flag, which a child
sees as practically a religious observance.
Now it is reasonably clear that children are not
taught the pledge of allegiance in school for religious
purposes, as such. But precisely how would the teaching
behavior and the learning behavior be categorized? Does
a "governmental variable" dominate? When the words
"under God" were added to the pledge through the media-
tion of President Eisenhower, was the "adding" itself
a governmental behavior? V/as it a submission that the
divine is more powerful than the human? What does the
fact itself mean that the pledge was selected as the
^6 David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child 1 s
Political World" , in Midwest Journal of Political






. nvehicle for acknowledging the ultimate authority of God,
or the ultimate dependence of the nation on God? Has
the pledge acquired a sanctified tradition of critical
importance in the "American way of life"? Was the
addition of "under God" a suggestion of America as "a
mission", having a salvific role in the world? Was it
an attempt to identify "our side", or "our cause", as
"right", because God is on our side, and we are on His?
What did Congressional support for the Eisenhower move
signify — that the American electorate is first a
religious, then a political, people?
These are all behaviors. If Edward C. Stewart
is right, cross-cultural interaction theory can be tested
by asking the number of exceptions, or special cases the
data require as auxiliaries to the main theoretical
terms, y Can Eachus's four categories handle all the
exceptions, or what he, himself, calls situational
variables, without doing violence to the generality of
his framework?
Let us consider briefly a matter of current
concern, the development on the American scene of what
^See our presentation of Stewart's Theory,






seem to be new modes of political behavior, rather too
broadly and diversely labeled as "the politics of
protest". Bryant Wedge talks about "distinctive
cultures" and difficulties involved in dialogue across
the differences of cultures, as we have seen. His
"distinctive cultures" would be called sub-cultures by
some, and are a critical element in the problem of the
politics of protest. The kind of courtroom behavior
demonstrated in the 1969-1970 trials of the "Chicago
Seven", the "Catonsville (Washington) Nine", and the
New York 31ack Panthers seems to be unique in the
history of American courtroom behavior. Within Eachus's
analytical scheme of categories, where would we fit the
reported behavior of, let us say, the Catonsville/
Washington Nine, involving allegations about the
destruction of military draft records and allied
offenses? Was the behavior that led to the act govern-
mental or ethical-religious? What of the behavior of
the act itself? What of the courtroom behavior, with
those charged initially refusing defense attorneys,
insisting on confessing that they had actually behaved
as charged, and so on?
Returning to the question of defining motivation







a bridge between observable behavior and unobservable
motivation by way of Skinner's concepts of audience and
contingency. In the notion of audience, characteristic
verbal repertoires are seen as serving as effective
consequences for the individuals behavior, and are
sometimes labeled norms, expectations, or values. The
assumption is that if we know these — for instance,
what consequences an actor expects for his behavior, or
what values he will achieve, and/or how the actor
evaluates audience norms, expectations or values — one
knows why he acts, that is, the motivation for his
behavior. Working in the other direction, of course,
this allows for predictability of behavior. This assump-
tion, too, is deceptive. Let us consider a set of
behaviors with various cross-cultural and cross-sub-
cultural ramifications.
In 1969-1970, mostly young "activists" went
from the United States to Cuba, via Canada, to work
temporarily in the sugar cane fields. Why? One reporter
asked one group of 20, ranging in age from 16 to 28, the
Washington, D.C., contingent of the Venceremos .
Responses included: "I'm so sick of answering that







revolution" j "For the sake of the psychological
component, namely, the idea of 1000 norteamericanos
helping with the harvest is inspiring. It kind of gives
the Cubans a lift." "When (we) return, we will be
ready to get to work ... to build a movement toward
social change in this country"; "The idea of going to
Cuba is great. It's out of sight." ^°
What were the expectations of this and other
actor and audience groups? According to the editorial-
ist, most of those embarking on the trip he reported
were preoccupied with old-fashioned worries like
seasickness and diarrhea, seemed to have little or no
idea of what they would actually do in Cuba, seemed
more in search of adventure than inspiration. What
values did they seek? What were their true behavioral
norms? How would one categorize their behavior in the
Eachus scheme? We observe a group or a number of
individuals en route to another social and political
culture. We "observe" some of their expressed reasons
for going. Do they themselves know their reasons, what
they expect, what values they hope to achieve? Do they
470
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really know what their own norms are, what the norms of
the "Establishment" are, what reinforcers they can expect
in their own culture or subculture? What behavior can
we predict in the cross-cultural situation in Cuba?
What behavior can we predict in respect to other sub-
cultures in the United States after their return?
Let us add the second concept taken from Skinner,
that of contingency, the terms of which are the environ-
ment in which behavior occurs, the behavior itself, and
the consequences of the behavior, or, translated into
behaviorist terms, discriminative stimuli, operants, and
positive or negative reinforcers. In the four categories
above, plus the audience and contingency concepts, Eachus
sees enough of a framework for scientifically analyzing
cross-cultural interaction and describing culturally
determined behavioral events. Within this framework,
then, theoretically, we should be able to analyze the
Venceremos behavior with its cross-cultural interaction
involvements. And, theoretically, we probably can.
Theoretically, we can postulate that the discriminative
stimuli of the environment include appeals by propagan-
dists for the Cuban revolutionary government, one or more







family situations, observed social inequities in the
United States, and related stimuli. As positive and/or
negative reinforcers, we could postulate warm welcomes
in Cuba, public appearances on Cuban television accom-
panied by expressions of gratitude from the Cuban govern-
ment, warm and friendly associations with Cuban canefield
workers, physical or emotional discomforts, rejection
by Cuban workers, discovery that the American visitors
are being exploited, etc.
But what is the practicability of so defining
the stimuli and the reinforcers? The corollary of the
somewhat rhetorical question is: "What is the utility
of the theory?" Does it really bring us closer to being
able to predict the operant behavior? As a matter of
fact, Eachus himself observes: "The identification of
antecedent environmental determinants of behavior
generally takes place after the behavior has been
exhibited, and some consequence has followed."
(underlining ours.) But can even this post factum
"analysis" of antecedent stimuli assure us that we know
which stimuli stimulated the behavior?







Utilitarian Evaluation of Theory
We return to our position in Chapter I. It is
a tedious, demanding, aggravating business to critique
research procedures, conceptual approaches, theoretical
frameworks. This is a real problem that euphemistic
language and academic amiability can not resolve. Our
outlines of the Washington Conference papers reveal
the awareness on the part of cross-cultural interaction
investigators of the paucity of verified hypotheses in
the field, and the lacunae between conceptualizations
and practical applications. Turning to Stewart again,
certainly himself a theorist, we are reminded:
Enthusiasm for theory often creates blind
spots which encourage the theorist to ignore
obvious aspects of behavior. In the area of cross-
cultural communication, we often are tempted to
overlook variations in behavior and repeat the
mistakes of the national character movement.
Yet behavior is complex and not easily subjected
to a few explanatory principles. The same individ-
ual from time to time will behave as if governed
by different internal forms. If we choose to
analyze a social group, again we find that the
social behavior of the group members is subject
to variation. Finally, if we analyze a system
such as American culture, nearly any statement
which can be made about it is subject to reserva-
tions and contradictions. ^72
1






In other words, when it comes to "nuts and bolts",
only that theory is useful which is verifiable. For all
practical purposes, only that theory which can be tested
in "real life" situations of cross-cultural interaction
can be called verifiable. And reports of purported
verification must be examined tediously, painfully, even
pedantically. Even when so verified, its practical
utility may be another matter altogether. We fail to
see the utility of the Sachus contingencies, for example,
or categories v/hich serve as determinants of human
behavior, even as descriptive classifications, if
interpretation of observed behavior plays so critical a
role in classifying the behavior, if the categories are
such that "situational variables" must in many instances
be forced to fit, and if an understanding of behavior
is contingent on assumed understanding of motivation.
Adding Skinner's audience and contingency notions does
not seem to help. Precisely the same problems remain.
This was one of the basic problems we found in
the Value Orientation approach, even as modified by the
Taxonomy of Concerns, to handle "situational variables".
In early 1970, the Vice President of the United States





undoubtedly assume to be "governmental". They appeared
to be significant openings to a program of Presidential
intervention in "off-year" congressional elections. In
keeping with the Eachus categories, we describe the
Vice President's and President's behavior as governmental
(political). Examining the verbal and "symbolic" content
of the speeches, how do we categorize the interpersonal
and intercultural behavior involved — the behavior
between the Vice President and the audience, or between
and among sub-cultures within the audience. In Skinner's
terms, the audience expectations, norms, and values
serve as effective consequences for the Vice President's
behavior. Here are key excerpts from his speeches
i
The working people of this country are out-
raged about crime and violence in their streets
and parks • • . (they) do not share the philo-
sophy of permissiveness expressed by the best
publicized (intellectuals) • . • (they) read
with disgust the rave reviews the press gives to
the latest dirty movie or book • • . (They) are
starting to resent the use of (their) children
as guinea pigs in the latest social experiment
of some way-out educator who sends his own
children to distant schools; (they) want to
hear no more from bleeding hearts who tell
(them) to feel sorry for criminals who have made
(their) city unsafe • . . (they) have had a
bellyful of politicians who fawn over young
radicals. ^73
^As released in Associated Press Dispatches,




r nTo what audience expectations, norms, and values
do such verbal behaviors appeal? Or, to ask the ques-
tion in Value Orientation terminology i "What does the
Vice President assume to be the • value set* of the
audience? Into what category of concerns, within what
value orientation of their own would they fit his verbal
behavior?" The skein of emotions in the key ideas of
the speeches is extraordinarily difficult to unravel.
Similar comments could be made about recent
remarks of Senator Abe Ribicoff, of Connecticut, in
announcing that he would vote for a proposed amendment
to an education bill. The amendment was proposed by
Southern senators. Presumably, Senator Ribicoff had
some political (governmental) element motivating his
observable (verbal) behavior. But is the content of
his remarks overridden with the political variables,
or, putting it in another form, while his objective may
be to muster votes, hence political behavior on the part
of his audience, does he appeal dominantly to political
variables in their expectations, norms, and values, or
is there something else, something exceedingly difficult
to categorize? The pertinent remarks were t
(We have children) going to school inan




r nblacks versus whites, police in schools • • •
principals and teachers afraid for their very
lives. Let us not kid ourselves. Wherever
we go across this land, when blacks move in
the whites move out, and if they have children,
they move as far away as they can. What shall
we do? Shall we chase the whites with buses
(or with) helicopters ... to get an equitable
distribution? 2^
What is our point? That the intangibles, the
undefinables, and unclassifiable elements in the sub-
cultural groups in the United States, or, in Bryant
Wedge's better term, the "distinctive culture" groups,
appear to be immensely important in determining the
behavior of both the audience and the actor or actors,
and this appears to be true of cross-cultural interaction
situations in any area on which data is available. We
see no way of labelling such elements as Eachus would
apparently have us do. American office-holders and
would-be office-holders seem to be required to be able
to gauge, to develop an accurate "feel" for — in the
absence of reliable measurement techniques — what we
can perhaps only describe as the "climate" of the
country. Moods are not measureable, but apparently are
often of importance for transcending measureable elements
WAs quoted by Joseph Alsop, The Washington





in a population. Neither moods nor "climates", it
seems to us, admit of Skinner-type categorizations, or
into any other stimulus-response schema.^5
Problems of Categories and Stereotypes in Respect
to International Relations
Moving into the international area of cross-
cultural interaction, we note, for example, the ease
with which rampant confusion has been generated about
the war in Vietnam by means of a device presumably
designed to clarify it — the simple, and highly
1
'-'Harold D. Lasswell explores the notions of
mood and climate in a provocative paper, "The Climate
of International Action", in Herbert C. Kelman, ed.,
op.cit.
. pp. 339-353* The paper tentatively proposes
techniques for measuring "collective moods", both of
elite or ruling groups and of non-elite elements in a
population, and of gauging the "international climate".
The general classificatory scheme for categorizing inter-
national moods is his familiar set of "eight" value out-
comes that we have previously discussed. While the
paper is provocative , as we have noted, it is so depen-
dent on the verifiability of the exploratory hypotheses
proposed, on the refinement of currently unrefined data-
collecting processes, and on the development of totally
new approaches that Lasswell envisions as plausible
(but which seem to us to border on the Utopian, and
which are certainly very far from reality at present),
that it seems to support, rather than weaken our thesis
about the resistance of intangibles to classification,
and the need for practicing politicians to develop a
"feel" for situations that simply won't be categorized
intellectually. Perhaps the "charismatic" politician




simplistic categorization of one set of opposed forces
as inspired by "nationalism". Literature abounds which
purports to demonstrate that the Viet Cong, the National
Liberation Front, and Hanoi are oriented to and deter-
mined by "nationalism", not by Communism. This dis-
tinction made, the dynamics of the situation are pre-
sumed to be self-evident.
If the position were true, or partly true, would
it really give us the kind of understanding we need to
formulate national policy in relation to Vietnam and
other areas of Southeast Asia? Does the concept which
seems to have pervaded much political and popular think-
ing today, namely, that the dominant dynamic on the
international scene is "nationalism", lead us closer to
insight, or deceive us more seriously, about the various
cultural forces at work within geographical areas and
between and among peoples of the world?
The work of Paul E. Sigmund illustrates the care
which must be exercised in interpreting the set of
phenomena too-readily labelled "nationalism". Sigmund
writes, for example, that the "most powerful motivating
force determining the policy of the uncommitted nations






upon their fellow, but nationalism and the desire for
national independence and prestige". 7 But Sigmund
is quick to observe that "nationalists" are not con-
cerned merely with geographic boundaries, but seek a
"modernizing nationalism" for their developing countries,
among the characteristics of which are such psychological
dynamics as "the development of an open and flexible
attitude to change and to human relations", and such
social dynamics as "the breakdown of traditional and
ascriptive distinction and their replacement by stan-
Zj.77
dards based on umversalistic norms and achievement".
In other words, there are many complex cultural dynamics
underlying behavior presumably motivated by "nationalism",
and since the entire thrust of our paper has been to
demonstrate the extraordinary complexity of cultural
dynamics and how little we really know about them, we
suggest that simply considering the behavior motivated
by "nationalism" explains little and can lead to much
illusion.
^76Paul E. Sigmund, ed., The Ideologies of the
Developing Nations (New YorkJ Frederick A. Praeger,
1967), p. 36.






Sigmund points out, for example, that one of the
ways nationalist leaders have used to achieve "modernizing
nationalism" is to assert independence by returning to a
traditional culture for inspiration. He cites efforts
of Bourguiba and Nasser in the Middle East to demonstrate
that their reforms are in keeping with the spirit of the
Koran; the appeal by political forces in Turkey to
religious traditions, despite Ataturk's policy of
secularization; and the support given by Islamic elements
to the bloody Indonesian reaction against the Communist
Party in 1965. The approach of Mohammed Ayub Khan is
illustrative. Using Communism as his foil, he tried
to appeal tactfully to Islam's teachers, the ulemas, to
update themselves and make themselves relevant to the
needs of Pakistan.
It is false to believe that Communism can be
a danger only for Christian nations. The condi-
tions of life that are developing in the Middle
East show clearly that the Islamic world is in
no way impervious to the attempts of Communism.
To prevent that danger, it is necessary that
Islam be taken out of the recesses of the past
and presented to the world in a way and a lan-
guage that are absolutely modern — not as an
ideology, but as a true plan of political, civic,
and spiritual action, because this is the funda-
mental meaning of Islam. ^7°
^?8Mohammed Ayub Khan, "Islam in Pakistan", in
The Ideologies of the Developing Nations , ed. by Paul E.






At the same time, in Africa, Senghor's attempted
modernized version of traditional culture by way of his
appeal to "Negritude" has provoked bitter controversy,
as was emphasized in 1966 at the "cultural" Festival of
Negro Arts, sponsored by the Senegal Government, where
Negritude was attacked by Africans themselves as a form
479
of reverse racism. Furthermore, the advocate of
modernizing nationalism comes to discover that efforts
based primarily on charges of neo-colonialism,
imperialism, etc., do not serve to transform an entire
society and culture. He becomes compelled to recognize
that under-development, ignorance, apathy, and corrup-
tion are his real enemies.
What all of this amounts to, it seems to us, is
further verification of our thesis, that the category
"nationalism" is a highly simplistic label.
Further verification is offered by Victor C.
Ferkiss. Under title of "Building a New Culture", Ferkiss
discusses cross-cultural problems confronting nations
trying to understand and relate to Africa, politically,
commercially, culturally. His discussion makes it clear





that stereotypes of "nationalism" do not clarify the
issues or solve the problems of understanding,
t • • what offers both danger and promise
to the world as a whole, the advent of the age
of universal culture as one aspect of the age of
universal history, affects African culture in
an especially poignant fashion • • • Africa is
forced to seek to restore or create its self-
image at the same time that it embraces the
uncharted future, to become again African at
the same time that it becomes modern. For many
ordinary Africans, eager for the material bene-
fits of the new way of life, this presents no
problem, or only the problem of forsaking a
tribal past for a modern present. They are only
too happy to embrace cultural change for the
sake of the promise of material abundance. But
for the intelligentsia who guide the continent's
destiny the conflict is a recognized and deeply
disturbing one, and attitudes generated by this
conflict are often the source of African
approaches toward both domestic and foreign
politics. The conflict over the meaning of^
being African runs through all of African life
today — religion, the arts, popular culture
and education — so that it is in these areas
that many of the crucial struggles over Africa's
future role in the world are being decided.^
Sigraund concludes the section of his discussion
we cited above with remarks which we feel likewise sup-
port our thesis that "nationalism" is a far too facile
explanation for the phenomena it purports to explain.
There is no denying that a certain disillu-
sionment has set in among those who have created
^Victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Iden-





the ideologies of the developing nations and
those who have observed or participated in the
effort to implement them. The dreams of a
Golden Age characterized by equality, solidarity,
unity, progress, and economic development have
given way in many cases to the harsh realities
of compromise, corruption, instability, and
apathy • • . Mystique has not given way com-
pletely to politique , nor has bureaucratism and
institutionalism totally replaced charisma and
reform.^1
In brief, it seems to us that a substantial
amount of "foreign policy" appears to flounder through
the years in part because of failure on the part of
participants to take seriously the complexity of the
underlying intercultural dynamics of the peoples
involved, dynamics that simply resist the kind of cate-
gorizing delineated by Eachus, Sternin, and others.
We find our point illustrated in another sphere
of cross-cultural activity involving "international
relations", the phenomena often lumped together and
interpreted as nationalism, and the complex dynamics
intertwined to make up a "culture" — the sphere of
organized religious missionary activity.
In January 1967, Roman Catholic Monsignor Ivan
Illich, New Yorker working in Cuernavaca, Mexico,
questioned the wisdom of current religious missionary







aid policies of the Church in the United States in
respect to Latin America. The policies questioned include
the sending of both money and missionaries, whether
clerical or lay, "Men and money sent with missionary
motivation", said Illich, "carry a foreign Christian
image, a foreign pastoral approach and a foreign politi-
cal message. They also bear the mark of North American
capitalism of the 1950 , s". 2 Not long afterward, a
missiologist at Catholic University of America in
Washington, called for a reevaluation of "longstanding
ideas and practice in the light of new and changing
realities", and quoted native African Archbishop
Raymond-Marie of Guinea as stating bluntly that "while
political colonialism had ended, religious colonialism
483
persisted". In the meanwhile, African Cardinal
Ruambwa had already preempted the remarks of all three
of these observers, at the opening of the Pan-African
Catechetical Study V/eek at Katigonodo, Uganda, in 1964,
by stating*
482 In Herder Correspondence , January 196 7.
^Ronald Hoffman, "Changing Realities in the





Here in Africa the great problem that faces
us in the pastoral formation of our priests is
how to adapt it to the African mentality. It
is only by adapting our religious instructions
to this mentality that we can hope to make
Christianity a way of life that will grow out of
a deep inward conviction, instead of being a
doctrine imposed on men from outside and only
more or less tolerable. ^o^
How categorize the behaviors involved in such
expressions? Are they dominantly governmental, economic,
religious, or educational, or are all these and other
variables so intertwined and so simultaneously
expressed or implied that analyzing, in the sense of
separating for purposes of categorizing, is virtually
impossible? For example, emphasizing but one aspect
that appears to us immediately as crucial to an under-
standing of cross-cultural interaction is the repetitive
references to the "outsider". In his discussion of
African religious values and their place in the socio-
psychological mesh of feelings and practices related to
modernizing nationalism, Victor Ferkiss sayst
"Christianity has been at home in Africa since its
geginningi nonetheless, it is increasingly regarded by
^8Zf






nationalists throughout the continent as a 'non-African
religion*." **
In another context, Frantz Fanon, himself born
in Martinique, and educated in France, could still say
as an office-holder in the Algerian Provisional Govern-
ment, concerning "colonialist settlers" in Africa
i
In defiance of his successful transplanta-
tion, the settler still remains a foreigner.
It is neither the act of owning factories, nor
estates, nor a bank balance which distinguished
the governing classes. The governing race is
first and foremost those who come from elsewhere,
those who are unlike the original inhabitants,
the "others". ^86
It seems to us that this question of the "others",
the "outsiders", is critical to some of the deepest
problems of both intercultural and cross-cultural
interaction. There is the temptation of the easy solu-
tion in seeing in the "Chicago Seven" courtroom case
cited above the influence of "the outsiders" who stand
to profit by the "breakdown in law and order", or the
"outsiders" who infiltrate college campuses, labor
unions, and other organizations to "stir up dissent".
^^victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for
Identity , op.cit. , p. 1^9.
^Frantz Fanon, "The Wretched of the Earth",





r nThe "outsiders" are often thought of, at least vaguely,
as Communists, and the temptation is to assume that if
"they" would stay out of lawsuits, campus, union, and
other situations, "we" (appropriate authorities or the
country at large) would have no serious problems. On the
other hand, there is an equally strong temptation to
ridicule the possibility of intervention by "outsiders"
as absurd, as "McCarthyism" , as "Communists under every
pumpkin", or as whatever happens to be the "in" pejora-
tive label of the moment. More than enough has been
written to make discussion unnecessary here about the
way adolescents rebel against established parental and
societal norms in the name of freedom and individuality,
only to bind themselves stringently to the norms of the
specific group to which they wish to attach themselves.
These and various other dynamics of the "outsider", the
"other" seem to have considerable significance for cross-
cultural and intercultural relations and the domestic
and international political ramifications thereof —
dynamics which are lost in schemes of classification.
Important as the point is in our minds, space
limitations preclude our pursuing it further, because





explicated in a paper by Richard Brody, concerning
problems of the behavioral sciences in respect to
international relations. A lengthy quotation seems
merited.
The intellectual ferment, which character-
izes the modern study of international politics,
stems from a disarmingly simple insight: inter-
national politics, like any social activity,
involves people. It follows, if people are
involved in operating the international system,
that individual, group, and organizational
factors may aid in explaining the behavior men,
organized into nations, exhibit toward each
other
•
The top foreign policy leaders of a nation
are not just men — they are men in socially
defined roles which may constrain their behavior.
Neither are they merely decision-making machines
which weigh "national interest" and "national
power" against the opportunity for "national
gain" to arrive at policy. National leaders are
individuals making policy choices for their
nations in a complex of highly articulated group,
organizational, societal, and inter-societal
systems. The task of the behavioral scientist
studying international politics is to gain under-
standing of how these systems fit together and
how they affect the choice behavior of individuals
in leadership roles.
But herein we come upon the fundamental
dilemma of international relations as a behavioral
science: If we study individuals stripped of this
system context, what will we learn of their
behavior in context? On the other hand, if we
attempt to study them in context, how do we gain
access to them?
The psychologist who is interested in behavioral
principles which are not context bound has avail-





~imost of which require for their application
direct contact with, or observation of the
subject. But how can we give a Taylor Mani-
fest Anxiety Scale to Kruschev during the
Hungarian revolt, or a Semantic Differential
to Chiang Kai-shek while Quemoy is being
shelled?387 6
Cognizant of these difficulties, Harold Lasswell
has offered his own lengthy post factum analyses of sig-
nificant political figures of history, in order to make
available what appear to be observable behavioral pat-
terns of past political actors, which can be used to
predict behavior of present or future political actors.
>Ve find his approach questionable for two reasons,
however x (1) it suffers from the same problem we have
discussed previously, that of arguing backward from
observed behavior to assumed motivation; (2) its use of
a psychoanalytic technique for trying to get at the
motives of men long gone from the political scene —
many of them for many centuries. Psychoanalysis has
'Richard A. Brody, "International Relations
as a Behavioral Science: Problems, Approaches and
Findings" , in Psychology and International Relations
,
ed. by Gerald Sperrazzo (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 19^5 ) • Brody does offer as a partial
reply to the question he offers the potential of occa-
sional direct access to decision-makers, the study of
some historical figures, the use of various "simulation"
techniques, etc. His reply is sincere and enthusiastic,





enough difficulty in achieving certitude about motiva-
tions of the living, in clinical, one-to-one, patient-
to-analyst settings* We are extremely wary about its
ability to reconstruct, then analyze the past.
Gross-Cultural Interaction and Definition of
Purposes
Returning now to Eachus's paper, we discover that
when he departs, by his own admission, from his basic
inquiry into cross-cultural interaction theory, and turns
to the "applied or engineering aspects" thereof, some
of his observations appear to us much more useful, or,
at least, more practical. The first of these is that
the initial problem to be faced in research in cross-
cultural interaction is that of stating the objectives
of sending people overseas or for having any contact with
other peoples. Admittedly, as he points out, certain
aspects of diplomatic intercourse may have to remain
ambiguous. Each individual's specific role and job,
however, can be described in considerable detail,
together with the purposes for which he is engaged in
it. The use of base-line rates, the relevant consequences





similar elements in behavior required in a particular
situation can be helpful in identifying and analyzing
what the behavior should be. We have previously cited a
study which we believe lends strong empirical support
488
to this theme. It merits discussion here.
Robert D. Campbell reports extensive and compre-
hensive interviewing of 534 Marines in I Corps in South
Vietnam. The subjects were selected on a random
stratified sampling basis. Within the general context
of cross-cultural interaction between Marines and South
Vietnamese, the Marines were asked to evaluate their
own .job performance and training, and were asked job-
oriented questions for the purpose. The responses to
these and related questions convinced the investigators
that the Marines overwhelmingly failed to distinguish
between jobs, tasks, objectives, goals, and missions in
describing and evaluating their own performance, and
considerable evidence was provided to suggest significant
discrepancies between conceptualizing behavior at policy-
making levels and implementing behavior at operating
"1
URR
Robert D. Campbell, op.cit. (The Campbell
paper at the Washington Conference, omitted from this






levels. That these discrepancies affect performance in
cross-cultural interaction can be readily illustrated.
The Marine whose immediate task is to deliver supplies
by an appointed time to a given unit deployed along a
very muddy road that runs through a thickly populated
hamlet may ignore, or not even advert to the possibility
of an alternate route that takes fifteen minutes longer,
but which bypasses the hamlet, avoids the consequences
of spattering mud on children, shops and houses, and so
on. Not oriented to thinking in terms of ultimate
goals, the immediate demands of his task will probably
also inhibit his even trying to make a judgment in terms
of the kind of supplies he is carrying — materials to
be used at a later date, ammunition required immediately,
or whatever — and discriminating between the necessity
of its deliverance at a given time and the undesirable
consequences of using the road in question.
Eachus offers an interesting and useful aside,
namely, that the relevance of the social behaviors of
others who serve as reinforcers for an American may be
so strong that they can not be overridden by considera-
tion for these same classes of reinforcers from another





integrators, mediators, and response integrators in the
McGonigal findings. The American visitor in Canada who
sees a leaking roof may sympathize with the poor, hard-
working house owner who is struggling to take care of
his family. The leaking roof in Vietnam may stimulate
thoughts in the same American about lazy gooks .
Eachus makes a further contribution, in our
opinion, in suggesting the possibility of training
individuals to become "behavioral engineers" in respect
to analyzing their own behavior, environmental stimuli,
consequences of their behavior, etc. A self-performed
functional analysis of one's own interpersonal relations,
apparent results of different types of behavior, and
related events seems to be a desideratum reasonably
availabke, although as we shall see later in examining
Stewart's thesis of cognitive forms, this may not be
the case. However, despite the questions Stewart poses,
as we have noted in a Vassilou study previously cited,
even the reading of an ethnographic essay about Greek
culture apparently served to increase awareness among
readers which could then be used as a practical guide
to behavior, whether or not the essay changed their





the development of such awareness among those exposed to
lectures and discussions of the Mole findings, so that a
"do-it-yourself" kind of analysis becomes at least
possible, whether or not either behavior or attitudes
change
•
However, when Sachus proposes the possibility of
examining how relevant variables affecting American behav-
ior can be manipulated to produce changes in its topo-
graphy, for the purpose of engineering new repertoires
of behavior, we again become wary, not only about the
theoretical possibilities, but about the practical
effort of such an effort in terms of resultant behavior.
This question is quite pertinent to the Newman and
McGonigal search for the influential target audience
for training in cross-cultural interaction and to the
Wedge paper synopsized in this chapter, concerning the
development of cross-cultural interaction leaders,
Edgar H. Schein and Gordon L. Lippitt reported a study
of 504 administrators and supervisors, civilian and
military, which attempted to relate attitudes concerning
the legitimacy of supervisors 1 influencing subordinates'




variables. 48 ? The authors feel that their findings sup-
^
port their hypothesis that congruence or agreement about
what is the legitimate area of the superior's influence
on subordinates and what is not is more important than
either supervisors* consideration for employees or their
demonstrated employee-centeredness
.
On the other hand, we saw in an earlier chapter
a leadership study by Chemers and Summers which found
that raember-to-leader affective relations were more
important than member-to-raember affection relations in
groups. It may be that the area of attempted influence
is critical, and that attitudes about what individuals
consider to be their "own business" may be reinforced
by leaders 1 efforts to change them. Another aspect of
this problem is one cited by McGonigal in the report of
his study of CAP units, previously discussed. He points
out that, following the September 1966 survey of atti-
tudes, a training series was designed for the purpose
of reinforcing positive channels and neutralizing nega-
tive channels, which would equate with Eachus's proposals
to try to produce operant repertoires in individuals
"Edgar H. Schein, et al. , Supervisory Attitudes
Toward the Legitimacy of Influencing Subordinates






individuals which are subject to direct control by appro-
priate audiences, and to produce changes in the topo-
graphy of American behavior, bringing it up to strength
in repertoires to be maintained by new audiences.
McGonigal reports the unintended results quite frankly
i
By pursuing feedback we learned that two
of those (training) sessions (the one on steal-
ing and the one on risking our lives) were
linking up with undesired mediators. We were
actually hurting our own cause unwittingly.
Naturally, we revised them at once and will
continue to pursue feedback to see if there
are other areas in which we can make our own
communication more effective and accurate. ^90
Americans as Change Agents
The next issue Eachus raises is widely neglected
in the literature and in much cross-cultural theory
and programmed training with which we are familiar,
despite the fact that it is, in our opinion, critical.
This is the issue of Americans as change agents . Eachus
observes, rightly, we believe: "I can not call to mind
any type of operation that the United States and its
various agencies conduct overseas which is not directed
at change of one type or another." 7 The assumption
^9
°CAP Report , March 196?, p. ^3.





that this is so is obviously dominant in nation-building
literature. However, it pervades literature on cross-
cultural interaction, as well, so that it is astonishing
how infrequently we explicitly face this fact or its
implications, except by disclaimers to the effect that
we are not in the business of changing indigenous
peoples* minds, attitudes, mores, cultures, values, etc.
For example, these disclaimers are part of the warp and
woof of the Mole reports and the training materials
developed thereupon. We see this as a serious dilemma
in relation to harmonious cross-cultural interaction.
Peace Corps workers have expressed particular concern
about being "used" as "tools of the United States" to
effect changes on behalf of American policy-makers and
in American interests, rather than in the interests of
indigenous peoples. ^
Official Peace Corps literature is quite enlight-
ening on the subjects
~1
The writer is personally familiar with prob-
lems of this type experienced or felt by Peace Corps
workers in certain areas of the International Trust
Territories, for example. Whether or not we agree with
the allegations and/or sympathize with the Peace Corps
workers or resent them, the experience as they perceive
it is almost certainly going to affect their own




• . • when the Volunteer supports innovation,
initiative, and resourcefulness, he very often
is supporting change. To what extent is he an
agent of change? And what change should he
support? Until he can free himself from the
tyranny of his own culture, can be truly support
change that his cultural bias does not allow
him to see as beneficial? It is probably gener-
ally agreed that it is the Volunteer's responsi-
bility to "assist people in bringing about
changes they want, to achieve goals of their own",
but Arthur Niehoff made the point that even when
we support people in achieving their own goals we
are influencing their lives; we begin to tamper
with social systems, religious structures, value
systems, vested interests, etc. In training we
should help the prospective Volunteer become
aware of the possible implications and conse-
quences of his influence on his host national
friends. He should recognize that when he
supports experimentation and innovation, he is
very often encouraging the individual to enter
into conflict with his society, and perhaps with
his family and his own internalized cultural
norms, beliefs, and values. A culture that has
been established and relatively stable for
hundreds of years does not usually welcome
change. (But then neither does the Volunteer's
own culture. If he can recognize the dynamics
of resistance to change in his own society, he
can achieve a better understanding of the prob-
lems of change in his host country. ) In sup-
porting experimentation and innovation, the
Volunteer does become an agent of change, but
he must be aware of the amount and direction of
change that can be tolerated and must be sensi-
tive to the reactions of society to the individ-
ual he is "supporting". He must remember that
his friend or co-worker cannot leave the situation
as he will at the end of two years' service.
After his departure, his friend may find himself
utterly and completely alone, facing the problem
of rejection by his own society. ^93
~1
^Cross-Cultural and Community Involvement
I






Civilian and military advisors and similar
American officials in various countries experience the
same dilemma facing individual Peace Corps volunteers,
American combat advisors with operating units in South
Vietnam confront it likewise as individuals. Military
groups experience the dilemma when engaged in various
volunteer civic action programs i for example, establish-
ing a medical clinic which may have to vie with local
witch doctors and various "tradition-oriented super-
stitions" may require teaching indigenous peoples
practices significantly disruptive of mores indigenous
to their cultures.
Much more serious, however, because carried out
on so large a scale, is the nature of war itself.
Addressing but one example, the present writer has
witnessed, as have countless observers, radical changes
in Vietnam effected by the American requirement for
building huge bases. Thousands of workers leave agri-
cultural or other pursuits and accompanying ways of
life to provide the necessary labor. The entire topo-
graphy of the base area changes. Thousands of yards of
concrete replace beaches, woodlands, or vegetation.





to support the base builders and, in time, those who will
work on the base. Wage scales change; "standards of
living" change. Cross-cultural contact increases and
intensifies, with thousands of Vietnamese who had never
previously seen an American now associating on a daily-
basis with thousands of Americans, The changes related
to both the present and the future are legion, and are
too obvious to need delineation here. The same is true
is respect to many other aspects of war, including the
mobilization of vast sectors of the population for dis-
ciplined military training, the mixing of rural and
urban residents in the same training camps and operating
units, and so on. This particular activity — mobiliza-
tion and its concomitants — had immense impact on
American culture itself, during World Wars I and II,
Frederick C, Wickert gives an interesting illus-
tration of one aspect of one of the many kinds of things
we are referring to, in the paper we synopsized for this
chapter.
In a Vietnamese province, the military offi-
cials demonstrated that they had a special need
for three thousand of a particular kind of
American rifle. In due course, the appropriate
U, S, military agency turned over the requested
rifles. The Vietnamese immediately disassembled
the rifles into three sections i stock, barrel,




sections in three rather widely separated
warehouses. When asked why, they answered
that they had devised the only safe way to
store them that they could think of to keep
them from falling into VC hands • • • The
rifles were never put to use as long as I had
any contact with the situation. Again, logical
assumptions were made about Vietnamese behavior
not borne out by later experience with it.
Institution building had not accompanied the
gift of rifles.
W
Wickert, of course, is writing about and strongly
advocating institution building, hence, significant
changes in the South Vietnamese behavior patterns. We
repeat that we do not believe that either pure or applied
research, political science, or policy-making science,
theorists or program designers in the field of cross-
cultural interaction, have seriously examined, or exam-
ined to a sufficient extent, the issue Eachus broaches,
of Americans as agents of change in every overseas capa-
city in which they engage.
Training Americans for Cross-Cultural Interaction
Language
When Eachus turns to the question of preparing
Americans for overseas activities, he avers that the
~l
'^Frederick C. Wickert, Washington Conference





single most important requirement is to prepare them as
autonomous members of a new verbal community, so that
they can speak, read, write, and listen to the language
of the host country without a mediator, or that they
can effectively use an interpreter, Eachus speaks of
this accomplishment as the ability to produce a set of
oral operants. In the synopses of the other papers
presented in this chapter, however, we see that there
is relatively little agreement on the subject of language
training. Some of the theorists we have cited take the
desirability of pre-entry language training for granted
(e.g., Eachus and Sternin)j others consider pre-entry
language training a potential impediment (e.g., Wedge,
who fears that it contributes to stereotyping) i others
(Stewart, for example) seem to consider it worthwhile,
but recognize the merit of opposed arguments. Hall takes
its worth for granted, but only when coupled with train-
ing in the M silent language". Spector sees learning the
host language, whether before entry or while in a culture
as a function of motivation. He observes t
The lack of a common language with their
hosts, is of course one of the states that char-
acterizes most overseas Americans. Effective
communications are required for anything more
than superficial contact • . • However, with







profoundly negative relationships are possible.
Language can be used constructively or to abuse
others. • • The essential point here is that
language deficiency is in large part a motiva-
tional deficiency. We have considerable evidence
to indicate that ordinary soldiers who may have
had no formal language training, but who have
had incentives to establish relations with Koreans
have learned to express themselves quite well in
Korean. ^95
The finding about soldiers in Korea can be readily
supported by findings in respect to Marines in South
Vietnam. As we have noted previously, Marines assigned
to Combined Action Platoons receive between five and ten
hours of language training before deployment to a unit.
They are taught little more than how to exchange
amenities, inquire about various facilities, identify
themselves as friendly Americans, ask about enemy
activity, and related topics. The present writer has
personally witnessed some Marines with only this much
language training and only a high school education or
less become conversationally adept, while he has seen
a large number in similar circumstances who rarely learn
more than they have been taught before assignment, and
^95paui spector, "An Ideological Weapons System",
in Washington Conference Reports , p. 144. Spector's
paper was presented as a report on the work of Robert L.
Humphrey, whom we have cited frequently as the author








who may well fail to retain even that much. We previously
took note of the tape recorded interviews of those who
have served in CAP units. The majority of individuals
questioned aver that they "picked up enough" to get along,
and did not feel their effectiveness particularly
inhibited by language deficiencies. All indicated that
a knowledge of the language is desirable, however,
McGonigal is somewhat ambivalent on the subject
of language training, but tends to accord with those
who consider pre-entry training to be an impediment
because of the "mental set" it is said to engender. The
present writer has discussed the subject with a number of
individuals whose assignments required extensive and
intensive language training in the United States before
reporting to Vietnam, These observers have been unanim-
ous in supporting the necessity of language training
and in their convictions that they were not in any way
prejudiced thereby.
In an earlier chapter, we referenced the debrief-
ing reports of various civilian officials returning from
Vietnam and the survey of chaplains serving with Navy and
Marine personnel in Vietnam. Of the almost 350 respon-





263, or more than 75%$ expressed a need for improved
pre-entry language training and the desirability of such
in terms of cross-cultural interaction.
One aspect of language training that we see
heavily emphasized in some of the theorists (e.g.,
Triandis and Stewart) is that of relationships between
language forms and other cognitive forms, bilingual
ability and what we might call "bicultural aptitude",
learning not only to read, write, speak, and hear a
language, but to think in the cultural forms of the
language, or to view life from within the language,
from the viewpoint of the language.
The one issue on which there appears to be
unanimous agreement, however, is that of the importance
of getting a feel for the culture and the people, while
learning, or, at least, in addition to learning the
language. No one in the field of cross-cultural inter-
action seems to accept language training as an end in
itself, or as having intrinsic utilitarian value apart
from some understanding of the people. We doubt that
the controversy has been settled beyond agreement on
this particular issue. Factually, it would appear most





send vast numbers of Americans into overseas areas,
little meaningful language training will be possible
prior to entry, so that a practical approach to cross-
cultural interaction and interaction training on a
large scale will probably have to proceed on the assump-
tion that most participants will not be able to speak,
read, write, or listen to the host country language.
This, despite Eachus* s admonition thatt
We must produce an effective repertoire of
verbal behaviors of an oral nature which are
compatible with and meet the expectations of
those individuals with whom he deals • • •
(Since it) is futile to continue in our expecta-
tions that the nationals with whom we deal will
speak English and will therefore be familiar
with the verbal contingencies expected when one
speaks English.^96
Culture Shock
Earlier, we presented a number of hypotheses
about culture shock, and cited some fairly extensive
descriptions of the experience, the manifestations and
the consequences. In the present chapter, besided includ-
ing in our synopses the remarks of Todd Eachus, we have
presented in some detail those of Martin Sternin, which
we shall return to in a moment.





Eachus observes that regardless of an individual's
ability to produce "an oral set of operants" when he
enters a new verbal community, he may still be dysfunc-
tional "because many of the commonplace reinforcing events
for this verbal behavior have been either set aside or
removed and subsequently replaced by other relevant
parameters".
We have examined the literature on the very fre-
quently referenced phenomenon called culture shock
carefully. Whatever additional explanations and extenua-
tions are provided by others, it appears to be widely
agreed that what Eachus is here expressing in the language
of Behaviorism is the critical factor in the culture
shock experience — the absence of environmental cues
immediately perceived as familiar. Given this, most of
the literature addresses the various manifestations and
consequences of culture shock and pre-entry training
possibilities to help prepare the trainee for, and hope-
fully alleviate the undesirable effects of the experience.
Eachus* s proposed solution to the problem is to
prepare individuals to behave functionally with respect





their environment, by assuring linkages with "the home
office", and by a system of rewards and punishments,
primarily economic. The Eachus solution is unsatisfying
for several reasons, of which we need mention only two.
First, the inadequacies we find in his four categories
which purportedly determine cultural behavior are demon-
strated here. Eachus again seems to assume not only that
behavior can be thus facile ly classified, but that the
economic determinant inevitably dominates. It seems
reasonably obvious that economic punishments and rewards
will at best be effective with those who have no other
"overriding" motivations. By definition, an "over-
riding" motivation, as Eachus humself uses the concept
in his paper, would "override" such punishments and
rewards. Secondly, we find it difficult to accept his
arbitrary statement i "This phenomenon called culture
shock is essentially a demonstration of emotional behav-
ior which is caused by an unstable emotional
environment." To observe that the culture shock
phenomenon occurs when familiar cues are not readily
perceivable or perceived is one thing. To impute the






We need not argue the merits or demerits of behavioristic
psychology to recognize that this is a basic assumption
thereof, which neither proves nor disproves its validity,
and this is precisely the point i it seems to be offered
here quite gratuitously. At the same time, of course,
it is necessary in the logic of an approach which
repeatedly refers to the environmental variables as
"controlling the individual's variables", or pre-entry
training which will prepare an individual to "behave
functionally with respect to the new relevant variables
which will ultimately control his behavior".
A discussion of the philosophical premises of
Behaviorism or Neo-Behaviorism as compared with the
philosophies of other major systems of psychology would
be required to discuss the Eachus concepts in depth, and
would take us both unnecessarily and unrewardingly far
afield. We make the point about Eachus* s observation
and training proposal primarily because one finds that
his approach is implicit in the discussions and recom-
mendations of many others who address the topic of
culture shock, regardless of their particular philosophi-
cal assumptions concerning psychological behavior.





focussed on the host country environment , with its lack
of familiar cues, as the dominant factor in culture
shock, and that, while this emphasis is important, and
appears to explain what happens , it does not necessarily
reveal the cause ,
In other words, it would appear to be virtually
unquestionable that the culture shock is a function of
the absence of perceived familiar cues in the environ-
ment. To impute a causal characteristic to the environ-
ment, however, explicitly or implicitly, distracts
attention from the characteristics of the individual
entering the environment.
In Sternin's paper we find careful delineation
of a variety of behavioral responses classifiable as
active or passive shock reactions and/or adaptive
reactions. Distinguishing carefully between foreshock
and true culture shock, and between the manifestations
and intensities of each, he repeatedly emphasizes in one
form or another the importance of individual "response
styles". Pointing out that response style is intimately
tied to learning potential, and that currently little
is understood about the relationship, he suggests that





be able to develop methods for utilizing a knowledge of
response styles for educational purposes, and for incul-
cating habits which facilitate the learning process. As
would be expected from Sternin's own work in values and
value orientations, he would shift pre-entry training
emphases to those cultural adaptation processes reflected
in the cultural values to which the visitor and host
are respectively committed, the social roles with
which each is accustomed to work, and the response style
with which the visitor characteristically responds to
his experiences.
We unquestionably support this shift in focus
to the characteristic responses of the individual. We
have seen little in Sternin's own value study, however,
or in any of the research studies or conceptual hypo-
theses we have referenced in our previous chapters
which gives us reason to feel Sternin*s confidence that
"response style is so evident and so demanding of the
observer's attention, it naturally constitutes the pri-
mary source of evidence" for describing cultural adapta-
tions such as culture shock. We do not feel that his
own value study of rural South Vietnamese demonstrated





characteristics of given response styles make it possible
to discriminate them without difficulty from other
response styles . As we have suggested repeatedly, we
suspect a substantial amount of stereotyping in both
popular and professional approaches to "life styles".
What the Kluckhohn and Sternin studies do seem
to suggest is that intro-cultural variants may be much
more common than intercultural variants, that there is
more diversity of responses to life's demands among
individuals within given cultures than between
"characteristic responses" of members of two or more
given cultures. Our own lists of "inferred values"
derived from what South Vietnamese and Americans express
as desiderata in each other seems to us to suggest con-
siderable similarity in underlying values. Lists of
stereotype attributes which we cited from Baker and
others would likewise seem to suggest, both by way of
desirable and undesirable characteristics (for which we
believe one can validly read "desired and undesired"
characteristics ) attributed to members of the culture
being stereotyped by members of another culture, that
both the stereotyped and the stereotypers share the same






Sternin and others interpret as response styles reflect-
ing deep-rooted values are adequately distinguishable,
with available techniques, from observable behavior
patterns which are, in fact, though not to the degree
Eachus would aver, "determined" by the environment. Is
it necessary to see in bowed head and "praying hands"
posture different value interpretation of, hence,
response to, human nature from that expressed by a
handshake? Or is it possible that hygienic or similarly
prosaic, if unknown, reasons "lost in antiquity" can
account for the use of the bow?
Here we are led to the paucity of research
follow-through on Lasswell's symbols and myths we cited
previously. It seems fairly clear that we all say and
do things which are said and done because, presumably,
they have "always" been said and done that way in our
culture, and, since they have for the most part proved
practical, we continue the practices thereof. Apparently
the present vogue of male hair styles has certain sub-
cultural, ill-defined, ambiguous characteristics. Did
similar vogues have similar characteristics in the days
of national heroes like George Washington, Daniel Boone,









style a "response style 1*, a reflection of deep-rooted
values to which an individual is committed, and when is
it simply a reflection of practicality, weather conditions,
unavailability of grooming materials, current vogue,
advertising pressures, commercial interests, political
tactics, or whatever; and whenever it is any of these,
why should these environmental elements have the deter-
mining force that they have, and why should they have it
with some individuals and not with others, or to greater
and lesser degrees, etc.?
Culture Shock and Personality
Overemphasis on value response styles which are
difficult if not impossible to discriminate can lead to
inadequate emphasis on the study of the very individual
whom Sternin sees to be so important, and rightly, we
believe. When we do focus on the individual, we discover
that not only deep-rooted values to which he may be com-
mitted affect his responses to his environment, but
other personality dynamics of perhaps quite equal
importance
•
In respect to the latter, we are impressed by






personality. 99 Asubel makes a strong argument, both
theoretically and empirically by way of clinical observa-
tion, for variations in responses to life based on one's
recognition of or failure to recognize his own intrinsic
worth. If sure of his own stature (his worth apart from
externally attributed or acquired characteristics — his
worth as a human person), status has little impact on
his attitudes or behaviors. If unsure of his stature
,
he becomes totally dependent on status (externally attri-
buted or acquired worth).
In an earlier chapter, we suggested that none of
the elaborate explanations of culture shock with which
we are familiar seems to go beyond offering what is
essentially a construct , an intervening variable which
serves to label and make manageable for discussion pur-
poses the phenomenon which it does not in fact explain .
It seems to us that the Asubel description of personality
helps explain why some individuals respond as they do
to a loss of familiar cues, and why others do not. Status
is a highly relative thing. While reluctant to induce
the hackneyed allusion to the well-known potlatch
David Asubel, Personality Development (New





burnings of possessions (not because it is hackneyed,
but because of uncertainty that its full dimensions are
really understood), we suggest that it is a quick way to
recognize the relativity of possession as a status
symbol. Status depends very largely on a stable environ-
ment, in which extrinsic value is attached to the same
things (possessions, behavior, etc.) in the same way.
A loss of the familiar in the environment can very well
mean a loss of status. To the individual who measures
his worth exclusively in terms of status, the loss is
shattering. To the individual who measures his worth
in terms of stature, nothing significant is lost in the
loss of the familiar in the environment. Degrees of
responses to loss would be proportionate, therefore, to
the degree of security basically and habitually experi-
enced by the individual. One could certainly assume
a continuum of responses, in terms of degree of
intensity, without doing violence to the hypothesis we
have been proposing.
Sternin reports that his observations concerning
culture shock are based primarily on his experiences with
some 200 Peace Corps trainees, who are quite homogeneous




approximately similar age. An examination of Peace
Corps literature on culture shock and related adaptive
reactions seems to support the hypothesis we have formu-
lated (if very loosely) on the basis of Asubel's work in
personality development. We shall examine some of the
Peace Corps experience at this point. It is important
to note that our source materials, the Peace Corps litera-
ture on training volunteers for cross-cultural activities,
were developed as the result of a 1968 conference which
engaged in an "agonizing reappraisal" of all Peace Corps
approaches and experiences accrued to that date. Of
adaptive responses in general, we are told:
It is difficult enough to enter and gain
acceptance in any community, but the problems
are compounded when it is a community of another
culture. Effective community involvement is
still another problem. Some Volunteers "go
native", blend into the culture, and thus lose
their effectiveness. Others withdraw from the
community and involve themselves only in their
technical jobs. Some retain their American ways,
standards, and values, and appear to be oblivious
and inconsiderate of the local culture and cus-
toms. Others are an abrasive influence in the
community. Too few demonstrate understanding,
acceptance of, and respect for the local culture
and the ability to support growth, development,
creativity, and expansion of interests on the
part of peoples of the community, 500
5QQCross-Cultural and Community Invoovement Train-
ing , ut supra, pp, ix-x, (Subsequent references to this
volume will simply be cited ad passim , to avoid an unneces-





It is interesting to note that, presumably as a
result of evaluating these experiences, the latest Peace
Corps training manual approach to culture shock problems
emphasizes that remedies depend on the individual's own
actions . The environment is discussed not as a
determinant but as a frame of reference within which
the individual must determine his own behavioral patterns.
The training manual provides a useful list of
symptoms of culture shock, most of which are cumulative.
The more common symptoms listed arei
(1) Excessive concern over cleanliness, the
feeling that what is new and strange is dirty — water,
food, dishes, bedding, people (fear of physical contact),
(2) Feeling of helplessness (disorientation).
(3) Desire for something familiar (American
people, food, etc.)
(4) Excessive irritation from delays and other
minor frustrat ions
,
(5) Resistance to learning the language or
customs,




r n(7) Great concern over minor pains or eruptions
of the skinj heightened awareness of pains, feelings,
nausea, discomfort, etc,
(8) Longing to be home with relatives, family,
friends, etc,
(9) Feeling that everything around you is strange
and possibly forboding.
(10) Peeling that the people are strange, differ-
ent, possibly stupid, and somehow less than human,
(11) Generalized and roving hostility toward
people and environment (sudden bursts of inappropriate
anger at telephones, shopkeepers, etc)
An equally useful graph of desirable progress for
the "culturally shocked" individual to achieve in a host
country is also provided in the manual. (See Table V-l.)
Using several symptoms as a base (those of the above list
not included in the graph are considered effects, rather
than causes of the cumulative strain), the graph illus-
trates the kinds of progression considered desirable in
terms of the conviction that "Personal Change in response
to the new stimuli is shown as preferable and a goal" ,^ v
501 The language is interesting in light of the
Personal Response Project we have been studying. We shall
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Other symptoms and other progressions, it is noted, could
be suggested, but these are usefully demonstrative.
The tone of the currently recommended Peace
Corps training approach is inherent, as we see it, in a
single phrase — the importance of convincing the
individual of the possibility of learning that he "can
manage" in the new environment. Virtually all of the
manual's references to letters and statements of
"successful" Volunteers who have endured the initial
culture shock experience emphasize the feeling of "joy"
in learning that despite, and, in many cases, they
believe, because of , an environment's being stripped
of all familiar cues, they can still "manage". They
can eat unfamiliar foods, survive intense heat, live
"comfortably" aware of snakes, rats, insects, overcome
what were thought to be elemental physical fears. Above
all, however, is emphasized the joy — not merely of
learning to relate to others — but of learning that
they can learn to relate to others t in learning that
they are capable of friendships.
In Asubel's terms, this is the experience of
learning that one is not only loved, but capable of






because of his own intrinsic worth, his stature, rather
than his extrinsically attributed or achieved character-
istics (intelligence, good looks, "friendliness",
generosity, money, possessions, etc.) An examination of
the list of "symptoms" of culture shock given above
reveals that many of them are strikingly similar to the
personality characteristics of the "insecure" personality
chronically dependent on status. This is particularly
true of those symptoms which imply a situation of threat ,
or potential failure, which will reveal one's intrinsic
worthlessness and provoke rejection .
In these terms, it seems to us, culture shock can
be understood as c ounter-re jec tion , the habitual behav-
ioral pattern described by Asubel as characteristic of
those who, at all costs, must conceal their "worthless-
ness". By projecting blame in advance on others for
their own self-anticipated failures, they justify defense
reactions which make success impossible. In effect,
they never let themselves be observably tested by the
environment. They administer an a priori test to the
environment, as it were, and pronounce it a failure.
Why such individuals might seek Peace Corps or




the scope of our discussion, but, in passing, we might
suggest rather simply that they "need" the Peace Corps
as another status symbol, another demonstration of their
own worth — the very worth in which they disbelieve.
A glance at the chart of desired progression,
above, reveals interesting terminology. It is hoped, for
example, that an individual will come to feel "control"
over the environment and himself, that he will feel no
"personal threat" in transactions, and so on. A review
of some of the "critical incidents" we have previously
discussed, or have included in Appendix U — incidents
we obtained from chaplains, civilian officials, and
others experienced in South Vietnam, those collected by
McGonigal and others, and those contributed from still
other sources — seems to reveal this same concern with
being able or unable to control oneself and the
environment, and the question of "threat".
The present writer has witnessed the experiences
of many hundreds of young male civilians in Navy and
Marine Corps recruit training. The environment includes
many of the "culture shock" stimuli listed above as
found in the Peace Corps literature. Responses, as





as symptoms of culture shock. The present writer •s own
observations concur with those of the very many observers
who have likewise been involved in recruit training,
namely, that the "joy" of completion is less a function
of being relieved of the "torture" than of having learned
that one could "manage", could "face up", could success-
fully survive.
With no pretense at having conducted a controlled
study, in the scientific research sense, the present
writer has observed most particularly those whose prog-
ress through the recruit training cycle is significantly
delayed, as well as the behavior of those who drop out
completely, or who are discharged involuntarily from the
recruit training program. J In the Marine Corps recruit
training program, provision is made for "deviants" by
way of a "Special Training Battalion". Individuals who
fail to achieve prescribed standards during training,
whether physical or behavioral, are assigned for varying
periods to the Special Training Battalion, where instruc-
tion is intensified, physical problems given closer
attention, and so on. Absence from one's parent unit
502The writer was assigned to the Marine Corps







for more than a few days requires reassignment to another
unit in a less advanced phase of the training cycle.
Demonstrated inability or apparent unwillingness to
achieve the required standards within approximately the
30 day maximum period permitted in the Special Training
Battalion means discharge from the battalion into the
"Casual Company", the unit which exists for the sole
purpose of handling those "administratively unsuited"
to the Marine Corps, during the relatively brief period
of processing prior to discharge from the Marine Corps.
The writers personal observations, opportunities to
lecture to scores of recruits assigned to special classes
in the Special Training Battalion, personal interviews
with approximately 300 such individuals and other
"deviants", reading of psychiatric interview evaluations,
and discussions with others professionally involved in
the field, convince him that "stature-status" dynamics
are at work in the recruit training situation in signi-
ficantly similar fashion as that described above in
relation to "culture shock" in Peace Corps situations.
Our exploration of psychological dimensions of
the personality as intrinsic to the culture shock pheno-





no way suggests, of course, that value discrepancies are
not an important factor in culture shock situations. We
agree completely with Sternin's conviction and with that
repeatedly presented and supported by illustrations, if
not by "scientific" data in the Peace Corps literature,
that significant discrepancy between one's own values
and those perceived as the values of members of the host
culture can provoke very considerable "shock". The
handling of the discrepancies, we suspect, will depend
both on the status-stature dynamics discussed above and
the practical meaningfulness of one's own values.
Experience of missionaries of all faiths seems to
suggest, for example, that the individual to whom the
natural and supernatural worth of human persons is an
"overriding" value, or whose personal sense of security
combines with years of disciplined training in beliefs
and thought patterns which help him relate his experiences
to those of Christ, a saint, or some other religiously
and personally venerated being, is able to "take in
stride" a wide variety of situations which might well
induce acute and lasting culture shock in the insecure,
or those whose purely "secular" values, or agnosticism,





evaluating the situation in the light of "higher values",
may leave them vulnerable to the immediacies of the
situation, particularly if it is physically repulsive
or threatening. Perhaps the well-known story of Damian
and the initial work among the lepers of Molokai, until
his time widely feared by peoples of the Pacific Islands,
typifies the variables we are talking about. Experience
also indicates that the "higher values" need not be
supernaturally oriented. Dedication to country may
provide the "higher values"; a "cause" may suffice.
Another important aspect of value orientations
in the pre-entry set that Sternin refers to, and the
interaction within the host country itself, that
should not be given short shrift, involves an entire
system of learned responses toward others. We hardly
need the reports of controlled studies to recognize
that the individual who has habitually not stolen, not
destroyed property wantonly, not raped, or murdered, or
assaulted, and who has habitually been courteous to
others, given to the poor, respected authority, practiced
honesty — in other words, generally behaved in accord-
ance with the vague set of moral values that can prob-






probably not deviate habitually in every way from this
"life style" in another culture. That he will not
deviate in any way, or to any degree, is somewhat more
difficult to predict. The present writer has witnessed
Americans arriving in the "worst sections" of naval ports
throughout the world, where they are greeted by literally
hundreds of young ladies, indigenous to the local culture,
but thoroughly knowledgeable in what appear to be univer-
sally understood activities, and by merchants of every
form of behavioral opportunity. The Americans are
thousands of miles from familiar restraints, anonymous
in uniform, and in cultural contexts about which they
have been advised by seasoned peers as having totally
different "moral standards". Deviations from "traditional
norms" are somewhat less than unusual.
Unfortunate and destructive though this may be
in terms of the "American image", and desirable cross-
cultural interaction (and there is ample evidence of
its destructiveness), this differs from the total habi-
tual deviation that would appear to be more probable
on the part of those with no "traditional values", or
with learned patterns of habitual contempt for such






to demonstrate the postulate, but rather widespread
experience accrued by the armed services suggests that
there may well be a continuum on which one might "fix"
any individual in terms of his habitual pre-entry
pattern of "moral behavior", and reasonably estimate
that his post-entry behavior will approximate his
position on the continuum, with each pole as we have
described it above.
The very least we can say to support such an
hypothesis is that each of the Armed Services has main-
tained a rather elaborate program of "Character Education",
"Moral Leadership", or similarly labeled effort since the
late 19^-Os, in accordance with which all military per-
sonnel receive lectures, or participate in discussions,
or in some related fashion are exposed to an elucidation
of "moral principles", as these are presumably reflected
in the official documents defining the "American way of
life". These programs have been developed by way of
extensive, if not scientifically controlled research,
among many thousands of military personnel in virtually
every area of the world, and at all levels of military
operation. Comparisons have been made between "moral







military training programs, operating forces, and so on.
Logistic, financial, and policy support has been con-
sistently based on the pragmatic belief that in some way
or other "good" moral behavior correlates positively with
"good" military performance on a M long-range basis", and
that "bad" moral behavior adversely affects military
operating efficiency (time lost in man hours for treat-
ment of venereal diseases, drunkenness, etc., distrust
generated in a military unit by the presence of a thief,
damage to the military image by way of bizarre behavior,
lawsuits, paternity cases, etc.).* ^ In other words,
pragmatically-oriented officials at every level, both
civilian and military, have invested significant numbers
of man hours and large sums of money in programs based
on some type assumed relationship between "traditional
5 ^The present writer, as previously noted, was
a member of a "research team in 195^# then administra-
tively responsible for the planning and implementing of
"research" and the development of training materials for
the United States Navy and Marine Corps, from 1955 to
i960, during which period he established and supervised
several teams working simultaneously in various parts of
the world. Research was largely of the participant-
observer type, buttressed by frequent consultations with
investigators in various disciplines. All these activi-
ties and the training programs which ensued were in behalf
of the assumption of a positive correlation between the
practice of "traditional moral standards" and military






moral behavior" and military effectiveness. Moreover,
regulations underlying this conviction have been in the
official statutes of American armed forces ab initio .
The point we are making is that we by no means
disavow the importance of value orientations as dimensions
of cross-cultural interaction, and, indeed, we strongly
support the notion that they are in some way related to
the handling of culture shock. But we are equally inter-
ested in the point that this relationship has not been
empirically demonstrated by controlled scientific
research. That the American public takes such a relation-
ship for granted even in our current moral milieu is
evident from concern expressed about the allegations in
respect to the purported "massacre" of South Vietnamese
at My Lai, in 1968.
Eachus's remarks beyond his reference to culture
shock address the issues of criteria for effectiveness
and the desirability of self-confrontation as a cross-
cultural interaction training technique. Both of these
issues admit of treatment more appropriately in conjunc-
tion with the paper we turn to next, that reflecting the
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Training for Leadership in Cross-Cultural Dialogue
Not only the title but the entire thrust of
this paper by Bryant Wedge is on leadership. This fact
subjects it, of course, to all the remarks about leader-
ship appearing previously in this paper, predicated on
the various studies that have been cited. Wedge offers
neither a definition nor a "theory" of leadership, as
such, so that it is impossible to learn from his paper
how he might be classified in terms of any of the con-
cepts or "findings" we have discussed. While there is
nothing we can do about this omission, in respect to
examining his theoretical positions on cross-cultural
interaction, it is important to make at least two
points i (1) the immense amount of leadership literature
available and the multiplicity of casual references to
leadership might evoke the assumption that a reasonable
number of empirically demonstrated principles have been
defined beyond reasonable controversy; (2) Wedge's
emphasis on training leaders in cross-cultural interaction
would seem to imply that training huge numbers of
"followers" is impossible or impractical. We shall





them space sufficient to distract from an analysis of
the paper in general*
In I960, the present writer attempted a synthe-
sis of significant leadership literature extant at the
time, and reviewed the state of leadership research,
particularly that conducted under Defense Department or
individual military service contracts (a very large
percentage of the total ).5°^
Except for fairly extensive agreement on classi-
fication of leadership theories into those focusing on
traits, or characteristics of the leader, those arguing
that the leader makes the group, and those which main-
tain that the group makes the leader (emergent
leadership), little else reported had won widespread
support. 505 The citations of current literature on
leadership appearing in earlier chapters of this pre-
sent work suggest that little progress toward unanimity
of theory has been achieved in the past ten years.
5°^John J. O'Connor, Psychology of Naval Leader-
ship (Washington, D.C.t Department of the Navy, Bureau
of Naval Personnel, i960) (Manuscript publication for
internal distribution.
)
See Roger Bellows, Creative Leadership
(Princeton, N.J.i Prentice-Hall, 1959)t for one of a





Evidence must be considered lacking, therefore, for
assuming that any set of leadership hypotheses has been
firmly established by empirical research or is so gen-
erally accepted by leadership theorists that it has
at least face-value utility.
The second point of importance involves an entire
approach to training in cross-cultural interaction. The
military services and other agencies of the Government,
including the Peace Corps, have the problem and respon-
sibility of preparing individuals for assignment over-
seas in a highly self-dependent category. Time, facili-
ties, personnel, and the other resources required for
appropriate training may be made available with relative
ease for such training (although they are not necessar-
ily made available). The overwhelming burden of the
military services, however, is to orient thousands or
hundreds of thousands of personnel for service overseas.
As we noted in the approach of McGonigal and his
colleagues, it was hoped and intended that attitude
surveys of Marines and Navy personnel in South Vietnam
would serve to identify "opinion leaders", and the
investigators believed themselves to be applying Rogers*
diffusion of innovation theory in their efforts to iden-




see evidence that they applied Rogers 1 theory, or that
their surveys yielded the data necessary to identify
opinion leaders, even were clear-cut definitions of
"opinion leaders" available.)
Is it Wedge's assumption that opinion leaders
can be identified, and his further assumption that in
training these we provide resources for training the
"followers"? What are the criteria for selecting leaders
for the training? What techniques can they use with
followers? Are we to settle for "watering-down" of
the teaching and learning process the farther we get
away from the initial leader trainees? Is the highly
elaborate DA-TA model he offers totally inapplicable to
the training of, let us say, 50,000 men within a time
frame of three months, six months, one year?
It is this kind of question which continually
plagues the research, and the apparent unavailability
of considered replies that frustrates him in examining
both the pure and applied research projects reported
and the theoretical literature. It is the annoying,
"nuts-and-bolts" kind of question that we believe has
important implications both practically and theoretically.
Most investigators in the field seem to be sincerely con-




Americans for cross-cultural interaction, yet give
little explicit evidence that they are willing to
address the immensely practical problem of preparing
huge numbers of Americans almost simultaneously We find
ourselves in considerable sympathy with McGonigal's
appeal to the American Psychological Association.
While millions of dollars are being spent on
hardward development, software funds are spent
almost solely on investigation — not on training
development,
,
We need pioneers who are willing to
come out of their shells and take stabs at design-
ing training models to modify attitudes between
races and national groups. We beg for help in the
area of mass media programmed instruction . We
have the largest adult audience in the world. We
have already available millions of man-hours of
training. The audience is waiting. The time is
available. Almost any sensitivity model which
could be programmed with mass media would turn the
current abuse of this opportunity into life saving
usefulness. Specifically, we desire (cross-
cultural interaction concepts) cranked into train-
ing models for no less than 400 men at a time .506
(Underlining ours.)
While we do not agree with McGonigal that "almost
any sensitivity model" would be useful, we do aver that
the most elegant theory is relatively useless for the
purposes he describes unless its assumptions address the
needs of training very large numbers of subjects at
any given time. Nor, as we suggested above, do we see





this merely as a practical problem. We see it also as a
legitimate question to ask of the theorist. Is he being
honest in setting the parameters of his theoretical
investigations and supportive research at certain limits,
then permitting hopes and encouraging visions about the
applications of his hypotheses, empirical data and recom-
mended techniques to problems far exceeding the limita-
tions imposed on his work by his own parameters?
Again we return to the notions outlined in our
introductory chapter. We think these questions neither
petty nor obsessive. The Eachus paper included a direct
answer t
I doubt if much could be gained in this step
of analysis (analyzing the purposes for being
overseas) if we are dealing with combat troops,
however. It's very easy to see why they are
overseas. They shoot bullets, and drop bombs,
and fire rockets and so on. I further doubt that
much could be done about their behavior to
increase "understanding between the peoples of
the world" or any other cliche that comes to
mind. 507
We disagree sharply with the Eachus statement, but
it is a very clear definition of his approach to preparing
individuals for cross-cultural interaction. We consider
it a gratuitous statement, but a statement that saves us






a great deal of time. If Eachus's theoretical formula-
tions are in fact based on this assumption, and his
empirical work employs it as a parameter, then we have
more data on which to base a decision than is given us
by those who describe in detail their investigations and
findings within deliberately limited contexts, but offer
them as very probably applicable to our much broader
needs. If we were to consider seriously the adoption
of the Eachus theoretical position and the teaching
techniques he recommends in conjunction with that posi-
tion, then we have almost by definition decided to con-
centrate exclusively on individuals being prepared for
highly individualized tasks.
Leaving, now, what we consider to be as crucial
an unanswered question as any to appear in the field of
cross-cultural interaction, we must address three other
important questions in the Wedge model. First, is his
usage of "intercultural" (or "distinctive cultures") and
"cross-cultural" in a relatively univocal fashion; the
second involves his assumption about the contingencies
of cultural change and multi-culture contact; the third
relates to his assertions about the inhibitive nature







We, ourselves, have used the terms intercultural
and cross-cultural univocally in several contexts in the
present work, particularly in conjunction with our dis-
cussion of culture shock. We believe, however, that our
usates singled out specific behavioral elements which
appear to be operative in any cultural milieu. We can
not pretend empirical evidence that this is so. Wedge ?s
usage, however, seems to imply that the distinctions
between cultures within what we generally think of as
the one, general social system (in the broad, Parsonian
sense of the terra), are the same in kind as distinctions
between cultures which are virtually synonymous with
general social systems. More simply i Wedge seems to
imply that the distinctions between rich and poor in
Kansas City are the same in kind as the differences
between the United States and Egypt. This assumption
seems to lead, in turn, to his emphasis on teaching
process in intercultural or corss-cultural communication.
(Another reason for the emphasis will be discussed below,
)
The more common terminology, of course, speaks
of "sub-cultures" within a culture, which is itself





even, in many cases, the nation-state. Classifying
Americans as ghetto dwellers, industrialists, white
collar workers, blue collar workers, capitalists, members
of professions, Jews, et al. , is a way of saying that
among the millions whose "life styles" reveal what it
means culturally to be an American, in various covert
and overt behaviors they reveal distinguishing character-
istics which somehow set them apart from one another.
Again we might find it possible to "fix" each sub-culture
on a continuum, the poles of which would be "most
American" and "least American", or even "American" and
"Un-American", in accordance with some exceedingly vague
but commonly used frame of reference. (Would it still
be white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant?) In the literature
at large, in turn, sub-cultural differences are treated
in a different frame of reference from that used to
discuss differences between cultures.
We are not really taking issue with Wedge on
this usage. We are emphasizing its importance — its
theoretical and practical implications. We have prev-
iously cited an interesting phenomenon. By their own
claim, by agreement of multiple observers, and by the




that the " ordinary*1 young male American Marines (and
Navy corpsmen) with relatively little formal training
for the purposes, relatively "average" educational back-
ground (high school or less), extremely limited language
preparation, and no demographic variables thus far dis-
cerned which distinguish them from any other individuals
of their age, education, etc., seem to interact effec-
tively and harmoniously, for the most part, with
Vietnamese Popular Forces in Combined Action Platoons,
and with related Vietnamese civilians. We have cited
this apparent fact several times. We shall look at the
situation now through the perspective of a I968-I969
study of the CAP program 1 Marine Combined Action
Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience . 5°° This study
included in-depth interviews of some 50 Marine veterans
of Vietnam associated with or knowledgeable about the
program, as the first stage of research. The second
stage included interviewing of some k?5 Americans and
k?5 Vietnamese in Vietnam, of whom, in turn, more than
200 Americans were actually functioning in CAPs and
more than 135 Vietnamese Popular Forces were doing the





same. Of the above number, likewise, 280 were Vietnamese
villagers in CAP areas.
Investigators spent periods in the field as
participant-observers with CAP units, administered
instruments to collect demographic data and analyzed
an attitude survey regularly administered by the Director
of the CAP program to CAP Marines terminating their tour
of duty.
The investigators report that attitudes of
Vietnamese villagers toward the Marines and relationships
between CAPs and villagers are generally excellent, with
few exceptions. Illustrative Vietnamese descriptions,
acquired both by formal interview and by "eavesdropping",
might be best reflected in the words of the hamlet chief
who had been upset by rumors that the local CAP unit
was to be transferred, and who pleaded with the research-
ers to emphasize to both Vietnamese and American officials
that the CAP unit was desperately needed where it was.
It is only because of the CAP team that the
people dare stake everything on planting their
crops on this land. If the CAP team leaves, it
will probably all be in vain, and maybe the
people will leave, too. If the CAP team is^t
here, we are too weak, and there is nothing I
can do. 509






In response to the questionnaire administered
by the Director of the CAP program to American Marines
terminating their tour with CAP units, 130 of 160
respondents stated that "the people of my hamlet/village"
were either very anxious, or pleased to have the CAP
there 1 138 stated that they think the Vietnamese people
are wonderful, very good, or pretty good (with only 21
statingj "Not the kind of people I like.")i 123 stated
that they believe PFs and Marines in the CAPs get along
very well or o,k. (with only 2 saying they don't get
along at all); and 120 stated that they respect a
Popular Force member as a person, or think he is o.k.
(with only 5 saying they did not care for him at all).-*
The investigators found thati
The basically decent and humane behavior of
the American personnel improves the people's
regard for American troops and dispels myths
about the brutal American aggressors. These last
two factors may provide the villager with his
first evidence that the Americans or even his
own government are concerned about his welfare
• • • (and, interestingly) Association with the
"militarily rich and powerful" Americans elevates
the PF*s status in his own and other eyes.5H
" The findings are quite similar to McGonigal
findings cited previously, especially in the apparent
tendency of Marines to like Vietnamese civilians better
than they like the military and para-military forces.






Now what kind of individual is it who interacts
in the fashion reflected by the responses cited above
(and by the McGonigal findings of similar nature)?
Allnutt states
i
In particular it should be noted that no-
where in this list (of requirements for effec-
tive CAP performance) is the requirement for
sophisticated knowledge of inter-cultural
relations. Though such talents might be useful,
the CAP Marine does not need to be the linguist,
sociologist, psychologist, expert on economic
development, and saint that many observers have
thought was required. In fact, the most basic
aspects of his mission could be conducted (and
often are ) with only a minimum of interaction
between Marine and villager. The prime benefits
of the operation are derived simply from the
villagers' observation of the Marines working
with the PP in his defense. What is_ needed,
rather than a genius and jack-of-all-trades,
is a good Marine , as evaluated by the same
standards that have been applied throughout
Marine Corps history — that is, a superior
fighting man and a gentleman. 51
2
The Allnutt sampling was taken of the same
Marines (or associates of the same Marines) interviewed
by the present writer in Vietnam in latter 1969» and
representative, as well, of those surveyed by McGonigal,
and those whose taped interviews were analyzed by the
present writer, as previously noted. All findings appear






synopsizing by the comment so frequently repeated by
CAP Marines concerning the Vietnamese i "When you get
to know them, they're no different from us ."
Now if we interpret correctly the concept we
believe to be basic to the above findings (particularly
as reflected in the underlined comment), we seem to
find support for Wedge's univocal usage of intercultural
and cross-cultural and the assumption this usage
represents — that there is no difference in kind
between what divides groups from one another in a
given culture and what divides one given culture from
another. If this be the case, Wedge appears to be
quite justified in emphasizing process in teaching
intercultural (cross-cultural) interaction skills.
What Wedge calls "contrast" sub-communities
(contrasted by distinction from normal community
environment of trainees) in or near the Fairfield,
Connecticut, area where he conducts his intercultural
leadership training program, include a State Police
unit, a motorcycle gang, a walled convent, a private
mental hospital, a Spanish-speaking neighborhood, a
small-town Chamber of Commerce, a middle-class neighbor-







group, decision-making officials of a broadcast
corporation, a professional football team, a black
ghetto, Alcoholics Anonymous, the world of a blind New
York eccentric known as Moon-Dog, an addict haven, a
John Birch cell, and a number of others. His emphasis
is on the technical challenges involved in gaining access
to these groups and participating in accordance with
the DA-TA model steps outlined in our synopsis of his
paper. The assumption seems to be, as we have been
noting, that differences between these sub-communities
is equivalent to differences between cultures, and that
therefore the training in processes of accession and
sequential steps of interaction applicable to approach-
ing these sub-communities is applicable to cross-
cultural interaction situations.
The Vietnam findings we have cited seem to
support this proposition in that "ordinary" Americans
in unfamiliar physical environments, in continuing
danger, and under stress conditions we have previously
described, seem to find rural South Vietnamese "pretty
much like us, once you get to know them". But are the
circumstances truly equivalent? Is the trainee in the







from the familiar environmental cues so widely referenced
in respect to culture shock? Is he in equivalent physi-
cal danger? Is he in equivalent "stress" circumstances
(not knowing whom to trust, etc.), in equivalent primi-
tive living conditions? In other words, are the cir-
cumstances of the "ordinary" American in a CAP unit in
South Vietnam sufficiently paralleled by the Wedge
trainees' circumstances to permit findings about the
first group to be applied to the second, hence, to
support the hypothesis that intercultural, in the Wedge
usage of the term, equals cross-cultural? We do not
know, and Wedge does not tell us. We are forced to
conclude that this question, too, likewise crucial in
conceptualizing an approach to cross-cultural interaction,
is raised, but unanswered within the conceptual structure
of the Wedge paper.
We move on to the question of cultural change
and multi-cultural contacts. Telling us that the com-
plexity of enduring natural systems of culture is such
that definitive analysis or prediction of the conse-
quences of cross-cultural interaction between any two
societies with any degree of certainty is precluded, he





plan for contingencies of culture change and multi-
culture contact. The only thing that can be said with
confidence is that whenever cultural contact programs
are deliberately initiated there will be unexpected
responses on both sides of the interaction, so that
preparation for cross-cultural interaction must emphasize
the interaction process itself. Constant and continuous
attention paid to the data of ongoing experiences, he
observes will encourage reciprocally good results and
minimize friction. We consider this an honest, helpful
statement. We are not sure, however, whether it is help-
ful in terms of admonishing us to consider the ongoing
change factor in a culture as a critically important
variable in developing training programs, or helpful
in suggesting the practical impossibility of such
training programs. Wedge's comment follows immediately
his statement that while "established and traditional
cultures break down and fall into disorganization, all
cultures display remarkable coherence and continuity so
that distinctive historic identity persists through
vast change and upheaval" • * ^ Further, he reminds us





that culture-systems involve a multiplicity of elements
in constant interaction, and that in contemporary times
all cultures are changing, reacting selectively to
accidents of history which affect them and to experienced
contact with other peoples.
Examination of all extensive American inter-
action with other cultures today suggests that the very
circumstances of such interaction are heavily weighted
with "modernizing** elements, whether economic or
military. If we have a large aggregate of Americans
in any area of the world we find them engaged in build-
ing dams, factories, or similar industrial and commer-
cial units, or in activities related to war. Not only
are the Americans change agents, as we have discussed
previously, but their very presence occurs today only
after the winds of change have blown in the host culture
itself. In other words, Americans entering host cultures
enter a culture already changed in some way, or the
Americans would not be entering, by invitation or in
any other form. (We are not speaking of Admiral Perry's
entering Japan, or a cultural anthropologist's studying
a New Guinea tribe. These are quite different circum-









Have we any criteria for evaluating the degree
of overall societal or cultural system change and the
proportionate weights and relevancies of interacting
elements and intercultural forces within the cultural
system? If we have criteria, have we techniques for
applying them? This is another of those important areas
in which theory and practice merge into substantially
the same set of questions.
In the midst of the immense complexities of
today's Vietnam, where we are concerned with hundreds
of thousands of Americans and millions of South Vietnam-
ese, where all the forces of change induced politically,
economically, militarily, and in so many areas of life
by the facts of war (the building of bases, etc.,
as discussed previously), can we reasonably hope to
develop inputs from the "data of ongoing experience"
that Wedge considers essential, in such fashion that
they could meaningfully guide our training efforts in
terms of cross-cultural interaction? Wedge says that
his trainees come to recognize that the essentials of
interacting processes are the same, regardless of the
diversity of sub-communities involved, and that the
exchange of experiences in the training group rapidly






confronted with the tremendous differences between
working with small groups and working with huge numbers
of people?
We find no difficulty in accepting the fact that
individual trainees can come to recognize, through their
own experiences and through exchange of information with
others, what appear to be common demoninators in the
processes of interaction in their milieu. We strongly
suspect that, despite the emphasis on process, they
come to recognize, too, rather readily, the samenesses
and differences in content in various sub-communities,
and that this knowledge is at least supportive. Is
this opportunity practically available in the circum-
stances confronting huge numbers of Americans in the
kind of interaction we have been discussing? Have we
the means, once again, to identify changes and persis-
tences in the cultural system, and the internal changes
which mean constantly shifting interactions between
sub-cultures and the cultural system, with resultant
changes in both, to transmit identification of such
changes, and their implications, to trainees, as "data
of ongoing experience", and develop and modify cultural







Again we believe that the Wedge paper raises a
critical question its own theoretical formulations do
not answer. Do we settle for what the CAP studies seem
to reveal — that no sophisticated training is really
needed? That the "average" American, trained as a
"traditional Marine" , who conducts himself as a gentle-
man, can and probably will interact quite effectively
and harmoniously with rural South Vietnamese, and, by
extrapolation, probably with peoples of other cultures,
as well? The paper does not provide an answer.
The third of the three questions we proposed
concerns the inhibitive nature of "knowledge" about
culture and communication acquired in the absence of
experience. Wedge says that such "knowledge" impedes
adaptation processes essential to the skill. He gives
illustrations from domestic situations, such as the
training of door-to-door salesmen (an untrained group
outsold a pre-trained group after a short period of
learning "the hard way" on the job), and international
situations, such as that of the 1956 Suez crisis. (The
British applied 50 years of experience in the Middle
East and accompanying expertise in Arab cultures,







taken place after 19^5* The United States went in
relatively "cold", with new observers with fresh views.
Conclusion! The United States recognized that support-
ing Anglo-French intervention would probably provoke
massive internal war.
)
On a more individual basis, Wedge describes what
happens to those truly expert in the language and
culture of host countries when events contradict estab-
lished expectations. He tells, for example, of an
American diplomat, who successfully replaced an expert
who had become persona non grata in a Mideast country.
The diplomat's success was attributed to his having
been trained in another culture area, so that he did
not enter the Mideast country wearing the blinders of
thinking he knew what was happening there. (Wedge
quotes Whitehead's "The man with a method good for
purposes of his dominant interests, is a pathological
case in respect to his wider judgment • • • "
)
Wedge includes in the general context of these
comments the question of language training (he "permits"
a maximum vocabulary of 100 words of language training
for the trainee entering another culture). In dis-







concerning language training. We turn, now, to the
Allnutt CAP study previously cited, both for its find-
ings about the language issue in South Vietnam and its
findings in respect to the general argument Wedge is
presenting here.
The Allnutt report tells us that there is nothing
more frequently cited as a need than language ability
in the CAPs, and, although the study itself finds that
the major CAP mission can be accomplished with minimal
language ability, it is true that inability to communi-
cate through the language is an extremely frequent
source of difficulty, both in terms of the interpersonal
relationships and of the secondary CAP missions, civic
action, psychological operations, etc. Allnutt then
observes:
The casual visitor to a CAP may be misled
by what appears to be a certain level of fluency
exhibited by about half of the CAP Marines, who
seem to joke and exchange comments with Vietnamese
quite naturally. An observer who speaks Vietnam-
ese himself, however, will soon begin to notice
that vocabulary used in such interchanges is
extremely limited and that the content of such
communications is restricted to very ordinary
phrases common to the environment that are used
repetitively. Most Marines who appear to "get
along" in Vietnamese in fact know only about 50
words. Such minimal language ability is put to
the test, and fails, just when it is most needed
— in times of crisis, when feelings run high





less carefully — shattering the communication
bridge between American and Vietnamese .51^-
The Allnutt findings in respect to language,
then, might be said both to support and disagree with
the Wedge postulate. The "50 word" average fits within
Wedge's 100 word limitation. More importantly, it seems
to be in part the problem of thinking they know the
language well enough to "get along" that traps the
Americans, and creates interaction problems in crises.
On the other hand, one might argue that had they
been truly pre-trained in the Vietnamese language, they
would not have experienced the difficulties, and would
not have been depending on a skill they thought they
had, but did not have.
A more significant finding, perhaps, both in
respect to the Wedge argument against pre-training in
cultural content, and in regard to our own interests
in the Personal Response Project approach, particularly
as advocated by the Mole reports, is reported in the
following, which we believe merits somewhat lengthy
quotation.




The personal response program • • • has
provided a wealth of data on Vietnamese customs,
religions, and general perceptions, some of
which is presented in lectures • • • in the CAP
school. Responses from Marines • • • give a
resounding approval for these lectures — most
Marines (as many as 75%) say that these were
the most enjoyable and useful classes given. . . 51 ->
The personal response studies have generated
a number of little-known facts about Vietnamese
life and facets of the American/Vietnamese
interface which are of great value to researchers
and planners. But when this wealth of material
is boiled down into a series of lectures designed
to affect the attitude of young newcomers to the
country, the result is too often a list of "do's
and dont's" that may or may not be meaningful
or even valid on an individual basis. Students
are instructed, for example, not to pat children
on the head (because the head is sacred) or to
point their foot at anyone (because this is
considered insulting).
While these may be thought of as "good manners"
in Vietnam, they are not by any means universally
observed. When the student subsequently observes
Vietnamese breaking these "rules" themselves, he
is disenchanted, and tends to reject the entire
content of the lectures (most of which is valid)
• • • Even more fundamental is the fact that non-
observance of "good manners" (on the trivial
level) is not frequently the cause of much discord
in Vietnam — the Vietnamese are quite accustomed
to foreign barbarians and expect them to act
differently. Real problems arise from the breach
of more basic and universal standards of conduct.
The Vietnamese is angered by the same actions that
would anger an American — he doesn't want his
mother insulted or ridiculed, he doesn't want you
to throw apple cores at his father, and so on.
In addition, the Vietnamese are perhaps more
~1
^ ^This finding is supported by our own inter-





attuned to "feelings" than are most Americans,
and if, in conversation, the American is
preoccupied with which way his feet are point-
ing and trying to look shorter than his counter-
part or keep his hands of his hips, that counter-
part is going to notice merely that the American
is distracted for some unknown reason and is
acting somewhat less than naturally — and he
will wonder why .516, 51
7
Allnutt goes on to discuss what the investigators
found to be even more subtly damaging, namely, that
reciting long lists of local peculiarities has the
overall effect of giving Americans the impression that
Vietnamese are silly and childish, and somehow "dumb",
an expression reinforced by tones of voice used by
instructors which seem to suggest racist attitudes most
counterproductive. In other words, the effort to
familiarize Americans with the local scene by content
instruction results in their developing supercilious
and disparaging attitudes toward the people about whom
they are being given the "knowledge" for harmonious
interaction.
The Allnutt report concludes that most inter-
personal problems are of a general nature, involving
5l6Bruce C. Allnutt, op.cit. , pp. 53-5^.
*
'See our concluding remarks in an earlier








essentially a display of attitudes upsetting to anyone
anywhere, and that, therefore, the lists of taboos should
be replaced by lectures and exercises on the basics of
"good manners and gentlemanly behavior".
The findings seem to lend strong support to
Wedge's argument about the inhibitive nature of "know-
ledge" without true cultural experience. It would seem
that such knowledge may inhibit processes of adapting
in ways required to learn essential skills.
From this point on we shall cite briefly the
points of special interest and apparent utility for
our purposes in the Wedge paper. (References are to
page numbers in the present manuscript.)
We note that Wedge uses "critical incidents"
primarily to help trainees recognize the ambiguities,
signals, and meanings in their intercultural environ-
ment, and that, once the concept of ambiguity is achieved,
they are ready for exposure to the five major theoretical
propositions of cross-cultural communication. D These
propositions seem to us to embody the principal teach-
ings of most of the observers we have referenced through-
out this text in respect to the general nature and





characteristics of culture systems. The fourth proposi-
tion is of some special interest because it defines
"communityH as a boundary-maintaining system of social
organization within which individuals identify them-
selves as members and perceive non-members as outsiders
.
This emphasis accords with our earlier discussion of
"outsiders" • A further note in this particular proposi-
tion is that membership in the political community sub-
jects members to authoritative discipline, Lasswell
and others, of course, define political power in basic-
ally this fashion — legitimacy in the exercise of dis-
cipline.
The dialogue and action experiences in "contrast"
cultures outlines as six steps in the DA-TA model are
all logical applications of the conceptual postulates
Wedge establishes, so that they require no evaluation
from a theoretical viewpoint. In practical terms, many
of them seem to reflect commonplace experience. Other
facets of their practicality will be discussed later
in relation to training programs in general.
An important emphasis in respect to the most
critical step of the experience, however, access to the




simplified because everyone involved recognizes from
the outset that the communicator is an outsider * It
will be recalled that some of the adaptive reactions
identified by some observers (e.g., Sternin, Peace Corps
officials, and others) include, on the one hand,
withdrawal from the host culture, and, on the other,
trying to become a true member of the host culture, and
withdrawal from one^ parent culture. Both reactions,
and they are expressed in various forms, (civilian
officials whose debriefing reports we have referenced
above discuss the temptation to "withdraw" into an
"American conclave — a common occurrence that we
have witnessed among military personnel overseas), are
self-defeating. In Wickert's paper on institution
building, synopsized in this chapter, we find reference
to a Ford Foundation study by George Gant which faults
the "foreign consultant" who lives, works, plays,
transports himself, etc., apart from the local peoples.
5
1 9
What seems to us important in the Wedge emphasis is the
clear definition of the communicator as an outsider .
but defined with the apparent understanding and approval
of all involved.
^^The reference in Wickert's paper is to George
F. Gant, "The Institution Building Project", in Interna-






Related to the "outsider" role explicated in the
access step is the requirement seen in the exploration
step for the communicator to lay aside his own interests
and purposes and attempt to identify the interests,
concepts, and concerns of the host community. The
question he must ask is not one of how to induce change
from outside, but what the community wants. This, of
course, is a continuing issue for political, economic,
and military "advisors" overseas, as we have previously
noted.
Wedge's discussion of the interest-interaction
step suggests close parity with Wickert's requirement
for institution building. An institutionalized or
continuing process must be developed which is "bigger
than both parties" , and which will survive the personal
relationships terminated by time and events. This
question of termination stressed by Wedge is equally
important. Examination of both French and American
involvement in Vietnam indicates the immense historical
implications of entrance into a society on an open-end
basis, without predetermined "rules of engagement" and
reasonably well-defined terminal points. The current
520por S ome of these historical implications, see
John J. O'Connor, A Chaplain Looks at Vietnam , Chapter It





anguish of attempted withdrawal of large numbers of
American forces from South Vietnam is too well known for
discussion here. What may be less evident, however, but
observed at first hand by the present writer and many
observers in similar positions, is the critical question
of trust which affects all interaction between Americans
and Vietnamese because of the "termination" issue. The
writer has seen as many as ten thousand Vietnamese
refugees leave Viet-Cong controlled areas and come into
American controlled areas because promised what they
construe as oantinuing , or permanent , security. He has
witnessed many indidivual Vietnamese provide intelligence
to Americans about enemy movements on the assumption that
the American presence would be permanent enough to
assure protection from future reprisal by the enemy.
Within the past two years, in light of these and similar
attitudes and behaviors, he has observed the development
of intense anxiety among Vietnamese about what they
fear to be American intentions to withdraw. We need
attempt no military or political judgment about the
situation to see revealed in it critical problems in





Perhaps no evaluation of Wedge *s theoretical
framework could be more appropriate than the one he pro-
vides himself concerning the "state of the art" in
general — that the combined social sciences have
only crude and fragmentary knowledge of the issues we
have been discussing, and know only enough to make a
start on a systematic approach to still poorly-mapped
territory.
An Analysis of Cross-Cultural Interaction
and Its Implications for Training
Triandis lays heavy emphasis on the role of
stereotyping in cross-cultural contact. We have dis-
cussed the general nature of stereotyping sufficiently
in this manuscript, and have cited enough studies con-
cerning it, that further comment is unnecessary. The
specific applications Triandis makes of the role of
stereotyping, however, do require discussion. We shall
discuss his hypotheses without discussing the highly
complex questions implicitly introduced by his refer-
ences to the laws of motor skills,
Triandis* first hypothesis is that in super-
ficially similar cultural situations, negative stereo-





dissimilar cultural situations. The problem is again
one of expectations. Because a second culture "looks"
like a familiar one, an individual expects familiar
behavior.
This hypothesis aligns well with Wedge's argument
that "knowledge" of a culture without action experience
in the culture inhibits the skill-development process,
and seems to be supported to the same degree the Wedge
postulate is supported by the findings about CAP units
in Vietnam that we cited. By the same token, both
Triandis and Wedge may be resolving the paradox of why
Marines in CAP units (and therefore closest to the
rural South Vietnamese environment) generally adapt
so well and interact so harmoniously. It may be, if
we apply the Triandis-Wedge argument, that they manage
so well because the culture is superficially so different
from their own. Perhaps, because they do not enter
Vietnam with the blinders Wedge refers to of thinking
they are going into a familiar or understood culture,
they succeed.
This concept may be a real "find" in our inves-
tigation of conceptual approaches to cross-cultural
interaction. It has many ramifications; we shall glance
l_yery briefly at two. _[
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One: If we were able to measure the pre-entry
attitudes of those CAP Marines who did not believe that
they really knew anything about Vietnamese culture,
would we find that these were the individuals who not
only interacted successfully, but who came to believe,
"They're no different from us, when you get to know
them"? Does this repeatedly-expressed sentiment,
invariably accompanied by the latter dependent clause,
reflect that those who enter the culture with the
attitudes we described above are, by virtue of that
mental set, in a position to discover "basic" similari-
ties in peoples beneath the dissimilarities? Do the
words "when you get to know them" actually signify in
a very deep sense what they popularly connote?-* 21
Two: Does the hypothesis tell us theoretically
what Allnutt's findings seem to tell us empirically —
~1
5 21 ln a lengthy personal discussion with the
author of the novel Anna and the King of Siam (The King
and I), we learned that she had developed the notes for
the novel over a period of ten years as a Methodist
medical missionary nurse in Siam (Thailand). During
these years, she says, she spent parts of almost every
day sitting and talking with local women in little
hamlets, establishing v/hat she considered to very "real"
and '" natural" relationships, and talking "woman talk",
about making meals, keeping house, taking care of chil-
dren, etc. In brief, she felt she came to "know" the
Siamese, and found them "basically the same" as
Americans, particularly with the same emotions, anxieties,






that some of the Mole-based type of training is counter-
productive? Must those Marines who do come to "know"
the Vietnamese and do come to interact successfully
first have to unlearn what they had been taught via
*>22
some of the Mole-based materials?^
Triandis* next several hypotheses are inter-
related, and while they are based on the postulate that
cross-cultural training is very specific, they propose
the possibilities of transferring skills within limited
cultural areas. The basic hypothesis here again seems
to accord with the Wedge postulates we have been
discussing, Triandis 1 illustration of the improved
facility for learning French that comes with an existing
facility in, e.g., Italian, reflects a common experience.
The Problem of negative transfer in the same field is
likewise a common experience. Many of us have exper-
ienced the embarrassment of mistakes, tongue-twisting
incidents, use of inappropriate expressions, etc., when
* This possibility certainly deserves investi-
gation. In its regard, we still have a paradox. If it
is the case, why do Marines when questioned about their
training for CAP units say that the Personal Response
Training was most important? Is it that they discard
content in short order (or simply forget it), but do
remember, or, because of the training, become and remain
alert to, the underlying message — respect for the







trying to switch from one language to another. Anyone
familiar with language study has likewise encountered
the negative transfer problem, we suspect, in assuming
that a given word or phrase will be formulated as in
a related language, only to be tripped up by exceptions.
The applications to cross-cultural interaction are clear
enough.
We have seen, too, that Wedged trainees profit
by exchanging information with one another about their
respective experiences in diverse sub-communities, and
that they seem to develop a common denominator of skills.
Wedge and Triandis also seem to be in agreement, there-
fore, about the possibility of transferring interaction
skills within limited areas, Triandis* idea of cultural
maps, related to, but more specific than, extant
cultural area maps developed by anthropologists, however,
seems to be fraught with dangers discussed in the
Stewart paper we have synopsized in this chapter.
Triandis seeks maps which will reflect divisions
of cultural areas based on social psychological data
such as attitude similarities, value similarities and
similarities in beliefs and behavioral intentions. Most




would be analyses of role perceptions. He cites his
own Role Differential Method (developed with Vassilou
and Nassiakou, in 1968) as the most promising tool
available, since it allows for quantitative representa-
tion of role perceptions in different areas.
It will be recalled that Stewart makes much of
internal forms and of superordinate forms. Because
the "inductive" individual is sometimes "deductive",
he points out, the problem of developing a theory which
can handle variations of behavior and variations of
internal forms is highly complex. He warns against
efforts to characterize behavior that would be guilty
of the errors of the once-popular national character
movement, and points particularly to the problem of
trying to devise an internal form which has conceptual
equivalence in two or more cultures, that is, a super-
ordinate form. Without what he calls a "complete
command" of two or more cultural systems, it would
appear that superordinate forms can not be constructed.
We feel that this and related concepts in the Stewart
paper challenge directly the type cultural map Triandis
seems to see possible by way of his Role Differential





for quantifying role perceptions hardly seems adequate
to recommend it. Every study we have discussed through-
out this manuscript, including several studies reported
by Triandis himself, has reflected the difficulties in
trying to measure the variables involved in the many
dynamics Triandis is necessarily including in his refer-
ence to the "role perceptions" that would be quantita-
tively represented by the Differential technique. This,
despite Triandis' studies which suggest that role
development in families follow universal laws. Be this
true, the dynamics of role perception are a totally
different thing from role development. Moreover, there
are many roles besides familiar roles.
When he tells us that specifics of role percep-
tions of particular roles differ across cultures, and
that we must examine whether such differences are trans-
lated into differences in behavior and patterns of
social action relevant in terms of job performance in
other cultures, we can agree. When he says that cultural
similarities and differences, as reflected in perceptual
and behavioral similarities across culture areas,
result in different degrees of difficulty in intercultural






manuscript thus far supports this hypothesis. His
enthusiasm about culture maps, however, seems to be
based on much less substantial support.
McGonigal hypothesizes, and feels that his
findings suggest, that one reason Marines seem to like
Vietnamese civilians better than they like Vietnamese
military personnel is that they come into closer
contact with military personnel. This would seem to
accord with and support Triandis* next hypothesis of
interest, which is that intercultural contact among
different cultures may lead to low cooperation. As
Triandis notes, however, the opposite view is defensible,
and the work of Sherif and Sherif indicating the impor-
tance of superordinate goals (of cross-cultural groups)
in reducing conflict, and O'Brien's work indicating that
when adequate task group performance occurs in cultur-
ally heterogeneous groups, this will improve perform-
ance, does seem to support the opposite view. There seems
to be a way of harmonizing the McGonigal hypothesis and
his interpretation of his findings with the O'Brien
and Sherif-Sherif arguments, however.
McGonigal might well agree with Sherif and Sherif







is reduced, iS, he might add, the goals are perceived
as important by both cultural groups, and if each
cultural group recognizes that the other group perceives
the goals as important. Such an approach, it seems to
us, would take account of the findings that many Marines
consider the Vietnamese military as slackers, cowards,
unpatriotic, not interested in their own country, etc.
Similar qualifications would save the harmony between
McGonigal and O'Brien. In those instances in which
Marines and Vietnamese military perform group tasks
adequately together, the Marine attitudes toward the
Vietnamese military are significantly better than in
situations where group task achievement has not accrued,
or where it has not been attempted. We seem to have
the near-perfect example in those CAP units in which
Marines and Popular Force work together as a team and
achieve measureable effects in terms of hamlet/village
security and related tasks. Where a group of Popular
Forces run from a fight with the enemy, Marine attitudes
become sharply negative, as we have seen. The same is
true, although the data does not appear in McGonigal 1 s
reports, in those instances in which Marines team up





Division. Standing physically on the border of the
DMZ in Vietnam, the present writer has been advised by
Marines of varying ranks and ages that the performance
of the First ARVN Division is comparable to the best
American Marine performances they have ever seen.
That interpersonal attitudes mediate cross-
cultural interaction training, Triandis* next hypothesis
of note, seems to be generally supported by studies we
have cited on motivation, and particularly by the work
of Robert L. Humphrey, previously referenced, in Turkey,
Korea, and Thailand, as described in the paper by Paul
Spector synopsized in this chapter. The following
hypothesis, that effective training in cross-cultural
interaction requires the development of skills to sus-
pend moral judgments about customs and norms inconsistent
with our own is essential to the exploratory phase of
Wedge's DA-TA approach, as we have seen, is basic to
the Mole approach outlined above, is very strongly
supported conceptually in the Sternin paper, and pervades
recommendations and approaches found in current Peace
Corps literature. (Whether there is any real utility
in Triandis 1 note that in language behavior we do not




immoral about the world "television", therefore judg-
ment should be suspended in regard to cultural behavior
in general, we question.)
When we come to the author's conception of
"subjective culture", we are confronted by what appears
to be a serious inconsistency. The hypotheses we have
discussed and related hypotheses presented in our
synopsis of the Triandis paper virtually all focus on
the importance of stereotypes. The very notion of
steroetyping, of course, is rooted in issues of perception .
By definition, a stereotype is a generalized judgment
based on something other than objective reality — in
other words, based on perceived reality incongruent with
objective reality.
^
2 3 Tne hypotheses throughout the
paper correlate various degrees of success and failure
in cross-cultural interaction with the nature and
intensity of stereotypes held. We have assumed that
Triandis has been telling us, for example, that the
problems confronting the individual who goes from, for
example, the United States to England, is that he
5 23various definitions of stereotyping are
available. We have previously cited some. Others may
be found in B. Berelson and G. A. Steiner, Human Behavior:
An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt,





perceives the British culture to be virtually identical
with the American. This is another way of saying that
the stereotype he holds of British culture is virtually
identical with either the reality of American culture,
or his held stereotype of American culture. In fact ,
he "misperceives" . Superficial similarities have
deceived him. He meets problems because his expectations
were erroneous, hence, are not met, or are contradicted
by the reality. (Triandis gives as an example the
American assumption that the British will use first
names.
)
Now in discussing cultures which are superficially
similar, but which require different behavior responses,
Triandis argues that in this situation intercultural
contact will be maximally difficult. On the strength of
this and related hypotheses and the arguments set forth
by Wedge, we explored and found support in the Allnutt
studies for the idea that the individual who does not
delude himself subjectively , in a pre-entry status,
that is, does not think he perceives the reality of the
other culture, but, in fact, inhibits the interaction
skill-acquiring process in country because he has





The thrust of Triandis 1 argument in discussing
subjective culture, however, is that from consistency-
theory (the Festinger frame of reference) it follows that
differences in subjective culture will result in nega-
tive interpersonal attitudes. Interchanging arguments
from consistency theory with those from exchange theory
and combining the two, as our synopsis of his paper
shows, he concludes to the prediction that in situations
of close cross-cultural contact negative interpersonal
attitudes will be operative. As we see it, Triandis
has slipped over from assumptions based on possible
differences between reality and perceived reality to
assumptions based on "objective" reality. He seems to
reify attitudes themselves.
What we would have expected, from his earlier
emphasis on and apparent meanings of stereotyping, and
from his description of subjective culture, would be
the conclusion that differences in subjective cultures
will result in negative interpersonal attitudes if
individuals misperceive as objective reality the
negative stereotypes available concerning the other's
subjective culture , and/or vice versa i which is another






negative stereotypes about each other's subjective
culture, negative interpersonal attitudes will accrue.
And in line with the particular hypothesis we discussed
above at length (involving the Wedge argument and
Allnutt findings), we would expect a conclusion or
prediction that the greater the superficial dissimilar-
ity of subjective cultures is in reality, and the more
accurate the individuals 1 perception of this reality,
the more harmonious will be their reciprocal cross-
cultural interaction.
Given the qualifification inherent in our
argument above, we believe that we see in the set of
postulates involving negative interpersonal attitudes
leading to more punishments than reinforcements, and
the weighing of costs against rewards, a highly logical
sequence. Our problem lies only in Triandis' deriva-
tion of his hypothesis about negative interpersonal
attitudes and subjective culture from his explication
of subjective culture and his earlier hypotheses on
stereotyping.
The applicability of this rather elegant model
of reciprocally interactive consistency and exchange
theories to our "mass needs", however, is again exceed-





is the potential of the "culture assimilator" training
method in terms of the numbers with whom we are concerned.
In both these respects, the Triandis theory shows
parallels with the Wedge theory similar to those demon-
strated in the discussion above. We shall reserve
further comment on the culture assimilator for later
discussion.
The Potential of Institution Building for
Military Cross-Cultural Training
Introduction
The candor underlying Frederic R, Wickert's
theoretical postulates in this paper is as refreshing
as it is essential. Todd Eachus, in the paper we dis-
cussed earlier, emphasized that the starting point in
cross-cultural interaction research must be to face the
problem of objectives in sending people into other
cultures or engaging in significant contact with people
of other cultures. He proposed, too, that we face the
fact that Americans assigned overseas, in whatever
capacity, are agents of change. It seems quite possible
to us that in a very broad sense, at least, or on a





"overseas" from other cultures. This thesis is simply
taken for granted by Wicker t. His unarticulated but
rather obvious assumption seems to be that if a Govern-
ment (and certainly it is Government-involved activity
with which we are primarily concerned in this manuscript)
is going to send change agents into other cultures, then
these agents must formalize their efforts, by under-
standing and applying the principles of institution
building. Otherwise, neither the sending nor the
receiving culture will profit, or profit for long,
tremendous resources will have been dissipated, and, in
many instances, considerable damage will accrue.
Wickert us in accord with a highly respectable
tradition in recognizing the importance of institution
building as essential to "rationalizing"^^ Government-
involved cross-cultural interaction.-* * Despite his
comment, for example, that Weberian rationality is not
52*4-
We speak of rationalizing here in the sense
of rational goal-oriented behavior as discussed by Max
Weber and others.
*
^We use the term Government-involved to include
not only official Government activity (diplomatic, mili-
tary, etc.), but economic and commercial ventures of






especially useful for helping us think about institution
building in non-Western cultures, he is in fact urging
us to adopt a Weberian mentality to a very large degree.
A brief excursion along these lines is in order not
merely anent Wickert's theory, but because the formaliza-
tion of cross-cultural activity, it seems to us, must
take account of the "evils of bureaucracy" of which Weber
speaks (also in quotation marks). Otherwise, Pollyanna
rules, and nothing significant perdures.
Inputs from Max Weber
Max Weber looked Eastward, of course, early in
this century. As Karl A. Wittfogel points out, unlike
those "many students who, examining Oriental civilizations,
found them to be substantially different from feudal
societies, often did not draw the development conse-
quences suggested by their research . • • Weber's
relevant observations, although never integrated, were




^Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A
Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven t Yale Univer-





A somewhat extensive quotation from Weber's work
on the theory of social and economic organization reveals
some of his thinking about the development and need for
formalization in all cultures and "sub-communities"
•
The development of the modern form of the
organization of corporate groups in all fields
is nothing less than identical with the develop-
ment ... of bureaucratic administration. This
is true of church and state, of armies, political
parties, economic enterprises, organizations to
promote all kinds of causes, private associations,
clubs, and many others. • • However many forms
there may be which do not appear to fit this
pattern, such as collegial representative bodies,
parliamentary committees, Soviets, honorary
officers, lay judges, and what not, and however
much people may complain about the "evils of
bureaucracy", it would be sheer illusion to think
for a moment that continuous administrative work
can be carried out in any field except by means
of officials working in offices. The whole
pattern of everyday life is cut to fit this frame-
work. For bureaucratic administration is, other
things being equal, always, from a formal, techni-
cal point of view, the most rational type. For
the needs of mass administration today, it is
completely indispensable. The choice is only
that between bureaucracy and dilletantism in the
field of administration.
The primary source of the superiority of
bureaucratic administration lies in the role of
technical knowledge which, through the development
of modern technology and business methods in the
production of goods, has become completely indis-
pensable. In this respect, it makes no difference
whether the economic system is organized on a
capitalistic or a socialistic basis. Indeed, if in




efficiency were to be achieved, it would mean
a tremendous increase in the importance of
specialized bureaucracy. 527
Weber did not express the convictions revealed
above ignorant of questions of traditional-transitional-
modern society, or of the nature of "Asia", A certain
amount of his thinking about "the Asian mentality"
seems to have been negatively stereotyped, e.g., his
references to the "cunning Mongol deceit" of the
"Tsarist bureaucracy", and its use of "the most tricky
means of the most cunning Asiatic deceit". Our
point is, however, that he seems to have been convinced
that China had developed economically as it had, in
large part because of a developed bureaucratic adminis-
tration.
We are not arguing here, of course, about the
merits of bureaucracy as such, nor are we arguing in
favor of an American role in changing other cultures.
We are suggesting that organization, formalization,
^ Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization , ed. by Talcott Parsons (New Yorki The
Free Press, 19^7) t 1967 edition, pp. 337-338.






r ibureaucratic administration, is_, quite possibly, as
Weber says, the only choice between bureaucracy and
dilletantism. Many American government officials return-
ing from South Vietnam can give multiple examples of
both bureaucracy and dilletantism, and the chaotic
consequences of both.
Preserve and Change t Problem and Paradox
The alternative, as we see it, is not merely
in facing up to the fact that Americans are sent overseas
as change agents, as Eachus observes, and in recognizing
the need for institution building, as Wickert points
out, but in honestly confronting the consequences of
these admissions, namely, that we do, in fact, to a very
high degree, consider "our" institution better than
"theirs" . Otherwise, nothing makes sense. We can
talk at will about not trying to induce change where
the local peoples do not want change. We can reiterate
constantly that even when they do want change, we want
only to help them change in their way. This, it seems
to us, is dishonest nonsense, consonant neither with
our official foreign policies, nor our various govern-
mental activities and commercial enterprises and the




peoples in a "traditional" culture where oil has recently-
been discovered, to dig into the ground with Stone Age
tools to extract it. The introduction of modern extract-
ing techniques will eventually bring about revolutionary
changes in certain sectors of the culture inevitably t so
that any disclaimer of "intending" change is fraudulent.
*
2 ^
Most of Latin America (probably with only the possible
exception of Mexico) is usually referred to as non-
Western, with many of the same connotations as the term
holds when applied to Borneo, Saudi-Arabia, or India.
But no one who has studied developments in, let us say,
Chile, under Eduardo Frei's presidency, could conceive
of the "Chileanization" of copper, programmed in conjunc-
tion with American interests and technology, as a move
toward preserving "traditional life styles" while
engineering major economic changes.
Now it appears to us to be psychologically
impossible, regardless of what euphemisms we employ to
^ 2^Naturally, one could argue the "principle of
double effect" here, asserting that change is an unin-
tended byproduct of the effort to help the host peoples
economically, but our "intention" is irrelevant if we
know such a byproduct is unavoidable. We are not argu-
ing that change is bad. We simply maintain that a
refusal to face the inevitably of change as a byproduct,





conceal the fact, that any individual or group trained
in Western institution building, can divest himself of
his total training when assigned the task of effecting
change by institution building in a non-Western culture.
If he could, what sense would it make? If he divests
himself of his total training, he has nothing to offer.
If he divests himself of what we might call "potentially
conflictual aspects" of his training (and how are these
to be defined?), where will he receive the complementary
training elements of which he is shorn? In the host
culture? Not at all. There he can acquire an under-
standing of how best to assist, how best to apply his
training to the needs and realities of the host culture.
But the assumption remains: he is there, sent or
invited, to help the local peoples build the only kind
of institution he knows, a Western-model institution —
shaped to the needs and potential of non-Western cultures,
oriented to the realities of life in arctics or tropics,
city streets or jungle paths, of urban sophisticates or
rural innocents, "life styles", attitudes, value
orientations shaped through the centuries or learned the
day before yesterday — but a non-Western model, nonethe-




about diplomatic or military or economic advisers,
factories, bridges, railroads or courses in sociology,
if we are there to effect change, no matter how sen-
sitively we adapt our approach to the local culture, the
assumption is that "our" institutions, given all the
reservations above, are better than "theirs", "we" are
better than "they" are in building institutions for
their needs. Even if we are called only to teach the
skills of institution building, again the assumption is
that we are more knowledgeable ("better" in this field)
than they, and the skills that we consider basic to the
process are desired skills by those sending or
requesting us.
Nation-Building
We have made much of this point for two important
reasons
:
(1 ) In a great deal of the literature in nation-
building and comparative politics which space limitations
preclude our citing here in detail (specifically, for
example , such works as those of Almond and Verba in
civic culture and political development, Pye and Verba






work on transitional societies and others), expressed
or implied disclaimers ad infinitum insist that the
exponents carry no brief in favor of any particular
culture, political system, or way of doing things. But
virtually every page of the literature begins and ends
with modern Western democracy as the "unit of analysis"
for evaluating whatever culture is being investigated.
We do not challenge the merit, utility, or desirability
of this usage here. What we do challenge are the dis-
claimers ~ the claims that it is not used!
Now nation-building and comparative politics
literature very deeply involves philosophies of cross-
cultural interaction. And because of the inconsistency
we have been discussing, we would suspect that one of
the worst possible ways to prepare, for example, a
Peace Corps worker, for efforts in an underdeveloped,
or non-Western culture (and the two terms, we believe,
are psychologically coterminous in the minds of many
of the authors) would be to expose him to certain large
segments of this literature. We turn once again to the
latest Peace Corps Training Manual.
. . .
the objectives of community involvement
have never been clearly outlined. As a process,
it has never been clearly defined. In most





it is treated only peripherally, whereas it
may well be the most central, universal, and
important aspect of Peace Corps service,
• • • If his (the Volunteer's) purpose is to
effect change, the PCV must ask himself many
additional questions. Is he morally justified
in making the people more aware of the differences
between their community and more advanced communi-
ties? Should he make them aware of their situa-
tion and encourage them to "improve" their lot?
What are the consequences of this kind of
involvement? Will he succeed only in making
happy people unhappy, or unhappy people unhappier?
Will he create forces for change in the country
that will lead tomore problems than the people
have already? To what extent will he be and should
he be imposing his own values, standards, beliefs,
aspirations, goals, on the people of the community
with whom he is working? Will he be creating
unrest, dissatisfaction, and are these necessary
for progress? Is progress, as defined by him as
an individual, by the Peace Corps, or by the so-
called more advanced societies, necessary? Or is
change inevitable, and is he merely an agent of
that change, assisting in making it a more orderly,
less painful, and more constructive process?
Can he make the people aware of the opportunities
for change, of their own potential for growth and
development, without making them dissatisfied,
unhappy, bitter, and disillusioned? (Peace Corps
Training Manual , op.cit. , pp. x-xi.)
The Practical Field Problem
(2) In all of the theoretical formulations and
training programs we have discussed in the field of cross-
cultural interaction, exceptional and consistent emphasis
is placed on respecting local traditions and customs,




hosts in "exploring" their needs, assuring that we do
things their way, even if we "know" our way is "better",
because it is, after all, their country.
The present writer can not address authoritatively
the impact of these constant admonitions on individuals
in non-military situations. His own experience, shared
with many observers, is that the 19-year-old Marine who
did not ask to go to South Vietnam (the Marines do have
many volunteering to go), whose friends have been killed
in ambush because the Vietnamese military would not do
things "the American way", who is homesick, perhaps
malaria-sick, dirty, hungry, hot (or cold), wet,
generally "fed-up", is quite likely to reply in less
than euphemistic language to euphemistic admonitions:
"If it's their country, what the hell am I doing here?"
Our observations, and a careful examination
of some of the critical incidents included in text and
appendix of this manuscript, as well as the negative
responses to open-end questions about the Vietnamese,
not only support our comments above, but demand a much
more consistent approach in both theory and training in
cross-cultural interaction.
The voice of a young Marine Captain who must




must nonetheless be heard, when asking: MHow can I
make my men perform like the sharp cutting edge a combat
force is supposed to be, if I have to put up with this
garbage?" (The reference was to the continued demands
that he evoke sympathy among his troops for the reluctance
of the Vietnamese to meet the requirements of fighting
wars and winning battles.)
We are by no means, of course, suggesting that
Americans enter any other culture, invited or not, and
attempt to impose, transpose, or transplant America
against the wishes of local peoples, or where their
circumstances prevent, or where institutionalized change
would be in their worst interest in the long run, or
anything of the sort. We have repeatedly expressed
awareness and strong approval of all the reservations
and qualifications to be considered. What we are saying
is i "Le^s stop pre tending." JJ
" Some excellent papers and commentaries on the
very crucial question we raise in this discussion are
included in David E. Novack and Robert Lekachman, eds.,
Development and Society! The Dynamics of Economic Change
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 196?). Other aspects






Demands of Theory and Practice
All of the foregoing has been introduced in con-
junction with Wickert's paper, because we believe that
the truly theoretical formulations of his paper, as
well as the engineering approaches which logically follow,
share this one, critical weakness with the approaches
we have been discussing here. He does frankly and forth-
rightly treat cross-cultural interaction as an effort to
change other cultures, and this, as we remarked at the
outset, is refreshing and essential. But he immediately
creates the problem of inconsistency we refer to, when
he attempts conceptually to preclude V/estern social
organization theory, scientific management values, human
relations thinking or Weberian rationality from his
theoretical frame of reference, in purported favor of
anthropologically broadened organization theory dominated
by non-Western norms and values, which he then ignores
in practice in explicating his concepts of institution
building. Indeed, the entire approach he offers, which
we have outlined, might be excerpted from a modern
531Western "Executive Management" manual. This puts
"J-For a comprehensive presentation of some impor-
tant aspects of such "models", see Harper Brown Keeler,
Freedom and Control t The Dilemma of Creativity in the






Wickert in precisely the position of others we have
cited, including the very many who recommend what should
not be done in a host culture without recommending how
either the do's or the don'ts can be made congruent
with the ultimate requirement to effect change in a
given arena as the concept of change and the theoretically
deduced engineering methodologies and techniques for
change (as well as the purposes, lofty or otherwise) are
fashioned by and understood in terms of his own, his
"parent" culture.
Specifically, for example, 7/ickert says that
essential to changing behavior in conjunction with host
culture change agents, the visitor must recognize that
only if the host culture change agents perceive a
cultural umbrella in their own culture within which they
can behave in a new way, will they respond to formal,
task-centered, cross-cultural interactions with the
visitor. He then avers immediately, however, that, by
definition, institution building points toward the intro-
duction of new values, new "normative behavior", new
functions and technologies. The trick of harmonizing
these two notions, both essential , it seems to us is






statements as we will, they appear to be equivalent to
admonishing builders to build a new house under the old
roof of an existing house without knocking down the
walls or any other support for the old roof until the
new house, or the new supports are built. It may be
possible , by exertion of architectural, engineering and
building skills, without regard to cost, time or other
factors basic to "exchange theory". It is also possible
that if the deed is done and the old roof leaks, the
new home (institution) will be ruined. The Scriptural
injunction against pouring new wine into old wineskins
has more than a spiritual connotation, particularly as
originally spoken — in an "underdeveloped" country!
Techniques of Institution Building
To us, the specific "nuts-and-bolts" of Wickert's
four sets of system elements involved in institution
building are self-evidently logical and appropriate.
(We do not imply, pejoratively, that they do not require
or merit his presenting and explaining them. They are
not self-evident, as self-revealing phenomena, readily
observable. They are self-evident, when enunciated as
he very carefully and helpfully enunciates them.) We




We might note very briefly in passing, perhaps,
the reference to Time as one of the four system elements,
Wickert describes it as the dynamic dimension within
which we judge the success or failure of the metamorpho-
sis from organization to institution. Whether the
institution-builder must concern himself with Time as
a value orientation, or with various other cultural
aspects of Time that we have seen to be critical to
some cross-cultural interaction concepts, Wickert does
not say. We assume that he conceives of institution
building within a linear-time orientation, with specific
target dates established (at least in general terms) for
the accomplishment of specific goals. (We must confess
sympathy with this possibly cavalier approach. It would
seem to us that if a culture has requested or is pre-
pared to engage in interaction with change agents from
another, it has already changed substantially toward a
532
lineal time orientation if it had not been so oriented. Y J
Wickert 1 s finding about the requirement imposed
on leadership to elect between protecting the new-found
532With due respect for St. Augustine's role in
history and Machiavelli's seizing upon the Augustinian
role in enunciating the lineal time concept as contrasted
with the cyclic, we suspect that the distinctions require
further study and are not nearly so unambiguous as they






organization and promoting change objectives coincides
with our earliest comments about tensions felt by Peace
Corps workers and various "advisors". George M. Guthrie's
review of problems this requirement poses for military
advisors, in particular, is well-presented, under the
title of Conflicts of Culture and the Military Advisor . "3
Wickert's note that vague objectives are not all
bad is congruous with both Stewart's and Sternin's dis-
cussions of ambiguity in the paper synopsized in this
chapter. The remaining hypotheses need no comment here.
The admonitions about living in American colonies are
extremely important, of course, and focus on problems
well-known to any American experienced overseas, as we
have noted previously. Solutions, however, are not
quite so readily available as the Gant paper that Wickert
quotes might lead us to believe.
533ceorge M. Guthrie, Conflicts of Culture and
the Military Advisor (Washington, D.C.i Institute for
Defense Analysis, 1966). See also: Warren R. Graham,
Preparation and Utilization of Military Assistance
Officers (Washington, D. C. : American University, CRESS
,
1969), C. 3. See especially page 44, where Guthrie points
out that societies may try to retain old ways of doing
things while desiring products these old ways can't
produce. Akin to this is the problem inherent in the
so-called "revolution of rising expectations". We
always risk increasing discontent when we introduce goals




Perhaps more than anything else in the Wickert ~^
paper, the urgent appeals for the development of institu-
tion building attitudes in "overseas men" is most impor-
tant. If the theoretical inconsistency we have dis-
cussed is faced honestly and resolved with integrity (if
resolution is possible), an all-out effort to help
develop these concepts would appear indicated. Until
such a situation accrues, it would seem to us that the
concepts merit inculcating, but with the reservations
we have suggested, as essential concomitants.
Theory, Method and Instruction for Cross-
Cultural Interaction
Introduction
The function of Americans as change agents over-
seas is as explicitly and frankly assumed by Edward C.
Stewart in this paper as by others we have cited, notably
Eachus and Wickert. However, Stewart addresses his paper
to the third of the three problems he considers important
factors in cross-cultural interaction, competence,
language, and cross-cultural communication. He defines
cross-cultural communication as a vague concept referring




the behavior of the advisor" • ("Advisor" is used
throughout the paper for Americans overseas in various
capacities.
)
As our synopsis earlier in this chapter reveals,
Stewart's theoretical formulations extend across a broad
spectrum. Many, if not all, of his postulates merit
detailed attention. To give them their due would require
a text devoted entirely to the purpose. Fortunately,
several of them have been discussed at least tangentially
elsewhere in the present manuscript in relation to other
theorists and cross-cultural investigators. Moreover,
as with each other paper we have considered, some
propositions seem more pertinent to our present purposes
than do others. We believe it most feasible and profit-
able, therefore, to focus attention here on his treat-
ment of culture and internal forms .
Internal Forms
Defining culture as "a system of internal forms
characteristic of an individual which he shares with
other members of his collectivity" , Stewart emphasizes
what he calls the actor 1 s "remarkable lack of awareness




behavior. 5^* The internal form refers to an observer's
analysis of the actor's behavior, therefore, rather than
to introspection by the actor. He takes an illustration
from internal linguistic form which establishes the
proper sequence of adjectives modifying a noun in English*
black











As he points out, the sequence "sounds*' right, only when
silk immediately precedes "dress" in the first example.
The power of the form is perhaps even more striking in
the second. Replace brick by frame, and transpose
position to "large, old, frame, red house" and one must
ask if the substance of the house is red . Stewart points
out that apparently the position of a modifier contributes
to the meaning of a word. One searches for a connotation
of color.
53^
Report , pp. 180-181.





As we have noted, the author sees two important
factors revealed by these examples i (1) the average
English speaker uses this correct form without being
aware of the existence of linguistic forms; (2) even when
aware, one can not "confront" the form. No cognitive
or affective process or structure can be identified by
the speaker as the form governing a modifier's position.
(Stewart acknowledges the influence of the Wurzburg
school of imageless thought.)
By no means, the author observes, however, are
all internal forms so precise as the linguistic forms
in the examples. The primary concern in cross-cultural
communication is with the internal forms which may
underlie linguistic forms in the patterns of thinking.
Findings have indicated that thus analyzed, some
languages can be considered predominantly inductive
or deductive. It is the imprecision and vagueness of
the internal cognitive forms of induction and deduction
which raise the fundamental problem of variation in
patterns of thinking, assumptions and values which govern
the behavior of individuals and constitute the content
of cross-cultural communication. No individual, langu-
age, or culture, he notes, can be described as either
I





These concepts Stewart considers to be crude
approximations of the system of internal forms which we
assumg to govern behavior. (Underlining his.)
It seems to us that the implications of Stewart's
concepts up to this point are profound for all cross-
cultural interaction theory and training and for the
dynamics of such interaction itself. Stewart brings
into focus what appears to us to be either ignored or
too blandly dismissed in much of the work we have thus
far cited, the lack of the actor's own awareness of many
of the internal forms that govern his behavior coupled
with the inability to introspect cognitive ly or affec-
tively to identify the internal forms. If this be so,
it would appear that the individual who uses the appro-
priate forms (whether aware of them or not) in cross-
cultural communication will be effective, but if he
uses inappropriate forms (unaware), he is unable to
correct for error in the future by way of his own
introspection. He is totally dependent on guidance
by an observer — and an observer who is either cogni-
tive ly or affectively aware of the inappropriateness
of the observed actor's usage. If our conclusion does,





believe, critical to the entire subject of the present
manuscript. Before examinint it further, let us suggest
but two instances of its importance, both relevant to
the theoretical assumptions purportedly basic to the
Personal Response Project research we have examined
earlier: (1) the question of identifying leaders,
"influencers" , opinion makers, early and late followers,
and laggards, in accord with Rogers' theory of diffusion
of innovations? (2) questions of cognitive dissonance.
In respect to both (1) and (2), we note a con-
cept contributed by Edmund S. Glenn in a work cited above
on cognitive structures, the concept of form-givers ,
which merits brief exploration before examining the
aspect of Stewart's work we have been discussing. 535
Glenn, too, discusses the sequential character
of language and observes that non-verbal types of
behavior are also sequential. The simplistic interpre-
tation of the famous Pavlovian dog conditioning experi-
ments in which stimulus and response are thought of
as isolated phenomena, for example, leaves out the
entire sequence which may begin with the hunt and go
Edmund S. Glenn, Cognitive Structures, Culture






beyond digestion into a new phase of hunger and search
for food. From this point, Glenn eventually proceeds
to discussion of discrepancies between "describing
and described 1*, the question of "a reasonable fit between
the co-subjectivity of language and object-directed
actions" , and two orders of subject activity, one co-
subjective and one objective (or object-oriented). ^
This latter set of concepts leads directly to the notion
of form-givers .
Innumerable experiments have shown that from a
strictly optical point of view all perceptual situations
are indeterminate, since the purely sensory stimuli,
or visual input, with which the perception begins can
be produced by an infinity of different external con-
figurations. Yet what we perceive, we perceive as
unambiguous, which means that we put order, we uncon-
sciously determine, or form the objectively indeterminate.
The factor of intervention of the subject within
the transaction . Glenn points out, is called a "form-
giver". That perceptual form givers depend on previous
experience has become one of the virtual "givens" of
53 We introduced Glenn's notion of co-subjectivity





psychology, supported by experiments in selective per-
ceptual distortion and in various other ways.
Glenn cites examples which lead directly to our
major point. He turns to experiments by Cantril, for
example, who observed that in situations where most
subjects see distortions in the sizes and shapes of
people viewed as objects, some subjects see some selected
persons as unchanged or "stereotyped". The object-
persons so stereotyped that they are unchanged under
optical conditions under which other object-persons
appear distorted are shown to be anxiety-producing for
the subjects concerned. When a group of apprentice sea-
men, for example, were used as subjects, an object-
person wearing a petty officer's uniform appeared as
stereotyped under the same conditions under which the
same object-person wearing the uniform of an apprentice
seaman appeared distorted . In other words, the petty
officer uniform as an anxiety-provoking object made a
man look like an anxiety-provoking authority figure.
These and similar examples indicate that perceptual
differences are tied to previous experience.
Glenn sees experiments on perception offering
the possibility of defining form-givers, and of observ-





an action apprenticeship in environments in which their
usual perceptual processes are distorted. He emphasizes
that the development of form-givers depends in part on
social and cultural experience, and turns to some
further experiments to try to clarify the possible
role of human universalities and cultural particularities.
The subjects of the experiments were urban and rural Zulu
populations, Glenn's description merits quoting.
In this experiment the subjects view the
rotation of a trapezoid shaped in such a manner
that the traces it produces on the subject's
retinae when viewed full face are identical
with those which would be produced by a rectangle
viewed in three quarters perspective; the entire
structure carried a suggestion of windowness.
At optimum distance all subjects, including rural
Zulus from a culture in which windows are unknown
and right angles never used in dwellings, per-
ceive the experimental gear in the same manner $
not as a rotating trapezoid, but as an oscillating
rectangle. Such an interpretation of the visual
cues suggests a preference for right angles in
the determination of form-givers — even among
rural Zulus, Such a preference fits with the
experience all men have with verticality and
horizontality and can be derived from the presence
of three semi-circular canals in the equilibrium
organ of the middle ear. However, as the subjects
come closer to the apparatus, rural Zulus lose
the illusion much more rapidly than do control
groups of whites and urbanized Zulus j this sug-
gests that the form-giver built around right angles,
reinforced in all men by the experience of verti-





in urban subjects by such things as the experi-
ence of windowness and more generally of right
angles in dwellings. 537
Through a series of conceptualizations interwoven
with offerings of supportive empirical data, which would
require an unduly lengthy excursion for us to reproduce
here, Glenn arrives at a consideration of the "collective
subject". During the process of socialization, form-
givers or centerings of attention are induced in the
young in such fashion that they reflect habitual patterns
of object-action of the older generation. If the human
and other environment remains unchanged during genera-
tions, form-givers may remain applicable without major
change, but if the old form-givers do not fit the new
situation, they may undergo change. Such change, says
Glenn, is likely to be determined largely by the type
of fit or lack of fit between form-givers and the
situation, and only secondarily by the personalities
of individuals involved, especially if we have a normal
distribution of personality traits in the population
involved. As a matter of fact, he observes, the type
of leadership which a society will select for itself
may be determined by the type of adjustment between the





form-givers and the situations. Those individuals whose
particular talents fit the existing type of need may be
expected to assume the lead for as long as the need
exists. If this be true, collective behavior may be
analyzed without reference to individuals. The individ-
uals making up the society have internalized the form-
givers characteristic to the society, and both the
society with its culture and the individuals with their
cognitive structures may be considered, says Glenn,
as systems of such form-givers, so that the balance
or imbalance between inherited structures of form-
givers will determine or be important in determining
action. More knowledge about the form-givers of a
culture and the situations facing it may lead to a
knowledge of how form-givers evolve.
Glenn's concept raises innumerable questions
within the context we have been exploring. We shall
return to some of them after examining the issue of
"self-awareness" raised by the Stewart paper — with its
questions about the actor's unawareness of his own
internal forms and his inability to "get at" them by
way of introspection.
Stewart himself applies his hypothesis that




governing their behavior to problems of cross-cultural
communication by introducing the notion of cultural
self-awareness . He points out that Americans, parti-
cularly, are given cross-cultural communication
instruction to impart to them knowledge of other
cultures. They are expected to understand another
culture without the advantage that comes with under-
standing their own. He proposes as a first requirement
of instruction in cross-cultural communication the
construction of knowledge of American culture. In his
paper he draws on various sources and outlines those
elements said to characterize American culture which
we have reproduced in our synopsis of his paper, and
which we have discussed in other contexts, notably in
our examination of Sterni^s value study. In his dis-
cussion of American culture, however, Stewart has much
less to say about cultural self-awareness, in terms of
questions of internal forms, than in a paper prepared
with John B. Pryle specific to the topic. *
The entire thrust of this latter paper suggests
that Stewart is addressing the very issue we raise.
1
538Edward c. Stewart and John B. Pryle, An
Approach to Cultural Self-Awareness (Washington, D.C.:





He observes i "Inducing cultural self-insight in train-
ing for cross-cultural communication is both a challeng-
ing and a practical objective. "539 wisely, we believe,
he discusses the concept of the self as explored by and
used in psychotherapy, clinical psychology, various
types of human relations training and other efforts
designed to assist the individual in achieving "self-
insight", then abandons such usages and approaches as
unsuitable for training large numbers of persons going
overseas. He notes Rosenberg's pointing out that in
such contexts the concept of the self is treated as
"a rather mysterious and indefinable entity", and
observes that a concept of the self with such unclear
dimensions is not useful for a training environment
that must replace the intimate relationships of these
other situations with a precise definition of the self.
In the latter respect, the characteristic of
the concept of the self considered crucial for training
for cross-cultural interaction is the reflexive aspect.
Stewart and others hypothesized that training in cultural
self-awareness and the cultural predispositions of






American cultural superiority, and induce attitudes of
cultural relativity. Further, developing cultural self-
understanding should facilitate understanding the pre-
dispositions of members of other cultures, provide a
better basis for morale for Americans overseas, develop
an appreciation for typical American predispositions
that facilitate or interfere with working overseas.
Stewart continues from this point, and enunciates
definitions of culture, behavior norms, values, assump-
tions, cognitive forms and related concepts we have
already seen explicated in the (different) paper we have
synopsized. He arrives, then, at the point at which we
anticipate his meeting the challenge he raises at the
outset of the paper, namely, that of inducing self-
insight. We are then tolds
Before a system of cognitive dispositions
becomes predictive of specific behavior, two
other theoretical terms are required; a grammar
of social roles and a taxonomy of events. Roles
provide the link between the individual and
actual behavior. It is assumed that variations
of cognitive terms within the individual repre-
sent different social roles, but we have no way
of specifying what particular variation is evoked
until the social role of the individual is known.
A final source of variance, which we also assume
to be reflected in the cognitive variations of
the individual, is the particular event, or ^
ecological situation, in which behavior occurs.





None of the above would be disturbing j on the
contrary, it would be encouraging, except that Stewart
advises us at this point that while there are a number
of ecological approaches in the literature, a taxonomy
of cultural events is not available, nor a satisfactory
grammar of roles. (It may be recalled that we faulted
Triandis for asserting the availability of such a taxo-
nomy and grammar by way of his own Role Differential
Method, Our own investigations to date influence us
in favor of Stewart's admission of non-availability.)
Stewart now suggests, however, that in the
absence of a grammar of roles and taxonomy of events,
the technique of role-playing partly solves the theore-
tical problems we are left with, and offers merit as a
training technique as well. It accomplishes both feats
by representing a very general issue and purpose to the
role-player, thus confronting him with an event of
sorts. By role-playing, M the cognitive terms of the
analysis of American culture are given a more concrete
set of references for describing their occurrence." The
abstractions and generalities of the cognitive descrip-
tion of American culture are linked to roles and events






to induce cultural self-awareness is found with the
part of the individual participating as the American's
counter-part in the role-playing situation, and he is
obviously a foreigner, identified as an overseas official.
The American believes that the counterpart is spontan-
eously playing a role, just as he is. But (and we have
seen this in our synopsis of the other paper) the counter-
part presents a contrived role to the American, a role
called the "contrast American" (and we have seen, too,
the meaning of this term). The contrast American is
synthetically but plausibly a member of "contrast
culture"
•
The role-playing scenes are written, Stewart
tells us, to elicit reliably from American role-players
a distribution of the cognitive terms that can be ade-
quately confronted by the contrast American. The
cognitive confrontation emerging in a face-to-face
encounter simulates cross-cultural communication between
Americans and the idealized type of contrast American,
at the cognitive level. Since plausible simulation is
imperative, the realistic is sacrificed to the plausible,
if need by, and the simulation model is therefore summar-
ized as cognitive, functional, and plausible, as distinct





Interestingly, Stewart concludes his paper by
telling us that very few persons with whom he has worked
can grasp the complexities of the contrast American
as a mirror image of the middle-class American (the
"typical" American advisor overseas).
The exercises nevertheless can be accepted
at different levels. The sophisticated expert
will see reflected the subtleties of cultural
differences, whereas the eager, high-achieving,
autonomous, competitive, instrumental, and
egalitarian American may see in the exercises
the practical benefit of a concrete encounter
with a foreigner. 5*H
Before thus completing his paper, however, Stewart
offers a summary of part of an actual role-playing
exchange, or simulation, to try to help convey the
nature of the cognitive confrontations that occur. While
somewhat lengthy, we believe it worth including here
verbatim , particularly since role-playing, or simulations
in one form or another, e.g., Triandis 1 culture assimila-
tors, are mentioned so frequently in respect to cross-
cultural interaction training.
In one of the scenes we attribute to the
trainee the successful completion of a community
development project. We do not specify its
nature, leaving the choice to the trainee who is
free to imagine any plausible project. In a
recent simulation, an American, playing the part
of a Peace Corps Volunteer, Mr. Smith, is asked
L




to do something else for the community. He
approached Mr, Khan, the contrast American,
and in a small fragment of their exchange, the
two men discussed the bridge spanning the local
river. It had just been completed, and Mr,
Smith suggested building another bridge, basing
his proposal on practical reasons. He evoked
the image of people crossing it and of another
bridge assisting the community,
Mr. Khan did not agree with Mr. Smith, since
he did not make the frequent American assumption
that if one thing is good, then two ought to be
better. The world is limited for him and the
accumulation of good is also limited. Secondly,
he saw the bridge esthetically, in contrast to
Mr. Smith who saw it practically. The bridge
was a symbol that united people, and since Mr.
Smith had been instrumental in building it, that
united his country and America, in the same way
that the arch of the bridge spanned the river
joining the two banks.
Although neither Mr. Khan nor Mr. Smith
declaimed on his views of the bridge, their
views emerged in the exchange regarding the
building of a second bridge. It was apparent
that Mr. Smith did not understand Mr. Khan, and
neither did most members of the class. If is
difficult to explain to most people Mr. Khan*s
esthetic response to the bridge and his belief
that a second one would dilute the value of
the first.
In the discussion following the simulation,
the argument was advanced that in American cul-
ture there is a generalized esthetic response
indicated by the amount of money devoted to
beautification of highways. The specific example
used was the planting of cherry trees on the
George Washington Parkway along the shores of the
Potomac, The 'view that the presence of an
esthetic response is indicated by doing something,
and its strength measured by amount of money
spent, fails to comprehend Mr. Khan's simultane-






abstractly, the bridge, for example, as a sym-
bol of unity. 5^2
Of interest to us in this summary is Stewart's
comment that the American participant did not understand
the counterpart "American contrast" participant's posi-
tion, nor did most members of the class. Further, their
discussion following the simulation provoked arguments
by the Americans which they thought showed comprehension
of the counterpart's position, but, according to Stewart,
did not. We would assume, then, that this particular
session did not result in self-insight, although it may
have helped the American role-player discover that he
was not on the same "wave length" with his counterpart
,
even though he thought he was.
Such an accomplishment would not al all suggest
to us, however, the achievement of "cultural self-
insight". While we assume that Stewart could offer
multiple examples with different outcome, if the desired
outcome is simply a recognition that two individuals are
not truly "communicating", important though such a dis-
covery may be — and it can indeed be critical, at times
— this appears to us to be substantially different from




"cultural self-awareness" , or "cultural self-insight",
the adducing of which was the challenge Stewart set out
to meet. We aver this if we have properly understood
Stewart's thesis, developed in relation to linguistic
forms, through a discussion of other internal forms,
into the proposition that an actor is unaware of many
of the cognitive forms that govern his behavior, and
is unable to examine those forms introspectively,
cognitive ly, or affectively. Our assumption was that
this thesis brought into focus the critical problem
of cross-cultural communication, which problem Stewart
translated into terms of "cultural self-insight" or
"cultural self-awareness". The issue we raised was that
the actor using appropriate forms in cross-cultural
communication will be effective, whether or not he
is aware of the forms he is using or of their correct-
ness, but if he uses inappropriate forms without being
aware of their inappropriateness, he is unable to
correct his usage by himself, by way of cognitive or
affective structures or processes through introspection.
We see this to mean that he can neither "feel" the
inappropriateness of the forms he is using or become




totally dependent on an outsider, an observer who is_
either cognitively or affectively aware, not of his
own internal forms, necessarily (although he may be),
but of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the
internal forms of the observed actor as expressed or
revealed by his behavior. (This fits, of course, with
Stewart's telling us that the internal form refers to
an observer's analysis of an actor's behavior, not to
introspection by the actor,) Our interpretation of this
would be that in the case of two Americans (or two mem-
bers of any culture) who are in a host culture, one
might say or do something unaware that it is inappro-
priate. He does not think it is (or perhaps does not
think about it at all; it may be spontaneous or
habitual in his behavioral pattern; in other v/ords, for
him, "the natural thing to do"). He does not "feel"
any inappropriateness. His companion either recognizes
intellectually that the behavior is inappropriate to
the host culture, or "feels" something is wrong.
Let us assume the companion (observer) tells the
actor (observed) he thinks or feels the actor did or
said something wrong. Perhaps he can tell him what he
thinks it is. Possibly he can only tell the actor he




The observer, in the first situation, is perhaps cog-
nitive ly aware in himself of the internal form involved
in the behavior, or in some way is cognitive ly able to
recognize the internal form by way of observing the
actor's behavior. In the second situation, the internal
form is not cognitively recognized at all. Perhaps
the observer can affectively recognize it in himself,
perhaps the observed behavior in some way stimulates
him to recognize it in the actor.
Whatever the means of recognition on the part
of the observer, the question remains, and we do not
see it answered in either of Stewart's papers i Does
the actor's explanation of the internal form expressed
in the behavior, or his statement simply that he feels
something wrong, in any way lead the actor to recognize
the internal form in question, either cognitively or
affectively? In other words, if he can not get at his
ov/n internal form directly (by himself), can he get at
it indirectly, by way of the observer's "cognitive"
explanation or demonstration of a "feeling"? An affirma-
tive reply to these questions, it seems to us, would
suggest the development of what we understand Stewart
to mean by cultural self-insight, or cultural self-aware-




influence the actor, or coerce him, into behaving
appropriately — which could only mean in this situation,
conforming "blindly" to a set of guidelines, or command-
ments — in a host culture. True cognitive understanding
of appropriate behavior (or correct overt expression of
appropriate internal forms) could not develop, presum-
ably, and even a "feel" for the appropriateness or
inappropriateness (the result of affective congruity
with correct or appropriate internal forms) would not
seem likely to develop. The actor, in other words, would
be externally guided by some pressure or other, on a
continuing basis, aided when alone only by rote
memory, to behave in a fashion appropriate to the host
culture.
It appears to us, as we suggested above, that
the implications of these aspects of Stewart's "internal
forms" are of profound meaningfulness in terms of
theory, training, actual behavior, and the capabilities
of one's associates, or fellow group members in a cross-
cultural interaction situation. Those implications
seem far too obvious to need discussion.
We do adduce at this point, however, the ques-






possible that Glenn's social form-givers fill the role
of those who themselves are more attuned, for whatever
the reasons, to recognizing the pivotal behavioral-
governing internal forms within themselves, and are
therefore able to recognize these in the observed
behavior of others? Whether or not form-givers recog-
nize internal forms in themselves, have they some
special capacity for recognizing these forms in others
or in the observed behavior of others? Does this capa-
city extend to their being able to recognize how cer-
tain internal forms can be evoked into external
expression, or behavior, for good or for bad, as
desired, in given situations? Are these early leaders
(in Rogers* terms), then, these influencers of others,
the individuals who emerge from the group because
the needs of the group in a given situation call for
their particular capacities (in Glenn's terms ) j are these
the given society's or sub-community's form-givers ?
If they are, do we, in fact, have a "normal distribution"
of form-givers in each group, sub-culture, culture?
Finally, what is their role in respect to forms already
given their group, or cultural entity? Glenn would say
that if the old forms still meet situations success-




either of persons or things, changes radically, the prob-
ability is that new forms will be needed, hence, new
form-givers. The situation or the environment changes
radically when masses of Americans enter other cultures,
as is the case in Vietnam, Quid de casu?
We must leave the Stewart paper, but a concluding
quotation may be appropriate in emphasizing the impor-
tance of the awareness of one's own culture in trying
to engage in cross-cultural communication (whether or
not cultural self-awareness accrues in the sense dis-
cussed above). The quotation is from the Washington
Conference paper presented by Paul Spector.^ ->
^
-%e did not synopsize this paper for analysis
of its theoretical formulations because of its heavy
emphasis on practice, rather than theory. Nonetheless,
the Spector paper is exceedingly valuable as represen-
tative of his own unusually broad experience and as
reflecting that of Robert L. Humphrey. Both investiga-
tors have conducted countless numbers of training ses-
sions for Americans in overseas cross-cultural situa-
tions. Both have engaged in extensive research for
empirical support for their methods. (We have refer-
enced Humphrey's work in Turkey, Thailand, and Korea?
more recently he has engaged in similar activities in
South Vietnam. ) The dominant impression gleaned from
observing both of these investigators at work, as well
as in reading their findings, is that they believe
intensely that they have unreservedly demonstrated the
validity of the principles enunciated in the above
quotation. (See Paul Spector, Washington Conference




The conscious adoption of the concepts of
human equality, freedom and democracy repre-
sents not only an awareness of men's personal
values as individuals and of their ethical rela-
tionships to other individuals, but also belief
in the fundamental ideology of the United States
(and indeed of democracies generally). For some
men it comes as a revelation that their private
values, although they have never considered them
consciously, are in fact expressions of the national
ideology. For others it is a revelation that the
national ideology which they had often heard
expressed in rhetorical terms by politicians and
others is indeed an expression of their own most
fundamentally held values. For both types a
genuine feeling of patriotism is built up on the
basis of the identity between private values and
national ideals.
This identity is important because it then
becomes important for the men to behave operation-
ally under the guidance of these principles as
a means of furthering the nation's welfare and
the well-being of mankind generally. Inasmuch
as these values constitute their own deeply
felt personal inclinations it becomes clear to
them that to act otherwise is not only to jeopard-
ize the nation's welfare and to deny the elementary
rights to host nationals which we ourselves believe
they should have. This identity of universal
human, national and personal ideals when con-
sciously understood is a powerful form of sustained
internal motivation that can serve in the many
different situations facing people both abroad
and at home.
Toward the Specification of a General Adaptation
Process in Americans Overseas
Many of the propositions of Martin Sternin's





manuscript, some in extensive detail. Without depre-
cating the many concepts presented, e.g., his comprehen-
sive treatment of culture shock, which we presented in
part in an earlier chapter, and included at greater
length in our analysis of the Eachus paper, we shall
address here only a few of the significant postulates
of the current Sternin paper. We are naturally inter-
ested, of course, in those elements of the paper that
will provide opportunity for further insight into his
major study of values and value orientations. In
this paper, Sternin does offer some elaborations per-
tinent to that central study, albeit, at times, cryp-
tically, and, at other times, ambiguously. Our treat-
ment will be brief.
Sternin begins the section of his remarks espec-
ially germane to his values study by asserting that to
the extent to which an individuals value system differs
from that of the people with whom he is living, he will
misjudge them and their perceptions of events, and they
will misjudge him and his interpretation of events. The
things he perceives as important cannot be perceived
in that way by the other. His solution to the problems




are possible, apparently, only to what he calls the
rare individual, the cultural sophisticate described
in our synopsis of his paper. The cultural sophisticate,
having suspended many of the commitments which define
him as a member of his own society need no longer
maintain the mechanisms v/hich protected his "prior"
system, and thus reaches a degree of freedom.
We can not accept this set of propositions for
several reasons. It appears rather obvious to us that
they represent a philosophical determinism gratuitously
imposed . »/e need not argue the merits of volitional
systems in this case precisely because Sternin's
assertions are gratuitous. He offers no premises for
his conclusions that mid judgments are automatic; they
will occur simply because value systems differ. V/e need
not say with the same arbitrariness: They will not .
V/e merely reject an undemonstrated conclusion.
Secondly, the inevitability of the mis judgments
which are directly functional to differences in value
commitments creates a closed value system itself; it
determines the outcome of all events by way of volition,
leaving room for neither the cognitive nor the affective.
In its own way, the thesis is as behavioristic as is




Thirdly, we reject the propositions for the same
reason we would expect Sternin himself to reject them —
that they violate virtually every other postulate in
his paper, and the entire burden of his argument. Let
us examine the major premise of his argument, that is,
the argument of the paper at large.
Sternin recognizes the worth of giving an
individual an overview of a culture prior to entry, but
considers detailed content relatively useless in most
cases, and counterproductive in many. We have seen the
same assertions in other papers and they appear sound.
The primary objective of cross-cultural training,
he avers, is to teach good judgment . Good judgment, in
turn, consists primarily of doing "right" things or
avoiding "wrong" things. Right and wrong, he says, are
in the eyes of the beholder . Therefore, good judgment
in a foreign context is a highly delicate matter.
He elucidates somewhat, then, his definition of
good judgment, telling us that it involves, among other
things, the ability to recognize what is known to be
right may in fact be inappropriate at the moment, to
retain one's composure in the realization, size up the
situation and act accordingly, and accept the conse-





This description of good judgment leads Sternin
to the belief that these capacities may be intentionally
and systematically developed. If they can, he proposes,
a realistic training program for the purpose is
recommended. However, before attempting such a program,
it is necessary to determine whether or not the judg-
mental process he has described is a reliable phenomenon,
"If it is not a stable pattern, if it is not a natural
process to be found in nearly all of us, then even the
most original and sophisticated training methods will
be built upon a quicksand base,"^
We have in all of the above a number of varia-
tions of Sternin* s major premises that good judgment
is the power to discriminate and to act selectively.
Whether or not we would accept or choose such a defini-
tion of good judgment is not germane. He accepts it,
proposes an entire thesis and training approach con-
tingent upon its validity, then proceeds to deny the
very possibility of its exercise! His entire set of
postulates become inoperative in the very situation in
which they are needed and for which they are designedl
Martin I, Sternin, Washington Conference






the situation in which visitor's and host's value
systems differ. They must "misjudge" each other and
each other's perception of events. Hence, contrasts
of networks of value systems must lead to misunderstand-
ings and problems.
What has happened to that "good judgment"
which is precisely the ability to distinguish between
the "right" and the "appropriate", the ability to "size
up a situation" and act accordingly? What is the point
in a training program designed to teach "good judgment",
even if we can determine that the judgmental process as
described is a "reliable phenomenon", a "stable pattern",
a "natural process" found in nearly all of us? If
differences in value systems automatically provoke
mis judgment, "ut quid perditio haec ?"
The third reason we gave above for rejecting
Sternin's assertions about mis judgment as a function of
differences in value systems, therefore, is precisely
the one we would expect him to give: his conclusion
denies his major premise.
Let us examine that major premise a bit more
closely, however, lest our effort to extricate Sternin
from the results of contradicting himself suggest accep-




suspect that one of the reasons for what we considered
the "fuzziness" of Sternin's approach to values and value
orientations will reveal itself.
The desirability of good judgment is too obvious
to need comment. Let us analyze, however, some of the
ingredients of good judgment as described by Sternin.
First off, he tells us that it consists in doing,
and the quotation marks are his , "right" things, or at
least avoiding doing "wrong" things. V/ithout quotation
marks , then, he tells us that right and wrong are in the
eyes of the beholder.
Now anyone familiar with writings in the field
of perception, cultural relativity, attitudes, values,
and various other concepts we have been discussing
throughout this manuscript is aware of and sympathetic
with the use of quotation marks in describing right and
wrong, good and bad, and similar terms with potentially
equivocal meanings, when these terms are used in certain
contexts. We are well aware that it is not considered
"right" for men to kiss each other on both cheeks in
America. In another culture, it is the "right", that
is, the "proper" thing to do. If Eskimos are, in fact,





practice, which would be considered "wrong" , in the sense
of being peculiar and inappropriate in America, would be
"right" in an Eskimo culture. We need hardly belabor
these familiar usages. In this sense of appropriateness
,
we use the terms good and bad, right and wrong, knowingly,
intelligibly in respect to co-workers in the field,
frequently with quotation marks, but, when the context
makes the meaning clear, without such markings.
We are not at all sure that Sternin is employ-
ing this traditional convention. We suspect that he
knowingly or inadvertently slips in and out of quotation
marks, if we may so describe the deeply meaningful issue
here, and in so doing generates confusion which pervades
his major thesis in the paper under discussion, and col-
ors a good bit of his work on values and value orienta-
tions. We find that a writer's own illustrations are
usually the best key to what he really means, hence
will adduce the example Sternin provides to illustrate
the meaning of good judgment and the importance of
teaching it, instead of teaching content.
By the time my oldest daughter was five, she
had been properly taught to obey traffic signals.
Not very long ago she decided to cross a nearby






the light changed. Seeing the red signal she
stopped, became confused, decided to run back
and was hit by a turning car. Fortunately,
she was hot injured. 5^5
It is in immediate conjunction with this homely
(and sincerely charming) little example that Sternin
tells us that good judgment involves the ability to
recognize that what is known to be right may in fact be
inappropriate at the moment. (Underlining ours.) The
illustration, we feel, is quite apt in relating what is
"right" and what is "appropriate".
When one talks about value systems, however, and
questions of .judging and misjudging others, while con-
cepts of the appropriate and inappropriate have a place,
a totally different set of concepts also require a
place, concepts of right and wrong, or good and bad,
and their equivalents, without quotation marks expressed
or implied. In other words, a value system is a net-
work of more than orientations toward the appropriate
and the inappropriate in the sense involved in a little
girl's becoming confused by an ambiguous traffic situa-
tion. It is a network which includes moral values and






fused by a traffic signal is not a moral judgment
(except in terms of questions of learned obedience,
respect for parental authority, etc., which are hardly
the issue here). The little girl's response was "wrong",
in quotation marks, because inappropriate, not because
it was a violation of a moral code or a system of
moral feelings.
When we turn again to Sternin's description of
the cultural sophisticate, whom he seems to consider the
ideally adjusted visitor in a host culture, we seem
to see more of the ambiguity of terminology and concept.
On the one hand, he talks about the cultural sophisti-
cate as the man who discovers that goals are made
important by virtue of people's agreeing, albeit unknow-
ingly, to treat each other in certain ways depending
on one's success in achieving those goals. Again he
gives illustrations, and again in the illustrations we
seem to see his real meaning. He talks about the
man in our society, for example, who displays by action
or dress that he does not value cleanliness and a
modicum of material wealth. The man is treated with
distinctly less respect than one who shows that he





points out, for nonmaterial wealth. The possession of
status or prestige, for example, for which so many
devote years of labor, time away from their families
and for which they are frequently willing to undercut
their colleagues, is largely dependent on the need for
the appreciation of others.
In such passages, and in others related, he
seems to express certain of the same concepts we
expressed ourselves in relation to status and stature.
But it is to be remembered that the values described
here are those which are in themselves "right" and
"wrong" only in terras of being appropriate or inappro-
priate, valued by oneself and or one's peers, etc.
(We are leaving aside, of course, questions of deliber-
ate contempt for others manifested through inappropriate
dress, language, etc., where moral evaluations could be
involved.
)
Now the cultural sophisticate, Sternin says,
is aware of these human qualities of culture j of its
being a "contract to keep the faith". The cultural
sophisticate is not a man without commitments ; he is a
man who recognizes that his commitments are meaningful
to himself and others only because they have "agreed"




"Commitments" is a broad termi "value commit-
ments", even broader. If Sternin means the terms to
include moral values, as we understand the concept,
and makes no distinction between these and the values
of appropriateness, he makes it virtually impossible
to understand any culture. In every culture there are
systems of moral values, quite apart from what is con-
sidered appropriate. Unquestionably, the two systems
can intertwine, and usually do. In some instances they
merge, at given points of contact, and we find it
difficult to distinguish what is "right" from what is
right . But anthropologists are virtually unanimous in
their findings that incest is a moral taboo in every
known culture (granted, conceivably, the exception
that may "prove" the rule). Recent investigations in
New Guinea have uncovered some interesting data on
cannibalism. There are circumstances in which certain
tribes consider it morally permissible, indeed,
morally obligatory. The determination is not in the
order of appropriateness % J
1
J See Klaus-Priedrich Koch, "Cannibalistic
Revenge in Jale Warfare", in Natural History . Vol, L5CXIX,




Obviously, we need not seek extremes, to make
our point. In Sternin* s own value orientation study,
as we have seen, he made a great deal of variance in
the human nature orientation, in respect to economic
and business activities, personal and social activities,
and government and community activities. As measured
by his Taxonomy of Concerns, forty percent of the rural
South Vietnamese respondents considered men's economics
and business activities to stem from a human nature
which was a mixture of good and evil . An even higher
percent saw human nature so mixed in terms of personal
and social activities. In respect to political
activities, however, more people viewed human nature as
inherently good and more as inherently evil .
There can be no question that Sternin is here
using the terms good and evil in the classical moral
sense. Rather than obviate the confusion of usage in
the paper we are discussing, however, we might say that
further confusion is generated by the fact that Sternin
himself, by way of a footnote reference in the very
center of his discussion about misjudging others because
one holds a different value system , tells us about his





of cultural values. We again get the impression that
he either knowingly or unwittingly interchanges, hence
seriously confuses, "right" with right, and "wrong"
with wrong.
It is of at least incidental interest to note,
in concluding these comments, the remarks of a Viet-
namese writer who has prepared a "Primer for Americans".
After several pages on appropriate and inappropriate
behavior, as perceived by Vietnamese, he opens a section
entitled "Moral Values and Social Intercourse", in
which he tells us about the sensitivities of many Viet-
namese to "differences in moral character and values". '
Happily, we may conclude our comments on Sternin's
paper by citing what we believe to be a promising concept.
Sternin sees considerable value in ambiguity , in respect
to the objectives of Americans overseas. He points out,
as a sign of maturity in the field of cross-cultural
interaction, the increasing recognition that specific
concrete accomplishments are not ends in themselves,
but serve various functions. Many apparently different
outcomes can be recognized as functionally equivalent.
^ Nguyen Van Thuan, An Approach to Better Under-
standing of Vietnamese Society (Saigon, Vietnam: l'Jichi-





We find a pare lie 1 with, and empirical support
in, the findings of Robert Campbell's study of cross-
cultural interaction in Vietnam, which we discussed
earlier. It will be recalled that Campbell found exten-
sive confusion converning jobs, tasks, goals, objectives,
missions, and a strong tendency toward rigidity in
interpreting a task assignment, for example — to the
degree that goals could be thwarted and ultimate missions
damaged. This problem of overspecification is not, we
think, endangered by the Eachus or Wickert recommenda-
tions for clarification of purposes that we discussed.
A further interesting parallel may be found in
Almond and Powell's hypothesis of probabilistic function-
alism. If trade unions develop in a political system,
they note, there is a high probability that political
parties, the electoral process, the legislature, the
bureaucracy will be affected. The system of interaction
resulting will be interdependent, but not necessarily
harmonious or stable. The authors see the task of
political science research as ascertaining how change
in any parts of the political system affects other
parts and the whole.
•5^°Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.,
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston,





It seems to us that this concept is a contri-
bution in terms of the justifiable concern expressed by
Sternin, Wedge and others, about being shocked and unable
to function adequately when one meets events that contra-
dict expectations. Training in expecting and looking
for ambiguity and "probabilistic functionalism" , wherein
disharmony and instability may be the dominant charac-
teristics of the situation in which one finds oneself,
while, at the same time, interdependence is functioning
throughout all parts of the cultural system (if we may
extrapolate from the "political system"), might contri-
bute significantly to the development of that capacity
Sternin sees as so desirable — good judgment, particu-
larly as it involves the ability to retain one's
composure, to size up the situation using all the
information at hand, and to act accordingly. If
this be good judgment, we support it without reservation
as a consummation devoutly to be wished for all parti-








In this brief concluding chapter we shall
i
(a) address the important difference between generali-
zation and explanation in the social sciences; (b) pro-
vide an abbreviated review of training efforts as related
to conceptual formulations in the field of cross-cultural
interaction! (c) suggest certain exploratory hypotheses
which appear promising in terms of further development
of cross-cultural interaction conceptualization.
Generalizations and Explanations
Writing on the need for contextualist criteria,
Arthur A. Goldberg discusses "explanation" in the social
sciences.
For me, explanation does not consist in
generalization, but in deduction from premises.
That a correlation has been found to exist
between self-identification, in terms of social
class, and party identification, and that such
a correlation has been found in numerous studies,
suggesting a general relationship between these
two phenomena is, to me, no explanation whatso-




question, "Why does such a relationship exist?" .5^9
Many of the theoretical formulations we have
examined have offered impressive correlations suggest-
ing general relations between and among phenomena. One
need only attempt a listing of the many concepts and
constructs common to most reports in the field we have
discussed throughout this work to recognize the fre-
quency with which such phenomena have been noted and
correlated by the investigators in much the same way.
The notion of culture shock is illustrative. No one can
study the cross-cultural interaction literature without
meeting repeatedly the warning that something comes
over a very significant number of visitors to a host
culture. We need glance at only a few of the papers we
have been examining immediately above, for example, to
see the following array (sharply abbreviated here)t
Todd Eachus i "The phenomenon called culture
shock is essentially a demonstration of emotional behav-
ior which is caused by an unstable social environment."
^ ^Arthur A. Goldberg, "On the Need for Context-
ualist Criteria: A Reply to Professor Gunnell", in The
American Political Science Review , Vol. LXIII, No. k
(Dec. 1969), p. 12^7. (The reply is to John G. Gunnell*
s
paper, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific




Martin I. Sternin i "The person in culture shock
is in fear for his mental well-being, which is experienced
to be, and may actually be, in real danger. If I were
asked to speculate • • • I would be inclined to propose
that in the case of Americans, it (the danger) is con-
cerned most often with a sense of helplessness and a fear
of losing control."
Bryant Wedge i "... I've repeatedly observed
the helplessness and shock of persons truly expert in
the language and culture of host countries when events
contradict established expectations."
We could multiply descriptions or descriptive
definitions of culture shock, but would find repeated
reference to such notions as loss of familiar environ-
mental cues, sense of helplessness, loss of control, and
related variables. Examination of discussions of symp-
toms of the culture shock syndrome again reveals a com-
munality of observations, including withdrawal, hostility,
fatigue, "going native", and similar emotional and phy-
sical behaviors. One finds little difficulty, therefore,
in "generalizing" to the recognition that something
debilitating comes over a very significant number of




to a sense of helpless unfamiliarity in his environment.
This is, indeed, an important thing to know. Knowing
about is, we can conceivably do something about it.
But what can we do? This we don't really know,
despite a substantial number of extensive commentaries
on the apparently correlated phenomena involved, because
we do not know why "culture shock" occurs. In Goldberg's
terms, we are aware of what at least appear to be general
relationships among phenomena, but we have no real
explanation . But what of a clear-cut statement of "cause",
such as we find in Eachusi "... culture shock ... is
caused by an unstable social environment"? When we in-
quire about the meaning of an unstable social environ-
ment, we are told that "many of the commonplace rein-
forcing events for . . • verbal behavior have been either
set aside or removed and subsequently replaced by other
relevant parameters". But why does this "cause" culture
shock? Why is the phenomenon not universal, or observed
as universal, or experienced universally to the same
degree? What data have we on culture shock experienced
by members of other cultures? What are the "commonplace"





The list of inquiries could be continued, but
our purpose is not to explore culture shock any further.
We reference is simply as illustrative of many of the
"givens" in extant approaches to the study of cross-
cultural interaction. It is but one set of many sets
of generalizations found in the literature without true
explanations. We consider Goldberg's commentary on
"explanation" in the social sciences in general crucial
to the current state of the study of cross-cultural
interaction.
We are not at all suggesting that there is wide-
spread pretense to the contrary. The greater number of
investigators and theoreticians, as we have seen, are
laudably conservative in presenting their findings,
observations, and hypotheses. We are unaware of any
general theory which purports to provide "explanations"
— give the "why" — of the many phenomena commonly
observed, or the many general relationships among such
phenomena recognized as at least suggesting positive
correlationships, and perhaps, in some cases, functional
relationships. Here and there one finds a proposition
presented as incontrovertible, but this is not done too




cation that a systematic explanatory theory springs full-
blown from the proposition's head.
What do we find, then? We find, for the most
part, a number of exploratory hypotheses. Many of these
are starting points for research projects. Sternin's
study of values and value orientations of rural South
Vietnamese is typical of these. Triandis' explorations
of role pattern variance in diverse cultures are likewise
typical. A survey of serious research efforts leads to
a recognition that in many instances there are just
enough tantalizing indications that an investigator is
on the right track, or "getting warm 1*, that a number
of these exploratory hypotheses may well be verified in
due time.
The problem is the field of cross-cultural inter-
action, however, as perceived by many investigators, is
that Hdue time" does not take account of present
urgencies. As we have noted frequently, the social
science community has felt itself obliged to respond now
to requirements imposed by expanding American contacts
throughout the world and the concomitant needs expressed
by policy-makers. The pressure of events has not so




has, in some), as led concerned parties to use explora-
tory hypotheses on an ad hoc basis in efforts to develop
concentrated or massive training programs for Americans
about to engage in, or already engaging in cross-
cultural interaction. Basically, the rationale has been
that something is better than nothing . We have critical
problems of increasing proportions in respect to Ameri-
cans in other cultures. Obviously, we must try to
alleviate the problems. We do not pretend to know all
the reasons for the problems. Perhaps we don't really
"know" any . But we have a number of ideas that have
accrued from observation. A number of hypotheses have
been and are being explored. We believe we see a number
of general relationships among some commonly observed
phenomena. We shall turn our efforts to trying what
may help. As Bryant Wedge put it: "The absence of a
satisfactory general theory does not prevent action.
For practical purposes, it is possible — indeed,
necessary — to proceed on the basis of partial theory
or incomplete models. "55°







There are some very critical problems in this
approach, however. Whether it is possible at this stage
to weigh costs against rewards is highly questionable,
but we would consider it most unwise to ignore the
problems. Before looking at them, we feel we should
comment upon the common assumption that when widespread
concern is evidenced about any issue, and high-level
policy-makers call upon high-level social scientists,
issue organizational directives, undertake crash research
projects, and initiate extensive training programs, the
very expression of concern itself, the very effort , must
inevitably produce beneficial results. Unfortunately,
euphoria is not only no substitute for a viable action
program — it can be immensely counter-productive. After
the initial surge of interest or effort, if a truly
effective action program does not appear, or is not
implemented, the disillusionment is exceedingly damaging.
This is unquestionably true in the military environment,
when personal and material resources are always at a
premium, and resentment against the steady prolifera-
tion of "programs" always runs high; it is particularly





Conceptual Frameworks and Training Approaches
Two of the most serious dangers we see, however,
in the approach we have been discussing involve: (1) the
fact that an extensive, long-range action/training
program initiated in major institutions tends to follow
the laws of inertiai (2) exploratory hypotheses have a
way of being "verified" by use.
The first danger needs little comment. Massive
organizations require considerable "lead time" for
implementing programs. Once such programs are underway,
they simply continue, by fiat , until a counter-force
slows them down, or eventually brings them to a halt.
Enthusiastic visions of "continuing feedback" and pro-
portionate modifications, continuing field evaluations,
periodic seminars and conferences, intensification of
support for hypotheses which seem to prove workable,
programmed means of rescinding efforts based on hypothe-
ses that prove unworkable, and so on, are simply
unrealistic in a huge organization. We do not feel the
necessity of demonstrating this reality at this point.
Anyone with any experience in research and development
in "software", coupled with actual field experience,







A less obvious danger, it seems to us, lies in
the assumption that the proliferation of techniques, the
development of training methodologies and training
methods, the formalization of programs, the widespread
usage of particular approaches and training materials
among many hundreds of thousands of personnel, all some-
how or other have a tendency to "verify 1* ipso facto what
had been initially considered by researchers and theore-
ticians an exploratory hypothesis. The need for true,
painstaking verification is ignored, in light of the
problems involved in verification, and the almost infin-
ite number of tie-ins the hypothesis now has with tre-
mendous action/training programs. One need not be more
than passingly familiar with Almond and Verba*
s
"probabilistic functionalism" to suspect the ramifica-
tions of pulling the hypothetical rug out from beneath
a training program involving perhaps a million men.
We discussed problems like this in another way
in our introductory chapter, but here we want to look
at them in application. What we might well call the
"reification" of hypotheses is clearly evident in the
cross-cultural training manuals themselves, both in the




in the actual content and/or technique proposed. An
examination of some of these manuals and related mater-
ials provides perhaps as meaningful a review of the
"state of the art" of cross-cultural interaction theory
and practice as could be accomplished in any way.
Arthur J. Hoehn provides us, for example, with
what he calls The Design of Gross-Cultural Training for
Military Advisors . He tells us:
Factors which make the advisor's assignment
quite different from typical military assign-
ments include the unusual physical and cultural
setting, the unfamiliar functions to be per-
formed, and the complex intercultural,
international, interorganizational, and inter-
personal aspects of the job. Adequate pre-
paration requires high-order knowledges and
skills which can be developed only by adoption
of new perspectives for area training. 551
Hoehn lists possible content elements for
expanded training for military advisors. He informs
us that current training focuses primarily on language
skills and learning information about social institu-
tions, history, politics, economics, and geography of
the host country, and about the objectives, organi-
zational structure, policies and procedures for
55lArthur J. Hoehn, The Design of Cross-
Cultural Training for Military Advisors (Alexandria, Va.i





conducting American advisory programs in the host
country. Types of information needing more attention,
he notes, concern the organization and behavior of the
host military, attitudes, motivations and work habits
of counterparts, systematic information concerning prob-
lems and issues of the past in interaction between
counterparts, approaches toward solutions and their
results. Further, whereas most advisor training is
currently directed to a particular country or culture,
training should be expanded to provide M for teaching
conceptual frameworks that have generality across
cultures , and that provide general schemas in terms of
which the advisor can structure his information and
observations and by reference to which he can organize
his thinking and planning as he goes about his job in
the cross-cultural setting.""2
Here we see the reification phenomenon at
work. The assumption here, apparently, is that we know
that certain conceptual frameworks do have generality
across cultures. Generality, of course, is a tricky
word. In light of our earlier discussion of






Hoehn really means. However, he assures us that "several
available types of conceptual frameworks are available",
and proceeds to list the same. It is in lists of this
sort, especially, that we get some of our best insights
into the state of the art. Hoehn includes, with varying
lengths of comment t culture and social system concepts,
e.g., Hall's theory of culture as found in The Silent
Language ; schemas developed for comparing dilfering ,u
cultures, as illustrated by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's
work and as demonstrated as potentially useful for
training, in the work of Stewart (with emphasis on
cultural s elf-awareness ) ; the schema covering the cross-
cultural innovation process, exemplified by concept-
ualizations of Niehoff and Anderson; conceptual frame-
works found in generalized models of developing nations,
e.g., the "prismatic model" of Riggs, relating adminis-
trative behavior to ecological conditions typical of
transitional societies.
The study of these conceptual frameworks,
however, is still not sufficient, says the author,
because they do not automatically translate into train-
ing programs, decision-making and communications acts.




r nbe directed toward learning decision-making skills and
cross-cultural skills, including, of course , (underlining
oursl), the understandings and sensitivities, perceptions
and attitudes, methods and strategies which are necessary
support to these high-order skills. (The obvious assump-
tion here, of course , is that a more than ample range
of demonstrated hypotheses are available in relation to
understandings, sensitivities, perceptions, attitudes,
methods, strategies, etc.) In other words, we find in
the Hoehn study what typifies so much of the cross-
cultural training approach, the vague passage from the
postulated to the proved, the subtle obliteration of
distinctions between assumptions and assertions, the
shifting of forces from the problem of conceptualizing
to the problem of translating concepts into practice by
way of developing appropriate techniques .
We turn, on Hoehn' s recommendation, to the
report of Robert J. Foster and Jack Danielian, An
Analysis of Human Relations Training and Its Implications
for Overseas Performance . Again we find the "general
relationships'* purportedly accrued by experience and
investigation as the frame of reference within which




culturally different patterns of thought and behavior
of Americans and host peoples as being the major obstac-
les to effective cross-cultural interaction, rather than
such obvious factors as differences in dress, gestures,
or food, commonly emphasized because of their exotic
appeal, The major obstacles, we are told again, are
"the basic cultural premises and beliefs that underlie
the more obvious cultural characteristics. "553
After a brief summary of the three training
methods at issue, the T-group, role-playing, and the case
study, in which claims are quite modest, and appropriate
qualifications are set forth, we are told:
Despite the sketchy and often technically
inadequate nature of the evaluative research
cited, an overall impression emerges that
human relations training can make an impact
on attitudes and interpersonal orientations
in unicultural settings when used with fore-
sight by experienced trainers . There is
reason to believe that such training may
also be a useful adjunct to existing lan-
guage and area study programs for prepara-
tion of overseas personnel, both military
and non-military . • . Human relations
training for overseas work can probably be
enriched by incorporating foreign nationals
into the training groups. T-groups of
553Robert j, Foster and Jack Danielian, An Analysis
of Human Relations Training and Its Implications for
Overseas Performance (Washington, D.C.t George




mixed nationalities, for example, may represent
a microcosm of a cross-cultural encounter that
can provide an in-depth cultural learning
experience for the participants. Under
skillful guidance , such a strategy may inte-
grate the substantive content of cultural
learning with the situational requirements
for behavioral change. In addition, exposure
to an unstructured training milieu may
"immunize" the trainee against adverse
reactions to the very real ambiguities of actual
overseas situations. 55^- (Underlining ours.)
It would be difficult to find more carefully
qualified language. How carefully, however, are the
qualifications observed in practice by the well-meaning
enthusiast looking for a sure-fire solution to his
problem of training Americans for overseas activities?
Edward C. Stewart and the same Jack Danielian
and Robert J. Foster have reported their work in
Simulating Intercultural Communication Through Role-
Playing
, in which we find further delineation of
Stewart's contrast-culture and contrast-American tech-
niques, as well as further explication of his usages
of the Kluckhohn values concepts and categories. Again
the emphasis is on "cultural insight".
The primary building blocks and systematic
dimensions of a social-psychological model are
cognitive variables — in this instance, cul-
tural values and assumptions • . • The essential





feature of the (simulation) exercises is a
representation of the social-psychological
aspects of interaction between people who
hold differing values and assumptions} the
key function of the exercises is to induce
a cognitive confrontation, with accompany-
ing emotional investment and behavioral
confrontation • . . American values and
assumptions must be accurately depicted,
because it is insight into one's own
values and assumptions that permits the
growth of a perspective which recognizes
that differing sets of values and assump-
tions exist (i.e., cultural relativism),
and development of the potential for
greater understanding of another culture. 555
(Stewart's underlining.)
Next, we review briefly a contribution by
Robert J. Foster, entitled Dimensions of Training for
Overseas Assignment . Foster tells us his intent is
"to provide conceptual categories and a framework
encompassing the major considerations in the design for
training for overseas assignments" .556 <ph e reasons for
so doing are two«
Conceptual categories that exist in a
person's mind influence the manner and abi-
lity with which he thinks about any pheno-
menon and, consequently, the way he plans,
555Edward C. Stewart, Jack Danielian, and
Robert J. Foster, Simulating Intercultural Communication
Through Role-Playing (Washington, D.C.t George
Washington University, HumRRO, 1969)1 P« !•
556Robert J. Foster, Dimensions of Training for
Overseas Assignment (Washington, D.C.j George
Washington University, HumRRO, I969) . P» 3« ,
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organizes, and implements. A conceptual frame-
work could be of help in synthesizing what is
known in the area of overseas training and be
useful as a frame of reference for the train-
ing executive and his staff in the planning
and implementation of training programs, 55
7
The title of the work should not be construed
to mean that it deals directly with training. Foster
notes that it does not. Its purpose is as he stated,
to provide a conceptual framework. We shall do no more
than list the table of contents to indicate the areas
on which the report presents propositions on the basis
that "Since various observers cite common themes,
although with different emphases, it seems reasonable
that the overseas situation can be characterized with
a fair degree of accuracy and generalization. "55°
Of the elements treated in the manual, and
listed below, we are then told, are underlying constants
characterizing the overseas job and forming the work







r nTHE OVERSEAS JOB





Differences in Physical Environment
Unprogramed Nature of the Work
Ambiguity
OBJECTIVES OF TRAINING







Objectives in Terms of Content Areas
Technical Knowledge and Skill
Language Proficiency
Effective Use of an Interpreter
Organization Orientation
Area Knowledge
Area Information Relevant to Personal
Concerns
Knowledge of American Foreign Policy and
Institutions
Health and Medical Knowledge
Mission and Work Role Identity






The appearance in the list of "constants* which





receives special comment from the author, which we feel
sufficiently illustrative of the "reification" phenomenon
we are discussing to warrant quotation.
This category is treated separately here in
order to emphasize its neglect in most training
programs. In the design of actual training
programs, the dynamics of certain processes in
human behavior should be integrated into relevant
components. Examples of the processes that should
be included are the dynamics of giving-receiving,
ambivalence, loneliness, ascendancy-submission,
psychological reactions to ambiguity, perceptual
distortion, advising, stereotyping, and forming
judgements. Others are more directly relevant
to intercultural interaction (see "Intercultural
Effectiveness")
.
These phenomena are part of our lives in any
situation; the justification for emphasis in an
overseas training program rests with the notion
that more conscious awareness of "what comes
naturally" may aid one to be more flexible in a
largely different environment. In addition,
there are often special aspects of specific
overseas situations, such as sharing blame and
praise with counterparts, and handling a police-
man (inspector) role simultaneously with being
an advisor, that need to be examined from a
social -psychological perspective. 5^0
Foster concludes by advising us that the dis-
cussion of the constants listed and their conceptual
categories offers a framework for thinking about
training, but that the individual trainer must address
the particular requirements of each individual program,




and that training objectives should not be tied to any
particular method.
Once objectives are clear, one uses
whatever methods or combination of methods
seem most appropriate to the particular
trainee population • . . Many of these
objectives require a restructuring of
emotional and mental "habits", rather
than such things as imparting knowledge
about another culture. As we have seen,
the overseas problem often seems to be
characterized by semi-conscious assump-
tions, egocentric perspectives, and limited
experience rather than by lack of knowledge
or intellectual demands. 361
There are other reports, other presentations
of substantially the same "general relationships"
observed among phenomena involving Americans in other
cultures, accompanying "conceptual frameworks", recom-
mended training procedures to apply the concepts
categorized within the frameworks formulated on the
basis of the commonly observed phenomena perceived as
general relationships. We are aware of no report more
thorough, however, in concrete explanations and illus-
trations of the increasing number of training method-
ologies and methods, and the conceptualizations they
are considered to reflect, than the Peace Corps Train-
ing Manual we have frequently cited. Under "General





Training Methodologies", for example, it includes:
Use of small groups, unstructured training,
the non-directive approach, the modified
T-group, instrumented development group training.
Under "Content, Method and Techniques", it
includes: The Role Model, Cross-cultural
exercises, community description, critical
incidents, culture assimilator, case studies,
situational exercises, role playing, non-
verbal communication exercises, cross-cultural
comparison exercises, force field analysis,
cultural immersion and simulation, use of a
third culture experience in training, behavior
contrasts, role of host nationals and experts,
American studies, world affairs and critical
issues, the free university, perceptual set
exercise, conformity/deviation exercise,
intergroup competition exercise, in-country
training, development of trainee attitude,
development of staff attitude, functioning of
the group, trainee responsibility, etc.
Most of the above listed "Content, Method and
Techniques" are further explored in terms of their
variations and sub-divisions, so that, for example,
not only role playing, but "role play in discussion"
and "Upper Volta role plays" are treated. Included,
as well, are field comments concerning cross-cultural
training, and the recommendations from Cross-Cultural
conferences, as well as "Resources for Cross-Cultural
Training"
.
Perhaps most interesting and pertinent of all,
however, in relation to this thorough collation and




the field of cross-cultural interaction and training
methodologies and methods developed thereon, is the
homely and modest comment by the authors after describ-
ing the fact that development of the manual has not been
merely a task of assembling diverse materials, but has
required developing and articulating experiential learn-
ing theory and methodology and evaluating various experi-
ential approaches to learning , "We . . . are anxious
to try some of the new ideas and clearer conceptions of
training that have evolved.** The manual appeared in
1262-
Equally significant is the cover design of the
Peace Corps Manual. It consists of the well-known
ambiguous figure shown below as Figure VI-1. What is
interesting about such a figure is that once both ele-
ments are perceived, it becomes impossible henceforth
not to see them. Indeed, when one deliberately forces
his attention on one figure, in a few seconds the other
comes into perspective, with the first returning in
another moment, and the alternate cycle repeating
itself beyond whim or will of the viewer. Such is the
ambiguity of perception. Such is the nature of "form-












frustrating ambiguity of current conceptual approaches
and their alternating cycle of mergers with training
methodologies and methods in the ambigious "field" of
cross-cultural interaction.
Generalizations and Expectations Revisited
The intent of this very brief glance at current
training literature is by no means intended to fault
those who have been researching and developing train-
ing methodologies and methods, or those who have
reported such efforts, and, in turn, interpreted them
or organized them into conceptual categories. Our
point has been that in the exigencies of research and
development oriented toward immediately useable results,
exploratory hypotheses become "verified", methods, tech-
niques, methodologies, analytical and conceptual
assumptions, frameworks, and "theoretical considerations"
all seem to become part of a big, self-nourishing,
closed circle, or a series of concentric circles,
feeding on circular arguments, in a kind of homeostatic
compound of reified postulates. It is not a matter of





We refrained from detailed comments about most
of the notions enunciated in the "training" literature,
in respect for space limitations. We assume that the
processes we have been describing reveal themselves
adequately in the illustrative materials we have cited
(all the work of serious and respectable investigators),
and require no further specific discussion.
Two general points deserve mention, however.
First, we discover that one need not cite a great num-
ber of training manuals to discern that virtually every
concept discussed in the theoretical papers we have con-
sidered is reflected in these manuals (and vice versa).
Secondly, we note the tendency for those involved in
"applied research" and development of training materials
to stress the "commonly observed phenomena" and the
"general relationships" among them, or the "underlying
constants" which provide a "reasonable basis" for
developing training methodologies and methods.
Neither event is surprising. We noted at the
outset of our presentations of current conceptual
approaches that the papers discussed were highly repre-




The second point needs comment and leads us
toward the conclusion of the present work. We must ask
those who see all the commonly experienced phenomena
and general relationships! "What of reciprocally con-
tradictory hypotheses? What of negative findings that
counter-balance the positive?" In examining the repre-
sentative papers synopsized in these chapters, we saw
precisely such conflicts.
And we could pursue the question to ask for
evidence — hard data — to support each of the
"commonly experienced phenomena". How commonly have
these phenomena been experienced? How many studies have
there been, with how many subjects in how many host
cultures? Apparently, it is now a "given", for example,
as the training manuals clearly illustrate, that the
major obstacles, the real problems, in cross-cultural
interaction are not what they were once believed to
be — differences in food, dress, customs and other
"esoteric" areas i they are differences in values, in
life-styles, in ways of looking at the world. Are they?
Perhaps. But many of the Marines surveyed by McGonigal
and others in South Vietnam expressed displeasure pre-
cisely with such things as the alleged dirtiness, lazi-
ness and untrustworthiness of the people, public .
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defecation, the smells, heat, cold, dampness, etc. —
in other words, all the "differences" between the "way
things are" in South Vietnam and the way they are in
the United States. How do we know what weight to give
to such variables so that we can "score" them against
differences in "value systems", or would views of time,
nature, and so on? Maybe thousands of Americans do
continue to meet their problems couched in very prosaic
terms of physical discomfort and distress, justifiable
disgust, homesickness and related ways that have nothing
to do with deep-rooted cultural differences. Do we
really know? Do we really have a wealth of empirical
data to support these allegedly "commonly experienced
phenomena"? Is it possible that if enough seminars and
conferences are held, with many of the same (relatively
small group) of participants, or if enough investigators
write and read pretty much the same literature, that
they are the ones who "commonly observe" these phenomena?







Toward the Beginnings of a Conceptual Approach
From the outset of this paper we have tried to
make clear our purpose of exploring as objectively as
possible the various efforts advanced in the literature
toward the formulation of a theory, or an analytical
framework, or an integrated conceptual approach for the
systematic study of cross-cultural interaction. While
it has become clear throughout our study that many of
these efforts have been highly provocative, none may be
said to have resulted to date in what we would consider
a workable theory, capable of explaining the various
phenomena we have discussed, or of providing a coherent
body of propositions which might yield and support the
investigation of further hypotheses.
Since we had hardly expected to discover an
advanced stage of theoretical progress in so relatively
new a field of speculation and research, however, we
are by no means disappointed. On the contrary, we
believe that our study has been fruitful in two signi-
ficant ways. First, we have satisfied ourselves of the






is, that no workable theory is currently available.
Since the entire thrust of our study has stressed the
implications of such a finding, its significance need
not be labored here.
It is with the second of our findings that we
shall concern ourselves for the remainder of this work,
namely, that there does seem to be enough support in
the literature wehave studied to justify the formula-
tion of a number of exploratory hypotheses. It seems
quite possible that a synthesis of the more promising
of these hypotheses might serve as a point of departure
for the development of a conceptual approach to the
field. It is this beginning , after all, that we had
hoped to achieve through our study, and if such is
achieved, or brought closer, the study has been
profitable.
We have formulated the exploratory hypotheses
listed below on the basis of the research project
reports, the "pure research", and the theoretical con-
cepts we have discussed. While we have indicated in
parentheses the principal investigators or theorists
whose findings or concepts have been used or modified






such formulations would necessarily be acceptable to
those named.
The hypotheses presented here seem to be promis-
ing in terms of meeting reasonable criteria. They are
internally consistent. They are congruent with one
another. They are congruent with empirical findings
we have been able to examine, both in the literature of
cross-cultural interaction and in that of the several
disciplines we have turned to. They seem to offer the
possibility of explanations, rather than merely of
generalizations, or general relationships. Negatively,
they seem more promising than do contradictory hypo-
theses and findings encountered from time to time in
our study.
Promising Exploratory Hypotheses
(1) There is a high positive correlation
between belief in and understanding of the basic
commonality of human beings and basic equality of
human life, and the development of a positive attitude







(2) A behavioral state inappropriate to a
cross-cultural situation may accompany a contradiction
of expectancies by events. (Bryant Wedge)
(3) There is a high positive correlation between
"sense of stature" and appropriate behavior in a cross-
cultural situation in which expectancies have been con-
tradicted by events j there is a high positive correlation
between "sense of status apart from stature" and
inappropriate behavior in the same situation. (Bryant
Wedge- and David Asubel)
(4) There is a high positive correlation
between perceiving as superficial the superficial simi-
larities or dissimilarities between cultures, and
appropriate cross-cultural interaction between parti-
cipants reciprocally so perceiving. (Bryant Wedge,
Harry-Triandis, Richard McGonigal)
(5) There is a higher probability of positive
correlation between appropriate behavior in a cross-
cultural interaction when the participants recognize
the functional equivalency of different outcomes, than





(6) Preparation for appropriate behavior in
cross-cultural interaction requires specification of
the purposes of the interaction. (Todd Eachus)
(7) Desired interaction outcomes tend to per-
dure if the cross-cultural interaction processes yield-
ing the outcomes are appropriately institutionalized.
(Bryant Wedge, Frederick Wickert)
(8) Self-discovery, either cognitively or affec-
tively, of the internal forms governing one's own
behavior is more difficult for some actors than for
others. (Edward Stewart, Edmund Glenn)
(9) Form-givers have the capacity to recognize
internal forms cognitively or affectively, (a) governing
their own behavior, (b) governing the behavior of others.
(Edward Stewart, Edmund Glenn)
(10) Form-givers have the capacity to recognize
forms required for actors to meet environmental needs.
CEdmund Glenn)
(11) Form-givers have the capacity to provide






Discussion of Exploratory Hypotheses
Hypothesis Onei Commonality and Equality
In concluding our discussion of Stewart's theory,
we quoted Paul Spector on the importance of awareness of
their own cultural ideals on the part of Americans who
would interact appropriately with others. Spector is
quite explicit about which cultural ideals or values are
involved
To achieve sustained, effective interaction
which will result on the whole in positive tan-
gible accomplishments and the feelings of security,
respect and friendliness on the part of host
nationals, it is necessary first ... to develop
the belief and emotional feeling that the host
nationals, by and large, are good and therefore
merit consideration, cooperation, concern for
their welfare and the willingness to self-
sacrifice. It is our own belief that these are
the basic positive attitudes that most Americans
hold toward each other • • . and that they
represent some of the significant factors which
contribute to the general welfare and development
of our society. 5o2
Spector proposes a "motivational program" to help
enlist such attitudes and marshal them in behalf of
improving cross-cultural relationships. To achieve this,
it is essential, he maintains!







To develop an understanding of the common-
ality of all human beings and genuine conscious
recognition of the fundamental equality of all
men . . . Once individuals realize that they are
dealing with other human beings who are funda-
mentally similar to themselves, and once it is
realized that the American belief in the equal
value of all human life can serve as the basis
for the host national feelings of security,
confidence, dignity and cooperativeness, it
is relatively easy for the American to conceive
of host nationals sympathetically as rational
human beings whose motivation and behavior can
be understood, on the one hand in common human
terms, and on the other, in terms of special
cultural conditions acting upon and through
human beings whose motivation and behavior can
be understood, on the one hand in common human
terms, and on the other, in terms of special
cultural conditions acting upon and through
human beings. 5°
3
Spector goes on to point out that unless they
have these attitudes, Americans can feel completely
at ease and even justified in cruel, hostile activity
toward others. Conversely, host nationals can hardly
expect fair treatment or trust completely those who
consider them inferior human beings.
The basic premises of Mole's studies of the
Vietnamese are essentially the same as Spector* s.
Mole stresses the necessity of recognizing and respect-
ing the "basic worth and dignity of the Asian as a
person", precisely identical in this respect with




every other person in the world, including the American.
The differences in behavior and values do not reflect
differences in worth as human persons.
McGonigal, too, as we have seen, has insisted
upon the recognition of equality. We have previously
cited his paper, "Breaking the Myth of the Asian Mind",
in which he decries overly-sophisticated or esoteric
approaches to understanding the Vietnamese, and argues
that we can accomplish nothing in this regard "unless
we respect them as equally important human beings ..."
The clue to the whole puzzle of how Americans can act
appropriately with the Vietnamese, says McGonigal, "is
still the magic of a human being treating the other as
a human being. "56^
Our own studies of the CAP units reported above
seem to lend empirical weight to this notion. We cited,
for example, what we considered a rather fair summary
of attitudes of American Marines in these units — the
frequently-used description of the Vietnamese i "They're
no different from us, once you get to know them." The
Allnutt study of CAP units supports this finding. It
56%*ichard A. McGonigal, "Breaking the Myth of






will be recalled that Allnutt and his associates con-
cluded that the interpersonal problems they observed in
CAP units were of a general nature, involving attitudes
which would provoke similar responses among peoples
everywhere, and that, hence, little sophistication is
required of the American who would interact effectively
with the Vietnamese. The requirement, rather, is for
ordinary respect for others as equals.
We previously recounted, as an illustrative
"critical indident" , the story of the American advisor
to the Vietnamese Air Force who resented the repeated
directions issued by a Vietnamese officer on how to
play a game, long after the American felt he had learned
to play it himself. The Vietnamese officer waited for
the American to express his impatience over being treated
as a child, or worse, then gently reminded the American
that the Vietnamese have precisely the same feelings
when treated that same way. In its homely way the story
highlights the importance of a sense of commonality and
equality on the part of actors in a cross-cultural
setting, and seems to suggest that the first of our




Hypothesis Twoi Contradiction of Expectancies
With due deference to the classic version of the
Golden Rule, a rendition more appropriate to cross-
cultural interaction would bei "Do unto others as they
would have you do unto them." The data that Bryant Wedge
offers as accrued experiences of the leadership trainees
who attempt to gain access to and involve themselves in
the activities of "contrast sub-communities'* , suggests
that a pre-entry mental set which expects members of a
host culture to behave as the visitor has predetermined
they should behave, may result in inappropriate visitor
behavior, if the hosts contradict his expectations.
An examination of the responses in the McGonigal
surveys given by American Marines expressing dislike for
Vietnamese reveals that the dislike is very frequently
predicated on the failure of Vietnamese either to prac-
tice "American" behavior, or to express what Americans
consider appropriate gratitude for American efforts in
their behalf, (See, for example, Appendix N, Table 1.)
The findings of the attitude study of Vietnamese civilian
workers aboard American bases indicate that the Viet-
namese, too, have problems when American behavior con-





Robert J. Foster supports the Wedge thesis in
the introduction to his collection of critical incidents
in cross-cultural interaction, when he points out that
those who claim excessive confidence and expertise in
advance about their abilities in cross-cultural situa-
tions. (See our page 390 for the Foster quotation.)
The Hrigidity M of some Peace Corps Volunteers
seems to result in similar problems related to unful-
fulled expectancies. In the Peace Corps Training Manual
we have cited previously, for example, we find singled
out as a major problem for Volunteers:
• • . the realization that not everyone
"wants" to be helped — at least in the way
the PCV may try to propose. Many things enter
here — pride, habit, tradition, social customs,
skepticism, willingness to be beholden. The
challenge to the PCV is to couch his sugges-
tions (preferably demonstrations) in a manner
which is socially acceptable and face saving
for the recipient. "565
The Wickert paper on institution building with
its examples of unfulfilled expectancies and the need
for doing things in the hosts' way, creating a climate
of acceptance of innovation, and so on, strongly supports
the Wedge thesis, as does the major thrust of Everett
Rogers' Diffusion of Innovations, cited above.





One further aspect of our exploratory hypothesis
deserves discussion here. We have seen Allnutt's find-
ings that Personal Response Training in the CAP schools
can be counterproductive, when, in an effort to prepare
American Marines to expect certain Vietnamese behaviors,
it presents a long list of local Vietnamese
"peculiarities", which succeed only in making the Viet-
namese look childish or stupid. Allnutt points out
that Marines may then develop a supercilious or patron-
izing air on the basis of this assumed "knowledge".
A number of problems can be thus provoked
.
Even more problematic, along these lines, is
the confusion generated by way of incongruities between
what the American is taught to expect that the Viet-
namese expect of him , and the Vietnamese behavior he
actually observes. For example, one of the Personal
Response discussions, "The Place of Women in Vietnam",
describes a critical incident involving one Lance
Corporal Jones, a successful member of a CAP unit. 5°°
One day Jones was seen walking along in broad daylight
holding hands with a Vietnamese girl who worked in the
5^Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook.





local barbershop. The next day "there was a definite
chill in the attitude of the whole hamlet •" The discus-
sion goes on to cite a survey among Vietnamese civilians
in Danang which showed 98^ of the people strongly
opposed to seeing an American hold hands with a Veit-
namese girl, 82?o believing that any girl seen with an
American in public must be a "bad" girl, and so on.
Varying customs are then discussed, and appropriate
American behavior recommended. It all sounds logical
— until the American asksi MWhy did the Vietnamese girl
hold hands, if the Vietnamese consider it wrong?" Ort
"How come there are so many Vietnamese prostitutes?"
Exploration of this particular hypothesis might
yield useful criteria for evaluating the context of
cross-cultural interaction training programs.
Hypothesis Three » Status and Stature
The Peace Corps Training Manual includes a set
of responses to questionnaires administered to various
Volunteers as field interviews. In response to the first
question placed, asking what kind of problems Volunteers
have in entering, adapting, gaining acceptance, and




One is constantly impressed with the
relationships between the internal secur-
ity of an individual personality and his
cultural framework. Meaning that even with
the highly selected individuals we work with,
the framework and the cares of their culture
comprise a portion of their internal secur-
ity and when those are withdrawn we, many
times, have a significant reaction. We
observe typically, increased anxiety, with-
drawal, rejection, and aroused psychosomatic
concerns. 5° 7
We have suggested that the stature/status equa-
tion offers a viable explanation for certain behaviors
observed in relation to "culture shock". The per-
tinence of the equation to the question of expectancies
and events discussed above, as well as that of the
latter question to culture shock behavior seems reason-
ably obvious.
It would likewise seem plausible to investigate
the status/stature hypothesis in respect to possible
implications for Hypotheses Eight through Eleven, below.
Perhaps the individual whose sense of intrinsic worth
is such as to free him from undue dependence on the
on the attitudes and expressed behavior of others is
the individual capable of discerning the internal forms
governing his own behavior and that of others. Perhaps





he is the likely form-giver, able to recognize and pro-
vide forms required to meet environmental needs. The
implications for leadership theory, for "diffusion of
innovations" theory, and for cognitive dissonance theory
seem to be self-evident. Taking only the latter by way
of example, it would appear reasonable that the individ-
ual most certain of his own worth, hence least depen-
dent on group approval, would be least likely to feel
uncomfortable, or under least pressure to change judge-
ments, behavior or attitudes simply because of discre-
pancies between his personal situation and that of the
group.
Clinical evidence accrued by Asubel and others
who have worked with the stature/status hypothesis
suggests, too, that the individual certain of his own
intrinsic worth is more likely to see the intrinsic
worth of others; hence the hypothesis has relevancy
for Hypothesis One, and the Spector thesis. *°
Hypothesis Four* Perceived Superficial Differences
Postulating that cross-cultural interaction
skills follow the same law as motor skills, Triandis





argues that more negative transfer is obtained when
cultural situations are superficially similar than when
superficially dissimilar. We modify his argument to
make room for perception
. (Motor skills need not involve
perception.) We then postulate that where either simi-
larities or dissimilarities are perceived as superficial,
more appropriate behavior will be obtained than if such
is not the case.
We relate this postulate to the Wedge argument
concerning contradictions between expectancies and
events. It seems logical to assume that the individual
who perceives either superficial similarities or dis-
similarities between cultures as superficial will enter
a new culture devoid of expectancies likely to be con-
tradicted by events. He is open-minded to the reality
of the new culture, prepared to meet it on its own
terms, so to speak, without pre-judgement. Perceiving
superficial similarities or dissimilarities as super-
ficial does not of itself result in a knowledge of the
"real" cultures involved, of course, but it perhaps
enables one to see the essential elements of the cul-
tures more clearly, stripped of their superficialities.




samenesses or differences to the degree that he can
never quite get to the underlying realities.
We discussed above the aptitude of the "average"
Marine for relating effectively with Vietnamese in Com-
bined Action Platoons, and coming to think of Vietnamese
as "the same as we are" beneath the surface, "once you
get to know them". There may be another factor at work
here. The author's experience in certain circumstances
in Vietnam — an experience shared by many — is that,
stripped of the customary conveniences and luxuries of
life in the United States, one is confronted with a
quantitatively different mode of existence. Hygienic
facilities, heat, shelter, furnishings must be provided ;
they are not simply "there", as they had always been
"there" before. If one wishes to sit, he sits on the
ground. If hot water is desired, the water must first
be located, a container found, a fire prepared. Toilet
facilities must be created; until they are, primitive
devices must satisfy.
As daylight fails, reading becomes difficult.
Recreational opportunities previously taken for granted
are no longer available. Talk sessions or simple games







awaken at ealier hours develops. In ehort, a new
rhythm of life sets in — a very much simpler rhythm
than that common to life in the United States.
The author has witnessed many individuals who
discover with considerable satisfaction that they are
quite capable of surviving in relatively primitive
circumstances, who seem to feel more Hvirile" in the
discovery, and who begin to take a certain pleasure in
being free of "things". If one may so phrase it, as
life becomes "quantitatively" simpler, it seems to
become "qualitatively" simpler — more real, more true.
If, indeed, this is what happens psychologically
(and one finds many references to the experience in
Peace Corps literature), then logically one should per-
haps be able to say that in such circumstances one is
more likely to find a "common denominator" with the
local people who live this form of life regularly. One
might ask if those involved in the ambassadorial services
of various countries sometimes fail to relate the true
"feel" of a people, or of pending political events to
their "home offices" precisely because they live in
circumstances which precludes the possibility of a




Hypothesis Fivei Functional Equivalency of Outcomes
Hypothesis Sixi Specification of Purposes
Hypothesis Severn Outcome Perdurance and Institu-
tionalization
These three hypotheses, derived from the Sternin
and Wickert papers, respectively, seem to fit well
together, and, at the same time, to fit with the Wedge
thesis on expectancies and events and the Asubel
thesis on stature/status. Wickert emphasizes the
necessity of doing things "their" way, to the degree
possible, if one is to be successful in institutionaliz-
ing innovations. It would appear to be< more likely
that one could recognize the validity of "their" way as
one of several possible ways of accomplishing specific
goals, if one is prepared to recognize the functional
equivalency of several outcomes, Sternin emphasizes
the need for specifying the purpose of interaction.
We might suggest that the individual who can keep in
mind the purpose (in bureaucratic terms i "See the big
picture"), while accepting various roads to achieving
that purpose, or various intermediate outcomes, or
the "functional equivalent" of an intended outcome,





and more likely to effect eventual institutionalization.
Current (1970) efforts to achieve "Vietnamization" of
the conflict in Vietnam is illustrative. If the purpose
of this effort is American military disengagement with-
out serious detriment to the security of South Vietnam,
then the purpose would be accomplished if, let us say,
another power, such as France, replaced American forces
with its own. Such specification of purpose helps make
the acceptance of functional equivalency possible.
Should the purpose be further specified that South
Vietnam's self-defense must be emphasized and insti-
tutionalized, so that it will perdure, and make future
help unnecessary, the mere relieving of American forces
by French forces might not achieve the purpose. Innumer-
able examples suggest themselves, but the concepts
involved appear to need no further elaboration here.
It might well be added, however, that the func-
tional equivalency hypothesis likewise fits well with
the Asubel thesis. The secure individual, since he is
little dependent for his sense of security on his
environment, or on acceptance or rejection of his ideas







alternate ideas and outcomes. The relevancy to the other
two hypotheses seems reasonably clear, as well as to the
Wedge thesis on expectancies and outcomes.
Hypothesis Eight t Self discovery and Internal Forms
Hypothesis Ninei Form-givers and Governance of Behavior
Hypothesis Teni Form-givers and Environmental Needs
Hypothesis Eleven i Form-givers and the Provision of
Needed Forms
These four hypotheses concerning internal forms
seem to merit investigation as possibly underlying all
of the hypotheses discussed above. In the earliest
stage of the present manuscript we discussed the critical
position of perception in relation to the entire question
of culture. Indeed, as our citations from R. Allers and
others indicated, culture can not even be defined with-
out reference to perception. In commenting on the 16^
definitions of culture included in their paper, "Cultures
A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions M , A. L.
Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn note that each group of
definitions includes ideas, patterns and values, suggests
selectivity, learning, the significance of symbols, and
so on. Our earlier discussions point to the place of







Both the Stewart and the Glenn papers we have
discussed offer important insights into questions of per-
ception and internal forms. If such questions are signi-
ficant in respect to culture, they are obviously signi-
ficant in respect to cross-cultural interaction, so
that continuing research related to these questions is
strongly indicated. Bronfenbrenner's pioneering efforts
in approaching certain issues of international relations
by way of studying Soviet and American perceptions
immediately come to mind.
We have already noted the pertinence of these
hypotheses to the theories of leadership, diffusion of
innovations, and cognitive dissonance. The efforts of
Newman, McGonigal and others discussed above, in res-
pect to identifying actual and potential "influencers"
strongly suggest the need for a sound conceptual approach.
Investigation of the form-givers hypotheses might meet
such a need. Indeed, the work of Max Weber and others
who have attempted to explain why societies change, and
postulate the presence of charismatic personalities or
social deviants for the purpose, might be given new





We conclude, then, by suggesting that the
exploratory hypotheses we have proposed — and they
are, precisely, exploratory — may help accomplish the
purposes to which this entire work has been committed.
In the absence of a wide-accepted theory of cross-
cultural interaction, and in view of the immense
resources being devoted to training programs to pre-
pare participants for cross-cultural interaction abroad
(and "sub-cultural" interaction within the United
States), firmer reference points than those currently
employed by investigators and program developers and
managers in the field appear to be needed. A synthesis
of the hypotheses proposed above would seem to provide
such reference points, which could, in turn, serve as
starting points for a conceptual approach to cross-
cultural interaction of provocative potential for the
political scientist who would further investigate the
complex "cultural" dynamics at work within, between,








Precis of Personal Response Research Activities
An official description of the initiation and objec-
tives of th° Personal Response Project notes that a Navy-
Marine Corps training exercise in March, 1965t "included
simulation of the problems which arise when military-
personnel fail to understand the religious and value
systems of the host country". 1 The findings of this
exercise "were determined to be immediately relevant to
Vietnam". 2 Hence, the Southeast Asia Religious Project
was established in the summer of 1965t and consequent
efforts were entitled Personal Response Project, with
the reneral objective as described above e Specific
objectives will be listed at a later point.
The first phase of the Project involved field re-
search to collect data concerning the religious and
ethical values of South Vietnamese, a comparative
Unit Leade rs Personal Response Handbook (Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U, S. Marine
Corps, NAVMC 26l6, 1967), p. 191.







analysis of religious and cultural value systems, and the
production of materials for orienting American military
personnel in the religious practices and value systems
of South Vietnam. The field research was carried out in
all four Corps of South Vietnam, that is, in each of the
four general sectors into which the country has been divided
for military purposes, and extended from August of 1965 to
July of 1966. 3
3
-The principal investigator was Robert L, Mole, who
Dublished his findings as The Religions of South Vietnam
in Faith and Fact (Washington, D. Cot Department of the
Navy, NAVPERS 15991. 1967). (Earlier mimeographed drafts
of his report were used as the basis for further Personal
Response research efforts and related activities, and
were published likewise as Understanding the Vietnamese
(FPO, San Francisco, Calif . 1 Service Force Pacific Fleet,
196?), prepared in collaboration with Richard A. McGonigal.
)
Principal investigators for all research efforts have been
Naval Chaplains trained in research design and in various
pertinent skills, including psychology, sociology, communi-
cations, etc., and aided by civilian social and behavorial
scientists. Because most research reports and resource
materials of this Project are unsigned, and official des-
criptive materials are usually a synthesis of many
reporters, and equally anonymous, it is frequently difficult
or impossible to credit individuals for reports and materi-
als cited. It should be noted that in those many instances
in which we either paraphrase or quote sources directly,
without giving specific credit, this is the primary reason.
The author pretends no originality in such cases. The
only single, ultimate clearinghouse for all reports and
related materials is The Chaplain Corps Planning Group
,
Washington, D.C., whom we shall refer to from time to time
as the Project Sponsors, even though various phases of the







The second project phase was begun in the summer of
1966, and emphasied "the development and implementation
of an effective program of communication for the trans-
mission of religio-cultural information and for attitude
improvement".^ A survey was made in September 1966 among
Marine Corps and Navy personnel in the I Corps area
(northernmost of the four sectors of South Vietnam), to
determine their attitudes toward Vietnamese military per-
sonnel and civilians. The sample surveyed consisted of
approximately one percent of the total Marine-Navy pop-
ulation, or 650 subjects, of whom the data for 500 were
used in final tabulations. 5 Results indicated the need
for "attitude improvement", and a strategy was designed
for the purpose.
^Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook t p. 195.
The principal investigator for this phase was Richard A.
McGonigal
^Report of Survey Taken in III MAF TAOR Among USMC
and USN Personnel to Determine their Attitudes Toward
ARVN and PFs and the Indigenous Local People (FPO, San
Francisco, Calif.: Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,
September 1966). (Editor's Notei TAOR = Tactical Area
of Responsibility; ARVN = Army of the Republic of





The third phase survey was conducted in January and
February 1967 among U. S. Marines and Vietnamese Popular
Forces (PFs) in Combined Action Platoons in I Corps, to
determine the reciprocal attitudes of those working and
living most closely together and to isolate problem areas
that would benefit from further educational efforts to
reduce tension. It was hoped also that information
might be gleaned for the selection of potentially effec-
tive members of Combined Action Platoons. The sample
included 55^t or 362 of the 658 Americans assigned to
these platoons at that time, and 19$, or 281 of the 1^79
Vietnamese Popular Forces assigned. The survey instru-
ment for Marines was substantially the same as that used
in the second phase survey. The instrument used for the
PFs was specially designed for the purpose. Assistance
in developing the latter instrument was provided by RAND
Corporation, ARPA Research and Development Field Unit in
Saigon, and the Eighth Army Research Unit in Seoul, Korea.
Report on Vietnamese and American Attitudes in
Combined Action Units (FPO San Francisco, Calif. 1 Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific, 30 March I967). The principal






It was learned that reciprocal attitudes were better in
Combined Action Platoons than in the units surveyed in
phase two.
The fourth phase survey was conducted over a ten-
month period (October 1966 to June 196?) among students
at the American Marine Non-Commissioned Officer Leader-
7
ship School in Okinawa. The sample consisted of ^6%,
or 205, of some ^5 students going through the school
at that time Strong negative attitudes toward both
military and civilian Vietnamese were detected.
The fifth phase attitude survey was completed in June
1967. The sample consisted of 5%, or 3,5^1 of the 70,7^8
American Marines and Naval personnel in I Corps at the
time. The basic testing instrument used was designed
with the help of Dr. Troy Paris, American Institute of
Research, Seoul, Korea, and Professors John Howard and
Herbert Hyman of Columbia University, New York. It was
found that while American Marine attitudes toward the
ARVN measured at the same levels as in previous surveys,
' Report of American-Vietnamese Attitudes at NCO
Leadership School, Camp Hansen, Okinawa (FPO, San
Francisco, Calif. » Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, June







and those toward PFs were slightly worse, there was a
12$ improvement in attitudes toward local civilian
Vietnamese."
At approximately the same time, so that it may be
considered part of the same fifth phase, there was com-
pleted an attitude survey of 18%, or 408 of a total of
2,300 Vietnamese civilians employed aboard U. S. Marine
Corps bases in I Corps.- These workers were found to
be the most defensive and least positive in their atti-
tude? toward Americans of all groups of Vietnamese
interviewed up to this point.
In June of 196?, a survey of American Marines and
Japanese civilian workers was completed at a Marine
Base in Iwakuni, Japan, and a similar survey, but of
American Marines and Ryukyuan civilians, was completed
at a Marine Base in Okinawa. These surveys may like-
wise be considered parts of phase five. In each case,
120 Marines and 120 civilians, or 2"}% and 2M of the
~l
Q
"Assessment of Attitudes o^ Third Marine Amphibious
Force Toward the Vietnamese (FP0, San Francisco, Calif.:
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, June 1967). Principal
investigators were Richard A. McGonigal and Otto
Schneider for this phase.
9 ...Attitude Study of Vietnamese Civilian Workers Aboard
USMC Bases > I Corps (FPO.San Francisco, Calif.: Fleet




appropriate populations were surveyed, as a "cross-
validation" study of the survey of Vietnamese workers
cited above. Results were similar to those recorded
for Vietnamese, above.
A sixth phase of the overall project includes a study
reported in March 1968. Two hundred sixty Popular Forces
were given a modified form of the Thematic Apperception
Test. Philip Worchel, who had adapted the test to a
Vietnamese situation, had completed a study of Vietnamese
Regional Forces and Popular Forces using this instrument,
and made it available to the Personal Response Project,
together with Vietnamese graduate students trained by him
in projective + <=sting techniques. While reports are
still preliminary, pending further processing of the
data, it is felt by the investigators that the findings
may justify considering beliefs about freedom and human
equality as universal.
1 Assessment of Attitudes Between USMC Personnel and
Civilian Workers Employed on U.S. Bases in Japan.
Okinawa, and Vietnam (FPO, San Francisco, Calif. 1 Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific, July 1967).
^ Attitude Study of Popular Forces Personnel, USMC
Combined Action Platoons, 1 corps, Kepubiic or Vietnam
(using Vietnamese Thematic Apperception Test) Fry , S"an
Francisco, Calif. t Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, March





The seventh and latest phase of the project to date
was completed in April of 1969» and consisted of a 1096
sampling of all Marine Corps and Naval personnel in I
Corps.
I
2 (Almost simultaneously a 10$ sampling was taken
exclusively of American Naval personnel in South Vietnam,
but none of the data is available for publication.) The
total sample included 6,401 personnel. Data is still
being processed and analyzed.
12 The results of this survey will be discussed
below. Since they have not yet been published, we shall




Phase Twot Attitude Survey for U. S. Marines
1. How do U. S. Marines in general feel about the ARVN
soldiers?
/ / They generally like them.
/ / They generally dislike them.
/ / Other (specify)
Briefly, why do the U. S. Marines feel this way?
2. How do U. S. Marines in general feel about the PF
sold iers?
/ / They generally like them.
/ / They generally dislike them.
/ / Other (specify)
Briefly, why do the U. S. Marines feel this way?
3. How do U. S. Marines in general feel about the local
people (other than ARVN & PFs)?
/ / They generally like themo
/ / They generally dislike them.
/ / Other (specify)





4. How do the ARVN & PF soldiers in general feel about
the Americans?
/- / They generally like them.
/ / They generally dislike them.
S / Other (specify)
Briefly, why do the ARVN & PF soldiers feel this way?
5. How do the local people (other than military) in
general feel about Americans?
/ ./ They generally like them.
/ / They generally dislike them.
/ / Other (specify)
Briefly, why do the local people feel this way?
6. How do you personally feel about the ARVN soldiers in
general ?
/ / I generally like them,
/_ / I generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
7. What two or three things do you like or admire most
about the ARVN soldiers?
8. What two or three things do you dislike or admire






9. How do you personally feel about the PF soldiers
in general ?
/ / I generally like them.
/ / I generally dislike them.
/~ ~7 Other (specify)
10c How do you personally feel about the local people
(other than military)?
/ / I generally like them.
/ / I generally dislike them.
/ / Other (specify)
11. What two or three things do you like or admire most
about the local people?
12. What two or three things do you dislike or admire
least about the local people?
13* What could the ARVN or PF soldiers do or stop doing
to promote better relations between Americans and
themselves?
14. What could the local people (other than the military)
do or stop doing to promote better relations between
Americans and the local people?
15. What could the Americans do or stop doing to promote







16. What could the Americans do or stop doing to pro-
mote better relations between Americans and the
local people (other than military)?
17. Aside from the people, what two or three things do
you like most about your assignment here in Vietnam?
18. Aside from the people, what two or three things do
you dislike most about your assignment here in
Vietnam?
19. Think back to a recent time when you, or another
American observed by you, were involved with a
Vietnamese in a situation which was especially harm-
ful to U. S. - Vietnamese relations . Describe what
actually occurred. Tell briefly what the outcome
was, and why the interaction was unfavorable or
harmful. Your description should include facts about
what actually happened, not merely impressions or
opinions
.
A. Describe the background situation:
Bo Who was involved? (Please use titles or other
descriptive information, not names).
C. Exactly what happened?
D, What was the outcome?
20. Think back to a recent time when you, or another





in a situation which was especially useful in
improving U. S. - Vietnamese relations . Describe
what actually occurred. Tell briefly what the
situation was, what you or the other persons did,
what the outcome was, and why the situation was
favorable or useful. Your description should
include facts about what actually happened, not
merely impressions or opinions.
A« Describe the background situation:
B. Who was involved? (Please use titles or other
descriptive information, not names).
C. Exactly what happened?
D. What was the outcome?
21. Would you like to return someday to this country as
a tourist?
CI Yes £7N<
22. Biographic Information: This information is needed
only for processing numerical data. Do not include




Do Total time spent in military service:





F. Time spent in Vietnam previous tour:
G. Time overseas in coutries other than
Vietnam:
H. Where from in U. S. i
I. Marital status:
J. Years of school completed:






Phase Three* Attitude Questionaire for PFs
Dear Friends of the Popular Forces and the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam. We request your assistance in
a most important project.
The U. S. Marines are starting a special school
for Marines coming to Vietnam. It is hoped that the
Marines will be given special instructions on customs
of the Vietnamese people, their religions, their ways
of making friends and greeting one another. Some of
these Marines will be coming to work with members of
the Popular Forces. We would like your advice as to
what should be taught at that school for Marines coming
to Vietnam.
1. What subjects do you think Marines should be taught
before coming to Vietnam?
2. Of these subjects which two or three would you say
are most important?
3. What things would you advise the Americans to do
to make friends more quickly'5
4. What things would you advise the Americans not to
do when they come to Vietnam?
5. Would you please give an example of a good thing
which an American may have done with a Vietnamese person?
6. Would you please give an example of a poor thing
which an American may have done with a Vietnamese person?
7. Do you think Americans get along well with (Please
check
)
Old people? Yes No Sometimes yes
Young men? Yes No Sometimes yes
Young women? Yes No Sometimes yes





8. Do you think Americans need extra instruction on(Please check)
Vietnamese manners? Yes No
Respect for property? Yes No
Buying things at the market? Yes No
Use of their money? Yes No
9. Would you say the ARVN or PF like the USMC? And
yourself? (Please check)
Like Dislike
10. Would you say the USMC like the ARVN or PF? (Please
check)
Like Dislike
11. Would you say the local people in your region like
the USMC?
Yes No
12. Would you say the USMC like the local people in your
region?
Yes No
13. Would you please give some reasons why you like the
USMC5
14. Would you please give some deficiencies of the USMC?
15« What improvements do you think should be made to the
rules of Americans and Vietnamese working together in
combined action units or battalions?
16. Would you please give an example of a funny thing
that has happened between Americans and Vietnamese?
17. Would you please give an example of a sad thing that
has happened between Americans and Vietnamese?
18. Please do not write your name but tell usi
a. Your age
b. Married or single
c. Number of children
d. Name of your province
e. Number of years of school





g. Number of months with PF or ARVN
h. Number of months working with USMC
i . What is your rank?
jo Do you have any special needs not covered by




Phase Five (Section One) t Attitude Survey
of U. S. Marines
VIETNAM ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
(Please fill in this form and do not sign your name.
Your opinions are important. Answer all questions as
fully as possible.)
1. How do U. S. Marines in general feel about the ARVN
soldiers ?
They generally like them.
They generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
2. How do U. S. Marines in general feel about the PF
soldiers ?
Th°y genera? ly like them.
They generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
3. How do U. S. Marines in general feel about the local
people (other than ARVN & PFs)?
They generally like them.
They generally dislike them.
Other (specify)








They generally like them.
They generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
5. How do the local people (other than military) in
general feel about Americans ?
They generally like them.
They generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
6. How do you personally feel about the ARVN soldiers ?
I generally like them.
I generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
?• What two or three things do you like or admire most
about the ARVN or PF soldiers?
8. What two or three things do you dislike or admire
least about thp PF or ARVN soldiers?
9o How do you personally feel about the PF soldiers ?
I generally like them .
I generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
10. How do you personally feel about the local people
(other than military)?





I generally dislike them.
Other (specify)
11. What two or three things do you like or admire most
about the local people ?
12. What two or three things do you dislike or admire
least, about the local people ?
13* What could the ARVN or PF soldiers do or stop doing
to promote better relations between Americans and
themselves?
\k. What could the local people (other than military) d_o
or stop doinp; to promote better relations between Americans
and the local people?
15. What could the Americans do or stop doing to promote
better relations between Americans and the ARVN or PF
soldiers?
16. What could the Americans do or stop doing to promote
better relations between Americans and the local people
(other than the military)?
17. Aside from the people, what two or three things do





18. Aside from the people, what two or three things
do you dislike most about your assignment here in
Vietnam?
19. Think back to a recent time when you, or another
American observed by you, were involved with a Vietnamese
in a situation which was especially harmful to U. S. -
Vietnamese relations . Describe what actually occurred.
Tell briefly what the outcome was, and why the interaction
was unfavorable or harmful. Your description should
include facts about what actually happened, not merely
impressions or opinions.
A. Describe the background situation:
T)
. Who was involved? (Please use titles or other descrip-
tive information, not names).
C. Exactly what happened?
D. What was the outcome?
20. Think back to a recent time when you, or another
American observed by you, were involved with a Vietnamese
in a situation which was especially useful in improving
U.S. - Vietnamese relations . Describe what actually
occurred. Tell briefly what the situation was, what you
or the other persons did, what the outcome was, and why
the situation was favorable or usefulo Your description
should include facts about what actually happened, not
merely impressions or opinions.







B. Who was involved? (Please use title or other
descriptive information, not names).
C. Exactly what happened?
D. What was the outcome?
21. Would you like to return someday to this country
as a tourist?
Yes No
22. Biographic Information This information is
needed only for processing numerical data. Do not




D. Total time spent in military service: months
Eo Time spent in Vietnam this tour: months
F. Time spent in Vietnam previous tour: months
Go Time overseas in countries other than Vietnam:
months
Ho Where from in U. S.i North East ....
Mid West









J. Years of school completed*
K. History of units served in Vietnam:
Regiment/Group Number of months Area
Regiment/Group Number of months Area
Regiment/Group Number of months Area_
Regiment/Group Number of months Area
Lo Number of months since your last promotion:
Are you eligible (in the zone) for promotion now?
Yes No o If not, how many months
will it be until you will be eligible (in the
zone) for promotion?






Phase Five (Section Two); Attitude Survey of
Vietnamese Workers Aboard USMC Bases
in I Corps
To Vietnamese Employees who are working in American
Organizations • We realize at this present moment, we
need your help in an important matter.
The Marine Corps is opening a special school for
the Marines that are coming to Vietnam. The purpose of
this school is to guide them in knowing Vietnamese
customs, habits, and religion. The school also shows
the Marines what ways to make friends and enter into
relations with Vietnamese people. Almost all of these
Marines shall be working with you. Therefore we want
you to give your opinion about what the school should
include.
1. Will you explain what subjects should be included
for the American Marines when they come to Vietnam,
2. Which of these subjects is most important?
3. What is necessary for the American to do to have
good relationships with Vietnamese people?
4 e What should Americans refrain from doing?
5. Can you give a good example of what the Americans
did for the Vietnamese?
6. Can you give an example of something bad that the
Americans did fo^ the Vietnamese?
7. Do you think that the Americans get along well with
the following groups of Vietnamese people? (Old men
and women; young boys; young girls; Children) (Yes,
No, Sometimes)
8. Do you think Americans need extra instruction on:
Vietnamese manners; The respect of Vietnamese property;




9. Do you think most of the Vietnamese employees like
the American Marines? (Yes-No)






11. Do you think that the people in your locality like
Marines? (Yes-No)
12. Do you think the Marines like the people in your
locality? (Yes-No)
13. Will you tell what you especially like about the
Marines?
1^. Will you please list the Marines 1 imperfections?
15» In your opinion what changes in work rules, etc.
would improve relationships?
16. Will you please give an example about a funny happen-
ing between the Americans and the Vietnamese?
I?. Will you please give a sorry happening between the
Americans and Vietnamese?
18. Do not write your name on this paper but please
give us the details as follows t (a, How old are you?;
b, Are you married or single?; c, How many children do
you have?; d, what is your privince?; e, How many years
have you attended school?; f, What job do you like best?;
g, How many years were you in the Army?; h, How long have
you worked for the Americans?; i, What are you doing now?;
j , Besides the matters above, do you want to add some?




I" APPENDIX F ~l
Phase Five (Section Three) » Attitude Survey
of USMC and Civilian Employees,
Iwakune, Japan, and Camp Courtney,
Okinawa, July 1. 1967
Greetings! The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (Forward)
request your assistance and advice. We are starting
a special school for Marines coming to your country for
duty at this station. In the past we know that not all
Americans have been thoughtful in their relationship to
civilians. Nearly all Americans want to be good
neighbors. Some do not yet know local customs, religious
observances or beliefs.
Even brothers living under the same roof some-
times do not fully understand each other. We hope that
by more communication and by extra instruction we can be
more worthy of your friendship.
Please be frank in your answers. We do not wish to
have your name mentioned. Nor, will what you say in
anyway affect your job. It will really help all of us
if you tell us exactly how you feel about the way





1. What do you think Marines should be taught before
coming to work in your country?
2. What would you suggest that Marines should do to
make friends more quickly?
3. What would you suggest that Marines should stop
doing in order to be better guests in your country?










ong we 11 with (please
Sometimes
Young men? Yes Sometimes
Young women? Yes Sometimes
Children? Yes Sometimes
5. Do you think Americans need extra instruction on
(please check)
Local customs? Yes No
Respect for property? Yes No





6. Would you please give an example of a good thing
which may have happened between an American your
fellow countryman to improve relationship:
7. Please give an example of a poor thing which may
have happened between an American and your fellow
countryman to hurt relationship:
~1
8. Would you say that How do you personally feel?
Civilian workers* 1, personally: (please check)
Like USMC? Like USMC?
Dislike USMC? Dislike USMC?_
Mixed? Mixed?
9. Would you say that the local civilians not working
on base:
Like USMC? Dislike USMC? Mixed?
10. Would you say that the USMC:
Like civilian Like Like you, per-
workers on base? local people? sonally?
Dislike civilian Dislike Like you, per-






11. Would you please give some reasons why you
dislike USMC?
12 c Would you please give some reasons why you like
USMC?
13. What improvements should be made to the rules of
Americans working with your people on the base?
14. What improvements should be made to the ways
Americans live and act off base after working hours?
15c Please do not write your name but please tell us:
a. your age
b. married or single
c. number of children
d. years of education
e. your favorite work
f. your present work
g. number of months with USMC
16. Please make any comments you wish that we did not





Phase Six (Section One)t Attitude Study of
PFs in CAPs , Functional Questionaire
1. I prefer living in the city -
town -
countryside -
2. T prefer to be in the Popular Forces -
Regional Forces -
Army of RVN -
3. I prefer working in a PF unit with Americans -
without Americans -
^. In the combined action platoon I prefer it when
Americans and Vietnamese live in separate buildings -
the same buildings -
5. In the CAP I prefer it when American and Vietnamese
eat in separate buildings -
eat together -
6. On a. patrol I prefer:
being the point, a leader out front -
being an aidman -
carrying the radio -
being a leader in the middle of the column -
an ordinary rifleman -
7. What I like best about a patrol is:
catching the VC -
meeting new people - '
protecting the people -
getting to know the terrain -
8. What I dislike most about a patrol is:
walking too far - arguments with USMC -
setting up an ambush - the VC -
the threat of an ambush - destroying caves -
being point, first man - dislike nothing -




9. In our CAP the discipline (punishment, fines, etc.)
should be i the same for PFs and USMC -
different for PFs and USMC -
10. I prefer moving from one hamlet to another every
30 days -
staying in one hamlet all the time -
11. The central government should give us medals for
bravery -
the USMC should give us medals for bravery -
12. T think the best length of a watch at night is:
2 hours or less -
3 hours or less -
4 hours or less -
over k hours -
13. T like best to stand watch at night by myself -
with another PF in same position -
with a Marine in same position -
no difference -
14. If I think I have been disciplined unfairly I can
nake my appeal by: seeing the village chief -
the district chief -
the USMC sergeant -
nothing -
15. The best ways for finding the most necessary needs
of the people in the hamlets are:
living with the people - asking the hamlet chief-
asking the cult committee - asking the PFs-
askinp- the school teacher - asking the RD team -
NA -
16. The best ways for Vietnamese to learn American
customs are to: learn the English language -
make a personal friend -
have a school -
17. In what ways should the PF participate in local
projects? provide security - learn trades, then






18c The best way to get support in local projects is to
i
get the people on our side -
ask the USMC -





I~ APPENDIX I ~1
The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and Fact1
Robert L. Mole
(Abbridged, and with editorial comment)
Vietnamese Taoism
Pointing out that Taoism was introduced into Vietnam
by way of Chinese cultural influence and occupation,
the author calls its influence "one of the more power-
ful religious forces in Vietnam today". *• As "a way", "a
road", "a law of life" requiring man to adjust to nature
in order to have happiness, Taoism is considered the
natural mode of behavior, the best way to become perfect
in relation to the natural world around us. Submitting
to the laws of nature, we become gentle, peaceful,
serene -- resigned to unchangeable fates. In popular
practice, for many believers, this means that some form
of nature worship is desirable, and various ritua]s to
discern nature's will in regard to the individual.
Many of the more basic Taoist beliefs have been
absorbed into other religions in Vietnam, and, the author
-'-For Animism see




tells us, "still mold and form cultural patterns affect-
ing; almost all ethnic Vietnamese or Chinese living in
3Vietnam". Medical practices, marital arrangements,
ploughing, and many other affairs are planned on the
basis of horoscope readings and similar efforts to learn
the will of nature, whether urban residents or peasants
are involved. The author finds:
"... many Vietnamese tend to accept all three of
the ways -- Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism -- without
worry of conflict. Taoism is for adjustment to the
natural world, Confucianism is for the social world,
while Buddhism is utilized for harmony with the universe
of which man is a part and for preparing for future
existences. The adoption of a new religion by the eth-
nic Vietnamese does not necessarily mean the abandonment
of an earlier faith. Rather it is often a process of
accommodation to include all concepts to increase the
surety for both the present and future existences."
Confuc ianism
Confucianism's ethical system emphasizes the regu-
lation of relationships between people. The improper
3ibid., p. 9»




conduct of these relations causes disorders in the
social group, hence throws man out of harmony with the
universe. Heaven and Earth are in harmony, and man
must aim to achieve a similar harmony. The author tells
us t
"Vietnamese Confucianism, though without a strong
formalized organization, still vitally affects nearly
all ethnic Vietnamese. This is part of the cultural
environment into which the child is born. Confucianism
gave Vietnam a highly organized hierarchial society.
Yet while encouraging the improvement of the individual,
it did so in order that he could better function for the
community. For the individual was, and is, perceived to
have little value beyond the family and society. In this
sense Confucianism is anti-individualistic • M ->
The author's finding about the Confucian relation
to the land is important for our purposes. Feeling that
the land has always nourished him, regardless of drought,
war, and so on, the farmer is said never to lose faith in






the land. We are toldt "Such worship of the land has
tended to create in the Vietnamese peasant an almost
fanatical attachment to his birthplace which nourished
him during his life, and becomes his grave after death."
Two of the key Confucian teachings reflect the
importance of others, particularly seniors, elders,
parents, ancestors, namely, that the individual is always
less important than the family, and that, as the father
must establish the moral climate within a family and
filial piety is the highest virtue within a family, so
the leaders of society must establish its moral climate,
must effect its reforms. Our investigator tells us that,
while popular Confucianism in Vietnam is quite different
from that taught by Confucius himself, Confucianism has
been a powerful influence in forming Vietnamese society,
and continues to be a great force at the present time.
Hinduism
The more obvious Hindu practices in Vietnam are
found largely in the Cham Tribe today, although there
was a day that it was strongly influential in the Champa






Empire which occupied Vietnam from north of Hue south-
wards along the coast. A number of otherwise unex-
plained daily practices in the life of the Vietnamese
family seem to be attributable to the subtle influence
of Hinduism, and the author suggests that when other
religious beliefs do not explain a particular Vietnamese
practice, Hinduism may hold the key.
Buddhism
It is in trying to synopsize the author's findings
about this major religion that we shall sin most griev-
ously by over-simplification, but we must nonetheless
try to single out those essential characteristics of
Buddhism, as practiced in Vietnam, which appear to be
most pertinent to questions of cross-cultural
interaction.
In a tightly-written historical background, the
author points out that there was a day (10th century)
that Vietnamese rulers supported Buddhism as the focal
point of culture, while Confucian scholars were exiled
from political life because their Chinese education
made their loyalties questionable. By the end of the
11th century, Buddhism had filtered down from being a




hamlets, where it was mixed with Taoism and
Confucianism to become an indigenous part of the popular
beliefs of the common people. In another 300 years,
however, the indigenous forces of Animism and Taoism
had so changed Buddhism, that by the end of the l^th
century it gave way to Confucianism, which then became
the primary religion of the government and remained
such until the 19th century. "However" says the author,
"Buddhism is such an inherent force in the culture of
Vietnam that irrespective of its actual numbers, no
comprehensive valid understanding of the people can be
gained without awareness of its origin, development or
influence."?
Beginning in the early 1930' s » various efforts to
revive Buddhism as a less syncretistic form of relig-
ious faith resulted in the formation of several
Buddhist Associations, which serve today to structure





establish guidelines for religious practices, charitable
activities, and, at times, to exert a certain amount of
political effort. 8
To reflect what we consider the pertinent elements
of Buddhist doctrine, we shall simply excerpt passages
from the author's report.
"Within Vietnam, Buddhism undoubtedly fills the
need of many people which Animism and Confucianism leave
void. Philosophically, Buddhism ties man to the uni-
verse eternally — past, present and future. Tn so
doing, it provides some comfort to the bereaved, a sense
of meaning; to existence, and a philosophy (thought
pattern) of adjustment to those things which the
Vietnamese Buddhist adherent does not believe can be
changed. "9
"Our excursion into the historical background pro-
vided by the report has been presented here in part
because we find in the popular press and the popular
mind so many references to Buddhism of a nature which
appears to us to distort the image of Vietnam, in
general. It is not at all uncommon, for example, to
be advised that "Vietnam is a Buddhist country", with
the implication that the majority of the people formally
practice this faith, under the organized guidance of a
highly structured Buddhist hierarchy.
^The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and Fact ,
op. cit




"The first (act of existence) is the law of change
or non-permanence. This law declares the world (universe)
and everything: in it to be impermanent, changing and in
constant flux. All things (living and non-living) pass
through the same cycle of existence — birth, growth,
decay and death ... In this concept, life is a contin-
uous flow and anyone clinging to any particular form,
regardless of its splendor, will suffer by resisting the
flow. The Buddhist is therefore to struggle to escape
this state of constant impermanency by seeking Nirvana.
Nirvana is that permanent state which is perfect peace
(tranquillity) that is both eternal and absolute."
"The universe is merely the expression of law.
All effects have causes, so that man's character is the
sum total of his previous thoughts and actions. Karma,
which means action-reaction, governs all existence so
that man is believed to be the sole creator of his
circumstances. His reaction to such conditions
determines his future status and ultimate destiny."
10 Ibid., p. 22.







The author now reports a finding which we have not
discovered elsewhere, despite what appears to us to be
its importance to a culture influenced by Buddhism. He
tells us first what is commonly reported:
"All life is one and really indivisible, though it
has innumerable, ever-changing perishable forms. Thus,
though every form must die, death or cessation of life
is not possible, and is an unreality. "l
He goes on, then, however, to reveal an important
conflict between Buddhist doctrine and popular belief.
"Paradoxically, this doctrine that the personal
self is not real is pivotal in Buddhist Theology. Since
there is no individuality of the self, there can be no
continuity of the individual. Instead, it is the life-
force which continues its almost endless cycle • • .
Reincarnation of the life-force is understood by learned
Buddhists as the teaching of the Buddha. However,
within popular Buddhism, many adherents tend to think
of themselves as personal candidates for reincarnation
and Nirvana. To them, the earning of 'Merit' through





good works, promises to improve one's status in future
existences. Within popular Buddhism, this hope of a
personal reincarnation seems to have more validity than
the hope of Nirvana. In this way he can realize the
rewards and benefits of his personal labors and sacrifices
in a more tangible fashion," 1 ^
We may cite two further notes before we must move
on to the next religion to be considered. The author
cites Buddhist spokesmen about the various roles Buddhism
plays, of which two are of particular interest for our
purposes.
"To provide advice, guidance, humanitarian goals
and values to society and to the governments of society.
Because wrong conduct can not be tolerated due to its
inconsistency with Buddhist ideals, such conduct must
be opposed, and if necessary resisted by force. The
Sangha (Buddhist order of clergy of all levels) has
supported war from time to time when such war was believed
necessary. Such support has included material assistance
in the forms of supplies, facilities, and personnel.




"The active participation in political affairs has
been practiced in Asia by the Sangha members directly.
They have encouraged the Buddhist laity to have active
roles in politics. The leaders of Buddhism are deeply
concerned about the origin, establishment, purpose,
function, administration and goals of political power
both in theory and practice."!^
Finally, we are told
i
"Bad merit or demerits must eventually be worked
off through suffering if Nirvana is to be achieved. In
part, the concepts of Karma seem to result in a sense
of fatalism. Man is the product of previous lives so
actions in the present life cannot make too much
difference. nl 5
Islam
The ostensible influence of Islam is slight in
Vietnam. What is perhaps noteworthy, however, is that
what th°re is of Islam is influenced by Animism,
Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and other concepts
and practices quite different from those in Mecca,
"I
^Ibid., p. 25.





Medina, and other such areas. Again, some of the Cham
Tribe seem to be adherents, and because of their former
dominance the author suggests as he did about Hinduism
that awareness of the Islamic presence may help explain
the otherwise inexplicable.
Roman Catholicism
The author points to two reasons why Catholicism,
the oldest form of Christianity in Vietnam, has been an
historic force in Vietnam for several centuries and is
now a religious force requiring the attention of anyone
who would understand the internal situation. The first
of these lies in its sheer numbers, since it constitutes
some 10.5^ of the population of South Vietnam. Secondly,
the Church's strong educational program has tended to
place many Church-trained men near the top of economic,
political and academic areas of Vietnamese life.
It is further observed that, while the universality
of Catholic doctrine and practice means that there are
no significant differences in such areas in Vietnam,
!6ln light of the Sternin report discussed pre-
viously, it is interesting to find that My Tho, head-
quarters for the Sternin study, is the seat of one of
the 13 Catholic dioceses in South Vietnam, with a






cultural patterns not in conflict with Church Law are
permitted to Catholics. Hence, the author tells us,
"the ancestor shelf of veneration with minor physical
modifications and emphasis is found in the home of nearly
every Vietnamese except for the animistic tribespeople
1 7
and the Protestants." r
Protestantism
Several denominations of Protestantism equal a
total of 150,000 persons, or about 1% of the total pop-
ulation of South Vietnam. The author tells us that it
would be quite difficult to determine the exact measure-
ments of its influence nationally since it takes a
nonpolitical stance. In some local areas, however,
its influence is significant, and it is pointed out that
it has been allotted six Chaplaincy billets in the South
Vietnamese Armed Forces, while Buddhists and Roman
Catholics share 176 billets equally, and each faith has
its own Chief of Chaplains.
The further point is made that Protestant churches
active in Vietnam endeavors are conservative, and that







their insistence on doctrinal beliefs so different from
many of the Vietnamese cultural patterns may keep their
numbers comparatively small.
Cao Dai
"The Cao Dai religion of South Vietnam, which first
appeared in 1919i is an important segment of Vietnamese
religious life. The Cao Dai claim about two million
adherents in all of South Vietnam, with some 60,000 in
the six provinces which make up I Corps, and another
I Q
60,000 in the six provinces of II Corps."
As we have noted previously, Cao Daism began as an
indigenous Vietnamese religion seeking to synthesize the
ba?ic doctrines of Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism,
Christianity and a Roman Catholic type church organization.
The author tells us that it was an effort to create a
universally acceptable religion in a part of the world
where many religious beliefs may intermingle in the
practice of the one individual. Too, it was a move toward
promoting harmonious human relationships by way of a
common spiritual life without religious discrimination.
Buddhists of Vietnam disclaim any affiliation.





For our purposes it seems pertinent to single out
four Cao Dai doctrines.
"Cao Dai believe that the human soul may 'go up' or
'go down' the ladder of existence, and that man by his
will and action determines the direction.
"The ultimate goal of Cao Daism is the total deliver-
ance of man from the endless cycle of existence in order
to realize a life of supreme perfection. To them, man
is created through the natural cycle of life and death,
and possesses an immortal soul which is sacred. This
soul must eventually obtain release from the cycle for
complete victory.
"The worship of ancestors is a means of communication
between the visible and invisible worlds; between the
living and the dead; and forms a means of expressing
love, gratitude and affection for the ancestors.
"Cao Daism also teaches, in its ethical concepts,
equality and brotherhood of all races, the love of justice,
the Buddhist Law of Karma, Buddha's Five Commandments, as
well as the Buddhist Eightfold Path to Perfection and the






The unusual position occupied by the Cao Dai is
illustrated by the extent of their involvement in
religious, political, and military activities, and in
the fact that, despite such a short history of existence,
they control to a large degree certain provinces in
20
which they constitute the major population. The
massacre of 2,791 Cao Dai priests and followers by the
Communist Viet-Minh, in August of 19^5, in Quang-Ngai
was one of a number of violent actions on the part of
the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong which turned the Cao
21
Dai away from Communism,
Phat Giao Hoa Hao
The final religion reported is popularly called
Hoa Hao, is likewise indigenous to Vietnam, was founded
as recently as 1939. but, unlike the Cao Dai, is defi-
nitely a form of Buddhism, and acknowledged by Buddhists
as such. Hoa Hao membership is between 750,000 and
1,000,000. It, too, has a history of zealous religious,
political, and military organization and activity, and
20
It is interesting to note that in Dinh Tuong
Province, where the Sternin study was carried out, the
Cao Dai make up 10$ of the total population.
21 The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and Fact
,
op. cit




it, too, is violently anti-Communist. The latter fact
is noteworthy especially since the founder of the sect,
Huyen Phu So led the Hoa Hao into the National United
Front, a Viet Minh organization, upon the surrender of
the Japanese in World War II. Refusing, however, as did
the leaders of the Cao Dai, to accept Viet Minh leader-
ship, So entered politics as the anti-French, anti-
Communist leader of the Hoa Hao. His later murder by
the Communists in the Viet Minh, according to the author,
is the basic reason the Hoa Hao bitterly oppose
Vietnamese Communists on every issue, and destroy
Communists who enter their strongholds.
Four major precepts mark the Hoa Hao religious
creed: honor parents, love country, respect Buddhism
and its teachings, love fellow man. Loyalty to the
religion itself seems to perdure, despite internal
political and military divisions that have occurred from
time to time. In view of our particular involvements
in Vietnam, and our relationships with various Vietnamese
military and para-military units, a series of observa-
tions by the author appear to be worth quoting at length.
"Created in violent stress, the HOA HAO have
been involved with and against the communists,
with and against the French, also with and
against the Japanese as well as with and
I




"Since HOA HAOISM originated in time of
Vietnamese national crisis and stress,
it has existed under threat of annihilation
by one force or another, and so has been
aggressively hostile itself. At least it
has been able to convey this impression to
the noninvolved Vietnamese peasant of the
delta.
"In spite of the reputation which the HOA
HAO soldier has established, some observers
believe that the average one is much the
same as other Vietnamese servicemen; he may
be either a poor, average or excellent fighter
depending upon his background, his training
and his personal motivation. However, his
loyalty to HOA HAO leadership is sufficiently
strong that good leadership can compensate
for other factors.
"The HOA HAO seem to like Americans, or demon-
strate little hostility or non-acceptance
toward them. This may grow out of SO's early
prophecy of the coming of the Americans as
well as the relationships experienced thus
far between the HOA HAO and the American
military personnel . . •
"While having doctrines based upon Theravada
Buddhism which has a long history of semi-
pass iveness, the HOA HAO are aggressive, and
quite acceptable fighters when well-led.
While giving allegiance to no religious
figure as such, the fighting adherents of
Hoa Haoism seem to have an almost fanatical
willingness to follow and obey their HOA HAO
immediate superiors without regard for personal
loss. At the same time, neither does the HOA
HAO shrink from acquiring possessions or seek-
ing to improve himself instead of resigning to
fate. Non-adherents of Hoa Haoism in areas





seem to follow the Eight Points of Honesty
in the relations with non-members of the
faith . . .
"Many observers say the HOA HAO troop com-
mander is the unquestioned leader of his
religio-military unit, and that his troops
will obey him to the extent that one
observer has remarked i "They would follow
him off the side of a cliff". This loyalty
is not normally found in units of HOA HAO
where non-HOA HAO are in command. Accord-
ing to some adherents, the HOA HAO, like
the Moslems of the Middle East under the
influence of Islam, have sometimes exerted
forceful persuasion in effecting conversion.
Several Vietnamese have remarked on occasion
that while sometimes divided among themselves,
the HOA HAO will more often be united together
against non-adherents, and seem to prefer to
have local government officials of their own
faith." 22
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Correlations by origin in United States adapted from






Correlations by time spent in Vietnam adapted from re-
port of survey, Phase Two, Sept. 1966, p. 22. J
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How do Marines in general feel toward
ARVN?
How do you personally feel toward the
ARVN?
How do Marines in general feel toward
the PF?
How do you personally feel toward the
PF?
How do Marines in general feel toward
the local people?
How do you personally feel toward the
local people?












In order of frequency mentioned what do
you especially admire about the ARVN?
Their willingness to learn (69)
Their bravery (52)
Their discipline (50)
Their concern for their country (32)
Their ability to work hard (22)
Their courtesy (10)
What do you especially dislike about the ARVN ?
Their apparent dishonesty (67)
Their apparent lack of training (54)
Their conduct in combat (44)
Their apparent laziness (33)
Their apparent discourtesy (16)






Respect their women & elders




Aside from the people what do you especially enjoy about
your assignment ?
Feel I am really helping people (77)
I am fighting communism (70)
Extra Pay in combat zone (61)
Seeing a new part of the world (38)
Meeting new people (27)
Learning from the people (27)
Appreciate my own country more (16)
Like the responsibility (1^)
I am facing reality (12)
This is easier than a line company ( 7)
I like the USO shows ( 1)
What do you di s like about your assignment?
Separation from loved ones (83)
Policy of control of PFs (79)
Living conditions (66)
Climate (66)
Combat & seeing friends killed (52)
Vietnamese don't appreciate us (10)
Can't tell VC from friendly VN (2)
Favoritism toward the PF (2)
Describe an incident which harmed U.S. - Vietnam
relationships
154 answered (^3%) Sept '66 III MAF = 31%
Describe an incident which helped U.S. - Vietnam
relationships





Assessment of Vietnamese Attitudes
(toward USMC & local people)
-
a. General
1. When asked what subjects Marines should be taught
before coming to Vietnam the PFs answered (in order of
frequency)
:
- Please discover the Vietnamese customs. (81)
- Learn some of the Vietnamese language. (79)
- Learn not to belittle our religions, practice your
freedoms. (77)
- Learn to speak with dignity to our old people and women,
and to be good natured with our young men (77)
- Respect the property of the people, especially out in
the countryside. (^-9)
- Learn some of our history, respect for our patriots e.g.
Quang Trung, Hai Ba Trung, Tran Hung Dao etc. (*H)
- Learn not to slight this country because it is small or
to underestimate the VC because their weapons are
crude. (3*0
- Consider the plight of our rural people. (20)
- Learn to eat some Vietnamese food. (19)
2. The 3 subjects which seemed most important for
Americans to study before coming to Vietnam were:
customs, language, tolerance.
3. Advice to help the Americans make friends more quickly
included j Be sincere, be simple in your help; be serious
with the women; regain our land from the VC ; communicate
with us more during the operation; work side by side —
not front and back; teach us some of the English language;
do not question the VC prisoner in front of the people;
recognize when you, too, make mistake and say you are
sorry; learn some of our language.
4. What things would you advise the Americans not to do







and i do not throw the cans of food and then flap the
arms (beckon) at the children, do not camp on our
graves, do not shoot the farm animal.
5. Would you please give an example of a good thing
which an American may have done with a Vietnamese person?
Answers to this question included a long list of
physical help to repairing buildings, roads, water dikes,
etc., many examples of medical assistance (especially
appreciated are our med-evacs to hospital) and repeated
mention of small generous acts on the part of individuals,
e.g. carrying civilians across rivers during the rainy
season, sharing water during the dry season, etc. (116 of
h\% recorded such incidents).
6. Would you please give an example of a poor thing
which an American may have done with a Vietnamese person?
Most frequently mentioned items were mistaken apprehen-
sion of VCs (of people whom the PFs knew to be friendly)
and the searching of "honest" people's homes. (VC are
most uniformly referred to as "dishonest" by the PFs.)
Many of the incidents are due to the language barrier,
such as when a Marine asked a farmer in English, "Are you
a VC?" The old man nodded his head and was arrested. He
thought the Marine asked, "Are you against the VC?"
Many of the answers were oblique. They did not
answer the question directly but said, "The Americans
should not be too proud of their many skills", or, "Do
not trifle with the whore". It was felt that to cat-
egorize these responses would be very difficult. Yet,
33<& (9^) did record an answer to the question.
7. Do Americans get a.long we 11 with: (T=281)
YES NO SOMETIMES BLANK
Old people? W 13% 15% zH
Young men? 60 5 15 20
Young women? 33 20 23 24
Children*? 50 16 1? 21
8. Do you think Americans need extra instruction ont
(T«28l)
YES N0_ BLANK
Vietnamese manners? 73% ° 27




rBuying things at the market?










9. Would you say that the ARVN or PF like the USMC?









































13. Would you please give some reasons why you like
the USMC? Tn order of frequency mentioned the answers
were
:
They unite our people and help our people
They bring security to this place
They are kind toward our children
They are hard working
They are generous with what they have
They are brave fighters and risk lives
for us
They are usually merry, jocund













14-. Would you please give some deficiencies of the
USMC? In order of frequency mentioned the answers weret
The Marines won't speak our language. (51)
They search some houses without cause. (31)
They capture some people without reason. (27)
They do not let us go by their vehicles along the
way. (11)
They sometimes act like the French. (11)
They sometimes drink too much wine. (9)
They fail to listen to us re. the VCs. (4)
They sometimes do not pay their bills. (2)
15. What improvements do you think should be made to
the rules of Americans and Vietnamese working together
in combined action units? The answer to this question
should first be put into the "world view" of the PF.
In many ways the PF shares a bit of our position in
relationship to the local people. The PF, like us, is
dependent upon the people for information and early
warning. Like us, the PF gets furious when he cannot
recognize the VC among a group of strangers. He there-
fore has much resentment toward his own neighbors when
they hide VC , do not report strangers or ignore the
curfew.
Many PFs are forced to serve outside their native
hamlets by their district chief (for tactical and/or
political reasons). This group is especially envious
of the higher wage of the RFs (Regional Forces) and the
APVN.
Nearly all PFs resent not getting the military or
financial rewards offered to brother servicemen for
heroic achievement. They resent not having a more
detailed rank structure which would give some realistic
expectations to promotions. Nearly all PFs fret over
the financial welfare of their families, especially
those who must devote full time to their duties at a
third pay of the ARVN.
Many PFs enjoy their assignment because of thpir
ability to be with' their families and to be a part of
building a new and secure community. They take real





a. A system of working together should be formed so
that everyone knows that the PF and USMC are together
"sticking up for the people." (^9)
b. A system should be developed so that more trust
is built up between the USMC and the PF as they together
try to weed out the VC . Each group needs the other*
(36)
c. There should be less discrimination because of rank
or religion. Some PFs feel defensive about being
Buddhist. They direct this plea as much or more at the
local people than at the Marines. They want an under-
standing with neighboring hamlets that religious ties
should not interfere with fighting the VC . (23)
d. Marines and PFs should be "graceful". Our inter-
preters insist on using that word . They mean it in
the dictionary sense of being full of a sense of what
is right, and proper. They wish there were more
opportunity for common meals. (18)
e. We should avoid a common appearance of "menacing",
be careful about the coordinates for mortaring, careful
in driving habits, etc. (18)
f. An understanding is necessary so that neither
group scolds or shows scorn toward the other. (The
PFs see themselves as part of the problem). Each group
should take care of its own discipline. (16)
g. There should be meetings at least once a month with
all Marines and PFs in a unit with a good interpreter






NCO Leadership School (Survey Okinawa)
A. Concerning Vietnamese Military
(1) Those who have been in Vietnami
—15% say Marines in general like Vietnamese
military
--65% say Marines in general die! ike Vietnamese
military
--19^ are of mixed opinion (1%, no answer)
—12$ say they personally like Vietnamese
military
--48% say they personally dislike Vietnamese
mil itary
--39% are of mixed opinion (1%, no answer)
(2) Those not yet in Vietnami
--26% say Marines in general like Vietnamese
military
--40% say Marines in general dislike Vietnamese
military
— 24% are of mixed opinion (9%» no answer)
--16% say they personally like Vietnamese
military
—21% say they personally dislike Vietnamese
military





B. Concerning Vietnamese civilians i
(1) Those who have been in Vietnam*
—22% say Marines in general like Vietnamese
c ivilians
--5^% say Marines in general dislike Vietnamese
civilians
—23% are of mixed opinions (1%, no answer)
--h.Ur% say they personally like Vietnamese
civilians
— 30% say they personally dislike Vietnamese
civilians
— 24% are of mixed opinions (2%, no answer)
(2) Those not yet in Vietnamt
— 22% say Marines in general like Vietnamese
civilians
--38% say Marines in general dislike Vietnamese
c ivilians
--2 8% are of mixed opinions (22%, no answer)
--21% say they personally like Vietnamese
c ivilians
— 18% say they personally dislike Vietnamese
civilians
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Personal Attitude Toward Vietnamese Military Forces
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What Should Marines Learn
Before Coming to Vietnam?
1
Learn and respect our customs, habits, religions,
manners (190)
Learn to resist communism and develop our country (138)
learn the Vietnamese language and live near the
people ( 70)
Learn not to scorn the people or the Vietnamese
flag ( 69)
Learn how the Vietnamese consider politeness,
honesty ( 6^
)
Learn to protect peoples' lives and property ( 53)
Learn not to offend one's honor ( ^8)
Learn not to distinguish the races, social classes,
religions ( ^3)
Learn to respect our old people ( ^1)
Learn our laws ( 25)
Learn to respect our security, independence and
freedom ( 25)
Learn Vietnamese psychology ( 25)
Learn who are RVN people and who are communists ( Ik)
Learn not to increase the cost of living ( 12)





Learn not to violate the Vietnamese pagodas,
graves, relics
Learn to respect the Sovereignty of Vietnam (this
is_ our country)
Learn not to menace or beat our people
Learn to guide our people
What Do You T hink Should Be Done to Improve
Vietnamese - American Relationships?
Be more serious with people
Respect the labor laws and morals of Vietnam
Give jobs according to worker's capabilities
Know the worker's characteristics, wishes and
family status
Simplify the procedure for requesting a job
Apply equal punishment to anyone who disobeys
orders
Help workers to improve their profession
Give priority to Vietnamese over other
national i ties
Find ways to improve the jobs and management
What Specifically Should the Americans Not Do?
Do not scorn the people, violate anyone's honor
Do not continue to do things after you learn they
offend the Vietnamese
Do not abuse people, debauch our women






















rDo not lose the USA personality and the USA
national honor ( \q)
Do not make contrary with the law and morals of
Vietnam ( 17)
Do not drop candies so close to the road, make
accidents for children, act like French ( 11)
Do not think all Vietnamese are communists ( 11)
Do not indirectly increase the cost of living ( 8)
Should not make friends messily or dismiss them
without reason ( 8)
Should not do some things while being drunk or
tired ( 2)
What Do you Especially Like About Marines?
Unite our country to fight Communism ( 92)
You have guided the peoDle, helped at times like
the fire ( 72)
you have provided jobs, better living, for our
peoole ( 64)
You have been polite, honest, and merry ( 60)
You have 1 ived far from home and sacrificed for
the Vietnamese freedom ( 48)
You have civilized and "constructed" our country ( 35)
You have respected our elders and loved our
children ( 27)
You are rich but have good discipline in combat ( 18)
Your men have worked hard and been conscientious ( 13)
Your men have not distinguished the races ( 4)






What Are Some Deficiencies of the Marine?
Your men have bad manners, forget their promises
many times ( 46)
Your men mistreated the Vietnamese, not kind with
everyone ( 32
)
Your men have been hot tempered, selfish, kept
private grudges ( 21)
Your men have distinguished the races, social
classes, religions ( 16)
You have disobeyed the laws and morals of Vietnam ( 12)
You did not keep discipline and safety on the
streets ( 12)
You dismiss the workers without reason, listen to
the "flatterer" ( 10)
You indirectly increase our cost of living ( 9)
You harass, beat our people, rape our girls ( 7)
You do not learn the Vietnamese language ( 6)
The jobs are over the workers' capabilities ( 2)
You like the new and forget the old, you show off






Samplings of Narrative Responses to
"Asian" TAT Picture #7
(With Occasional Interviewers' Comments)
1. This picture was taken during an operation. These
are VC supplies. The man standing here is a Russian
and these men are VC.
2. The VC were on an operation to get people's rice.
This Russian leads the VC
.
3* These men think that they have to complete the
mission which the Russian assigned, that is, gathering
the farmers' rice. They do not want to meet government
or American soldiers, for then they fear for their lives.
^. They entered the village and took some rice, but
when they were returning to che mountains, they met
the government and American soldiers on an operation.
The VC were killed or captured. Only this Russian
escaped
.
1. These men are ARVN soldiers. They are going to visit
the people in the hamlet. The two men dressed in black
are civilians who live in this hamlet.
2. They have come to the hamlet to see what the people
need. They will help the people, and spy on the VC
movements
•
3. The people of the hamlet are the soldiers' allies.
They feel they have a duty to preserve security for the
people. Their wishes arei to obtain information from






^. They are held in high esteem by the people and are
given information that they desire. They will go and
capture the local VC
.
1« This man is an American. He has come out to visit
members of this CAC.
2, A member has been killed, so he has come to console
his men and to help keep up their morale.
3e The soldiers wish to take revenge for their friend
by ki] ling VC
.
^. They will strive to find the VC and kill them.
la Here is a scene of U. S. Marines and PFs . They are
learning to understand each other through a humorous
story.
2. The VC harass the people, preventing them from
working and getting food. The Allied Forces come to
help the Vietnamese. The Marines and PFs have set up
in an outpost to protect the people.
3. They plan to unite to destroy the Communists.
k. Th«y will destroy the Communists and re-establish
the security of the hamlet.
la Here are four Marines and two PF soldiers. They
are discussing operations against the VC to liberate
the people who are ill-treated by the VC
.
2. The VC have been harassing the people, forcing them
to pay taxes, torturing the people to follow them.
3. The friendly force must liberate the people, preserve
their security, and give them freedom and happiness.
They wish to destroy the local communists so that the
I




4. They will go on a sweep operation against the VC
.
The American Army will issue medicines to help the
people.
1. Here is a scene of VN and US soldiers who have
combined on an operation and have captured two VC . One
carries a Russian rifle, and the other does not carry
a weapon.
2. The ARVN and the US Marines coordinate on a sweep
against the VC.
3« They plan more operations to capture VC.
k. In the future, the VC must be defeated.. They must
lose and withdraw from VN or they will be killed.
1. Here are some VC who have just returned to the
friendly forces. The American is welcoming them.
2. They have submitted to the national political regime.
3. These men are happy that they have returned to the
nation. They hope the government will let them return
and live happily.
U-, The government permits them to return and helps them
with a job. They no longer listen to VC propaganda.
They have returned to their nation.
1. Here are some ARVN with two captured VC who have
been harassing the people.
2. These VC entered the village to oppress the people.
They were captured and will be sentenced by the ARVN.
3. The soldiers think they must destroy the communists.





b. The Army will destroy the communists and return
peace to the people. These two VC , because they have
repented, will receive clemency from the government*
1. These are two VC returning to the right way with
the National Government and the U. S. Forces.
2. They returned because they could not suffer the
oppression, the cruel policy, and the killing of people.
3. These two returnees want the government to help them
and their families toward safety and happiness. This
American and all the soldiers here plan to appeal to
other VC to return. They also think of ways to help
these two returnees.
k. Afterward, these two returnees' lives will be better,
and they will live as others do. And these American






1. These are U. S. Marines and PFs observing a hamlet.
2. They plan to develop the hamlet and help the people.
3. The Marines and the PFs do not want the VC to shoot
so they can come into the hamlet.
4. This hamlet will become better. Later, the Americans
will bring food for the people, and the PFs will help








1. This is a joyful conversation between VC and ARVN.
2. These two VC couldn't suffer the hardship in the
jungle, therefore they returned to the right way and
are treated kindly,,
3. These VC are very happy because now they will have
food to keep them alive and clothes to wear. The
soldiers are also very happy, and they want to appeal
to other VC to return,
^. Afterward, these VC will become ARVN soldiers. The
government will help them and give them the prospects
for a better life.
Questioner's impressiont
Answer shows t Sincerity
Cooperation
Thorough answers
1. These are soldiers talking with returnees.
2. These VC returned to the right way because they
realized the kindness and clemency of the Vietnamese
government. Furthermore, they see that it provides
a happy life for the people.
3. All of the soldiers want many VC to return, for this
makes the war smaller and smaller. These returnees
think so, and they want to gather with their families.
U, After more and more returnees come, the country
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1. This group is a combination of VC , American and
ARVN soldiers. They are discussing work for the near
future.
2. These VC have just returned, and they show the
residence of a group of VC.
3o All of them plan the attack. The VC wish to have
good luck.
^. Thanks to their cooperation, they defeat the Vc
,





1. This shows one Marine, two members of a Communist
cadre, and some ARVN soldiers.
2. They are guiding the VC in returning to the right
way.
3. Although returning to the right way, these VC don't
realize the policy of the National government.
4. The American and the soldiers try to help them
realize what is right and what is wrong. They want
these two VC to have the same aspirations as the rest
of the soldiers.
1. This American soldier and the Vietnamese soldiers
are talking together,, They are men who work on rural
construction.
2. The soldiers go on an operation from the hamlet.
They meet two cadres of rural construction men and





3. They think everyone should have to serve in the
regular national force.
4. They will continue to go on operations to locate
and capture VC. The rural construction men continue
to build hamlets for the people.
1. The U. S. Army soldiers have been fighting and have
beat the VC , capturing two VC and one rifle.
2. They captured two local VC and brought them to their
outposto
3. They are happy about capturing the VC and they wish
to capture more VC
•
4. These two VC will be POWs as soon as they have been
interrogated.
1. These two persons are returnees. This man is an
American, and these tnree are PF soldiers.
2. The two VC request to return because living with
the VC is very hard.
3. The VC request clemency from the government. The
PF soldiers want the returnees to show them where VC
shelters are, so they can plan a sweep operation.
4. The returnees inform the PF soldiers, and then the
PFs go on an operation to capture VC weapons.
1. This group consists of six persons. They are
soldiers, no, it is four soldiers and two VC. They
are whispering something very secretly.
2. These two are returnees. They are giving information
to the soldiers about VC shelters. Three of the soldiers





3. They wonder if the VC are telling the truth. The
VC want to be believed and not sentenced by the
government.
4, After interrogating these two VC , if they are
sincere, the government will help them and instruct
them as national soldiers to fight against the
Communists.
1. This man is an ARVN soldier, and these men are VC.
The ARVN soldier is appealing to these VC to return to
the national government.
2. These men realize their mistaken ways and present
unhappiness and they decide to return.
3. These five VC now want to return to the RVN
government.
^o This man is advising them in the way to return.
1. This man is an American and these are Vietnamese
soldiers. They are talking together.
2. The Americans have come to Vietnam to help the
Vietnamese people fight the Communists. They are living
together in the villages and hamlets with the PFs
.
3. They wish for an early peace so they can all go home
to their families.
4. Someday in the near future, there will be peace.
They will go home to be with their families and to work
making a living.






2, They have surrendered to the Americans, and the
Americans are shaking their hands to console them and
to welcome them,
3o The VC were confused, not knowing what was the
truth or the right way,
^•o The American knows he must help these men. The
returnees want to show the national troops the under-
ground hideouts and bases of the VC.
5* They will be treated favorably by the national







Interview with Viet Cong Ralliers
All of the following excerpts are taken verbatim
(ad passim) from Volumes 2 and 3 of Ithiel de Sola Pool's
study of the Chieu Hoi Program. Each is a reply given
by a Viet Cong rallier (Hoi Chanh) to a question posed
in an interview.
In leaflets you must not use caricatures
like the one on the safe-conduct pass.
It is much better to use photos, real
pictures. Above all, the Government has
a way of portraying the VC in an ugly
way, like apes, and that is not a very
good idea because it insults the VC's self-
esteem. It is much better to show actual
photographs of how the Government has
treated the ralliers.
• . • Some of the leaflets we saw in the
VC , for example, had a picture of a man
supposed to be a VC , who looked more like
an animal or an ape or something of that
sort which the men in the VC found to be
very insulting, lacking politeness, and
lacking consideration. When the VC see a
leaflet like that in which the VC have been
drawn in a very insulting way, they feel
that the Government is not very polite.
When leaflets are designed, people should
be very concerned to be sincere, and they
must not deform or exaggerate the truth.
Even though I went with the guerillas, I
still went to the pagoda and observed a







Q. Were you criticized for that?
At I was. They criticized me for being super-
stitious but I did not pay attention to it.
My mother was a devout Buddhist and I
observed vegetarian diet as she did,
A former Viet Minh VC is interesting in respect to the
usage of the word "religion":
A. I actually have no religion,
Q, But do you make any offerings to your
ancestors?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. In other words, Confucian?
A, Yes,
Said another in answer to the question!
Q. Did he ever practice any religion?
A, He worshipped his ancestors. No special
religious sect.
The VC who reply that they do "not practice any
religion" may include many who engage in what others
would call religious observances, A cadre was asked
about the religious practices of his superior in the
VC. He said:
He worshipped his ancestors and went to
the pagoda on big Buddhist festival days.






Some people, predominantly the many lower level
cadre, find themselves in the curious position of being
VC, anti-religious, and Confucian or Buddhist at the
same time. The Viet Cong plays on this ambiguity by
adopting certain ceremonials. One rallier proudly talked
about the time he was invited to join the Party: He
said:
• • . Then the day came when I had been
invited and I accepted to join the Party.
There were four people with an altar with
joss sticks and a Party flag. I took an
oath of allegiance to the Party in front
of the altar. I was to work, and, if
necessary, die for the Party.
A. I have known three Party secretaries and two
of them are Buddhists and the other is
non-religious.
Q. Did the two Buddhists practice at all?
A. T would like to use the right sense of the
word in Vietnamese, which refers to ancest-
ral worship ... we can say that they are
Confucianists, that they are worshipers of
ancestral lineage a kind of worship
heavily influenced by Confucianism.
The VC instruct their soldiers that they
come from the people and that without the
people they would be nothing. Without the
people the soldiers would die, therefore,
the soldiers must help the people who are
in fact their masters.
The VC win the heart of the people. They
have a heavy tax but they even make the




the VC are so good to them. The VC soldiers
will even help you to build your house.
They will even take out their handkerchief
to wipe the nose of a kid. The soldiers and
the cadres are good to the people. The
rural people respect them. The rural people
don't like the mustached people like the
Revolutionary Development Cadre who come in
here. They regard them as playboys. They
act silly. They order the people around.
They order the people to help them. The
people don't listen to them and don't like
them. The VC are not this way.
The VC treat the people very kindly, but only
for the sake of appearance. In reality the
VC exert very tight control over the people .
• . The VC first make good propaganda and
promise everything to the villagers, and then
once they have made the promises they resort
to coercion.
The VC said if I did not join them they
would take my mother to the jungle and re-
educate her until she persuaded me to join
the VC. In this circumstance, I had no
alternative but to accept and join the VC
as a guerrilla.
We didn't want to join the VC but they made
us do so because if we did not do so they
would make it difficult for our families.
I was away from my family for two months,
and within two months I tried to escape
twice.
But you know, at that time I didn't pay
much attention at all to what they said.
I was just angry with my parents. It all
started with my lack-adaisical attitude in
the rice field. My father slapped me one
day for not working hard enough, and I was
very sad so I went fishing. A man who I
knew was a VC propagandist came by and talked





In my village, a lot of the young lads
joined for fun They did not know what
the movement meant, but it was exciting.
At first, of course, I was young and
didn't know much about Communist doctrine
even though I joined the Party.
It was in 1950 when the war against the
French was going on. I had just finished
secondary school and soon afterward a
group of Viet Minh came into my area to
enroll young people in the cadet program.
After that, you could become an officer
candidate. At that time I was sixteen
years old and had the opinion that if you
were a soldier, you were very brave and
very adventurous. I wanted to play hero;
I did not join out of patriotism.
Most of the ones who volunteered were the
young lads who believed the propaganda,
a great deal of blood and guts, as they
said, intended to liberate all of South
Vietnam, just like the North.
I was excited and interested in the VC
propaganda ... I was so interested that
I waited until my brother was away (he
objected); then I asked my father if I
could go. I went to a village in the
countryside and while I was there, there
were VC meetings. I was able to listen to
the VC propaganda and after listening to
it, I decided to join.
My mother visited me and persuaded me
to rally, so I rallied out of my deep
love for her; but not on account of the
Government policy.
I recognize that in my past the Communists
had never given anything to my family





I found that my mother was not doing well
at all. She was not able to take care of
the ricefield; the house was partly-
destroyed j and we had more and more serious
financial difficulties. And we did not
know whether there will be peace next year
or not. If peace does come, and if I should
continue working for the VC , our situation
would be more critical. I decided to come
out and help my mother by working and sending
her money to hire farm labor.
Seeing this leaflet, I missed my wife and
children very much. I was so sad about
my situation that I made up my mind to rally.
When I was living with the VC I had to pay
them six thousand piastres taxes. Being a
poor carpenter leading a very hard life, I
couldn't afford such a payment. So I made
up my mind to move my house. Earlier, they
forced me to work for them for two weeks,
without my receiving any kind of recompense.
I hated the Communists because they took
advantage of people to serve the Party --
not to serve the people. They used people
as you might squeeze a lemon. When there
is no more juice to come out then the lemon
is thrown away. I saw old people get sick
and the VC would not give them medicine
saying that they are saving the medicine for
younger men. You sacrifice for the Party,
the Party doesn't sacrifice for the people.
The VC lied to me. They promised much but
delivered little. They did nothing which
they promised they'd do. They said the war
whould be over in 1965 and all Viet Nam
would be liberated. That was a lie. I got
very tired of the lies, and I rallied. The




I had been a first lietenant for a long
time and they had never given me a promotion.
I had been purged from the army and sent
to the countryside and when they needed some-
one to go to the South and get killed, they
sent for me.
I belonged to a higher class in the society,
but I fought to destroy myself. It made no
sense to me. The VC had divided my parents'
land in half. They took away the land.
Eventually, they wanted to take a half of what
was left. But I didn't like this and finally
they took away three-quarters of my parents
'
land . This was very bad on my brother and
sister. They couldn't raise enough money to
support them, so I began to see the handwriting
on the wall and moved my family to Saigon.
Life is, of course, hard in the VC but it is
hardest of all for the VC soldiers. On one
hand we have to suffer the most of anyone in
the VC but on the other hand we are expected
to establish an example to the other villagers
— like paying taxes early and taking part in
public works, etc. Our wives, of course,
realized that this is unjust, especially as it
goes on year after year and they complained to
us a great cVal. Secord, the bombardment is
terrifying. It is obvious at this point that
the GVN is stronger. Third, politics - (I
would say that we are really un-political
people). As ralliers it is thought that we
hate the VC or love the GVN, but we rally away
from something not so much towards something
else. Next, the Party members say, even to
someone who is well thought of, "When death
comes to him - it is the end." Men have suffered
a lot and given up a lot; but in the end they
will die, so they are discouraged and no they
rally.
It is necessary to show to these people that the
Government uses the former VC in a proper way




for the country. The cadres who rally to
the Government do not have the intention
of looking for their daily meal. All they
want is enough to keep them alive. They
sincerely and really have the idea of help-
ing the Government ... It is necessary to
show to them that the Government has a policy
of employing their talents. Up to now, the
Government has not had any policy like that.
This is why the Government has not been able
to exercise any influence on the cadres who
are still in the VC. This is why they have
not had success.
• • the Tet festival is a sacred occasion
in Viet Nam and also because the village
people insist that during this time everyone
should be able to enjoy the festival. The
VC cadres do not necessarily like to do this
but they must to please the people.
1 chose the day next to the celebration day,
when control is very lax and it was easy
to get away. But there were no supernatural
considerations except not on the 5th, the
14th, or the 23rd of any mont 1^ because those







Selections from Sampling of Critical Incidents *
In November 1967 t the Catholic priest at Cam Lo
dedicated his church, built with the help of American
materials and labor. He invited a number of American
military personnel and civilian officials to the
dedication. He did not, however, invite the district
chief, a Buddhist and ranking ARVN military officer in
the district. A few weeks later, the Third Marines
sponsored a childrens' party and appealed to the district
chief to provide liaison. The district chief very
pointedly did not invite any Catholic children to the
party.
A former U. S. Army adviser in Viet-Nam reports
an interesting illustration of cultural differences in
the attitude toward time. While visiting a construction
site, the adviser noticed that the young lieutenant on
the job had put up a bulletin board with a construction
schedule on it with dates, and so forth, exactly as he
had been taught in the United States engineering school.
He also observed that the lieutenant was mixing his
mortar in a batch-box by hand. The ensuing conversation
went something like thisi Adviser t "Why don't you use
your concrete mixer? You have in your battalion a small
16-S mixer." Ri "Oh, yes." Advisen "You know how
to use it?" Ri "Oh yes, I learned it at your school."
Reported by American Marine and Navy personnel
unless otherwise noted, and transmitted by U. S. Navy
Chaplains in response to previously-cited letter (CPGi
EJHilp over P1730/6?, 15 March 196?), and on file in






Adviser i "Well, if you know how to use it and you've
got one available, why don't you use it?" Ri "Well,
I'm a day ahead of schedule now, mixing by hand, so
why should I use the mixer?"*
In Hoa An during December of 196? I attempted to
distribute clothing and soap that had been sent to some
of our men by their families to give to the people. I
secured the assistance of a Chief, 3 Corpsmen, and a
vehicle driver. We were mobbed by the crowd and had
the whole load taken away from us by force. In trying
to equally distribute about a hundred bars of soap, I
was physically manhandled by the crowd and thought I
would be hurt. The Marine driver, a large and strong
young man, pulled them off of me, I attempted distri-
bution myself because the village ^hief too often sold
the material given to him for distribution. After this
hard lesson, I worked strictly through the Missionaries,
local Pastors, and orphanages to hand out whatever I
might have to give the Vietnamese,
When we began to bargain for the labor of the
Montagnards to work at our command post, we made a deal
with an elder concerning a certain number of people to
work. The day they arrived there were only a tenth of
the number we had bargained for. We learned later the
elder we had dealt with did not want to admit he could
not fill the contract because he only had a few in his
clan. He was the youngest elder in the refugee center,
therefore, he was unable to bargain with the senior
elders. This emphasized the point that negotiations
should always start with the most senior member of the
hamlet or village.







To the Vietnamese, a Dai Uy (Captain) has great
authority. For a Dai Uy to. participate in physical
labor is unthinkable to them. This ought not be
overlooked. On one occasion, while presenting bags
of cement to a local church in PHU HOA, west of Da
Nang, I carried a bag from the trailer to the church.
The following occurred i the local pastor protested,
grasped my hand, led me into his church, and in broken
English said, "Please, Captain Sir, in Vietnam 'Honcho*
never work. You Honcho!" Later, in conversation,
our ARVN liaison officer affirmed that to the local
Vietnamese, whose customs must at first be respected,
people of authority are not expected to engage in
physical labor.
-i
In late November 196?, my Civic Action interpreter,
a boy 1^ years of age, had one foot and part of his leg
blown off when he stepped on a land mine while climbing
through the wire at a junk yard next to our camp, Camp
Faulkner, south of Danang. The assistance that this boy
had given us, which was common knowledge, caused the
men to overlook the fact he was attempting to steal some
junk and instead of their attitudes being hardened they
became more sympathetic to the plight of the majority
of the Vietnamese people and especially that of the
children. More and more men took a personal interest in
Kim as they visited the hamlet and saw how he and the
others are forced to live. As a result, many of the
men began to write home for clothes, school supplies,
etc., not only for the children in our hamlets, but all
of the children we could reach. This incident led our
men to take a greater interest in the Nursery and
Orphanage. As a result of this interest, our men built
a structure for the Son Bien School which would provide
room for 500 more students; built a Little League base-
ball field, outfitted and completely equipped two teams
(this brought our men in close contact with the children
and their families)? and, as time went on our men gave
money to orphanage children to pay their high school
tuition, maintained all equipment at the nursery and
both orphanages, and did many other things for the





The impassive attitude or their failure to issue
warnings was most difficult to explain, I had occasion
to see this firsthand, when my clerk and I walked into
an ambush in a "pacified" area. Walking across rice
paddies to hill 22, a distance of 800 meters, to say
mass for another company, automatic weapons opened up
on us at the midway point, from Le Chau village,
seriously wounding my assistant L/Cpl Billy V,
Collicott (awarded the Bronze Star for this engagement).
Minutes before, we met two men who were running in our
direction; it was an easy matter to sound a warning
as they passed. Incidents like this happened to Marines
everyday. It is difficult for the Marine who voluntar-
ily jeopardizes his life for a worthy cause to accept
fear or reprisal as the only answer.
While staying at our detachment at Sa Dec, I
observed the following tragic scene i The base at Sa
Dec is next to a soccer field which was used by local
school boys. A wire fence separated the two areas.
Some of the men of the detachment were taking karate
lessons from a Korean instructor on the volleyball
court next to the fence. The class drew the attention
of the youngsters playing soccer and they came to watch,
The instructor showed his displeasure and tried to
motion the boys away without success . Then some members
of the class made threatening gestures (shaking fists)
at the children. In a rage one of the Americans in
the class took his M-16 and pointed it at the children
and this got the desired results. About fifty children
ran in panic. I'm sure this one thoughtless act was
talked about in the village and reached more ears than
the news of what our men were accomplishing at the
orphanage at Sa Dec.
My experiences were limited in time, but I saw
great changes in the attitudes of our men and of the
Vietnamese people in the areas where we worked. A
statement by a Vietnamese nurse to me, as I said,
"Goodbye", indicates our best way' of reaching the






sorry to see you go. You and the doctor (meaning
those who worked in the clinic - doctor, corpsmen,
dentist) love our people. You care . We can see it
in your faces and actions ." This could be said of
many of our men serving in Vietnam, and I quote it
only to show our best course of action. Let them
know that we do care.
Six nuns and a priest lived here and ran an
orphanage as well as the parish. A perceptive cool-
ness was noticeable at once. Matters came to a head
when our offer to assist the nuns with Medcap program
was callously brushed aside. My own conversation
with the Vietnamese priests in the past were seldom
satisfying (due to language barriers and at times even
Latin failed us) but this particular priest's attitude
was exceptionally non-committal. (I learned later
that he was seized during TET and held captive for two
months, returning to his Ville only three days before
we arrived.)
Despite our cool reception from the leaders of
the Ville, who we felt certainly should have been more
effusive in their appreciation of our visit, I offered
Mass in the Church for our men and the hordes of
children who in their simplicity or curiosity went
along with us.
I noticed among the shadows in the rear of the
Church two or three nuns attending the Service. After
Mass, one nun on the pretext of rearranging the altar
passed me a note. The note readi
"Dear Father,
We had to tell the people we do
not want you here, but we are
very glad you are here."
I smiled knowingly, and she responded with a nervous
grin, but quickly reached for the note explaining, "I





One incident with the local clergy may be of
some value, A Catholic Bishop was the recipient of
a $500 donation from the Marine Division Catholic
Chapel Fund, The Chaplain who made the presentation
was astounded by the nonchalance of the Bishop who
merely took the check, placed it on his desk, said
the two words "thank you" and proceeded to talk of
other things. The Biship seemed ungrateful, and that's
how we regarded him. We talked about it on the way
back to the office and concluded that it must be
unseemly for Vietnamese to make any big deal out of
such a donationj a Catholic bishop in this country
could well be influenced by the Buddhist thing about
it really is better to give than to receive. What we
thought ingratitude was more likely great courtesy.
The following incident is appropriate! Shortly
after occupying their company TAOR, having relieved
a company which had been there a month or so, "IT
Company, Seventh Marines, had a night patrol receive
sniper fire from the hamlet adjacent to the company
CP. The patrol returned fire with rifles and grenades,
but there were apparently no casualties on either
side. The following day the incident was discussed
with the hamlet chief, with the result that he let
his people know we would have to bring the supporting
tanks' guns to bear on their homes, if this happened
again. A fairly friendly relationship continued with
the hamlet, and as long as the CP position was
occupied by Marines, no further hostile fire came
from that hamlet. I'm sure our big guns were a factor,
but also the company commander's readiness to sit down
for some plain talk with the local leader generated
more than a little mtftraAl respect.
While with the 1st Medical Battalion, two Marines
told me similar experiences. I'll tell one of them.
This Marine was wounded during a fire-fight. While
lying wounded in the jungle, someone dragged him to a
safe, shaded place and gave him medical aid. This





and left, A short time later, the enemy corpsman
came back, checked the Marine and said before he
departed, "Why don't you Americans go home". This
Marine anticipated difficulty on returning to his
unit and having to hunt the enemy.
Upon one occasion it was necessary to relocate
a number of graves. The proper amount of money was
paid and some men brought into the camp to dig the
graves up. A monk, though he was not dressed like
one, performed a religious ritual while the grave-
diggers sat around and talked. When he was finished
they began to dig. Since there was not much left
except the shrouds of sand the digging was apparently
very dull work. The diggers would become quite
excited and animated whenever they found a sizeable
piece of bone or hair. There seemed to be no par-
ticular reverence or taboo associated with the way
they joked around and exhibited their finds. Perhaps
this reflects more on occupational attitude rather
than a lack of taboo consciousness.
The superior of the convent in which I was teach-
ing English cleared this point up for me. Upon my
detachment, the nuns gave me a luncheon at the convent.
The local pastor was there, and some other nuns who
could speak English. During the course of the meal
the superior indicated to the pastor that she had a
question for me and wanted to know if it was proper
to ask it. After he assured her it was alright the
pastor translated her questiont HWhy do the G. I.'s
always pay more attention to the children of the
hamlets and the towns than they do to the elderly and
officials?" A legitimate question, I thought to
myself, and I was in sympathy with her about the
problem she had here. The answer I gave her seemed
to relax her a bit, and I could see she was a little





One young man went to mast for throwing a pop
can at a Vietnamese on a motorcycle injuring him quite
seriously. When asked the reason for his actions, he
simply stated that he did not like the Vietnamese, he
didn't like the way they looked, the way they smelled,
their food and the way they talked j he took this
manner of expressing his attitude. Having him trans-
ferred to the hospital as a stretcher bearer, where he
worked with Vietnamese and Americans alike was bene-
ficial and resulted in a marked improvement in his
relationship with the Viets.
1
One yeoman managed to procure a few bags of cement
for a Viet sailor to enable him to construct a grave
marker for his father. They picked it up together and
jointly constructed the marker. Even though they could
not talk to each other they became great friends. The
next day the sailor brought a beautiful painting into
the office for the yeoman. A personal response on an
individual level is a most effective means of promoting
favorable attitudes.
An employee, a young girl, came by and they forced
her to dance to rock and roll music with several of
them. The poor thing was naturally quite terrified but
the troops thought it was a big joke. The girl went
home to her village and described these events and thus
all the work done with these villagers was destroyed by
a thoughtless act. As one battalion commander saidi
"The careless actions of a few men creates more V. C.
than my men can control."
One particular incident comes to mind of a
minister who came to visit me in Phu Bai. It became
his custom to make the rounds from Chaplain to
Chaplain gaining promises of help. One day he was
evidently in a hurry and didn't want to come to my
office but wanted to talk at our front gate. His





interpreter look up the Vietnamese word for
"obligation" • I explained I had no obligation to
meet his "requests" and that I didn't like this atti-
tude and we parted. When the air was cleared in a
few days, our relationship was on much firmer ground
and a great deal of mutual respect was evidenced.
When at all possible, I tried to provide the
Vietnamese a means of being of assistance to us.
This was so they would not feel indebted to us for
our aid. To the Oriental a debt owed a person is
taken seriously.
The most beneficial operation we had was when
our battalion agreed to help build a school for a
nearby village. It was agreed with us and the
village chief that the Marines would give all the
assistance needed but would work as the local villagers,
worked. They provided some materials and we provided
others. When they began work, we began. When they
stopped, we stopped. This project, with this type
attitude began and finished in this manner. The
Marines who worked on this project began to have the
opinion that the people of this particular village
wanted to do better and would do better if they had
half a chance. Needless to say, many such projects
did not begin nor end in this fashion. Many felt
that since the Marines would do it th n let them do
it. In such cases the Marines attitude would be
self-explanatory.
Even the children are not insensitive to choosing
sides. One Sunday morning while circut riding to our
battalion's outposts we came upon a mining incident.
A water-buffalo stumbled across an enemy mine in the
roadway. Both the animal and the 10 year old riding
him were killed instantly. The boy's best friend came
around the next day and pointed out several more mines
he had found. The lad started a one-boy crusade to
rid his area of all VC mines in honor of his friend.
The VC became his enemy because they killed his friend.





violated the honor of his immediate family, this same
lad could have conceivably planted hundreds of these
same explosives to strike down as many Marines as he
could.
Concerning face; there were two men, both captains
up in this province (this was back in December) and when
I came back after being away for a while at Christmas,
they both had been made majors. Of course, we were
very pleased — Major VNX and Major VNY. They had a big
party up there and the province chief was pleased as
punch with these two guys. All of a sudden it turned
out that the Captain VNY on the promotion list was
another Captain VNY in a different province. Now, this
guy had worn his major's insignia for a full two or
three weeks -- had a big party in celebration. You talk
about loss of face; you would have thought that if a man
had to take that off and put his captain's bars back on,
he probably would have gone out and blown his brains out,
but do you know he did it without a whimper. I sure
would have been insulted. But there was no visible
ripple. The next thing I know, he appeared at work one
day, he had his three pips for captain back on and was
back to work -- even a couple of people made a little
joke about it — you know, it's too bad. He kind of
laughed it off and went on. I was amazed. This to me
was one of the biggest examples of taking this face
thing much more seriously than it really warrants.
As a consequence of the evacuation of refugees
owing to the Cedar Falls Operation, we gave tin for
roofs to the hamlet chief of An Dien. We counted it
out and gave it to him — each family was authorized
33 pieces of tin and 10 bags of cement. We gave it
to him by the thousand sheets. One of the people came





for his tin, Mr. Dam called the chief in and asked
him about it. The man confessed it was true and he was
told that it must not happen again. He was made to
give the money back. Mr. Dam straightened the whole
thing out. In spite of this the hamlet chief stayed
on the job. Apparently he had been put in charge by
the district chief before the one that was there with
me. He was really no good. I know that he wasn't
popular with his people because his hamlet was the
poorest hamlet in the district. In order to improve
the standards of the hamlets, you've got to have the
hamlet chief working with you. This man just wouldn't
work with us and, as a consequence, I just said, "All
right. You can't remove this guy even though he's not
worth a damn, so let the people suffer." Maybe the
people will rise up against him and sell him out. I
talked with the district chief and the assistant
district chief hundreds of times. He was called in
and talked to, but nothing was done. That's one of
the things that I never did accomplish. I tried get-
ting him out so often, but because it's not a secured
area, his hamlet was not included in the hamlet-village
elections that were accomplished. So he remained there.
T was never able to find out why he wasn't replaced,
and I could never get a reason for it.
Basically, I think it was because the area wasn't
secure and they couldn't throw the thing open to
elections. It may well have been that they were afraid
that a VC would be elected. I don't really know. I
just knew that the man couldn't be touched. It was a
real strange thing. I think the solution would have
been to forcibly remove him.
i_
T spoke to one Vietnamese corporal (in Vietnamese)
one evening at a beer stand in a small district town —
Vietnamese Special Forces units were in the town. We
had gotten along in the conversation to the point where




r "Iback and forth. I had mentioned a lot of frustrations
I had about the Vietnamese .attitude towards the whole
situation. I came off rather bluntly with the question
to him of, "What if we all go home tomorrow? What if
all the American forces — the Free World military
forces — go home tomorrow?" Well, he really took this
as an offensive remark and responded in the sense that
he possibly even swore at me in Vietnamese — I don't
know. He said, "You can go home tomorrow." I asked
him, "What would you do?" He said, "I'd take my wife
and daughter and place them in a hamlet — probably a
VC hamlet — and I'd go to the field and I'd be the
guerrilla for ten or fifteen days. I won't accept
defeat, I won't accept what the Communists have to give
me." This was something coming from a man who was in
the lower ranks in the army, and it was, in a sense,
a shot in the arm. I think this was a truthful and
honest remark on his part — whether or not he would
ever do it when the force was against him is another
factor. But this was an attitude that I was impressed
by.
Another instance occurred when the regional direc-
tor came up to stay overnight in one of the RD hamlets.
We had dinner with some of the RD team leaders and
went into a talking session that lasted three or four
hours. It was certainly a staged affair — the dis-
trict chief had all his forces around that particular
hamlet that night and it was really the most secure
area in the province at that time. I had known those
cadre team leaders for eight or ten months and I knew
that they were very frank with the Americans — they
didn't hide any feelings or any impressions about the
Vietnamese government or their attitudes towards this
leader or that leader. The district chief purposely
left the room during some parts of the conversation
because he knew that the director just wanted to talk
to those four leaders. Two of them had been in the
army before and they were very frustrated with the
lack of support they were getting. They would talk
about the enemy — the Communists or the VC — in the
sense that they knew their enemy and didn't want






sophistication that impressed me — a sophistication
of understanding of the problem of development in the
middle of a war like that, of trying to empathize
with the peasants in that hamlet. These were young
guys who wanted to do nothing but go back to their
farms after it was over — they were real kids. They
knew the rural peasant and they were tough. I was
impressed by their sincerity and their honesty in
answering some questions that upset us. In some cases,
we gained a sense of pride in talking to those guys
because it waB an unadulterated conversation itself;
they spoke right off the hip and leveled in on a lot





Critical Incidents! Marine Attitude Survey
June, 1967
I was forced to live with six "Cheu Hoi" due to
lack of living space. These were six ex-VC. There
was also an ARVN staff sergeant, I was forced to
live with them against my original wishes and I ended
up. very interested in them. We conversed for many-
hours and I was amazed by their alert response and
eager attitude. I think I made my first real friends
with the Vietnamese people. And I think my attitude
and time with them helped upgrade their opinions of
Americans
•
We were sweeping a road and there was a Vietnamese
boy named, Charlie. He was a good friend of ours. The
VC had planted a mine and he was trying to tell us
where it was. One of the Marines wouldn't believe him.
In an effort to stop the trooper the Vietnamese boy
ran in front of him — both were killed.
Our whole squad was moving along Route 9» We had
been in-country just two days. We were out of water.
An ARVN soldier showed us a well. One of the Marines
said the water might be poisioned. Somehow the ARVN
understood so he drank the water first to show us it
was good. It was good.
During the monsoon while on an operation I walked
into this gook store with my trousers torn from my
crotch all the way to the bottom of my trousers. Papa-
san told me to take the trousers off and gave (under-
lined three times) me a new pair. Something the Corps
had not done in ten days of torn trousers. Papa-san






Some captains and lieutenants were eating at the
same table with some ARVN in our mess hall. They did
not know the ARVN were fluent in English. They heaped
insult upon insult about the people. The ARVNs quit
eating, gracefully rose and left.
A PFC misplaced his wallet. He saw the PFs stand-
ing near his bunker and accused them of stealing it
and beat them pretty bad. A CPL gave the wallet back
to the PFC.
There is a local woman who always comes around at
noon chow to fill her lunch pail out of the g.i. can
near the mess hall. The messman in charge of the wash-
ing line is supposed to keep her away. Instead of
trying to tell the woman "no" politely he simply turns
the hose on her every time she comes near. The woman
gets chased away but she keeps coming back. Several
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